Gartha Conley v. National Mines Corporation , 595 F.3d 297 ( 2010 )


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    Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
    File Name: 10a0035p.06
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    _________________
    GARTHA C. CONLEY, widow of Dave Conley, X
    Petitioner, -
    -
    -
    -
    No. 09-3039
    v.
    ,
    >
    -
    -
    NATIONAL MINES CORPORATION; OLD
    -
    REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY; DIRECTOR,
    -
    OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
    PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF -
    -
    Respondents. -
    LABOR,
    -
    N
    On Petition for Review of an Order
    of the Benefits Review Board.
    No. 08-0355 BLA.
    Argued: January 12, 2010
    Decided and Filed: February 12, 2010
    Before: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge; SUTTON, Circuit Judge;
    *
    WISEMAN, District Judge.
    _________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: James D. Holliday, Hazard, Kentucky, for Petitioner. Laura Metcoff Klaus,
    GREENBERG TRAURIG, Washington, D.C., for Respondents. ON BRIEF: James
    D. Holliday, Hazard, Kentucky, for Petitioner. Laura Metcoff Klaus, Mark Elliott
    Solomons, GREENBERG TRAURIG, Washington, D.C., for Respondents.
    *
    The Honorable Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., Senior United States District Judge for the Middle
    District of Tennessee, sitting by designation.
    1
    No. 09-3039          Conley v. National Mines Corp., et al                               Page 2
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    WISEMAN, District Judge. Petitioner Gartha C. Conley seeks review of an
    order of the Benefits Review Board (“Review Board”) dated November 25, 2008, which
    reversed an Administrative Law Judge’s award of black lung benefits on a widow’s
    claim filed by Mrs. Conley under the Black Lung Benefits Act (“BLBA”), 30 U.S.C.
    §§ 901–945, after her husband Dave Conley died of metastatic lung cancer.
    Respondents are the National Mines Corporation (“NMC”), Old Republic Insurance
    Company, and Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States
    Department of Labor. The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether the Review
    Board erred in reversing the ALJ’s decision on the grounds that the decedent’s treating
    physician’s opinion was insufficient to carry the widow’s burden of proof, based on the
    standard previously articulated by this Court in Eastover Mining Co. v. Williams, 
    338 F.3d 501
    (6th Cir. 2003). For the reasons set forth herein, we AFFIRM.
    I.
    Dave Conley, a heavy smoker for decades,1 was diagnosed with lung cancer in
    1994, for which he underwent radiation and chemotherapy treatment. By the time it was
    discovered, however, the disease had already spread to his lymph nodes and was later
    found to have metastasized to his brain, pancreas and liver. He died on March 25, 1996.
    The “immediate cause” of his death, as noted on his death certificate, was
    “[c]ardiorespiratory failure due to consequence of pulmonary malignancy with
    metastasis.” (Appendix (“App.”) 69.) The death certificate, which was completed by
    his treating physician, Dr. Ira Potter, also identified the decedent’s “history of cigarette
    smoking [and] coal mining” as “[o]ther significant conditions [that] contributed to death
    but [did] not result[] in the underlying cause.” (Id.)
    1
    The evidence regarding exactly how long Mr. Conley smoked is conflicting, but he smoked
    heavily for a minimum of eighteen or twenty years and possibly as many as fifty years.
    No. 09-3039            Conley v. National Mines Corp., et al                                      Page 3
    Petitioner Gartha C. Conley filed for benefits in June 2005, nine years after her
    husband had died of lung cancer.2 After the Department of Labor (“DOL”) collected
    Mr. Conley’s work and medical records, the claim proceeded to the Office of
    Administrative Law Judges for a hearing, which was conducted on May 2, 2007.
    Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Larry S. Merck presided over the hearing and issued
    a decision and order awarding benefits on January 23, 2008. (App. 17–36.) The parties
    agreed that lung cancer was the principal cause of death and that the lung cancer was
    related to Conley’s history of smoking rather than to coal mining. It was also undisputed
    that Mr. Conley had clinical pneumoconiosis arising out of his coal mine employment.
