Maiden v. N Amer Stainless , 183 F. App'x 485 ( 2005 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 05a1017n.06
Filed: December 29, 2005
No. 04-5443
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DANNY L. MAIDEN, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTH AMERICAN STAINLESS; STEVE ) EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
SHAVER, )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
)
Before: GILMAN and COOK, Circuit Judges; MILLS, District Judge.*
PER CURIAM. Danny Maiden appeals two district court orders denying his motion to
remand to state court and dismissing his complaint against his former employer North American
Stainless (“NAS”) and supervisor Steve Shaver. Finding no error in the district court’s fraudulent-
joinder conclusion and agreeing with the district court that Maiden failed to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, we affirm.
I
*
The Honorable Richard Mills, Senior United States District Judge for the Central District
of Illinois, sitting by designation.
No. 04-5443
Maiden v. North American Stainless, L.P. and Steve Shaver
NAS, through its agent Shaver, discharged Maiden, an at-will employee. Maiden filed a
complaint in state court alleging NAS and Shaver: 1) wrongfully discharged him in retaliation for
his cooperating in a stolen-property investigation; and 2) intentionally interfered with his
prospective employment relations after the discharge. NAS and Shaver removed the complaint to
federal district court on diversity-jurisdiction grounds, claiming that Maiden fraudulently joined
Shaver (a non-diverse party) to defeat federal jurisdiction. Maiden moved for remand to state court,
saying that at the time of removal, non-diverse defendant Shaver precluded federal jurisdiction. The
district court denied the motion, agreeing with NAS and Shaver that inasmuch as Maiden
fraudulently joined Shaver, jurisdiction in the district court was proper.
NAS and Shaver then moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court
dismissed both claims. This appeal followed.
II
We review de novo 12(b)(6) dismissals. Perry v. Am. Tobacco Co., 324 F.3d 845, 848 (6th
Cir. 2003). We view the complaint in the light most favorable to Maiden, accept his factual
allegations as true, and determine whether Maiden can prove any set of facts in support of his claims
that would entitle him to relief. Id.
As a preliminary matter, we assess the jurisdictional issue surrounding whether Maiden
fraudulently joined Shaver. In deciding whether Maiden fraudulently joined Shaver, we examine
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No. 04-5443
Maiden v. North American Stainless, L.P. and Steve Shaver
the complaint, as the district court did, to determine whether the complaint evidenced that Maiden
“had at least a colorable cause of action against [Shaver] in the . . . state courts.” Jerome-Duncan,
Inc. v. Auto-By-Tel, L.L.C., 176 F.3d 904, 907 (6th Cir. 1999); Salisbury v. Purdue Pharma, L.P.,
166 F. Supp. 2d 546, 549 (E.D. Ky. 2001).
In pleading both his wrongful-termination claim and his intentional-interference claim,
Maiden targeted NAS as “acting by and through [Shaver] . . . .” But Maiden’s complaint neither
sought any relief directly from Shaver nor alleged that Shaver himself acted unlawfully; the
complaint did not seek damages from Shaver individually. In the absence of a colorable cause of
action against Shaver, the district court properly determined Maiden fraudulently joined Shaver.
That being so, we find no error in the denial of Maiden’s motion to remand the case to state court.
III
We also reject Maiden’s argument that the district court erred in granting Defendants’ motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. First, as to the wrongful-discharge claim, Maiden’s at-will-
employee status allowed NAS to terminate him “for good cause, no cause, or for a cause that some
might view as morally indefensible,” unless “the discharge [was] contrary to a fundamental and
well-defined public policy as evidenced by existing law.” Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows,
666 S.W.2d 730, 733-34 (Ky. 1983) (concluding that K.R.S. § 342 sets forth “an important public
interest that injured employees shall receive, and employers shall be obligated to pay, for medical
expenses, rehabilitative services and a portion of lost wages,” and any “action on the part of an
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No. 04-5443
Maiden v. North American Stainless, L.P. and Steve Shaver
employer which prevents an employee from asserting his statutory right to medical treatment and
compensation violates that policy”). The district court found that Maiden failed to allege a public
policy violation to support the claim, and we agree.
In his complaint, Maiden pleaded that “the discharge . . . was substantially motivated by
retaliation . . . for Plaintiff having lawfully cooperated with the Sheriff in recovery of the stolen
property.” He further pleaded, “[T]he Plaintiff had solemn duties and rights to cooperate with the
enforcement of the criminal laws of this Commonwealth, and those rights are established and
protected by the constitutions, by specific statutes, and also by the well-established public policy
of . . . Kentucky, and these United States.” As the district court correctly found, however, Maiden
failed to identify any fundamental and well-defined public policy as evidenced by existing law
requiring that Kentuckians cooperate with law enforcement. Maiden’s brief fails to point to any
case establishing such a well-defined public policy; he cites only irrelevant criminal statutes and
Firestone Textile Co. Div., the key Kentucky case (also cited by the district court) that established
the public-policy exception to Kentucky’s at-will employment defense to wrongful discharge claims.
Regarding Maiden’s intentional-interference claim, the district court properly dismissed for
Maiden’s failure to allege a factual predicate to support that claim. Maiden does not challenge the
district court’s conclusion that his complaint lacked factual allegations. He contends rather that the
district court erred by refusing to consider his affidavit, wherein he set forth the factual
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No. 04-5443
Maiden v. North American Stainless, L.P. and Steve Shaver
circumstances of his claim. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, courts generally look to the allegations
in the complaint. Courts may consider matters outside the pleadings that “are presented to and not
excluded by the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P.12(c) (emphasis added). Courts are not, however, required
to do so. “[I]t is well-settled that it is within the district court’s discretion whether to accept extra-
pleading matter on a motion for judgment on the pleadings and treat it as one for summary judgment
or to reject it and maintain the character of the motion.” 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1371 (4th ed. 2005). Thus, the district court did not
err by refusing to consider the affidavit.
IV
Because Maiden can prove no set of facts in support of his claims entitling him to relief, we
affirm.
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