United States v. Manuel Verduzco ( 2014 )


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  •                   NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 14a0183n.06
    Case No. 13-1586
    FILED
    Mar 07, 2014
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                             )
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                         )
    )       ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
    v.                                                    )       STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
    )       THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
    MANUEL VERDUZCO,                                      )       MICHIGAN
    )
    Defendant-Appellant.                        )
    )
    )
    BEFORE: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge; SILER and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
    SILER, Circuit Judge. Defendant Manuel Verduzco appeals his sentence. Upon his plea
    of guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine, the district court
    sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment. The court denied Verduzco acceptance of
    responsibility credit and assessed him a three-level enhancement for his managerial role in the
    conspiracy. Verduzco appeals both of these decisions and also challenges the sentence as
    substantively unreasonable. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
    BACKGROUND
    I.      Underlying Conduct
    Verduzco approached his nephew, Edgar Torres De La Mora (“Edgar”), to set up a drug
    trafficking business in which Verduzco would acquire cocaine in California and he and Edgar
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    would deliver the drugs to Grand Rapids, Michigan. Edgar and his brother, Orlando Torres De
    La Mora (“Orlando”), arranged for others, including Ismael Olague-Vasquez (“Olague”) and
    Carlos Rodriguez-Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”), to drive cocaine from California to Michigan.
    In 2010, a vehicle driven by Olague and Orlando was stopped and searched, which
    ultimately led to the discovery of five one-kilogram packages of cocaine and a GPS unit. The
    GPS indicated a final destination of 622 Lynch Street, S.W., Grand Rapids, Michigan. Upon
    learning of Olague’s and Orlando’s arrest, Verduzco told the other co-conspirators to abandon
    the house at 622 Lynch Street and to discard their cell phones. He also rented two motel rooms,
    where Verduzco, Edgar, Rodriguez, and Israel Torres De La Mora (“Israel”) stayed for a few
    days. The group then moved to a new residence on Walsh Street in Grand Rapids. The remaining
    cocaine was given to Oscar Ibarra Mondragon (“Mondragon”) to sell. After Mondragon sold the
    cocaine, Verduzco agreed to drive Edgar in Verduzco’s Chevrolet to California with Rodriguez
    in a second vehicle to pay for the cocaine.
    Meanwhile, the Drug Enforcement Agency received information that Mondragon was a
    supplier of cocaine and marijuana in Grand Rapids. After Mondragon was arrested, he identified
    Edgar as a source for cocaine and reported that he had previously obtained cocaine from Edgar at
    622 Lynch Street, and later at 1028 Walsh Street, S.E., in Grand Rapids.
    Verduzco, Israel, and Orlando absconded to Mexico in late 2010. Verduzco later returned
    to the United States after unidentified gunmen killed his daughter and shot him in the wrist.
    Verduzco believes that his nephews, Israel and Orlando, tried to have him killed because they
    blamed Verduzco for Edgar’s arrest and conviction.
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    II.       Guilty Plea
    In 2010, Edgar, Israel, Rodriguez, and three others were indicted for conspiracy to
    distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and
    841(a)(1). Verduzco and Orlando were later added in a superseding indictment. In 2011, the
    government filed a second superseding indictment, which included proffer statements given by
    certain co-conspirators regarding the conspiracy and Verduzco’s involvement.
    In 2013, Verduzco pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess
    with intent to distribute cocaine. At his plea proceeding, Verduzco admitted that he was involved
    in the conspiracy from April to June of 2010. He confessed that he rented the two motel rooms,
    that he knew his nephews were engaged in bringing cocaine from another state into Michigan to
    sell, and that he rented the rooms in part to avoid their arrest for drug trafficking. He also
    admitted that he drove Edgar in his truck to California at some point during the conspiracy, but
    was not specific about the purpose or date. Verduzco further conceded that he introduced Edgar
    to Mondragon in exchange for $500; however, he claimed that he did not at first realize the
    introduction was related to drugs.
    III.      Sentencing
    At Verduzco’s sentencing, the district court heard objections to the scoring of his
    Guidelines range. First, Verduzco objected to the aggravating role enhancement under USSG
    § 3B1.1, arguing that his role did not fit the definition of a leader and that he should receive a
    two-level enhancement, despite agreeing that five or more people were involved in the
    conspiracy, removing it from consideration. The court compromised on the objection, stating:
    [W]e’re dealing here either with 3B1.1(a) or (b), and the real question is the status
    either as an organizer or simply a manager. It’s pretty clear he was at the very
    least a manager. Whether he was an organizer is a little less clear. And, again,
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    based on my general philosophy involving the rule of lenity, I would grant a one-
    offense level reduction there.
    Just to be clear then, the scoring for aggravating role will come under 3B1.1(b) at
    three-offense levels enhancement.
    Verduzco then objected to the obstruction of justice enhancement under § 3C1.1, arguing
    that he did not threaten Edgar, Olague, and Mondragon while they were incarcerated. The court
    overruled his objection, finding the co-conspirators’ affidavits to be “very credible” and
    supportive of the two-level enhancement.
