Venus Blackshear v. Interstate Brands Corporation , 495 F. App'x 613 ( 2012 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 12a0917n.06
FILED
No. 10-3696
Aug 20, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
VENUS BLACKSHEAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
INTERSTATE BRANDS CORPORATION, COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF OHIO
Defendant-Appellee.
/
Before: MARTIN, MOORE, and COOK, Circuit Judges.
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. After being fired, Venus Blackshear brought suit
against her employer, Interstate Brands Corporation, alleging discrimination and retaliation based
on sex and race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Ohio Revised Code
§ 4112; retaliation in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act; and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment for Interstate Brands on all claims.
Blackshear appeals the grant of summary judgment on all claims except her claim under the Family
and Medical Leave Act. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment.
I.
Venus Blackshear worked as a Sanitor at the Interstate Brands bakery in Columbus, Ohio,
from 2004 until her termination in March 2008. Beginning in June 2006, and continuing throughout
the rest of her employment, Blackshear complained of harassment and discriminatory treatment by
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her supervisor, Rebecca Keller. Blackshear, an African-American female, alleged that Keller made
sexual advances on Blackshear’s domestic partner, Deidre Manning, a Caucasian female who was
also employed by Interstate Brands and supervised by Keller. Manning allegedly rejected Keller’s
advances and told Keller that she was in a relationship with Blackshear. After discovering the
relationship between Blackshear and Manning, Keller allegedly began harassing Blackshear and
treating her unfairly. Blackshear responded by filing human resources complaints, union grievances,
and charges with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission and Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.
On January 24, 2008, Blackshear and Manning got into an altercation at the bakery while
both were working a night shift. Bruce Rainey, a supervisory employee but not the direct supervisor
of either Blackshear or Manning, witnessed the two women yelling and swearing at each other.
During an arbitration hearing, Rainey testified that Blackshear approached Manning during this
argument and told Manning, “I will knock you the fuck out.” Manning did not physically threaten
anyone during this argument. Rainey separated the two women, sent them both home after
ascertaining that their direct supervisor, Keller, was not present, and reported the incident in writing
and verbally to the human resources manager, Al Zarella. Zarella met with Manning, and Manning
stated that she did not remember whether Blackshear had threatened her. Zarella also met with
Blackshear, who denied threatening Manning and stated that Manning had been experiencing a
diabetic episode and that Blackshear’s conduct was an attempt to help calm Manning.
Interstate Brands has a Workplace Violence Policy, which provides in part:
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Violence, threats, harassment, intimidation, and other disruptive behavior in our
workplace will not be tolerated: that is, all reports of incidents will be taken seriously
and will be dealt with appropriately. Such behavior can include oral or written
statement[s], gestures, or expressions that communicate a direct or indirect threat of
physical harm. Individuals who commit such acts may be removed from the
premises and may be subject to disciplinary action, criminal penalties, or both . . . .
Any employee found in violation of this policy will be subject to immediate
termination of employment.
Relying on the statements made to him by Manning, Blackshear, Rainey, other witnesses, and union
representatives, Zarella concluded that Blackshear had violated Interstate Brands’s Workplace
Violence Policy by threatening Manning with physical harm. Zarella and Syd Wiley, the human
resources director, concluded that Blackshear’s conduct required discharge. Blackshear was
discharged on March 13. Manning was suspended for seven days due to her conduct.
After grieving her discharge, Blackshear filed suit in state court. Interstate Brands removed
to federal court. Following discovery, Interstate Brands moved for summary judgment. The district
court granted summary judgment on all claims. The court found that Blackshear’s sex
discrimination claim was not actionable because the alleged discrimination was based on “[m]ere
jealousy” and not gender. The district court also found that Blackshear’s race discrimination and
retaliation claims failed because Interstate Brands’s decision to terminate her employment was based
on a non-pretextual, non-discriminatory reason. The district court granted summary judgment on
her Family and Medical Leave Act claim after finding that she had presented no evidence of a causal
connection between her leave under the Act and her termination. Finally, the district court found that
Blackshear’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress failed because Interstate Brands’s
conduct did not constitute “extreme and outrageous conduct.” Blackshear appeals the district court’s
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findings on her claims of sex discrimination, race discrimination, retaliation, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
II.
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Regan v. Faurecia
Automotive Seating, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2012 WL 1623206, at *3 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Salling v.
Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 672 F.3d 442, 443 (6th Cir. 2012)). Summary judgment should be
granted where the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and
affidavits show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The moving party has the initial burden of
proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists.” Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269
F.3d 703, 710 (6th Cir. 2001). In deciding whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, we
must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.
III.
A. Sex Discrimination
Title VII states that it is an “unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
discriminate against any individual . . . because of [her] race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Ohio Revised Code applies the same standard in evaluating
employment discrimination claims. See Ohio Rev. Code § 4112; Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v.
David Richard Ingram, D.C., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 3d 89, 92-93, 630 N.E.2d 669, 672 (Ohio 1994); see
also Carter v. Univ. of Toledo, 349 F.3d 269, 272 (6th Cir. 2003) (“We shall consider [plaintiff’s]
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federal and state-law discrimination claims under the Title VII framework because Ohio’s
requirements are the same as under federal law.”).