    Consequently, the only issue, in theory, that required resolution by the ALJ was whether
    Mr. Conley’s clinical pneumoconiosis was a “substantially contributing cause or factor
    leading to” his death. 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c)(2). That was the question upon which
    NMC focused its arguments. The ALJ, in fact, credited the opinions of NMC’s experts
    who concluded that the decedent’s clinical pneumoconiosis did not cause or contribute
    to his death.
    However, the ALJ devoted a substantial portion of his analysis to the question
    of whether the record supported a conclusion that Mr. Conley had chronic obstructive
    pulmonary disease (“COPD”) that was caused at least in part by his exposure to coal
    dust and therefore qualified as legal pneumoconiosis, separate and apart from the
    undisputed diagnosis of clinical pneumoconiosis.                   Ultimately, the ALJ made an
    independent finding that Mr. Conley had “legal” pneumoconiosis as well as “clinical”
    pneumoconiosis, and that the legal pneumoconiosis was a contributing cause of death.3
    2
    The delay in filing is related to the fact that Mrs. Conley was receiving workers’ compensation
    benefits from the Commonwealth of Kentucky, which offset any benefits that might have been awarded
    under the BLBA. Conley was awarded total disability for black lung in his Kentucky state workers’
    compensation claim in 1989, and Mrs. Conley received those benefits through June 2006.
    3
    The term “pneumoconiosis” is defined by statute as a “chronic dust disease of the lung and its
    sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine employment.” 30
    U.S.C. § 902(b) (1994). The regulations clarify that this definition “includes both medical, or ‘clinical,’
    pneumoconiosis and statutory, or ‘legal,’ pneumoconiosis.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a). The regulations
    distinguish between clinical and legal pneumoconiosis as follows:
    (1) Clinical Pneumoconiosis. “Clinical pneumoconiosis” consists of those diseases
    recognized by the medical community as pneumoconioses, i.e., the conditions
    characterized by permanent deposition of substantial amounts of particulate matter in
    No. 09-3039           Conley v. National Mines Corp., et al                                         Page 4
    Pneumoconiosis, whether legal or clinical, is considered a “substantially
    contributing cause” of death if it “hastens death.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c)(5). Based on
    the opinion of Mr. Conley’s long-time treating physician, Dr. Potter, who was not a
    pulmonary specialist, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Conley’s death was “hastened” by
    legal pneumoconiosis (COPD) and awarded benefits based upon that conclusion.
    Specifically, Dr. Potter testified as follows:
    Q53 Okay. Do you believe that lung cancer would have killed Mr.
    Conley irrespective of his lung disease?
    A        Yes.
    Q54 Do you have an opinion as to whether having the degree of COPD
    that he had [previously described as moderate] substantially hastened his
    death?
    A      I, I am of the group that certainly believes that people with
    chronic lung disease have less respiratory reserve, less capacity to deal
    with these things, and that therefore it does make a difference.
    Q55 Could you explain to us from a physiological standpoint or an
    anatomical standpoint what damage COPD causes and why it would
    make a person less likely to survive?
    A       COPD destroys air cells. The, the condition leads to destruction
    of the alveolar sacs. And this decreases your respiratory reserve, your
    ability – we all have a respiratory reserve when we are walking around
    and we call upon it when we exert ourselves. I think that you lose a lot
    of that when you have COPD or interstitial fibrosis either one, and that
    is part of our physical resistance. In other words, the healthier we are,
    the better we’re able to deal with serious problems.
    Q56 Can you estimate – is there any way to tell how much longer Mr.
    Conley might have survived had he not had legal pneumoconiosis?
    the lungs and the fibrotic reaction of the lung tissue to that deposition caused by dust
    exposure in coal mine employment. . . .
