State of New Jersey v. C.W. , 449 N.J. Super. 231 ( 2017 )


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  •                        RECORD IMPOUNDED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
    APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
    SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
    APPELLATE DIVISION
    DOCKET NO. A-2415-16T7
    STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
    APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    March 21, 2017
    v.                                       APPELLATE DIVISION
    C.W.,1
    Defendant-Respondent.
    _____________________________
    Argued March 13, 2017 – Decided March 21, 2017
    Before Judges Sabatino, Nugent and Haas.
    On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
    Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. W-
    2017-000015-1516.
    Samuel   J.   Marzarella,   Chief   Appellate
    Attorney, argued the cause for appellant
    (Joseph    D.    Coronato,    Ocean    County
    Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Marzarella, of
    counsel;    John   C.   Tassini,    Assistant
    Prosecutor, on the briefs).
    Laura B. Lasota, Assistant Deputy Public
    Defender, argued the cause for respondent
    (Joseph   E.   Krakora,   Public   Defender,
    attorney; Ms. Lasota, of counsel and on the
    briefs).
    1
    We use initials to protect the identity and privacy of the
    alleged victim, a minor, who resides in close proximity to
    defendant.
    Alexander Shalom argued the cause for amicus
    curiae American Civil Liberties Union of New
    Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union of
    New Jersey, attorneys; Mr. Shalom, Edward L.
    Barocas and Jeanne LoCicero, on the brief).
    Claudia   Joy   Demitro,    Deputy   Attorney
    General, argued the cause for amicus curiae
    Office of Attorney General (Christopher S.
    Porrino, Attorney General, attorney; Ms.
    Demitro, of counsel and on the briefs).
    The opinion of the court was delivered by
    SABATINO, P.J.A.D.
    This appeal by the State from a denial of its motion for
    defendant      C.W.'s    pretrial   detention        presents      several      legal
    issues arising under the new Bail Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15
    to -26 ("the Act"), which became effective on January 1, 2017.
    The     novel    issues    posed    to    us    include:     (1)   the    proper
    standards    of    appellate   review     for      assessing   a   trial     court's
    decision to detain or release a defendant under the Act; (2) the
    analytic impact of a defendant's juvenile record, a facet that
    is not numerically reflected in a defendant's risk-assessment
    scores; (3) the significance to the detention analysis of a
    defendant's       tier   classification      under     Megan's     Law;    and     (4)
    whether a recommendation by the Judiciary's Pretrial Services
    Program   to    detain    a   defendant      creates,    under     the    recently-
    enacted     Rule    3:4A(b)(5),     a   rebuttable       presumption         against
    release that such a defendant must overcome.
    2                                    A-2415-16T7
    For the reasons amplified in this opinion, we construe the
    Act and the associated provisions within Rule 3:4A as follows.
    First, we adopt the agreed-upon position of the parties and
    the amici that the scope of appellate review of a detention
    decision    generally       should    focus    on   whether     the     trial     court
    abused its discretion, but de novo review applies with respect
    to alleged errors or misapplications of law within that court's
    analysis.
    Second, we conclude that a defendant's prior history of
    juvenile delinquency and probation violations is a permissible –
    and   at   times    especially       significant     –   consideration           in   the
    detention       analysis.        Such   consideration         of    a     defendant's
    juvenile record is authorized by the Act, as it is logically
    subsumed    within    the     factors    set    forth    in     N.J.S.A.      2A:162-
    20(c)(1).
    Third, in appropriate cases, a detention analysis under the
    Act should afford considerable weight to the tier classification
    of a defendant who has previously committed a sexual offense
    subject    to    Megan's    Law,     N.J.S.A.   2C:7-1     to      -23,    and    whose
    dangerousness and risk of re-offending have been evaluated on a
    Registrant Risk Assessment Scale ("RRAS").                    Such a Megan's Law
    tier classification falls within the broad terms of N.J.S.A.
    2A:162-20(c)(1).           The   Megan's      Law   tiering        is   particularly
    3                                   A-2415-16T7
    salient   where     a     defendant       has       been   classified     in   "Tier    3"
    corresponding to the highest risk of re-offense, and where the
    pending charges involve new sexual offenses.
    Fourth, we reject the argument that a Pretrial Services
    recommendation       to        detain    a      defendant     creates,     under     Rule
    3:4A(b)(5),    a    rebuttable          presumption        against   release     that    a
    defendant must overcome.              However, as the Rule expressly states,
    such a recommendation to detain may be, but is not required to
    be,   relied   upon       by    the     court       as   "prima   facie   evidence"     to
    support detention.
    Notably in this regard, the Acting Administrative Director
    of the Courts recently announced in a March 2, 2017 guidance
    memorandum2        that         the      standard          "two-part"      format       of
    recommendation, which had been used by the Pretrial Services
    Program for the most serious cases (and which was used in this
    case), is being discontinued.                That memorandum further clarified
    that the two-part format was not intended by the Judiciary to
    convey a recommendation that equally valued the options of (1)
    detention or (2) release upon stringent conditions.                            Instead,
    the two-part format was meant to convey that detention was the
    2
    See Acting Admin. Dir. of the Courts Memorandum, "Criminal
    Justice Reform – Amendment of the Decision Making Framework to
    Clearly Indicate No Release Recommended for the Highest Level of
    Risk Defendant" (March 2, 2017).
    4                               A-2415-16T7
    preferred option, but if the trial court rejected that primary
    recommendation,         then   stringent            conditions    of         release
    alternatively should be imposed.
    Lacking     the   guidance   of       the     Administrative     Director's
    recent clarifying memorandum, as well as subsequent published
    case law on legal issues arising under the new statute 3, the
    trial court rejected the State's motion to detain C.W.                      Instead,
    the court released him on specified conditions, which it made
    more stringent after learning of defendant's close proximity to
    the residence of the minor.
    The trial court found that the State had not met its burden
    for detention under the Act.         The court reached that conclusion
    in   spite   of    defendant's     troubling        prior   record     of    sexual
    wrongdoing as a juvenile, his two violations of probation that
    caused the Family Part to order him confined for three years in
    a    juvenile     detention    facility,          his   highest-level       Tier     3
    classification under Megan's Law, and his close proximity to the
    minor's residence.
    3
    See State v. Ingram, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. 2017)
    (generally allowing the State to establish probable cause at the
    detention hearing through a written proffer rather than through
    testimony); State v. Robinson, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div.
    2017)   (clarifying   the  State's   discovery  obligations   in
    connection with the detention proceeding), leave to appeal
    granted, ___ N.J. ___ (2017).
    5                                   A-2415-16T7
    The trial court appears to have afforded significance to
    defendant's low numerical risk-assessment scores on the failure-
    to-appear and new criminal activity indices.                           However, both of
    those scores do not take into account the fact that defendant
    has been confined in a juvenile facility for several years.                                 In
    addition,     the       trial        court's      decisions           do     not     explain
    specifically      why    it     rejected         the     portion      of     the   Pretrial
    Services     recommendation           of     detention,          despite       the      Act's
    requirement for such a written explanation.
    We further note that there are material informational gaps
    in   the    existing     record,       such       as     the    details       relating      to
    defendant's two violations of probation and also his Megan's Law
    classification.         These    gaps      impede        a     full    and     appropriate
    consideration of the issues in this case as well as our own
    appellate review.
    For these and other reasons explained in this opinion, we
    remand     this     matter      to     the       trial       court     for     expeditious
    reconsideration of its ruling.
    I.
    We derive the pertinent facts, in part, from the State's
    allegations, mindful that this case is only in the pretrial
    phase.     Fundamentally, the State contends that defendant C.W.,
    who is presently twenty years old, attempted on two different
    6                                       A-2415-16T7
    dates   in   2016   to   engage   in    sexual   activities   with    a   minor
    female.      The minor reportedly lives nearby defendant and his
    parents in Ocean County.4
    The Charged Offenses and the State's Investigation
    According to the State, in May 2016, defendant, who was
    then age nineteen, approached the minor, who was then eleven
    years old.5     He offered to give her a video game system if she
    allowed him to touch her and if she would touch his erect penis.
    The   girl   declined    defendant's        proposal.   She   ran    home   and
    reported the incident to her brother.
    Several months later in November 2016, defendant (who had
    turned twenty over the summer) contacted the minor through a
    social media message.       He asked her to send him photographs of
    her wearing a bikini.      She did not respond to him.
