Dungan Heights v. Sweeney, C. ( 2019 )

J-S38032-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
DUNGAN HEIGHTS ASSOCIATES, LLP : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
COLLEEN SWEENEY AND THOMAS : No. 3232 EDA 2018
REMICK :
Appeal from the Order Entered September 27, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): 180502661
BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J., and COLINS*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED AUGUST 23, 2019
This matter is one of two related appeals filed by Dungan Heights
Associates, LLP (Plaintiff) from orders of the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County sustaining preliminary objections in actions that Plaintiff
filed against tenants in a shopping center that it owns and dismissing the
actions without leave to amend.1 Because the court erred in failing to grant
Plaintiff leave to amend its complaint, we vacate in part and remand.
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1 The other of these related appeals is Dungan Heights Associates, LLP v.
Fox Chase Senior Center, Inc., No. 3231 EDA 2018. While the defendants,
leases, and leased premises are different in the two appeals, the preliminary
objections and the courts’ orders and reasoning were the same in both cases
and the issues in the two appeals are identical.
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S38032-19
In February 2015, Plaintiff entered into a commercial lease with Colleen
Sweeney and Thomas Remick (Defendants) under which Defendants leased
Store Number 07 of Plaintiff’s 7770 Dungan Road, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
shopping center. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint ¶¶4-5 & Ex. 1.2 In 2017,
Plaintiff initiated a landlord-tenant action against Defendants in Philadelphia
County Municipal Court with respect to this lease. On April 24, 2018, Municipal
Court entered a judgment in favor of Defendants. On May 23, 2018, Plaintiff
filed a timely de novo appeal to the court of common pleas. See Phila. Co.
R.C.P. No. 1001(a)(1). In its complaint filed with the de novo appeal, Plaintiff
averred that Defendants had breached the lease by failing to pay rent and
other amounts due under the lease and sought damages and possession of
the leased premises. Defendants filed preliminary objections in the nature of
a motion for a more specific pleading asserting that Plaintiff’s averments
concerning both breach of the lease and damages were insufficiently specific.
Defendants’ Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff’s Complaint ¶¶11-14.
In response to these preliminary objections, Plaintiff filed a First
Amended Complaint pleading additional detail concerning the monthly rent
under the lease, the date that Defendants entered into possession of the
premises, and the total amounts of its damages claims. Plaintiff’s First
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2Because this is an appeal from an order sustaining preliminary objections,
we accept as true the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. Jones v. Board
of Directors of Valor Credit Union, 169 A.3d 632, 635 (Pa. Super. 2017).
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Amended Complaint ¶¶6, 7, 11. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, however,
like its original complaint, made no averments concerning the dates when
Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to pay rent and other amounts owed
under the lease. Defendants filed preliminary objections to the amended
complaint consisting of both a motion for a more specific pleading asserting
that Plaintiff’s averments concerning both breach of the lease and damages
were insufficiently specific and a motion to dismiss for failure to provide a
sufficient verification. Defendants’ Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint ¶¶14-24. Plaintiff in response filed a substitute
verification and an answer to the preliminary objections contending that the
averments of the First Amended Complaint were sufficiently specific.
On September 27, 2018, the court of common pleas sustained
Defendants’ preliminary objections and dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiff timely moved for reconsideration
and specifically requested in that motion that the court of common pleas grant
it leave to file a second amended complaint to cure the insufficient specificity
alleged by Defendants. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration ¶¶16-19. The
court denied the motion for reconsideration on October 23, 2018 and Plaintiff
timely filed the instant appeal from the September 27, 2018 dismissal order
on October 25, 2018. In its Pa.R.C.P. 1925(a) opinion, the court of common
pleas stated that it sustained Defendants’ preliminary objections on the
ground that Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint was insufficiently specific
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because it contained no averments as to when Defendants failed to pay rent
and make other required payments under the lease and no averments as to
the amounts of the payments that Defendants failed to make. Trial Court
Opinion at 4-5.
Plaintiff raises the following two issues in this appeal:
1. Did the Court of Common Pleas err when it sustained the
Preliminary Objections, because the First Amended Complaint
was sufficiently specific to allow Defendants to prepare a
defense?
2. Did the Court of Common Pleas err when it dismissed the First
Amended Complaint and failed to grant Plaintiff leave to amend
the pleading to cure the purported deficiency, contrary to its
duty to liberally allow amendment of the pleadings?
Appellant’s Brief at 2. We conclude that the court of common pleas did not
err in sustaining Defendants’ preliminary objections, but that it committed a
reversible abuse of discretion in dismissing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint
without granting Plaintiff leave to amend.
In reviewing an order dismissing a plaintiff’s complaint on preliminary
objections we apply the same standard as the court below. Discover Bank
v. Stucka, 33 A.3d 82, 86 (Pa. Super. 2011). The sole preliminary objection
on which the court of common pleas based its dismissal was Defendants’
objection pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(3) that the averments of Plaintiff’s
First Amended Complaint were insufficiently specific. To determine whether
the court properly sustained a preliminary objection under Rule 1028(a)(3),
this Court must examine the averments in the complaint, together with the
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documents and exhibits attached thereto, in order to evaluate the sufficiency
of the facts averred. Rambo v. Greene, 906 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. Super.
2006).
