Hyatt v. United States ( 2000 )


Menu:
  •                                                                           RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    4    Hyatt v. United States                       No. 98-4229                  Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
    ELECTRONIC CITATION: 
    2000 FED App. 0108P (6th Cir.)
    File Name: 00a0108p.06
    States v. Simmonds, 
    111 F.3d 737
    , 745 (10th Cir. 1997)
    (citing Forest v. United States Postal Serv., 
    97 F.3d 137
    , 139-
    40 (6th Cir. 1996)). Furthermore, “a statute does not operate
    ‘retrospectively’ merely because it is applied in a case arising   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    from conduct antedating the statute’s enactment or upsets                        FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    expectations based on prior law.” Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269                        _________________
    (citations omitted). Rather, we must determine whether the
    Act “attaches new legal consequences to events completed
    ;
    before its enactment.” Id. at 269-70. Although the events
    
    underlying Hyatt’s conviction antedate the Antiterrorism and        DAVID L. HYATT,
    
    Effective Death Penalty Act, the application of the Act’s                   Petitioner-Appellant,
    
    limitation period does not attach “new legal consequences to
    
    events completed before its enactment.” Id. The limitation                                               No. 98-4229
    v.
    
    period applies to Hyatt’s filing of a motion under Section
    >
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
    2255, which occurred after the enactment of the statute; as a
    Respondent-Appellee. 
    result, the application of the limitation period is prospective
    1
    and not retroactive. See id.
    We recognize that even though the limitation period is
    prospective in application, it cannot be applied so as to bar a          Appeal from the United States District Court
    motion before the movant has had a reasonable opportunity to              for the Northern District of Ohio at Akron.
    bring it. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 
    454 U.S. 516
    , 527 n.21           No. 98-01042—David D. Dowd, Jr., District Judge.
    (1982) (quoting Wilson v. Iseminger, 
    185 U.S. 55
    , 62-63
    (1902)). For this reason, applying the literal language of                       Submitted: October 26, 1999
    Section 2255 would be an unfair and severe instance of
    retroactivity. See 
    id.
     However, the one-year grace period                     Decided and Filed: March 27, 2000
    ensures that any prisoner whose conviction became final prior
    to April 24, 1996 would have had an adequate opportunity to         Before: MARTIN, Chief Judge; SUHRHEINRICH and
    file a motion under Section 2255. Therefore, we join the                         SILER, Circuit Judges.
    majority of other circuits and hold that prisoners whose
    convictions became final on or before April 24, 1996 had                             _________________
    until April 24, 1997 to file their Section 2255 motions.
    COUNSEL
    Consequently, because Hyatt filed his Section 2255 motion
    after April 24, 1997, we hold that the motion was time-barred      ON BRIEF: Samuel A. Yannucci, ASSISTANT UNITED
    and AFFIRM the decision of the district court.                     STATES ATTORNEY, Akron, Ohio, for Appellee. David L.
    Hyatt, Coleman, Florida, pro se.
    1
    2        Hyatt v. United States                         No. 98-4229        No. 98-4229                            Hyatt v. United States           3
    _________________                                 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act became
    effective on April 24, 1996. A majority of circuits have
    OPINION                                       interpreted the Act to provide a one-year grace period for
    _________________                                 prisoners whose convictions became final prior to the
    effective date of the Act. See Paige v. United States, 171
    BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Chief Judge. David L. Hyatt                        F.3d 559, 560 (8th Cir. 1999); Goodman v. United States, 151
    appeals the district court’s denial of his motion pursuant to 
    28 F.3d 1335
    , 1337 (11th Cir. 1998); Brown v. Angelone, 
    150 U.S.C. § 2255
     to set aside his conviction and vacate his                   F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 1998); Mickens v. United States, 148
    sentence. The district court held that his motion was untimely             F. 3d 145, 148 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Flores, 135
    under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of                 F.3d 1000, 1006 (5th Cir. 1998); Burns v. Morton, 
    134 F.3d 1996
    , Pub. L. No. 104-143, 
    110 Stat. 1214
     (Apr. 24, 1996),                 109, 112 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Simmonds, 111 F.3d
    which allows prisoners one year after their convictions                    737, 745 (10th Cir. 1997); Lindh v. Murphy, 
    96 F.3d 856
    , 866
    become final to file motions under Section 2255.                           (7th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 
    521 U.S. 320
     (1997).
    Under this interpretation, such prisoners had until April 24,
    On November 19, 1993, David L. Hyatt was convicted of                    1997 to file motions under Section 2255. Hyatt’s conviction
    possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute in violation           became final prior to the effective date of the Act. He filed
    of 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1), 846. He was sentenced to life in                his Section 2255 motion on May 4, 1998, well after the
    prison on January 26, 1994. We affirmed the judgment and                   expiration of the one-year grace period. As a result, the
    sentence on September 9, 1995. On May 4, 1998, Hyatt filed                 district court rightly concluded that his motion was time-
    a motion to set aside his conviction and vacate his sentence               barred.
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    . On September 25, the district court
    granted the United States’ motion to dismiss and issued a                     Hyatt argues that the retroactive application of the period of
    certificate of appealability on the sole issue of whether                  limitations violates his due process, ex post facto, and
    Hyatt’s Section 2255 motion was timely. In reviewing a                     Suspension Clause rights under the Constitution. These
    district court’s denial of a motion under Section 2255, we                 arguments are without merit. While statutory retroactivity has
    apply a clearly erroneous standard to its factual findings and             “long been disfavored,” Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511
    review its conclusions of law de novo. See Nagi v. United                  U.S. 244, 268 (1994), retroactivity concerns generally do not
    States, 
    90 F.3d 130
    , 134 (6th Cir. 1996).                                  bar the application of a changed limitation period to a suit that
    is filed after the amendment’s effective date. See United
    The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
    amended 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     by adding a time-limit provision
    for Section 2255 motions. As amended, Section 2255
    precludes a prisoner from filing Section 2255 motions more                          (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion
    than one year after the conviction becomes final.1 The                     created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of
    the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making
    a motion by such governmental action;
    (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized
    1                                                                      by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the
    Section 2255 now reads in pertinent part:                          Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
    review; or
    A one-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this             (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims
    section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of —              presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
    (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;   diligence.