    On November 14, 2016, the minor and her mother reported the
    two incidents to the police.           Officers from the Special Victims'
    Unit of the Ocean County Prosecutor's Office interviewed the
    minor on December 1, 2016.         The police also took tape-recorded
    4
    The record supplied to us does not clearly substantiate whether
    the minor lives immediately next door to defendant, but it is
    uncontested that she resides approximately 100 feet from him.
    5
    The minor reported that defendant had approached her after she
    got off a school bus, whereas defendant stated to the police
    that he had approached her outside of his residence.     We need
    not resolve here this discrepancy about the exact location.
    7                             A-2415-16T7
    statements from the minor's mother and brother, both of whom
    provided information consistent with her reported allegations.
    Continuing with the investigation, detectives interviewed
    defendant at a local police station on January 19, 2017. 6                In a
    video-recorded statement, defendant admitted to the detectives
    that he had asked the minor for bikini photos.                     He further
    admitted that, on another occasion, after watching pornographic
    videos and obtaining an erection, he opened his front door, saw
    the minor, and asked her to touch his erect penis.
    The police arrested defendant after his interview.                   In a
    complaint-warrant,    the   State    charged    him    with   second-degree
    criminal   attempt   to   sexually   assault    a     child   of   less   than
    thirteen years of age, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:14-
    2(b), as well as third-degree endangering the welfare of a child
    by attempting to engage in sexual conduct to impair or debauch
    that child's morals, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a)(1).
    The Pretrial Services Risk Assessment and Recommendation
    Using defendant's fingerprints, the police carried out the
    Act's new automated pretrial risk-assessment process, pursuant
    to   N.J.S.A.   2A:162-25.       See     N.J.   Attorney       General      Law
    6
    Defendant does not allege in this interlocutory appeal that his
    admissions were coerced or that the police failed to warn him of
    his right to remain silent in compliance with Miranda v.
    Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    , 
    16 L. Ed. 2d 694
    (1966).
    8                                A-2415-16T7
    Enforcement Directive No. 2016-6 ("Directive No. 2016-6"), at
    15-16 (Oct. 11, 2016) (detailing the process).       The automated
    process gathers information about defendants from various law
    enforcement and Judiciary databases, including the State Police
    criminal   case   history   system,   the   PROMIS/GAVEL   criminal
    database, the MACS municipal court database, and other sources.
    The information derived from these sources is used to address
    the following nine risk factors:
    (1) defendant's age at current arrest;
    (2) current violent offense, or current
    violent offense by a defendant twenty years
    old or younger;
    (3) pending charge(s) at the time of arrest;
    (4) prior misdemeanor7 convictions;
    (5) prior felony convictions or any prior
    convictions (misdemeanor or felony);
    (6) prior violent convictions;
    (7) prior failures to appear in the past two
    years;
    (8) prior failures to appear older than two
    years; and
    7
    The risk assessment tool has been developed for the Judiciary
    by a private foundation. Variations of the tool have been used
    in other jurisdictions, some of which, unlike New Jersey, use
    the categorical terms "felony" and "misdemeanor." See Laura &
    John Arnold Foundation, PSA Risk Factors and Formula, 2 (2012)
    http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/PSA-Risk-
    Factors-and-Formula.pdf.
    9                         A-2415-16T7
    (9)     prior          sentences           leading       to
    incarceration.
    Notably,     the     automated     process      does     not     account    for     a
    defendant's juvenile history.             Hence, the numerical scores it
    generates    do    not   reflect     adjudications        of     delinquency      for
    serious    violent    crimes,     juvenile     violations      of   probation,    or
    failures of a juvenile to appear at proceedings.                    Directive No.
    
    2016-6, supra, at 29-30
    .8
    Using    an     algorithm,    the    automated      process     generates      a
    Public Safety Assessment ("PSA"), i.e., a risk profile designed
    to inform the trial court of the likelihood, on a scale of one
    to six, that defendant, if released before trial, would engage
    in a New Criminal Activity ("NCA") or Fail to Appear ("FTA") at
    future court events.       
    Id. at 27.
            The PSA has also been designed
    to include a "flag" if there is a statistical likelihood that
    the defendant would engage in a New Violent Criminal Activity
    ("NVCA").    
    Ibid. A defendant's NCA
    and FTA scores are then factored into the
    Judiciary's approved Decision-Making Framework ("DMF").                    The DMF
    8
    The automated process also does not account for:    (1) facts
    pertaining to the present offense indicating that a defendant is
    especially dangerous; (2) the strength of the State's case; (3)
    pending charges or convictions from another state; or (4) a
    defendant's involvement with a violent street gang or organized
    crime, drug dependence, or mental illness. See Directive No.
    
    2016-6, supra, at 28-29
    .
    10                                A-2415-16T7
    attempts     to     identify       the        recommended        level   and     type    of
    conditions    and       intervention      or        monitoring    services     needed    to
    manage the risks posed by defendant if he were released.9
    At the time of C.W.'s detention hearing, and prior to the
    Acting     Administrative          Director's          March     2,   2017     clarifying
    memorandum,       the    six    possible       DMF    recommendations         were:     (1)
    release on own recognizance ("ROR"); (2) release with pretrial
    monitoring level ("PML") 1; (3) PML 2; (4) PML 3; (5) PML 3 +
    EM/HD (Electronic Monitoring/Home Detention); or (6) Release Not
    Recommended.            The    "Release        Not    Recommended"       category       also
    contained the wording, "If Released, PML3 + EM/HD."10
    Here, the one-page Pretrial Services report reflected that
    defendant was twenty years old, and was charged with a violent
    offense.     It further indicated that he had no pending charge at
    the   time   of    his        arrest;    no    prior     indictable      or    disorderly
    persons adult convictions; no prior violent adult convictions;
    9
    Other considerations within the DMF include: (1) the presence
    or absence of an NVCA flag; (2) whether any of the current
    offenses were violent; (3) whether defendant was currently
    charged with escape, murder, sexual assault, robbery, or
    carjacking; and (4) whether the currently charged offenses
    exposed defendant to parole ineligibility under the No Early
    Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2 ("NERA").
    10
    According to the March 2, 2017 clarifying memorandum, the DMF
    and resulting Pretrial Services recommendation will now simply
    read "No release recommended" for the highest-risk defendants.
    "Amendment of the Decision Making 
    Framework", supra
    .
    11                                 A-2415-16T7
    no   prior   failure   to     appear   pretrial;    and   no       prior   sentence
    leading to incarceration.
    Based on this information, defendant was rated by Pretrial
    Services with a FTA score of one, (i.e., the lowest possible
    risk for failing to appear), and an NCA score of two, (i.e., the
    next    lowest     possible     risk   for    engaging        in     new   criminal
    activity).    Defendant was not "flagged" for new violent criminal
    activity.
    Notwithstanding      defendant's     low   FTA   and    NCA    scores,     the
    recommendation Pretrial Services presented to the trial court
    was "Release Not Recommended.           If Released, Weekly Reporting +
    HD/EM."      The   document    contained     no   elaboration        on    how   that
    recommendation was generated.11
    11
    Instructional slides created by the developers of the PSA
    tool, which have been supplied to us by amicus American Civil
    Liberties Union ("the ACLU") counsel without objection, indicate
    that the DMF process should determine whether a defendant's
    pending charges involve certain offenses "in which the majority
    of the time a recommendation of preventative detention would be
    appropriate regardless of the risk assessment results."     Those
    offenses    are   escape,   murder,   aggravated    manslaughter,
    manslaughter,   aggravated   sexual  assault,   sexual   assault,
    robbery, or carjacking.    The slides also call for a similar
    recommendation if the PSA resulted in an NVCA flag and one of
    the current offenses is violent.
    Defense counsel and the ACLU argue that these categories, which
    would include defendant because of the charge of attempted
    sexual assault, routinely produce an "automatic" and computer-
    generated Pretrial Services recommendation for detention. We do
    not have enough information in this record to evaluate whether
    (continued)
    12                                   A-2415-16T7
    As     the   Prosecutor   and    the   Attorney   General   stress,
    defendant has a significant prior juvenile record that was not
    taken into account numerically in his PSA.            Specifically, in
    August 2010, he was adjudicated delinquent for acts that if
    committed by an adult would constitute second-degree attempted
    sexual assault and third-degree endangering the welfare of a
    child, acts which he committed in July 2009.             Other charges
    were dismissed.     He was initially ordered to serve three years
    of probation, and directed to register as a sex offender under
    Megan's Law.     The record does not provide any further details
    concerning these prior offenses.