    (2) Legal Pneumoconiosis. “Legal pneumoconiosis” includes any chronic lung disease
    or impairment and its sequelae arising out of coal mine employment. This definition
    includes, but is not limited to, any chronic restrictive or obstructive pulmonary disease
    arising out of coal mine employment.
    20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a).
    No. 09-3039            Conley v. National Mines Corp., et al                                 Page 5
    A        No.
    (App. 47–48.)4
    Because the ALJ found that Dr. Potter’s opinion was “based on objective medical
    evidence, as defined in § 718.201 to include medical testing and Claimant’s medical and
    work histories” (App. 26), and “supported by his treatment and hospitalization notes,
    medical reports, deposition, and Dr. Potter’s familiarity with [Mr. Conley’s] condition
    due to his special relationship with [him] as his treating physician for twenty-one years”
    (App. 29), the ALJ deemed Dr. Potter’s report to be “well-reasoned and well-
    documented.” (App. 26, 29.) On that basis, and in reliance upon his reading of
    § 718.104(d), the ALJ accorded Dr. Potter’s opinion “additional probative weight.”
    (App. 29.)
    The ALJ also considered the opinions of Dr. Bruce Broudy and Dr. A. Dahhan,
    both board-certified in internal and pulmonary medicine and B-readers. As indicated
    above, although he accepted those physicians’ opinions that clinical pneumoconiosis did
    not contribute to or hasten Conley’s death, he discounted their opinions that legal
    pneumoconiosis did not contribute to or hasten his death. In fact, both Dr. Broudy and
    Dr. Dahhan found that Conley had, at most, minor respiratory obstruction, and what little
    he had was wholly attributable to cigarette smoking rather than to coal mining. In other
    words, both physicians implicitly concluded that Conley did not have legal
    pneumoconiosis at all, and therefore did not address the issue of whether legal
    pneumoconiosis hastened his death. Dr. Dahhan did testify unequivocally, however, that
    Conley’s metastatic lung cancer was neither related to nor hastened by inhalation of coal
    dust and that his death from lung cancer would have occurred at the same time and in the
    same manner regardless of whether he had ever worked as a coal miner. In a second
    supplemental report dated March 20, 2007, Dr. Dahhan expressly disagreed with Dr.
    Potter’s conclusion that Mr. Conley’s weakened lung condition made him more
    susceptible to lung cancer, noting that Conley was not able to undergo a complete
    4
    Dr. Potter conceded that cigarettes rather than coal-dust exposure caused Mr. Conley’s lung
    cancer. (App. 54.)
    No. 09-3039        Conley v. National Mines Corp., et al                           Page 6
    surgical resection of his lung cancer because it had already metastasized to the hilar
    nodes. He also noted, based on the oncologist’s records, that Conley tolerated radiation
    therapy well and concluded that there was no evidence in the record suggesting that
    Conley would have done better in his fight against lung cancer if he had not also suffered
    from pneumoconiosis.
    The ALJ nonetheless concluded that Dr. Broudy and Dr. Dahhan failed to offer
    any explanation for disregarding Conley’s lengthy coal-mining career as a possible cause
    for his chronic respiratory ailments and instead attributing them solely to his smoking.
    Because he found these “conclusory” opinions regarding the diagnosis and etiology of
    the bronchitis not to be well reasoned or well documented, the ALJ accorded little
    probative weight to Dr. Broudy’s and Dr. Dahhan’s opinions in reaching a decision as
    to whether “legal” pneumoconiosis contributed to Mr. Conley’s death. (App. 33.)
    Instead, he accorded more weight to Dr. Potter’s report and concluded on the basis of
    that report that Mrs. Conley had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr.
    Conley’s legal pneumoconiosis (COPD and chronic bronchitis) caused or contributed
    to his death. He therefore awarded benefits under the BLBA. (App. 33–34.)