The test for whether a complaint is sufficiently specific is whether its
averments are sufficiently clear and set forth sufficient facts to enable the
defendant to prepare its defense. Commonwealth by Shapiro v. Golden
Gate National Senior Care LLC, 194 A.3d 1010, 1030 (Pa. 2018); Rambo,
906 A.2d at 1236; Unified Sportsmen of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania
Game Commission, 950 A.2d 1120, 1134 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). “A complaint
‘must apprise the defendant of the nature and extent of the plaintiff’s claim
so that the defendant has notice of what the plaintiff intends to prove at trial
and may prepare to meet such proof with his own evidence.’” Discover Bank,
33 A.3d at 86-87 (quoting Weiss v. Equibank, 460 A.2d 271 (Pa. Super.
1983)). A preliminary objection of insufficient specificity is properly sustained
where the failure of a complaint to aver when the defendant’s acts occurred
impairs the defendant’s ability to identify the conduct on which the plaintiff
bases its claims or the defendant’s ability to determine what defenses it has.
Pa.R.C.P. 1019(f) (“[a]verments of time, place and items of special damage
shall be specifically stated”); Stilp v. Commonwealth, 910 A.2d 775, 786-
87 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (en banc), aff'd, 974 A.2d 491 (Pa. 2009).
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint avers facts sufficient to state a cause
of action and advise Defendants of the general nature of the claim against
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them. Plaintiff pled the lease on which it bases its claims, attached a copy of
the lease, and averred that Defendants had failed to pay rent and other
amounts under the lease. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint ¶¶4-9, 14, 18
& Ex. 1. The First Amended Complaint, however, is devoid of any allegations
as to when Defendants failed to pay rent and other amounts due under the
lease and avers only total amounts owed in 2018, after the lease had been in
effect for a number of years. Id. ¶¶9, 11. Moreover, the First Amended
Complaint does not attach any statement of Defendants’ payments or plead
any other information from which the Defendants could ascertain what
payments Plaintiff alleges that they failed to make. Compare Discover
Bank, 33 A.3d at 87 (complaint was sufficiently specific where it attached
account summaries showing defendants’ payment history). Given the period
of years that the lease was in effect, the mere averments that Defendants at
unidentified times failed to make payments under the lease is insufficient to
give Defendants adequate notice of what Plaintiff alleges against them so as
to enable Defendants to prepare their defense. The court of common pleas
therefore properly sustained Defendants’ preliminary objections to Plaintiff’s
First Amended Complaint.
The court, however, erred in dismissing the action without granting
Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. While leave to amend a
complaint is a matter within a trial court’s discretion, it is a reversible abuse
of that discretion to dismiss a complaint on preliminary objections without
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leave to amend where there is a reasonable possibility that the plaintiff could
cure the defect in the complaint by amendment. Hill v. Ofalt, 85 A.3d 540,
557-58 (Pa. Super. 2014) (vacating dismissal of complaint for failure to grant
plaintiff leave to file amended complaint); Lovelace v. Pennsylvania
Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association, 874 A.2d 661, 666
(Pa. Super. 2005) (same); Hoza v. Hoza, 448 A.2d 100, 103-04 (Pa. Super.
1982) (same). Here, it was evident that the defect in the First Amended
Complaint, lack of specificity, was readily curable by an amendment adding
averments concerning the dates of Defendants’ failure to make payments in
accordance with the lease and the amounts that Defendants failed to pay at
those times. Indeed, Defendants conceded in their preliminary objections that
Plaintiff could easily make the necessary averments to make its complaint
sufficiently specific. Defendants’ Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint ¶17 (asserting that “Plaintiff would know this information, and
averring it would be relatively simple and expeditious”).
Defendants argue that the dismissal without leave to amend can be
affirmed because Plaintiff had already amended the complaint once in
response to their preliminary objections. This argument is without merit.
While a court need not grant endless opportunities for amendment where a
plaintiff has already filed multiple insufficient complaints and failed to cure
defects in its complaint following court orders sustaining preliminary
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objections and granting leave to amend,3 that is not the case here. The court’s
order dismissing the First Amended Complaint without leave to amend was
the first and only court order finding that Plaintiff’s pleading was insufficient.
The fact that Plaintiff did not correct a defect in response to Defendants’
preliminary objections before the court made a ruling does not show that
Plaintiff is unable or unwilling to sufficiently plead its claims against
Defendants or that amendment would be futile. Hoza, 448 A.2d at 103.
Defendants also argue that under Werner v. Zazyczny, 681 A.2d 1331(Pa. 1996), leave to amend was not required because Plaintiff did not request
leave to amend in its response to the preliminary objections to the First
Amended Complaint. This argument likewise fails. In Werner, our Supreme
Court held that the court was not required to sua sponte grant leave to amend
where the preliminary objections were granted on a legal issue that did not
appear curable by amendment and the party who brought the action “never
requested that the [c]ourt allow him leave to amend.” Id. at 1338. Neither
of those conditions is present here. The defect on which Defendants’
preliminary objections were based was a pleading issue that was patently
curable by amendment, not a legal defect. Moreover, Plaintiff made a clear
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3 See, e.g., Mace v. Senior Adult Activities Center of Montgomery
County, 423 A.2d 390, 390-91 (Pa. Super. 1980) (en banc) (court would not
be required to allow amendment where plaintiff had already filed five
complaints, at least one of which was filed after the court had ruled the prior
complaint insufficient).
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request that the court grant it leave to amend while the court had jurisdiction
of this matter and could have corrected its error and eliminated the need for
this appeal. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration ¶¶16-19 & Supporting
Memorandum of Law at 3-4. The fact that this request for leave to amend
was in a motion for reconsideration does not negate its sufficiency to make
clear to the court that Plaintiff sought to cure the defects in its pleading by
amendment. See Hill, 85 A.3d at 546-47, 557-58 (vacating dismissal without
leave to file amended complaint although request that the court grant leave
to amend was first made in motion for reconsideration).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court of common pleas’ order
insofar as it sustained Defendants’ preliminary objections, but vacate the
order insofar as it dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint without leave
to amend.
Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/23/2019
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