Ex Parte S.E.W. ( 2017 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-16-00255-CV
EX PARTE S.E.W.
From the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2015-CI-14781
Honorable Gloria Saldaña, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
Karen Angelini, Justice
Irene Rios, Justice
Delivered and Filed: February 15, 2017
REVERSED AND RENDERED
This a restricted appeal of an order granting a petition for expunction. In its brief, the Texas
Department of Public Safety raises several issues challenging the trial court’s order. Based on this
court’s existing precedent holding the expunction statute is arrest-based and not offense-based, we
sustain the Department’s first issue and need not address the remaining issues. See TEX. R. APP.
P. 47.1 (noting opinions need address only issues necessary to final disposition of appeal). We
reverse the trial court’s order and render judgment denying S.E.W.’s petition for expunction.
BACKGROUND
On September 28, 2006, S.E.W. was arrested for theft and securing execution of a
document by deception. S.E.W. subsequently pled guilty to the offense of securing execution of
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a document by deception and, on January 23, 2008, was placed on six months deferred adjudication
community supervision.
On March 17, 2008, the State filed a motion to dismiss the theft charge. In the section of
the motion stating the reason for requesting the dismissal, the following appears, “P.I.F.” The trial
court signed an order dismissing the theft charge the same day.
On September 2, 2015, S.E.W. filed a petition to expunge the theft charge. The Department
filed an answer but did not appear at the hearing. On October 22, 2015, the trial court signed an
order granting S.E.W.’s petition, finding she was “entitled to expunction as provided by Article
55.01(a)(2)(A)-(B).” The trial court found various agencies, entities and persons “may have
records or files pertaining to [S.E.W.] in connection with the arrest and/or alleged offense
described in” the order and ordered those agencies and persons to request the return of any
information sent to a central federal depository “regarding the arrest and/or alleged offense
described herein.” Finally, the order required the Department to request records subject to the
order to be destroyed. The Department appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
To prevail on a restricted appeal, the appellant must prove: (1) the notice of the restricted
appeal was filed within six months after the judgment was signed; (2) the appellant was a party to
the underlying lawsuit; (3) the appellant did not participate in the hearing that resulted in the
judgment complained of, and did not timely file any post-judgment motions or requests for
findings of fact and conclusions of law; and (4) error is apparent on the face of the record. Pike-
Grant v. Grant, 447 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex. 2014). The record clearly establishes the first three
elements; therefore, we only need to determine if the Department has shown error apparent on the
face of the record. For purposes of a restricted appeal, the face of the record includes all papers
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on file in the appeal. Norman Commc’ns v. Tex. Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997);
In re D.M.B., 467 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, pet. denied).
Generally, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a petition for expunction
under an abuse of discretion standard. Ex parte K.R.K., 446 S.W.3d 540, 541 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2014, no pet.). If a ruling on an expunction turns on a question of law, however, we
review the ruling de novo because the trial court has no discretion to determine what the law is or
to apply the law to the facts. Id. Statutory construction is a question of law reviewed de novo. Id.
ANALYSIS
The relevant portion of the expunction statute set forth in article 55.01(a)(2) of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
(a) A person who has been placed under a custodial or noncustodial arrest
for commission of either a felony or misdemeanor is entitled to have all records and
files relating to the arrest expunged if:
...
(2) the person has been released and the charge, if any, has not resulted
in a final conviction and is no longer pending and there was no court-ordered
community supervision under Article 42.12 for the offense, unless the offense is a
Class C misdemeanor....
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01(a)(2) (West Supp. 2016).
In its first issue, the Department contends the trial court erred in granting S.E.W.’s petition
because she did not meet the statutory requirements to have “all records and files relating to [her]
arrest expunged.” The Department argues the statute is arrest-based and does not allow records of
each individual offense for which a defendant is arrested to be expunged. Because S.E.W. was
placed on court-ordered community supervision for one of the offenses for which she was arrested,
the Department contends S.E.W. is not entitled to have all records and files relating to the arrest
expunged. S.E.W. acknowledges Texas appellate courts, including this court, have held the statute
is arrest-based; however, S.E.W. attempts to distinguish those cases.
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This court recently reiterated its holding that the expunction statute is arrest-based. Tex.
Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Ryerson, No. 04-16-00276-CV, 2016 WL 7445063, at *2-3 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio Dec. 28, 2016, no pet. h.) (mem. op.). In Ryerson, this court rejected the same or
similar arguments raised by S.E.W. in her brief. See id. Although S.E.W. attempts to distinguish
the prior opinions holding the statute is arrest-based, we held in Ryerson that the facts of the cases
“have no effect on the application of the expunction statute. It is a bright line rule.” Id. at *3.
Because S.E.W. was placed on court-ordered community supervision for one of the offenses for
which she was arrested, she is not entitled to have “all records and files relating to the arrest
expunged.” See id. at *2-3.
Although we understand the logic behind S.E.W.’s arguments given that her arrest was for
two unrelated offenses and was based on two separate arrest warrants which were simply executed
on the same day at the same time, those arguments need to be presented to the Texas Legislature
in seeking an amendment to the expunction statute, not to this court. As we noted in Ryerson, if
the Texas Legislature intended the expunction statute to be offense-based instead of arrest-based,
it could have amended the expunction statute in response to the numerous court decisions holding
the current statute is arrest-based. 1 See id. at *3 (citing Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v.
Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 653 (Tex. 2006) (noting statutory amendments by Legislature were in
response to court decisions); Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Mega Child Care,
Inc., 145 S.W.3d 170, 188-89 (Tex. 2004) (noting Legislature amended statute in response to
intermediate appellate court decision)). The Department’s first issue is sustained.
1
We note the Texas Legislature attempted to amend the expunction statute in 2015; however, the legislation was
vetoed by the governor. See T.H. v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 03-15-00304-CV, 2016 WL 5874869, at *4 n.2
(Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 6, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
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CONCLUSION
The trial court’s order is reversed, and judgment is rendered denying S.E.W.’s petition for
expunction.
Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice
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