    NMC appealed that decision to the Review Board. The Review Board, applying
    Sixth Circuit law, held simply that the ALJ had erred in finding there was sufficient
    evidence in the record to establish that Conley’s death was hastened by pneumoconiosis
    in light of the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Eastover Mining Co. v. Williams, 
    338 F.3d 501
    (6th Cir. 2003). In that case, this Court held that “pneumoconiosis only ‘hastens’ a death
    if it does so through a specifically defined process that reduces the miner’s life by an
    estimable time.” 
    Id. at 518.
    II.
    A.
    The Sixth Circuit reviews the legal issues raised in this administrative appeal
    de novo but accords deference to relevant factual findings. Eastover 
    Mining, 338 F.3d at 508
    . The ALJ’s factual determinations must be upheld if they are supported by
    No. 09-3039        Conley v. National Mines Corp., et al                           Page 7
    substantial evidence in the administrative record, and the decision as a whole must be
    affirmed if the ALJ’s decision was rational, supported by substantial evidence in the
    record, and consistent with controlling law. Glen Coal Co. v. Seals, 
    147 F.3d 502
    , 510
    (6th Cir. 1998). “Where, however, an ALJ has improperly characterized the evidence
    or failed to [take] account of relevant record material, deference is inappropriate and
    remand is required.” Eastover 
    Mining, 338 F.3d at 508
    (citing Dir., OWCP v. Rowe, 
    710 F.2d 251
    , 255 (6th Cir. 1983)). Further, a failure by the ALJ to apply the correct legal
    standard presents a legal question over which the Review Board and this Court have
    plenary review. Arch of Ky., Inc. v. Dir., OWCP, 
    556 F.3d 472
    , 477 (6th Cir. 2009).
    Technically, of course, this Court is reviewing the Review Board’s decision
    reversing the ALJ, not the ALJ’s decision itself. The Court is not called upon to
    determine whether the Review Board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence,
    but whether the Review Board correctly concluded that the ALJ’s decision was not
    supported by sufficient evidence based upon the legal standards we have established.
    Thus, the standards of review for the Review Board and for the Sixth Circuit are the
    same. Eastover 
    Mining, 338 F.3d at 508
    n.9 (citations omitted).
    B.
    “The Black Lung Benefits Act creates an adversarial administrative procedure
    designed to require mining companies to pay those miners (or the survivors of those
    minors) who legitimately suffer from a class of various coal dust-related pulmonary
    injuries commonly categorized as pneumoconiosis.” Eastover 
    Mining, 338 F.3d at 508
    (6th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted). Under the BLBA and the implementing
    regulations, benefits are provided to the eligible survivors of a miner whose death was
    due to pneumoconiosis. In order to be eligible for survivor’s benefits, a petitioner bears
    the burden of proving, Eastover 
    Mining, 338 F.3d at 508
    , that the miner had
    pneumoconiosis that “arose out of coal mine employment,” and that his death was “due
    to pneumoconiosis.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(a). For claims arising after 1982, a coal
    miner’s death will be considered “due to” pneumoconiosis if either one of the following
    criteria is met:
    No. 09-3039            Conley v. National Mines Corp., et al                                       Page 8
    (1) Where competent medical evidence establishes that pneumoconiosis
    was the cause of the miner’s death, or
    (2) Where pneumoconiosis was a substantially contributing cause or
    factor leading to the miner’s death or where the death was caused by
    complications of pneumoconiosis. . . .5
    
    Id. § 718.205(c)(1)–(2).
    The regulations further provide that survivor’s benefits are not
    available where “the principal cause of death was a medical condition not related to
    pneumoconiosis, unless the evidence establishes that pneumoconiosis was a substantially
    contributing cause of death.” 
    Id. § 718.205(c)(4).
    “Pneumoconiosis is a ‘substantially
    contributing cause’ of a miner’s death if it hastens the miner’s death.”                                
    Id. § 718.205(c)(5).