    Finally, Verduzco objected to the district court’s denial of the acceptance of
    responsibility reduction under § 3E1.1. The court again overruled his objection, stating:
    When I prepare for sentencing I start at the beginning. . . . [W]hen I read the
    defendant’s plea agreement or the plea transcript in front of [the magistrate
    judge], I had serious questions at that point, before I had ever looked at the
    presentence report, that [Verduzco] truly was accepting responsibility for his role
    in this offense. He did everything possible to minimize his involvement.
    ***
    And then coming to the presentence report in which [the probation officer
    specialist], again, someone very experienced and with no axe to grind here, found
    Mr. Verduzco to be somewhat evasive, had significant lapses in memory on very
    important factors. It all suggests to me, convinces me, persuades me that there is
    not an acceptance of responsibility here.
    The district court calculated Verduzco’s Guidelines range to be 262 to 327 months’
    imprisonment. It then considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, determined that the Guidelines
    range approached a life sentence because of Verduzco’s age, varied downward seven years
    below the bottom of the Guidelines range, and sentenced Verduzco to 180 months’
    imprisonment.
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    DISCUSSION
    I.      Acceptance of Responsibility Reduction
    A. Standard of Review
    Because the district court “is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of
    responsibility . . . the determination of the [court] is entitled to great deference on review.”
    USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.5. Therefore, we review for clear error. United States v. Genschow, 
    645 F.3d 803
    , 813 (6th Cir. 2011). The court’s determination “will not be overturned unless it is
    without foundation.” United States v. Morrison, 
    983 F.2d 730
    , 732 (6th Cir. 1993).
    B. Analysis
    Verduzco argues that he should have received a two-point reduction for acceptance of
    responsibility because he pleaded guilty, confessed sufficient facts for the district court to accept
    his guilty plea, expressed regret, and admitted he knew what he did was wrong.
    Under the acceptance of responsibility reduction, a defendant’s offense level can be
    decreased by two levels if the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility.
    USSG § 3E1.1(a). The court should consider, inter alia, whether the defendant truthfully
    admitted to the conduct comprising his offense. 
    Id. at cmt.
    n.1(A). The Guidelines advise that:
    Entry of a plea of guilty prior to the commencement of trial combined with
    truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense of conviction, and
    truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant conduct . . . will
    constitute significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility . . . . However, this
    evidence may be outweighed by conduct of the defendant that is inconsistent with
    such acceptance of responsibility.
    
    Id. at cmt.
    n.3. The Guidelines further advise that:
    Conduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the
    Administration of Justice) ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted
    responsibility for his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary
    cases in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply.
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    Id. at cmt.
    n.4.
    Because the district court assessed the obstruction of justice enhancement under § 3C1.1,
    Verduzco could only receive acceptance of responsibility credit in an extraordinary case.
    Although he entered a guilty plea and admitted his conduct comprising the offense, he threatened
    Edgar, Olague, and Mondragon, which is inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. Further,
    Verduzco has not shown that his case is an extraordinary one in which both the obstruction of
    justice enhancement and the acceptance of responsibility credit should apply.
    The district court did not clearly err in determining that Verduzco did not accept
    responsibility and was thus not entitled to a two-level reduction because there was ample
    evidence in the transcript of the plea proceeding and in the presentence report to show that he
    had not accepted responsibility and had instead tried to minimize his role in the conspiracy.
    
    Genschow, 645 F.3d at 813
    . Therefore, we will defer to the district court’s conclusion that
    Verduzco did not accept responsibility. USSG § 3E1.1 cmt. n.5.
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    II.      Managerial Role Enhancement
    A. Standard of Review
    We review a district court’s findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Washington,
    
    715 F.3d 975
    , 982 (6th Cir. 2013). Usually, we review its legal conclusions de novo; however,
    we review the legal conclusion that a person is an organizer or leader for the aggravating role
    enhancement under a deferential standard of review. 
    Id. at 982-83.
    This review is deferential
    because an aggravating role enhancement “depends on a number of factual nuances that a district
    court is better positioned to evaluate” as the court “is most familiar with the facts and is best
    situated to determine whether someone is or is not a ‘leader’ of a conspiracy.” 
    Id. at 983.
    B. Analysis
    Verduzco argues that the district court did not make a sufficient factual determination
    that he should receive an enhancement for leadership of the conspiracy because the evidence
    does not show he exercised control over any person and because introducing Edgar to
    Mondragon only amounted to suggesting that the offense be committed.
    Under the aggravating role enhancement, a defendant’s offense level can be increased
    based on his role in the offense as follows:
    (a) If the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved
    five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels.
    (b) If the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader)
    and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise
    extensive, increase by 3 levels.
    (c) If the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any
    criminal activity other than described in (a) or (b), increase by 2 levels.
    USSG § 3B1.1.