    Thereafter, defendant was charged with violating probation
    on two occasions, once in December 2012 and again in February
    2013.    The record on this appeal does not disclose the nature of
    those separate violations, which were concurrently adjudicated
    in the Family Part. However, they apparently were sufficiently
    serious to cause the court to sentence him in April 2013 to
    three years of confinement at the New Jersey Training School, an
    (continued)
    that characterization is correct, and neither the Prosecutor nor
    the Deputy Attorney General at oral argument knew if it were
    true.   In any event, that particular nuance of the DMF process
    need not be ascertained or evaluated in this opinion, although
    counsel are free to develop the record on the subject on remand
    if they so choose.
    13                          A-2415-16T7
    all-male juvenile detention center in Jamesburg.                 The exact date
    of his release is not documented in this record.
    Defendant's        history     also    reflected    that,   at    some    point
    after he was adjudicated delinquent, he underwent an evaluation
    for Megan's Law purposes because of the sexual nature of his
    juvenile offenses.        He was classified as a Tier 3 offender, the
    highest tier, corresponding to a "great risk of re-offending,"
    as opposed to a low or moderate risk (Tiers 1 and 2).                            See
    Attorney    General      Guidelines        for    Law   Enforcement      for    the
    Implementation     of     Sex       Offender     Registration    and    Community
    Notification Laws 17 (Feb. 2007).12
    The State's Motion for Pretrial Detention
    After defendant was arrested and charged with the present
    offenses concerning the minor, the State timely moved for his
    pretrial detention under the new law.                   The pretrial detention
    hearing    was   held    in   the    Criminal    Part   on   January    25,    2017.
    12
    Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 201, we take judicial notice that
    defendant, represented by an assistant public defender, appealed
    his tier classification in Docket No. A-4495-15. The appeal was
    opposed by an assistant prosecutor.       Neither the assistant
    public defender nor the assistant prosecutor are counsel
    involved in the present pretrial detention appeal. A different
    panel of this court issued an order on December 9, 2016,
    affirming in part the trial court's June 21, 2016 tier
    classification as to certain criteria, but remanding for the
    reconsideration of other criteria.   Given the sealed nature of
    that separate classification matter, we do not discuss here its
    substantive content.
    14                             A-2415-16T7
    Defendant     appeared         at    the    hearing         with    counsel,    and    two
    assistant prosecutors appeared for the State.13                           No witnesses
    testified.
    The Prosecutor asserted at the detention hearing that the
    State was seeking the detention of defendant because he had been
    charged     with     a     second-degree         offense       to    which     NERA     was
    applicable; was believed to be a Tier 3 Megan's Law registrant14
    who   had   violated       a   condition       of     his    release;   and    otherwise
    presented a danger to the community.                    The Prosecutor argued that
    probable     cause       had   been    established,          referencing       the    facts
    reported to the police as set forth in a supporting affidavit.
    The Prosecutor further emphasized that, during an interview with
    police,     defendant      had      admitted     to    soliciting       the    minor    for
    bikini photographs through social media and asking her to touch
    his erect penis.
    Defense counsel argued at the hearing that probable cause
    had not been demonstrated.                 He contended that a proffer by an
    affidavit was not sufficient and that the State had to present
    13
    For ease of discussion, we refer collectively to the                                two
    assistant prosecutors as "the Prosecutor."
    14
    Neither the Prosecutor nor defense counsel brought to the
    trial court's attention at the detention hearing that the Tier 3
    classification had been appealed and remanded.
    15                                   A-2415-16T7
    live    witnesses.15    He   also    contended   that        the    State   had
    improperly failed to provide the defense with all discovery in
    its possession, including the recorded statements made by the
    minor, witnesses, and defendant.16
    The trial court was persuaded that the State should have
    provided the defense with the requested discovery, and stated it
    was willing to grant an adjournment to allow for that turnover.
    However, defense counsel declined an adjournment, as he did not
    want to delay matters and have defendant remain in jail for that
    reason.     Accordingly, the court ruled that probable cause had
    been   preliminarily   established    for   purposes    of    the    detention
    hearing, but indicated it would consider defendant's assertions
    of alleged deficiencies in the State's presentation in its final
    decision.
    Following the court's probable cause ruling, the Prosecutor
    announced that the State was relying on defendant's PSA and
    criminal case history in support of its motion for detention.
    15
    This categorical legal argument was subsequently rejected in
    
    Ingram, supra
    , ___ N.J. Super. ___ (slip op. at 34).
    16
    The following month in 
    Robinson, supra
    , ___ N.J. Super. ___
    (slip op. at 27), we clarified the State's discovery obligations
    in relation to the detention hearing. The Supreme Court has
    granted the State's motion for leave to appeal in Robinson, and
    the case is awaiting argument before the Court.
    16                               A-2415-16T7
    She   urged    that    defendant     should     not     be   released      under   any
    circumstances.
    Although the Prosecutor recognized that defendant had low
    scores on the PSA, she asserted "this [was] one of the occasions
    where    the   PSA    simply   [did]     not    account      for   the   defendant's
    [offense] history and/or the serious nature of the crime."                         She
    noted that while defendant has not had the opportunity to amass
    an adult criminal record, he does have a significant juvenile
    record.       In fact, she asserted he committed as a youth sexual
    wrongdoing allegedly similar to the current charges. She also
    emphasized      defendant's        probationary        sentence,     his     previous
    designation as a Tier 3 Megan's Law offender, his subsequent
    violations of probation, and his ultimate commitment to three
    years    in    juvenile     detention.         Based    upon   his   history,      the
    Prosecutor maintained that there was a high risk that defendant
    would not comply with release conditions and would, once again,
    re-offend.
    Defense counsel responded that the PSA, on which defendant
    had     received     very    low    scores,     was     a    reliable      "sanitized
    assessment" of his actual history.               Counsel acknowledged, as an
    aside and without any further comment, that defendant did have
    "one juvenile conviction [sic]" that was not accounted for by
    the PSA scores.
    17                                  A-2415-16T7
    Defense counsel further argued that his client not only
    must    be     presumed    innocent,    but        also   should      be   given     the
    opportunity under the new Act to show the court that he could
    comply with release conditions while his charges were pending.
    Counsel maintained that defendant was not a flight risk because
    he had been residing with his parents "for many years now" in
    Ocean County, had a girlfriend who was three months pregnant,
    and was about to start a job at a local restaurant.
    With    respect    to   conditions        of    release,      defense   counsel
    asserted that defendant was willing to stay away from the minor,
    her residence, and school, and also would remain in contact with
    counsel and Pretrial Services.                   He represented that defendant
    was    presently    on    medication,       receiving     counseling,        and   being
    monitored by his parole officer.
    The Trial Court's Rulings
    After     considering      these          arguments     and     the     written
    materials, the trial court issued an oral ruling at the end of
    the    hearing,     denying    the   State's          motion   for    detention      and
    instead releasing defendant on several conditions.
    Among other things, the court observed in its oral decision
    that    defendant    has    "roots     in    the      community,"     "prospects      of
    employment," and "ties . . . to [the] area."                      The court further
    noted that defendant had "no failure to appear in the past two
    18                                 A-2415-16T7
    years," and "no prior sentence" for an adult crime.                          The court
    also   recognized       that   defendant      is    "presumed        innocent       until
    proven guilty," and that he had not been charged with murder or
    another offense that would make him presumptively inappropriate
    for release under the new statutory scheme.
    The trial court did briefly acknowledge that defendant had
    a   prior    juvenile      delinquency    adjudication         for    second-degree
    sexual assault, had been classified under a Tier 3 pursuant to
    Megan's Law, and had apparently "re-offended quickly after he
    was released."         Nevertheless, the court concluded that the State
    had not met its burden by clear and convincing evidence under
    the statute to show that no combination of conditions could
    reasonably       assure    defendant's     appearance     in     court        and     the
    protection and safety of the community before trial.
