United States v. Robert Smith ( 2019 )


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  •                        NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
    File Name: 19a0238n.06
    No. 18-5776
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    FILED
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                               )                      May 03, 2019
    )                  DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                              )
    )
    ON APPEAL FROM THE
    v.                                                      )
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT
    )
    COURT FOR THE WESTERN
    ROBERT SMITH,                                           )
    DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
    )
    Defendant-Appellant.                             )
    OPINION
    )
    BEFORE:        COLE, Chief Judge; STRANCH and READLER, Circuit Judges.
    JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Robert Smith pleaded guilty to being a felon in
    possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 98 months’
    imprisonment.    On appeal, he argues that the district court erred in applying a four-level
    enhancement to his Guidelines offense level for possessing a firearm “in connection with another
    felony offense.” USSG § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). He also argues that the written judgment impermissibly
    varies from the oral sentence because it does not include a provision that Smith’s federal sentence
    run concurrently to any forthcoming state sentence for related conduct. For the following reasons,
    we AFFIRM the application of a § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement but REMAND for the district
    court to amend the written judgment to conform to the oral sentence.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    On February 4, 2017, Memphis police officers responded to a domestic violence call.
    Smith’s girlfriend told the police that Smith had punched her in the face and strangled her,
    No. 18-5776, United States v. Smith
    temporarily stopping her from breathing, during an argument. Police officers arrested and
    searched Smith, finding eight individually wrapped bags of marijuana (weighing 8.4 grams in
    total) and a handgun with an obliterated serial number in his pocket. Because Smith had previously
    been convicted of a felony, he was subsequently charged in federal court with being a felon in
    possession of a firearm. He was also charged with aggravated assault—a felony—and other crimes
    in state court in connection with this incident.
    Smith subsequently pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At the
    sentencing hearing, the parties disputed whether a four-level enhancement under Guideline
    § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applied for using or possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony
    offense.” After hearing argument as well as testimony from one of the police officers involved in
    Smith’s arrest, the district court ruled that it did, citing two separate grounds.
    First, the district court concluded that this enhancement applied based on the crime of
    aggravated assault. Relying on the officer’s testimony and the presentence report, the court found
    that it was more likely than not that Smith had the gun in his pocket while he was strangling his
    girlfriend.1 In so doing, it rejected the defense’s argument that Smith may have retrieved the gun
    out of a back room after the physical altercation and before the police arrived. The court also
    found that possession of the gun “emboldened” Smith to commit this assault because “[h]e knew
    that if push comes to shove, he ha[d] the ultimate trump card.” The court thus found that Smith’s
    possession of the gun was “in connection” with the felony offense of aggravated assault.
    1
    Although Smith did not admit to committing aggravated assault, as this charge was still pending
    in state court, he did not dispute the facts stated in the presentence report. On appeal, he refers to
    the “alleged aggravated assault” but does not argue that the district court erred in finding by the
    preponderance of evidence that he committed this felony offense. Instead, he argues only that the
    government did not prove that he “possessed the firearm during the alleged aggravated assault.”
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    No. 18-5776, United States v. Smith
    Second, the district court determined that this enhancement applied based on the felony
    offense of possession with intent to distribute marijuana. It found that it was more likely than not
    that Smith had the intent to distribute the eight bags of marijuana he possessed because, despite
    weighing only a little over eight grams, these drugs “were packaged for resale.” The court did not
    explain, however, why Smith’s possession of the gun was “in connection” with this offense or
    make any factual findings relating to this nexus.
    At sentencing, the district court orally granted Smith credit against his sentence for the time
    he spent in pre-trial state custody and ran his federal sentence concurrently to “any sentence that
    may be forthcoming in state court” based on this incident. Yet the written judgment reflects only
    the former ruling, and not the latter.
    II.   ANALYSIS
    A.      § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) Enhancement
    This court “review[s] a district court’s calculation of the advisory sentencing Guidelines as
    part of our obligation to determine whether the district court imposed a sentence that is
    procedurally unreasonable. In doing so, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear
    error and its legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Angel, 
    576 F.3d 318
    , 320 (6th Cir. 2009)
    (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We also review deferentially “the district court’s
    determination that the § 2K2.1 enhancement applies in a particular fact situation.” United States
    v. Taylor, 
    648 F.3d 417
    , 431 (6th Cir. 2011). “A district court should apply the enhancement only
    if the government establish[es], by a preponderance of the evidence, a nexus between the firearm
    and an independent felony.” 
    Angel, 576 F.3d at 321
    (alteration in original) (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    The commentary to the Guidelines Manual states that § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applies “if the
    firearm . . . facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, another felony offense.” USSG § 2K2.1
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    No. 18-5776, United States v. Smith
    comment. (n. 14(A)). “[P]ossession of firearms that is merely coincidental to the underlying felony
    offense is insufficient to support the application of § 2K2.1.” 
    Angel, 576 F.3d at 321
    (alteration in
    original) (quoting United States v. Ennenga, 
    263 F.3d 499
    , 503 (6th Cir. 2001)). Nevertheless,
    this enhancement “applies if the firearm had some emboldening role in [a] defendant’s felonious
    conduct.” 
    Id. (alteration in
    original) (quoting 
    Ennenga, 263 F.3d at 503
    ).
    Here, the district court found that Smith possessed the gun at the time he was committing
    aggravated assault. The court also found that possessing the gun emboldened Smith to commit the
    assault. Although a different court may not have made the same factual findings, upon our review
    of the record we are not left with “the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
    committed.” United States v. Myers, 
    854 F.3d 341
    , 357 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v.
    Sosebee, 
    419 F.3d 451
    , 455 (6th Cir. 2005)). The court therefore did not clearly err.
    Under our caselaw and deferential standard of review, the district court’s factual findings
    with regard to the assault support the application of a § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement. See 
    Angel, 576 F.3d at 321
    –22. Accordingly, we need not reach the alternate ground for affirmance—that
    Smith possessed a gun in connection with the possession with intent to distribute marijuana.
    B.      Variance Between Oral Sentence and Written Judgment
    It is well established “that when an oral sentence conflicts with the written sentence, the
    oral sentence controls.” United States v. Schulz, 
    855 F.2d 1217
    , 1225 (6th Cir. 1988). “The reason
    for the primacy of the oral sentence lies in the fact that ‘[a] defendant is present only when being
    sentenced from the bench.’” United States v. Penson, 
    526 F.3d 331
    , 334 (6th Cir. 2008) (alteration
    in original) (quoting United States v. Villano, 
    816 F.2d 1448
    , 1452 (10th Cir. 1987) (en banc)).
    In this case, the written judgment conflicts with the oral sentence. The district court stated
    that Smith’s federal sentence would be run concurrently to “any sentence that may be forthcoming
    in state court” based on this incident. But the order of commitment makes no mention of this
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    No. 18-5776, United States v. Smith
    requirement. The Government nonetheless claims that there is no conflict between this document
    and the oral sentence, arguing that “Smith has not shown that he was actually subject to any other
    actual or potential state sentence for the conduct in question.” Smith has no burden to do so; it is
    sufficient that the presentence report indicates that state charges were pending. We therefore
    remand for the district court to issue an amended judgment that conforms to the oral sentence.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement but REMAND
    for the limited purpose of amending the written judgment to conform to the oral sentence.
    -5-