    To qualify for an adjustment, a defendant must have been the organizer, leader, manager,
    or supervisor of one or more other participants, or people who are criminally responsible for the
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    offense. 
    Id. at cmt.
    n.1 & n.2. “In general, ‘a defendant must have exerted control over at least
    one individual within a criminal organization for the enhancement of § 3B1.1 to be warranted.’”
    United States v. Vandeberg, 
    201 F.3d 805
    , 811 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Gort-
    DiDonato, 
    109 F.3d 318
    , 321 (6th Cir. 1997)).
    Both Verduzco’s admitted conduct and the proffers of his co-conspirators provide ample
    evidence that he was at least a manager in the conspiracy. Olague said that Verduzco was the
    boss of Edgar, who was the boss of Olague, and that Verduzco arranged all of the jobs for the
    defendants. Edgar declared that Verduzco introduced him to the cocaine business and to
    Mondragon, helped him set up the business, and arranged for the purchase of all the cocaine that
    the co-conspirators trafficked. Verduzco admittedly arranged the hotel rooms following Olague’s
    and Orlando’s arrest, and Edgar and Rodriguez said Verduzco ordered the co-conspirators to
    abandon the Lynch Street residence and discard their cell phones. Verduzco also admitted to
    introducing Edgar to Mondragon. Therefore, the evidence shows that Verduzco exerted control
    over at least one co-conspirator and was at least a manager of one co-conspirator, whether
    directly like Edgar, or indirectly like Olague.
    Verduzco also exercised decision-making authority throughout the conspiracy, as evinced
    by Edgar’s statement about setting up the business, Olague’s statement that Verduzco arranged
    all of the jobs, Edgar’s and Rodriguez’s statements that Verduzco directed their activities after
    Olague and Orlando were arrested, and Mondragon’s assertion that Verduzco set the price of the
    cocaine and controlled the source of cocaine for Edgar. Therefore, the nature of Verduzco’s
    participation indicates that he was at least a manager in the conspiracy because he made many
    key decisions for the conspiracy and controlled the source of the cocaine supply.
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    The district court did not err in finding that Verduzco qualified for the three-level
    enhancement under § 3B1.1(b). 
    Washington, 715 F.3d at 983
    . Verduzco’s admitted conduct and
    his co-conspirators’ proffers provide ample evidence that he did not “merely suggest committing
    the offense,” USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4, but instead exercised a leadership role in the conspiracy.
    III.      Substantive Reasonableness of Sentence
    A. Standard of Review
    We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-
    discretion standard, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent
    of any variance from the Guidelines range.” United States v. Studabaker, 
    578 F.3d 423
    , 430 (6th
    Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007)). We apply a presumption of
    reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences. United States v. Vonner, 
    516 F.3d 382
    , 389 (6th
    Cir. 2008) (en banc). If a sentence is below the Guidelines range, the defendant’s burden to rebut
    the presumption is even higher. See United States v. Curry, 
    536 F.3d 571
    , 573 (6th Cir. 2008)
    (“[S]imple logic compels the conclusion that, if [a within-Guidelines sentence] would have been
    presumptively reasonable in length, [a] defendant’s task of persuading us that the more lenient
    [below-Guidelines sentence] is unreasonably long is even more demanding.”).
    B. Analysis
    Verduzco argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because Edgar, who is
    young and healthy and “a far worse actor in this drug conspiracy,” received a sentence five years
    shorter than Verduzco’s, and that this disparity erodes respect for the law.
    Section 3553(a)(6) requires the district court to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted
    sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of
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    similar conduct.” Despite Verduzco’s argument that the court should have considered the
    disparity between his and Edgar’s sentences,
    [s]ubsection 3553(a)(6) is concerned with national disparities among the many
    defendants with similar criminal backgrounds convicted of similar criminal
    conduct. It is not concerned with disparities between one individual’s sentence
    and another individual’s sentence, despite the fact that the two are co-defendants.
    Instead, § 3553(a)(6) is there to ensure nationally uniform sentences among like
    offenders so as to leave room to depart downward for those defendants who are
    truly deserving of leniency.
    United States v. Simmons, 
    501 F.3d 620
    , 623-24 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).
    Although a district court may determine a defendant’s sentence in light of a co-defendant’s
    sentence, such action “would be a discretionary one because the district court is not required to
    consider that type of disparity under § 3553(a)(6).” 
    Id. at 624.
    Verduzco has failed to make an argument regarding the disparity between his sentence
    and the sentence of defendants across the nation with similar criminal backgrounds convicted of
    similar conduct. Therefore, there is no evidence that Verduzco’s sentence is substantively
    unreasonable when compared with those of similarly situated defendants. Verduzco is not able to
    rebut the demanding presumption of reasonableness that accompanies his below-Guidelines
    sentence. 
    Curry, 536 F.3d at 573
    . The district court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced
    Verduzco to 180 months’ imprisonment, seven years below his Guidelines range. 
    Studabaker, 578 F.3d at 430
    .
    AFFIRMED.
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