    The court denied the State's immediate motion for a stay
    for purposes of an emergent appeal.                   The court then agreed,
    without defense objection, to impose all of the conditions the
    Prosecutor       had    requested   if    release      were    granted.             These
    conditions required defendant to:                  (1) avoid all contact with
    the minor and her family; (2) appear for all scheduled court
    proceedings;      (3)     immediately    notify     Pretrial    Services        of   any
    change      of    address,     telephone      number,     or         other     contact
    information; (4) avoid the commission of any new offenses; (5)
    19                                   A-2415-16T7
    report    to    Pretrial         Services     telephonically     once    every    other
    week, and in person once every other week; (6) remain on home
    detention, with electronic monitoring; and (7) comply with his
    Megan's Law obligations.
    Defendant agreed to abide by these conditions, but inquired
    if he was still allowed to go to work.                         Without waiving its
    right    to    pursue      the    present     appeal,    the   Prosecutor      did   not
    object to defendant working, provided that he adhere to a strict
    schedule and return home after work immediately.                         It was also
    agreed that defendant had to stay at least 500 feet away from
    the minor's home.
    After       dismissing         the   parties,    the    court     reconvened     the
    proceeding later that same day, upon learning that the minor
    actually lived within 100 feet of defendant's home, and also
    that defendant would likely come into contact with minors if he
    were to work at the local restaurant.                       Given this additional
    information,         the   court     modified      its     original     ruling.       It
    determined that, because defendant and the child apparently were
    neighbors, he would have to remain inside his home at all times,
    except    to    go    to    work    or   to    appointments      with    the   advance
    permission of Pretrial Services.                    The court further directed
    that defendant would have to find employment                          at a different
    20                               A-2415-16T7
    location where he would not be likely to come into contact with
    minors.
    The court issued an order implementing those terms that
    same afternoon.       The order did not elaborate further on the
    court's reasons, but instead cross-referenced the bench ruling.
    Hours later, the State filed an application with this court for
    permission to file an emergent motion for leave to appeal.                     We
    denied the emergent motion, without prejudice to the State's
    right to file a motion for relief in the regular course.                     The
    Supreme Court likewise denied emergent relief.
    The State promptly moved for leave to appeal on January 31,
    2017.     The same day, we issued a sua sponte interim order,
    directing the trial court to furnish, as mandated by N.J.S.A.
    2A:162-23(a)(2),      a   written    statement    of   reasons   for   denying
    detention contrary to the Pretrial Services recommendation.
    The trial court submitted the written statement of reasons
    on February 2, 2017.         In that amplification, the trial court
    first   noted   the   parties'      discovery    dispute   and   the   alleged
    deficiencies in the State's probable cause presentation.                       It
    then summarized the parties' arguments in support of and against
    pretrial detention.         The court repeated its conclusion that,
    after considering all of the arguments and proofs, the State had
    not established its burden to justify detention by clear and
    21                              A-2415-16T7
    convincing evidence.             The statement of reasons did not refer to
    the Pretrial Services recommendation, but it did again reference
    defendant's low PSA scores.
    We then granted the State's motion for leave to appeal.
    Meanwhile, at our invitation, the Attorney General and the ACLU
    each   moved   for     and    were    granted    leave   to     appear   as    amicus
    curiae.
    On appeal, the Prosecutor and the Attorney General urge
    that    we   reverse       the    trial   court's      denial    of    the    State's
    detention motion.          They argue that the trial court abused its
    discretion by overlooking or under-valuing important aspects of
    this case, including, among other things, defendant's juvenile
    history as a sex offender, his violations of probation, his tier
    classification under Megan's Law, his very close proximity to
    the minor's residence, and the Pretrial Services recommendation
    to detain.
    Defendant     and     amicus   ACLU     argue   that   the     trial   court's
    decision was reasonable, supported by the record, and consistent
    with the terms and objectives of the new law, and should not be
    disturbed.
    II.
    Before delving into the legal issues raised by this appeal,
    we begin with a brief overview of the key elements of the Act
    22                                  A-2415-16T7
    and the associated Rule 3:4A, the latter which was approved in
    August 2016 and became effective with the new statute on January
    1, 2017.
    The Act signals a momentous change in our State's criminal
    justice    system.       As   our    colleagues    extensively     detailed       in
    
    Robinson, supra
    , ___ N.J. Super. ___ (slip op. at 8-10), the Act
    is the result of a constitutional mandate by New Jersey voters
    to    replace   the     former   bail-dependent        system   with   a    system
    providing    defendants       with   "a   right   to   pretrial   release,       but
    authorizing       pretrial       detention        under     certain        limited
    circumstances."         See N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 11.             The Act also
    imposes certain speedy trial requirements.                See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-
    22.
    "As codified by the Bail Reform Act, the new system favors
    pretrial release and monitoring as the presumptive approach and
    limits preventive detention to defendants who actually warrant
    it."    
    Robinson, supra
    , ___ N.J. Super. ___ (slip op. at 8).                    "By
    permitting judges to keep high-risk defendants detained without
    bail, and to release with or without conditions those defendants
    who pose little risk of flight or of committing another offense,
    these constitutional and legislative changes represent a major
    reform to criminal justice that will promote public safety and
    fairness."      
    Ibid. 23 A-2415-16T7 Nonetheless,
        the    trial      court   remains    authorized,        upon
    motion   of    a   prosecutor,       to   order   pretrial      detention       of   a
    particular     defendant      when   it   finds   by   "clear    and    convincing
    evidence, that no condition or combination of conditions can
    reasonably assure the effectuation of these goals."                       N.J.S.A.
    2A:162-15;     accord   N.J.S.A.       2A:162-18(a)(1);      N.J.S.A.      2A:162-
    19(e)(3).
    The State may file an application for pretrial detention
    when a defendant is charged with, among other things:                     (1) any
    crime of the first or second degree enumerated under NERA17; or
    (2) any crime enumerated under N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(b)(2) (Megan's
    Law) or the crime of endangering the welfare of a child under
    N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4.       See N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(a)(1) and (4).                Under
    this    same   statutory      section,     the    State   may    also    move    for
    pretrial detention when a defendant is charged with any other
    crime for which the prosecutor believes there is a serious risk
    that the goals set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 cannot be met.
    N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(a)(7).
    At the detention hearing required by N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(c),
    if the defendant has not yet been indicted, "the prosecutor
    shall    [first]    establish        probable     cause   that    the     eligible
    17
    It is undisputed that defendant, who is charged with a second-
    degree offense, meets this predicate requirement.
    24                              A-2415-16T7
    defendant committed the predicate offense."                   N.J.S.A. 2A:162-
    19(e)(2).      Probable       cause   consists      of    a   "well   grounded"
    suspicion    that    an     offense   has    been   committed.        State      v.
    Sullivan, 
    169 N.J. 204
    , 211 (2001).            See also 
    Ingram, supra
    , ___
    N.J. Super. ____ (slip op. at 8-9).
    Except for when an eligible defendant is charged with a
    crime set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b), i.e., murder or any
    crime for which the defendant would be subject to an ordinary or
    extended    term    of    life   imprisonment,      the   statute     imposes     a
    rebuttable   presumption         against    detention.        N.J.S.A.   2A:162-
    18(b).18    Hence, in order to prevail on a detention motion in
    other offense categories, the State must rebut the presumption
    that some amount of monetary bail, non-monetary conditions, or a
    combination thereof would reasonably assure (1) the defendant's
    appearance in court when required, (2) the protection of the
    safety of any other person or the community, and (3) that the
    defendant will not obstruct or attempt to obstruct the criminal
    justice process.         N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(b).
    18
    In these other instances, there is a rebuttable presumption
    that the eligible defendant "shall be detained."        N.J.S.A.
    2A:162-19(b) (emphasis added).    The defendant can rebut this
    presumption by the lesser proof standard of preponderance of the
    evidence. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(e)(2). Under this same statutory
    provision, if the defendant successfully rebuts the presumption,
    the prosecutor can still establish grounds for detention by
    clear and convincing evidence. 