    In the present case, the parties agree that metastatic lung cancer was the principal
    cause of Dave Conley’s death. The question before this Court is whether the Review
    Board applied the correct legal standard and appropriately reviewed the ALJ’s factual
    findings when it concluded, as a matter of law, that Dr. Potter’s opinion was insufficient
    to establish that pneumoconiosis “hastened” Mr. Conley’s death.6
    C.
    In Eastover Mining, the ALJ awarded benefits to a miner’s widow and the
    Benefits Review Board affirmed. The mining company appealed, and the Sixth Circuit
    reversed, holding, on the basis of a number of grounds, that the ALJ’s decision was not
    supported by substantial evidence. In that case, the direct cause of the miner’s death was
    either acute gastrointestinal bleeding or a pulmonary embolism. His treating physician
    submitted a report in which he concluded, “‘within a reasonable degree of medical
    probability,’ that pneumoconiosis ‘hastened [Decedent’s] death.’” Eastover 
    Mining, 338 F.3d at 505
    (quoting from the administrative record) (alteration in original). In support
    5
    A proven diagnosis of “complex pneumoconiosis” may also establish the requisite causation,
    20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c)(3), but it is undisputed here that Mr. Conley did not suffer from complex
    pneumoconiosis.
    6
    Although NMC contested on appeal to the Review Board the ALJ’s factual determination that
    Mr. Conley had legal as well as clinical pneumoconiosis, it has not raised that issue in the present appeal.
    No. 09-3039        Conley v. National Mines Corp., et al                             Page 9
    of that opinion the doctor hypothesized that, although the pulmonary embolism was the
    direct cause of death, “pneumoconiosis hastened his demise because the miner’s ‘lack
    of oxygen [and] his retained carbon dioxide all played an effect on all parts of his
    body.’” 
    Id. at 505
    n.6 (quoting from the administrative record).
    The Court found that one of the primary deficiencies in the ALJ’s decision was
    his reliance upon the treating physician’s opinion linking the miner’s death to his
    pneumoconiosis, as that opinion was entirely conclusory and based upon nothing but the
    physician’s own unsubstantiated belief:
    Put differently, Woolum [the treating physician] argued that because
    Decedent had pneumoconiosis, his body lacked oxygen and excessively
    retained carbon dioxide. This weakened the miner, “played an effect on
    all parts of his body,” and thereby hastened a death that would have
    occurred anyway from the pulmonary embolus. Even if this is an
    accurate medical conclusion, it is legally inadequate.
    Again, Petitioner must show that pneumoconiosis “hasten[ed] the miner’s
    death.” 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c)(5). One can always claim, as Woolum
    did, that if pneumoconiosis makes someone weaker, it makes them less
    resistant to some other trauma. If, for instance, a miner with
    pneumoconiosis gets hit by a train and bleeds to death, Woolum (or
    someone adopting his position) would argue that the pneumoconiosis
    “hastened” his death because he bled to death somewhat more quickly
    than someone without pneumoconiosis. This is absurd, of course, and
    presumably not what Congress meant by “hasten.” Under Woolum’s
    interpretation, pneumoconiosis would virtually always “hasten” death to
    at least some minimal degree. Legal pneumoconiosis only “hastens” a
    death if it does so through a specifically defined process that reduces the
    miner’s life by an estimable time. Woolum’s letter is conclusory and
    inadequate because Woolum just asserts that because (in Woolum’s
    opinion) the miner had pneumoconiosis, the disease must have hastened
    his death.
    Eastover 
    Mining, 338 F.3d at 517
    –18 (emphasis added).
    Unless the italicized portion of the quoted passage can be considered dictum, this
    panel is bound by it. The petitioner in this case does not seriously contend that it is
    dictum, and this panel agrees that it is not. Moreover, consistent with Eastover Mining,
    a conclusory, unsupported opinion such as the one offered by Dr. Potter in this case is
    No. 09-3039         Conley v. National Mines Corp., et al                           Page 10
    insufficient to support the determination that Mr. Conley’s legal pneumoconiosis
    hastened his death.