Blackshear has not presented evidence of discriminatory action by her employer “because
of” her sex. She has presented evidence in support of an allegation that Keller treated her unfairly
due to Keller’s jealousy of Blackshear’s relationship with Manning, but has provided no evidence
of discriminatory treatment due to her gender. The district court correctly found that personal
animus, such as that allegedly exhibited by Keller, cannot be the basis of a discrimination claim
under federal or Ohio law. Barnett v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 153 F.3d 338, 343 (6th Cir. 1998)
(holding that “personal conflict does not equate with discriminatory animus”). We agree that
Blackshear has not presented evidence of an actionable claim of discrimination on the basis of sex.
B. Race Discrimination
Blackshear argues that her race discrimination claim should be evaluated under the mixed-
motive standard rather than the traditional single-motive standard described by McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 396 (6th
Cir. 2008) (“Discrimination claims brought pursuant to [Title VII] are traditionally categorized as
either single-motive claims, i.e., where an illegitimate reason motivated an employment decision,
or mixed-motive claims, i.e., where both legitimate and illegitimate reasons motivated the
employer’s decision.”). However, Blackshear presented her claim as a single-motive claim and only
raised the mixed-motive argument on appeal. Blackshear has waived this argument on appeal.
Pressman, 384 F.3d at 186; see also Thurman v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 90 F.3d 1160, 1172 (6th
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Cir. 1996) (“[I]ssues not squarely presented to the trial court are considered waived.”). We therefore
consider her claim under the traditional single-motive standard.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, “(1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case
of racial discrimination; (2) the employer must articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its actions; and (3) the plaintiff must prove that the stated reason was in fact pretextual.” Dunlap
v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 519 F.3d 626, 630 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Harrison v. Metro. Gov’t of
Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 80 F.3d 1107, 1115 (6th Cir. 1996)). To establish a prima facie claim
of discrimination by circumstantial evidence, “a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that he is a member
of a protected class; (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action; (3) that he was qualified for
the position; and (4) that a similarly-situated employee outside the protected class or classes was
treated more favorably than he.” Younis v. Pinnacle Airlines, Inc., 610 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 2010)
(citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
Even assuming that Blackshear has made a prima facie claim of discrimination, Interstate
Brands has presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her and Blackshear has
failed to demonstrate that this reason was pretextual. The employer meets its burden of
demonstrating a legitimate reason for termination by “explain[ing] what it has done or produc[ing]
evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.” Romans v. Mich. Dep’t of Human Servs., 668
F.3d 826, 839 (6th Cir. 2012) (alteration omitted). Interstate Brands presented evidence that it
terminated Blackshear because her conduct violated the Workplace Violence Policy; the Policy
dictates that any employee found to be in violation of the Policy will be terminated. Wiley, Interstate
Brands’s regional human resources director, testified that, in all cases where employees were found
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to be in violation of the Policy, the employees were discharged. With this explanation and evidence,
Interstate Brands has met its burden of presenting a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
discharging Blackshear. See, e.g., id.
“Under the law of our circuit, a plaintiff can show pretext in three interrelated ways: (1) that
the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate the
employer’s action, or (3) that they were insufficient to motivate the employer’s action.” Id. Where
a plaintiff attempts to show that the employer’s proffered reasons had no basis in fact, we examine
whether the employer had an honest belief in the proffered reasons. “If the employer had an honest
belief in the proffered basis for the adverse employment action, and that belief arose from reasonable
reliance on the particularized facts before the employer when it made the decision, the asserted
reason will not be deemed pretextual even if it was erroneous.” Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576
F.3d 576, 586 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Sybrandt v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 560 F.3d 553, 558-59
(6th Cir. 2009).
Blackshear has not demonstrated pretext. First, Interstate Brands’s reason for her discharge
was based on the fact, as recounted by witnesses and union representatives, that Blackshear had
engaged in disruptive behavior that violated the Policy. While Blackshear disputes that she made
a verbal threat of direct physical violence against Manning, Interstate Brands—relying on facts the
company gathered in its investigation—discharged Blackshear based on its honest belief that
Blackshear had made such threats. See Upshaw, 576 F.3d at 586-87 (finding that a later-discovered
mistake in the data upon which employer relied in taking an employment action did not demonstrate
pretext where employer honestly believed, based on facts before it at the time, that the data supported
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its action). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Blackshear’s account of the incident,
there is no genuine issue of material fact as to Interstate Brands’s honest belief that Blackshear made
“statement[s], gestures, or expressions that communicate[d] a direct or indirect threat of physical
harm” in violation of the company’s Policy. Second, Blackshear has not presented any evidence
demonstrating that her violation of the Policy did not actually motivate Interstate Brands’s decision
to discharge her. She concedes in her brief that her alleged violation of the Policy is at least one of
the reasons upon which Interstate Brands based its decision to terminate her. Lastly, Blackshear has
not demonstrated that her violation of the Policy was insufficient to motivate her termination. See,
e.g., Sybrandt, 560 F.3d at 560-61 (finding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that employer’s
reason for termination was insufficient where employer discharged plaintiff because she violated a
company policy). The Policy explicitly states that the company will “immediate[ly] terminat[e]” any
employee who makes threats of physical harm, and Wiley testified that Interstate Brands did indeed
terminate any employee found to be in violation of the Policy.