    Ibid. 25 A-2415-16T7 The
    Act further prescribes that the court at a detention
    hearing "may take into account" the following information:
    a. The nature and      circumstances   of   the
    offense charged;
    b. The weight of the evidence against the
    [presumptively] eligible defendant, except
    that    the    court  may    consider  the
    admissibility of any evidence sought to be
    excluded;
    c. The history and characteristics of the
    eligible defendant, including:
    (1) the eligible defendant's character,
    physical and mental condition, family ties,
    employment, financial resources, length of
    residence in the community, community ties,
    past conduct, history relating to drug or
    alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record
    concerning appearance at court proceedings;
    and
    (2) whether, at the time of the current
    offense or arrest, the eligible defendant
    was on probation, parole, or on other
    release pending trial, sentencing, appeal,
    or completion of sentence for an offense
    under federal law, or the law of this or any
    other state;
    d. The nature and seriousness of the danger
    to any other person or the community that
    would be posed by the eligible defendant's
    release, if applicable;
    e. The nature and seriousness of the risk of
    obstructing or attempting to obstruct the
    criminal justice process that would be posed
    by the eligible defendant's release, if
    applicable; and
    f.   The  release  recommendation  of   the
    pretrial services program obtained using a
    26                          A-2415-16T7
    risk assessment         instrument        under     N.J.S.A.
    2A:162-25.
    [N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20.]
    Notably, although Section 20 of the Act does not place any
    special emphasis on the PSA, another provision within the Act,
    N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(b)(1), expressly mandates the court "shall
    consider        the     [Pretrial        Services]         risk       assessment         and
    recommendations         on    conditions      of     release      before        making   any
    pretrial release decision[.]"                (Emphasis added).
    We agree with the State that this quoted language within
    Section    16    signifies      that   a     trial      court   may   not       ignore   the
    Pretrial       Services      recommendation        in    its    detention        analysis,
    although it is not bound to follow it.                      That interpretation is
    consistent with Section 23(a)'s requirement that, if the court
    issues    an    order     contrary     to    the    recommendations         of    Pretrial
    Services,       the   judge     "shall       provide      an    explanation        in    the
    document       that   authorizes       the    eligible         defendant's       release."
    N.J.S.A.       2A:162-23(a)(2)       (emphasis          added).       As    we    discuss,
    infra,    that    did     not   occur       here,     perhaps      due     to    perceived
    ambiguities in the two-part format of the recommendation.
    New        Rule   3:4A(b)(5),        which       implements       these      statutory
    facets, instructs that the court:
    may   consider    as  prima   facie  evidence
    sufficient to overcome the presumption of
    release   a    recommendation   by  [Pretrial
    27                                    A-2415-16T7
    Services] established pursuant to N.J.S.A.
    2A:162-25 that the defendant's release is
    not recommended (i.e., a determination that
    "release not recommended or if released,
    maximum   conditions").       Although  such
    recommendation by [Pretrial Services] may
    constitute sufficient evidence upon which
    the court may order pretrial detention,
    nothing herein shall preclude the court from
    considering other relevant information [in
    reaching its detention determination].
    [(Emphasis added).]
    "After     considering   all     the    circumstances,         the   [Pretrial
    Services] risk assessment and recommendations on conditions of
    release,    and     any   information        that    may   be    provided      by     a
    prosecutor or the eligible defendant, the court shall order that
    the   eligible      defendant"    be     either       detained       or    released.
    N.J.S.A. 2A:162-16(b)(2).        A defendant may be released on:                    (1)
    his   or   her    own   recognizance;    (2)    execution       of    an   unsecured
    appearance bond; (3) non-monetary conditions; (4) monetary bail;
    or (5) a combination of conditions and monetary bail.                       N.J.S.A.
    2A:162-16(b)(2); N.J.S.A. 2A:162-17.                Monetary bail can only be
    used to reasonably assure the eligible defendant's appearance.
    N.J.S.A. 2A:162-17(c)(1).19
    19
    The court-ordered non-monetary conditions, paraphrased, may
    require the defendant to:     (1) refrain from committing any
    offense during the period of release; (2) avoid all contact with
    an alleged victim of the crime; (3) avoid all contact with all
    witnesses who may testify concerning the offense; (4) remain in
    the custody of a designated person, who agrees to assume
    (continued)
    28                                  A-2415-16T7
    With this backdrop in mind, we turn to the discrete issues
    presented.
    A.
    Our first task is to ascertain the appropriate scope of
    appellate review of a trial court's order granting or denying
    pretrial detention.     The Act does not specify a scope of review.
    Nor have our two published cases resolved it while examining
    other important legal issues under the new law.             But see 
    Ingram, supra
    , ___ N.J. Super. ___ (slip op. at 37-38) (noting that the
    Attorney     General   had   posited        an   abuse-of-discretion    review
    (continued)
    supervision and to report any violation of a release condition
    to the court; (5) maintain employment, or, if unemployed,
    actively seek employment; (6) maintain or begin an educational
    program; (7) abide by specified restrictions on personal
    associations, place of residence, or travel; (8) report on a
    regular basis to a designated law enforcement agency, or other
    agency, or pretrial services program; (9) comply with a
    specified curfew; (10) refrain from possessing a firearm,
    destructive device, or other dangerous weapon; (11) refrain from
    excessive use of alcohol, or any use of a narcotic drug or other
    controlled substance without a prescription by a licensed
    medical practitioner; (12) undergo all available medical,
    psychological, or psychiatric treatment, including treatment for
    drug or alcohol dependency, and remain in a specified
    institution if required for that purpose; (13) return to custody
    for specified hours following release for employment, schooling,
    or other limited purposes; (14) be placed in a pretrial home
    supervision capacity with or without the use of an approved
    electronic monitoring device; or (15) satisfy any other
    condition deemed necessary to reasonably assure the effectuation
    of the goals of the Act. N.J.S.A. 2A:162-17(b)(1) and (2).
    29                              A-2415-16T7
    standard, and that the Public Defender had indicated at oral
    argument that such a standard "most likely" applied).
    Our task has been eased because the parties and the amici
    essentially        agree       that    the    appropriate        general      standard         of
    appellate review is to sustain the trial court's decision unless
    it represents an abuse of discretion.                        However, as the parties
    also agree, de novo review must be conducted if the trial court
    erred in its application of the law, such as by relying on a
    legally impermissible reason, by failing to consider a legally
    required factor in the detention calculus, or by failing to
    provide adequate reasons for its decision.
    Even though we accept counsel's agreement that these are
    the appropriate review standards for appeals arising under the
    Act,    we        provide       the    following           discussion       for     sake       of
    completeness.            We begin with a recognition that the statute
    explicitly confers upon defendants a right to appeal an order of
    pretrial detention "pursuant to the Rules of Court."                                N.J.S.A.
    2A:162-18(c).20          The    appeal       "shall    be    heard     in    an    expedited
    manner."          
    Ibid. In addition, the
      defendant    who       was     denied
    release      by    the    trial       court    "shall       be   detained     pending         the
    disposition of the appeal."                  
    Ibid. 20 See R.
    2:9-13 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017) (delineating new rules of
    appellate practice specifically to guide detention appeals).
    30                                       A-2415-16T7
    Although the State has no reciprocal statutory right to
    appeal decisions granting a defendant's pretrial release, it can
    pursue interlocutory review in this court's discretion.                                  The
    State may do so through a motion for leave to appeal filed in
    accordance with the general requirements of Rules 2:2-3 and 2:5-
    6.      Indeed, that is the jurisdictional path that led to the
    present case being heard by this court, having granted leave to
    appeal.
    None of the parties or amici support adopting the standards
    of    review    that     case   law    from       the   circuit    courts    has    deemed
    applicable under the federal Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§
    3141 to 3156 (1984), on which the Act was largely based.                               Like
    our     own    law,     the     federal       statute     does     not    identify       the
    applicable standard of review.                    United States v. Perry, 
    788 F.2d 100
    , 104 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
    479 U.S. 864
    , 
    107 S. Ct. 218
    ,
    
    93 L. Ed. 2d 146
    (1986).               The circuit courts have been split in
    resolving that question.
    Three    circuit       courts    have       adopted   a    "clearly   erroneous"
    standard,       i.e.,    a    highly        deferential      standard     much     like     a
    traditional abuse of discretion standard, whereby the detention
    order    will    be     sustained      if    it    is   supported    by   the    evidence
    presented at the hearing.               See, e.g., United States v. English,
    
    629 F.3d 311
    , 319 (2d Cir. 2011); United States v. Rueben, 974
    31                                   A-2415-16T7
    F.2d 580, 586 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 
    507 U.S. 940
    , 
    113 S. Ct. 1336
    , 
    122 L. Ed. 2d 720
    (1993); United States v. Fortna,
    
    769 F.2d 243
    , 250 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Chimurenga,
    
    760 F.2d 400
    , 405-06 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams,
    
    753 F.2d 329
    , 333 (4th Cir. 1985).