    There is some room for argument, we acknowledge, about what it means to
    hasten death “by an estimable time.” Does that mean that every medical opinion must
    quantify a precise number of days by which pneumoconiosis hastens death? Will an
    estimate of months suffice? Of years? Or will a range of any of the above do the trick?
    And what if for a medically legitimate reason an estimate cannot be made? We believe
    that, as is so frequently true when it comes to the application of a legal principal, context
    and common sense will govern the resolution of these questions. For instance, the
    “estimable time” language employed in Eastover Mining does not exist in a vacuum; it
    follows upon the heels of the requirement that legal pneumoconiosis be shown by
    medical opinion to hasten death “through a specifically defined process.” A conclusory
    medical opinion, in other words, will not suffice. Neither will an opinion, like Dr.
    Potter’s, that addresses the issue at such a high level of generality—“the healthier we
    are, the better we’re able to deal with serious problems”—that it amounts to nothing
    more than a conclusion. A medical opinion that pneumoconiosis expedited death
    through a “specifically defined process” must explain why that is so and generally
    should be able to explain how and to what extent—customarily through a range of
    time—that process hastened a specific patient’s death. In that regard, it bears emphasis
    that every death, like every person, is different. More precision may legitimately be
    expected when it comes to the relationship of legal pneumoconiosis to some primary
    illnesses than to others.
    In the end, however, we need not decide today whether a medical opinion may
    suffice under Eastover Mining without making some range-of-time estimate in
    describing the “specifically defined process” by which legal pneumoconiosis sped the
    demise of an individual already suffering from a deadly illness, because the issue is not
    presented. Here, Dr. Potter’s opinion fell well short of “specifically defin[ing]” the
    process by which pneumoconiosis hastened Dave Conley’s death. As stated in Eastover
    Mining, “[o]ne can always claim . . . that if pneumoconiosis makes someone weaker, it
    No. 09-3039            Conley v. National Mines Corp., et al                                       Page 11
    makes them less resistant to some other 
    trauma.” 338 F.3d at 517
    . Dr. Potter’s opinion,
    like that of the physician in Eastover Mining, even if medically true, is legally
    inadequate to support his conclusion that legal pneumoconiosis hastened Dave Conley’s
    death.7 The petitioner bore the burden of proof as to that issue, and her failure to present
    adequate evidence to support the ALJ’s ruling is fatal to her appeal.
    This Court therefore affirms the decision of the Benefits Review Board.
    7
    The Court notes that the case upon which the Petitioner relies, Brown v. Rock Creek Mining Co.,
    
    996 F.2d 812
    (6th Cir. 1993), even if still current, would not dictate a different conclusion. Brown was
    decided under the 1992 version of 20 C.F.R. § 718.205, which did not contain the “hastens death”
    language included in the current version. Instead, it provided that death would be considered “due to”
    pneumoconiosis if pneumoconiosis was a “substantially contributing cause” of death. 20 C.F.R.
    § 718.205(c)(2) and (4) (1992). The primary importance of Brown was that it embraced the “hastens
    death” standard that was subsequently incorporated into the language of 20 C.F.R. § 718.205. See 
    Brown, 996 F.2d at 816
    (“The statutory language, the administrative purpose in adopting the regulation, and the
    well-reasoned interpretations of our sister circuits . . . are persuasive that the appropriate standard to be
    adopted by this circuit is that [pneumoconiosis] will be found to be a ‘substantially contributing cause or
    factor’ of a miner’s death in a case in which it has actually hastened his death.”). Applying that standard,
    the Court in Brown reversed and remanded for payment of benefits based upon a finding that “the
    overwhelming evidence was that pneumoconiosis hastened the miner’s death” in that case. Id.