Blackshear has not provided sufficient evidence to prove pretext, even if we were to find that
she has established a prima facie case of race discrimination. We affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment for Interstate Brands on this claim.
C. Retaliation
Blackshear alleges that Interstate Brands fired her in retaliation for filing complaints of race
and sex discrimination. Blackshear’s retaliation claims fail for similar reasons as her other Title VII
and state-law discrimination claims. Title VII retaliatory discharge claims based on circumstantial
evidence follow the McDonnell Douglas framework, which requires the demonstration of a prima
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facie case, a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, and
pretext. Ladd v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 552 F.3d 495, 502 (6th Cir. 2009). This framework also
applies to retaliation claims under Ohio Revised Code § 4112. Greer-Burger v. Temesi, 879 N.E.2d
174, 180 (Ohio 2007). To make out a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, a plaintiff must show
that “(1) she engaged in Title-VII protected activity; (2) [her employer] knew that she engaged in the
protected activity; (3) [her employer] subsequently took an adverse employment action against [her];
and (4) the adverse employment action was causally related to the protected activity.” Ladd, 552
F.3d at 502. Even assuming that Blackshear has made out a prima facie case of retaliation, she again
has not shown that Interstate Brands’s non-discriminatory reason for firing her—her violation of the
Workplace Violence Policy—was pretextual.
D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Finally, Blackshear appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her state law
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress by Interstate Brands. Under Ohio law, such a
claim exists where “[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
serious emotional distress to another.” Anderson v. Eyman, 907 N.E.2d 730, 741 (Ohio Ct. App.
2009) (quoting Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am.,
6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 374, 453 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ohio 1983) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Welling v. Weinfeld, 113 Ohio St. 3d 464, 866
N.E.2d 1051 (Ohio 2007)). To state such a claim under Ohio law, the “plaintiff must allege that (1)
defendants intended to cause emotional distress, or knew or should have known that their actions
would result in plaintiff’s serious emotional distress, (2) defendants’ conduct was extreme and
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outrageous, (3) defendants’ actions proximately caused plaintiff’s emotional injury, and (4) plaintiff
suffered serious emotional anguish.” Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing
Hanly v. Riverside Methodist Hosps., 78 Ohio App. 3d 73, 82, 603 N.E.2d 1126, 1132 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1991)).
Blackshear argues that Interstate Brands’s conduct—including both its decision to terminate
her and Keller’s alleged continuous harassment of Blackshear—was extreme and outrageous. In
addition to the company’s decision to fire her in March 2008, Blackshear argues that Keller gave her
a larger workload than other employees, verbally harassed her, and unjustifiably reported her poor
conduct to management. In her deposition testimony, Blackshear explained that Keller had
attempted to make her life miserable by doing “[e]verything she could get away with, from my
worksheet to writing me up to trying to get me fired off the job, anything she could do to—to take
me to the edge, she—she did it.” Blackshear claims that she suffered migraine headaches and mental
anguish as a result of this conduct by Keller.
For an actor’s conduct to rise to an actionable level, it must be “so extreme and outrageous
as to go ‘beyond all possible bounds of decency’ and . . . be considered as ‘utterly intolerable in a
civilized community.’” Pyle v. Pyle, 11 Ohio App. 3d 31, 34, 463 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Ohio Ct. App.
1983) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. d (1965)). Viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to Blackshear, neither Interstate Brands’s decision to terminate Blackshear nor
Keller’s alleged conduct was “beyond all possible bounds of decency.” An employer’s decision to
discharge an employee because it believes the employee violated a workplace policy is not extreme
and outrageous. See Foster v. McDevitt, 31 Ohio App. 3d 237, 239, 511 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Ohio Ct.
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Ohio App. 1986) (finding that an employer is entitled to act upon its legal rights, including its right to
terminate an employee, regardless of whether it knew or intended that the act would add to
employee’s emotional distress). A decision to terminate an employee, regardless of whether the
decision was discriminatory, is not sufficient to sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Godfredson v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 173 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n employee’s
termination, even if based upon discrimination, does not rise to the level of ‘extreme and outrageous
conduct’ without proof of something more.”). Further, Keller’s alleged conduct—including her
reporting of Blackshear’s poor conduct to management, close inspection of Blackshear’s work, and
negative comments toward Blackshear—do not constitute behavior “beyond all possible bounds of
decency” that an average person would find to be outrageous. See Yeager, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 375, 453
N.E.2d at 671 (“[L]iability [for intentional infliction of emotional distress] clearly does not extend
to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). For these reasons, we agree with the district court that no
reasonable juror could find that Interstate Brands’s conduct constitutes the “extreme and outrageous”
behavior necessary to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress under Ohio law.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.