    A majority of the circuit courts, however, independently
    review detention decisions affording more limited deference to
    the district court's ruling.        United States v. O’Brien, 
    895 F.2d 810
    , 813 (1st Cir. 1990).          Under this more stringent standard,
    "[i]f upon careful review of all the facts and the trial judge's
    reasons    the   appeals   court   concludes   that   a   different    result
    should have been reached, the detention decision may be amended
    or reversed."     
    Id. at 814.
    Meanwhile, six circuit courts adhering to the "independent"
    standard of review specify that factual findings will only be
    reversed    if   they   are   clearly   erroneous.        United   States    v.
    Cisneros, 
    328 F.3d 610
    , 613 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v.
    Portes, 
    786 F.2d 758
    , 762 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v.
    Hurtado, 
    779 F.2d 1467
    , 1470-72 (11th Cir. 1985); United States
    v. Maull, 
    773 F.2d 1479
    , 1487 (8th Cir. 1985); United State v.
    Motamedi, 
    767 F.2d 1403
    , 1406 (9th Cir. 1985); United States v.
    Hazime, 
    762 F.2d 34
    , 37 (6th Cir. 1985).
    32                               A-2415-16T7
    Two other circuits generally hold that the district court's
    determination should simply be given deference.                    United States
    v. Villarman-Oviedo, 
    325 F.3d 1
    , 9 (1st Cir. 2003); 
    O'Brien, supra
    , 895 F.2d at 814; United States v. Delker, 
    757 F.2d 1390
    ,
    1399-1400 (3d Cir. 1985).           However, as explained in 
    O’Brien, supra
    , 895 F.2d at 813, as a practical matter, this general
    deference   "to    the     determination     of    the    trial    court   in     the
    context of an independent review typically will mean giving the
    greatest deference to purely factual determinations."
    The parties and amici in this case eschew these varying
    federal approaches.        They instead urge that we apply traditional
    standards   of    review    that   have   been     used    in   appeals    of   bail
    decisions in our State.
    Historically, the purpose of bail was not to protect the
    community   from    a    defendant's      future     criminal      or   antisocial
    conduct or to inflict punishment, but instead merely to ensure
    the   defendant's    appearance     at    court     proceedings.          State    v.
    Korecky, 
    169 N.J. 364
    , 376 (2001); State v. Steele, 430 N.J.
    Super.   24,     35-37     (App.   Div.     2013),       certif.   improvidently
    granted, 
    223 N.J. 284
    (2014).               The setting of bail has been
    entrusted to the reasonable and sound discretion of the trial
    court, and our appellate courts have generally sustained those
    rulings in the absence of a proven abuse of discretion. See,
    33                                  A-2415-16T7
    e.g.,   State      v.   Fajardo-Santos,           
    199 N.J. 520
    ,   533-34   (2009);
    
    Korecky, supra
    , 169 N.J. at 373; 
    Steele, supra
    , 430 N.J. Super.
    at 34-35.         The trial court's discretionary decision to impose
    non-monetary conditions of release upon a defendant to protect
    the public also has been customarily reviewed for an abuse of
    that discretion.          See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 
    61 N.J. 351
    , 364
    (1972); 
    Steele, supra
    , 430 N.J. Super. at 34.
    While the concept is difficult to define with precision, an
    appellate court "may find an abuse of discretion when a decision
    'rest[s]     on    an    impermissible        basis'      or   was    'based   upon     a
    consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors.'"                        
    Steele, supra
    , 430 N.J. Super. at 34-35 (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cty.
    Prosecutor, 
    171 N.J. 561
    , 571 (2002)).                     An appellate court can
    also discern an abuse of discretion when the trial court fails
    to take into consideration all relevant factors and when its
    decision reflects a clear error in judgment.                         State v. Baynes,
    
    148 N.J. 434
    ,       444   (1997).        Likewise,     when      the   trial   court
    renders a decision based upon a misconception of the law, that
    decision     is    not    entitled      to        any   particular     deference     and
    consequently will be reviewed de novo.                         See, e.g., State v.
    Stein, 
    225 N.J. 582
    , 593 (2016); State v. Williams, 441 N.J.
    Super. 266, 272 (App. Div. 2015).
    34                                A-2415-16T7
    A reviewing court generally will give no deference to a
    trial     court       decision      that        fails     to      "provide     factual
    underpinnings        and    legal   bases       supporting       [its]    exercise    of
    judicial discretion."            Clark v. Clark, 
    429 N.J. Super. 61
    , 72
    (App. Div. 2012).           If a trial court has merely catalogued the
    evidence and issued an order without sufficiently explaining its
    reasoning, such a conclusory approach does not serve the parties
    and does not facilitate appellate review.                       It is vital that the
    trial court make the necessary findings and explain its reasons.
    See generally, R. 1:7-4; see also Barr v. Barr, 
    418 N.J. Super. 18
    , 46 (App. Div. 2011); Barnett & Herenchak, Inc. v. State, 
    276 N.J. Super. 465
    , 472 (App. Div. 1994); In re Valley Hosp., 
    240 N.J. Super. 301
    , 306 (App. Div. 1990), certif. denied, 
    126 N.J. 318
    (1991).
    We concur with counsel that these well-established general
    principles      of    appellate     review      are     sensibly    applied    in    the
    context of pretrial detention rulings issued under the Act.                          The
    statutory    scheme        envisions   that     judges     in     the    Criminal   Part
    repeatedly will be called upon to make detention decisions in a
    wide    array   of     cases.       Over    time,       those    trial    judges    will
    naturally develop considerable expertise in applying the terms
    of the Act.          As the First Circuit observed in 
    O'Brien, supra
    ,
    895 F.2d at 813, "it would unduly intrude on the ability of
    35                                  A-2415-16T7
    [trial] courts to render these [pretrial detention] decisions on
    a day to day basis if they were subjected to cavalier treatment
    by an appellate court with little experience or opportunity to
    develop expertise."
    The wording of the Act itself lends support to the adoption
    of an abuse of discretion review standard. Section 18 states
    that the court "may" order release if the State has met its
    burden.      N.J.S.A.      2A:162-18(a).      Furthermore,       Section      20
    outlines the factors that the trial court "may" consider in
    ruling on detention motions.         N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20.         "The use of
    the word 'may' generally conveys that an action is permissive,
    not mandatory."     Myers v. Ocean City Zoning Bd., 
    439 N.J. Super. 96
    ,   101   (App.   Div.   2015)   (citing   Harvey   v.   Bd.    of    Chosen
    Freeholders of Essex Cty., 
    30 N.J. 381
    , 391 (1959) (stating
    that, absent legislative intent to the contrary, use of "may"
    indicates that a provision is permissive, and use of "shall" or
    "must" reflects that a provision is mandatory)).
    From a policy perspective, the objectives of the new Act in
    attaining the expeditious resolution of criminal cases could be
    thwarted    if   this   court   routinely   second-guessed   decisions        on
    pretrial detention motions simply because we personally would
    have reached a different result than the trial judge. We surely
    do not wish to encourage dissatisfied parties to file appeals
    36                                A-2415-16T7
    having little or no merit on such collateral issues, while the
    trial court proceedings are possibly stalled in the meantime and
    the   parties'      resources        are   diverted        to   appellate            briefing.
    Excessive appeals are also bound to interfere with the Act's
    speedy trial goals.
    That      said,   we    also    must     remain      vigilant       that       detention
    rulings are not simply rubber-stamped, and that the procedural
    and   substantive        requirements          of    the     Act        and    other     legal
    principles are honored.              In many instances, the pretrial hearing
    may entail no witness testimony and no need for credibility
    findings by the trial court, to which we ordinarily accord great
    deference.       State v. Locurto, 
    157 N.J. 463
    , 471 (1999).                            Hence,
    we often will be looking at precisely the same paper record
    concerning a defendant's risks as the trial court. Even so, our
    primary role in appellate correction should be one of assuring
    that the law is being followed properly in the trial court.                                 The
    traditional standards of review used by our courts in bail cases
    will serve that goal.
    When      conducting         appellate        review      under         this     largely
    deferential standard, we also must bear in mind the evidentiary
    standard     under      the   Act     that     governs       the    detention          ruling.
    Where,     as    here,       the     charged      offenses         do    not     trigger       a
    presumption of detention pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(b) — as
    37                                       A-2415-16T7
    it would in murder and life imprisonment cases — the State must
    meet   a     heavy    burden    to    establish        the    need    for   detention        by
    "clear and convincing evidence."                 N.J.S.A. 2A:162-18(a)(1).                  The
    drafters      of    the   Act   presumably       chose       that    high   bar       to   make
    detention the appropriate result for only a limited group of the
    most     serious       cases,     where     public          safety     is   demonstrably
    threatened by a defendant's release, the defendant clearly is
    not likely to appear for court, or he or she is likely to
    threaten to obstruct the criminal justice process.
    The    State's     burden      of   establishing         clear    and   convincing
    evidence in this context falls somewhere between the ordinary
    civil standard of preponderance of the evidence and the criminal
    standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.                       In re Perskie, 
    207 N.J. 275
    , 289 (2011).          This heightened standard is typically applied
    where the evidentiary matters are complex, prone to abuse, error
    or   injustice,        and     also   where      an    individual’s         interests        in
    liberty or personal welfare are at stake.                       Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
    v. Land, 
    186 N.J. 163
    , 170 (2006); State v. Michaels, 
    136 N.J. 299
    ,   321-23        (1994).    The   standard        is     also    frequently       imposed
    where,     by      operation     of   common      or       statutory    law,      a    strong
    presumption favors a contrary result.                      See Auge v. N.J. Dept. of
    Corr., 
    327 N.J. Super. 256
    , 263 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 
    164 N.J. 559
    (2000).
    38                                        A-2415-16T7
    Clear and convincing evidence should produce in the mind of
    the decision-maker "a firm belief or conviction as to the truth
    of    the   allegations         sought     to   be    established."            State    v.
    Hernandez, 
    170 N.J. 106
    , 127 (2001) (quoting In re Samay, 
    166 N.J. 25
    , 30 (2001)); State v. Hodge, 
    95 N.J. 369
    , 376 (1984).
    The   evidence      must   be     "so     clear,     direct    and    weighty          and
    convincing as to enable either a judge or jury to come to a
    clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the precise facts in
    issue."     In re Seaman, 
    133 N.J. 67
    , 74 (1993) (quoting Aiello v.
    Knoll Gold Club, 
    64 N.J. Super. 156
    , 162 (App. Div. 1960));
    accord 
    Hernandez, supra
    , 170 N.J. at 127.                     To meet this test,
    the truth of an allegation must be "highly probable."                           
    Perskie, supra
    , 207 N.J. at 290.
    Consequently,        in     exercising         our    role     of        appellate
    oversight, we are obligated to bear in mind the challenging
    burden under the Act that the State must meet in most cases to
    support its detention motion.                If the points in favor of the
    detention motion do not heavily weigh in favor of the State in
    such instances, the trial court should deny the application, and
    we    should   be    loath       to      disturb     that   denial        on     appeal.
    Conversely, if the State manifestly has made such a showing, we
    must carefully consider whether the trial court has abused its
    39                                    A-2415-16T7
    discretion or misapplied the law in rejecting the application
    and, if so, set aside the determination.
    B.
    We next consider the legal significance of a defendant's
    prior juvenile record in making a detention decision under the
    Act.     This likewise is an issue on which counsel fundamentally
    agree.
    As we have noted, the Pretrial Services matrix for the NCA
    and FTA scores does not statistically incorporate a defendant's
    prior juvenile record.              Nevertheless, Section 20 of the Act
    broadly authorizes the trial court to consider a defendant's
    "past      conduct"    as    one    of   the   many   permissible    factors     in
    evaluating       his    or    her    suitability      for   pretrial     release.
    N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20(c)(1).
    A defendant's prior adjudications of delinquency and the
    nature of his or her juvenile offenses are logically part of his
    or   her    "history    and    characteristics"       and   indicative    of   the
    danger he or she poses to the community under N.J.S.A. 2A:162-
    20(c) and (d).         Notably, juvenile history is taken into account
    in     federal    detention        determinations,     where   the     court    is
    directed, under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3142(g), to consider the same
    types of information set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-20.                          See,
    40                             A-2415-16T7
    e.g., United States v. Begay, 315 Fed. Appx. 53, 54-56 (10th
    Cir. 2009).
    We appreciate that the objectives of the juvenile justice
    system    generally    differ     from    those    for    the   adult     criminal
    justice process.          See, e.g., In re Registrant J.G., 
    169 N.J. 304
    , 325 (2001) (emphasizing the Juvenile Code's preference for
    "supervision, care and rehabilitation" as alternatives, instead
    of incarceration for juveniles adjudicated delinquent); State ex
    rel. S.S., 
    367 N.J. Super. 400
    , 407 (App. Div. 2004), aff'd 
    183 N.J. 20
    (2005) ("Even with respect to a juvenile charged with
    conduct that would be a crime if committed by an adult, the
    overriding      goal      of    the       juvenile       justice      system     is
    rehabilitation, not punishment.").
    Nevertheless, an adult defendant's prior juvenile record
    may properly be considered in making sentencing determinations,
    particularly     if    the     juvenile       adjudications     are    relatively
    recent, voluminous, or severe.            See, e.g., State v. Torres, 
    313 N.J. Super. 129
    , 162 (App. Div.) (instructing that a sentencing
    court    may   consider    defendant's        juvenile   record,   even    if   the
    charges did not result in adjudications), certif. denied, 
    156 N.J. 425
    (1998); State v. Phillips, 
    176 N.J. Super. 495
    , 502
    (App. Div. 1980) (holding that a sentencing judge may consider
    juvenile offenses "so long as they are not given the weight of a
    41                               A-2415-16T7
    criminal conviction") (citing State v. Marzlof, 
    79 N.J. 167
    ,
    176-77 (1979)).
    Simply stated, a defendant's juvenile offenses may count in
    the detention calculus, but should not be weighed as heavily as
    prior adult convictions.     None of the parties before us dispute
    this principle.
    C.
    We next consider the relevance of a defendant's prior tier
    classification as a sex offender under Megan's Law. As part of
    the Megan's Law assessment for such potential registrants, the
    State is obligated to demonstrate the propriety of defendant's
    tier classification by clear and convincing evidence.       In re
    Registrant M.F., 
    169 N.J. 45
    , 54 (2001).
    The RRAS was developed by a committee of mental health
    experts and members of the law enforcement community convened by
    the Attorney General.      See In re Registrant of C.A., 
    146 N.J. 71
    , 82 (1996); In re Registrant V.L., 
    441 N.J. Super. 419
    , 425
    (App. Div. 2015).    The RRAS was created in response to the
    Legislature's directive in Megan's Law for the Attorney General
    to promulgate guidelines and procedures for notification of a
    sex offender's whereabouts, depending upon the offender's degree
    of risk of re-offense.     N.J.S.A. 2C:7-8; 
    V.L., supra
    , 441 N.J.
    Super. at 428-29.    The RRAS is divided into four categories
    42                       A-2415-16T7
    corresponding        to   the     individual's       seriousness          of     offense,
    offense      history,      personal         characteristics,         and        community
    support.     
    Id. at 429.
            Each category contains at least two of a
    total of thirteen criteria, and each such criterion is assigned
    a    score   corresponding        to    a    low,    moderate,       or        high    risk
    assessment.     
    Ibid. The factors are
    then all assigned weights
    with a multiplier, producing an overall score that numerically
    classifies     the    offender     in   either      Tier   1   (low    risk       of     re-
    offense), Tier 2 (moderate risk of re-offense), or Tier 3 (high
    risk of re-offense).            
    Ibid. The scoring is
    to be conducted in
    accordance with Guidelines issued by the Attorney General, 
    id. at 426,
    and a Registrant Risk Assessment Manual, 
    id. at 429.
    Placement      in   Tier     3    under    Megan's       Law    means       that     a
    defendant has been found by clear and convincing evidence to be
    in   "the    highest      risk    [of    re-offense]       category        for        sexual
    offenders[,]      requiring       Internet       registration        and       the     most
    comprehensive degree of community notification."                      Riley v. N.J.
    State Parole Bd., 
    219 N.J. 270
    , 276 (2014); 
    M.F., supra
    , 169
    N.J. at 52-54.
    Here, when defendant was designated as a Tier 3 Megan's Law
    offender, he presumably underwent a comprehensive evaluation in
    43                                   A-2415-16T7
    order to determine the likelihood that he would re-offend.21                               The
    precise     nature        of     his    original        offenses      would     have      been
    considered.        Many aspects of his life and character would have
    been assessed.           Another trial judge conducted a hearing on that
    classification, at which defendant presumably had the right to
    counsel.
    It    is     obvious       that    an   assessment         conducted      pursuant     to
    Megan's    Law        tier     review    comprises       a    material,       although     not
    dispositive,          source     of     information       for    a    trial    court      when
    conducting        a      detention       hearing.        The     tier     classification
    logically       falls     within       the   broad      ambit    of    N.J.S.A.      2A:162-
    20(c)(1),       which        authorizes      the      pretrial    detention      judge       to
    consider      a       defendant's        "character,"          "physical       and     mental
    condition,"        "past       conduct,"      and     other     personal      history      and
    characteristics.
    In fact, many of the risk-related considerations within the
    Megan's Law assessment topically correspond to those at issue
    under   the       Act,    in    gauging      a     defendant's       likelihood      of    re-
    offending while on release. The Megan's Law tier classification
    should be particularly instructive where, as here, the defendant
    is charged with new sexual offenses.
    21
    As we have noted, we do not know the current status of
    defendant's tier classification in the wake of the December 2016
    remand.
    44                                  A-2415-16T7
    D.
    The        final       legal       issue          before         us   is   whether,         as    the
    Prosecutor        argued          in    his     initial          brief,      a   Pretrial        Services
    recommendation           to        detain          a        defendant       creates,        under       Rule
    3:4A(b)(5),        a     rebuttable             presumption            against      release        that    a
    defendant must overcome.                        At oral argument on the appeal, the
    Prosecutor withdrew this particular argument.
    To aid the trial bench and bar, we should nevertheless
    point      out    that,           as    the     Rule         expressly       states,        a    Pretrial
    Services recommendation to detain a defendant may be, but is not
    required     to        be,    relied          upon          by   the    court    as    "prima          facie
    evidence" to support detention.                              R. 3:4A(b)(5).           Again, the use
    of   the    term       "may"           within      the        provision      signals        discretion.
    
    Harvey, supra
    ,           30    N.J.       at       391.       The       court     may       require    a
    prosecutor to rely upon more than the PSA and the recommendation
    to carry its burden.                    Cf. Ingram, ___ N.J. Super. ___ (slip op.
    at 33) (analogously noting the court's discretion to require a
    prosecutor        to     provide         a    more          expansive       proffer    to       establish
    probable cause).
    III.
    Having        addressed            these          various        general      points        of    law
    implicated by the new Act, we finally turn to the trial court's
    rulings in this case.                    We approach our review acutely cognizant
    45                                        A-2415-16T7
    that the court's rulings were issued in the first month of the
    new Act's implementation.                     That was before any published case
    law    construing            the    Act    had    emerged    and     while       prosecutors,
    defense lawyers, and court personnel were all adjusting to the
    many    operational            challenges        presented      by   the     new    statute.
    Indeed, much of the trial court's oral and written analysis
    focused      on    discovery         and   proffer     issues      that    had    yet     to    be
    addressed in a published opinion, until this court's respective
    February 2017 decisions in Robinson and Ingram.
    With that context and timing in mind, and affording all due
    deference         to   the     trial      court's     zone   of    discretion,       we     have
    several reservations about the court's reasoning, as well as the
    sufficiency of the record.
    Despite         the    temporary       remand,    the      trial    court     did       not
    explain in writing specifically why it deviated from the portion
    of     the    Pretrial             Services      recommendation       advising          against
    defendant's release.                 As we have already noted, such a written
    explanation is required by the Act in N.J.S.A. 2A:162-23(a)(2).
    We suspect that this critical omission may have been caused by
    the somewhat confusing two-part format of the PSA, which the
    Judiciary has now corrected prospectively since March 2.                                   It is
    conceivable that the trial court may have perceived that the
    second part of the Pretrial Services recommendation stating, "If
    46                                     A-2415-16T7
    released, weekly reporting + HD/EM," meant that detention and
    release on conditions were equally recommended for C.W.                       As the
    Acting Administrative Director's March 2 memo clarified, such
    equivalency was not intended under the prior format.
    We recognize the public defender and the ACLU have argued
    that a Pretrial Services recommendation to detain is automatic,
    or at least virtually automatic, for any defendant charged with
    a sexual assault.          Even if the recommendation to detain in such
    cases is, in fact, an automatic, computer-generated certainty in
    sexual    assault       cases,   the   statute    nevertheless        obligates    the
    trial court to provide written reasons explaining why it is
    departing from that recommendation, whatever its genesis.                          That
    unfortunately was not done here.
    The trial court did mention in its rulings the two low
    scores in defendant's PSA for FTA and NCA, and the absence of a
    violence flag.           We cannot tell, however, how much weight the
    court actually placed on those low numbers. The numbers are not
    particularly     informative           here    since     they   do     not    reflect
    defendant's juvenile history, and since he would presumably not
    have   skipped      a    court   appearance      while    he    was   confined     for
    several years at Jamesburg.
    We are also concerned about the trial court's abbreviated
    passing    references       to    defendant's      juvenile      record      and   his
    47                                 A-2415-16T7
    classification under Megan's Law.                       The court did mention the
    existence      of    those    things     in    its      oral    ruling,     but      did    not
    explain why they did not make a difference to the outcome.
    The present record on these points is also deficient to
    afford meaningful consideration.                   We do not know what conduct
    was involved in defendant's two violations of probation in 2012
    and    2013.        Apparently,     he    was      not    charged        with    additional
    substantive        offenses    stemming       from      those    incidents,          but   that
    does   not     necessarily       mean    that      they    were    minor        or   did     not
    correlate in some way to defendant's past wrongful behavior.
    Similarly, there is no information in this record about the
    timing, details, underlying rationale, or current status of the
    tier classification under Megan's Law.
    As    an     additional    concern,         we    lack     confidence         that    in
    denying detention the trial court sufficiently took into account
    several      points    stressed     by    the      State,       including       defendant's
    alleged commission of a new sexual offense after his discharge
    from Jamesburg, the close proximity of the minor's residence
    (which only seemed to come into play in phase two of the January
    25 hearing with respect to modifying the conditions of release),
    and overall public safety considerations.
    The     Prosecutor     and   the       Attorney         General    urge       that     we
    reverse      the     trial    court's     ruling        and     issue    our     own       order
    48                                      A-2415-16T7
    mandating detention.        Conversely, defense counsel and the ACLU
    submit that we affirm the trial court's ruling as is, although
    they candidly acknowledge certain shortcomings in the record and
    the court's analysis.       They also maintain that the statute only
    permits the State or a defendant to reopen a detention hearing
    with material information that was "not known" to that party at
    the time of the original hearing.            N.J.S.A. 2A:162-19(f).
    We adopt neither advocated course of action. Instead, we
    remand the matter for reconsideration by the trial court, which
    will now have the benefit of the new case law, as well as the
    March 2, 2017 guidance memorandum and this opinion.               The parties
    and the court shall develop or clarify the record further, as
    may be feasible and fair under the circumstances.
    In issuing this remand, we do not encourage prosecutors in
    the   future   to   make    "bare-bones"       presentations     at   detention
    hearings   with     an   expectation        that   they   will   automatically
    receive a second chance at amplifying their contentions if they
    do not prevail.          Nor do we invite defense counsel or trial
    judges, despite the busy and rapid-paced nature of this docket,
    to cut corners unduly.         Nevertheless, as our system adapts to
    the new law, a remand in this case is a fair and instructive
    outcome.
    49                              A-2415-16T7
    In the meantime, the stringent conditions of defendant's
    release set forth in the trial court's January 25, 2017 order
    shall remain in place, unless and until the trial court issues a
    superseding    order.    The   aggrieved   party    on    the    outcome       of
    reconsideration may seek review in a new appeal or motion for
    leave to appeal. We do not retain jurisdiction.
    Remanded    for     further   consideration    by    the    trial    court,
    consistent with this opinion.
    50                                  A-2415-16T7