Lawrence Ray Dirden II v. State ( 2016 )


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  •                                      In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    ____________________
    NO. 09-16-00086-CR
    ____________________
    LAWRENCE RAY DIRDEN II, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    ________________________________________________________________________
    On Appeal from the 9th District Court
    Montgomery County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 12-01-00324-CR
    ________________________________________________________________________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    In four issues, Lawrence Ray Dirden II (“Lawrence” or “Appellant”)
    challenges the trial court’s revocation of his community supervision. We affirm.
    Lawrence was indicted for Aggregate Theft in an amount in excess of $200,000, a
    first degree felony.1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 31.03, 31.09 (West 2011 and
    Supp. 2016). In the amended indictment, the State alleged that Lawrence
    1
    Lawrence’s wife, Denise Dirden (Denise), was also charged with
    Aggregate Theft in an amount in excess of $200,000, and the cases were tried
    1
    . . . unlawfully appropriate[d] property, by acquiring or
    otherwise exercising control over the property, to wit: money, in the
    aggregate value of $200,000 or more, from Isaac Martin III, and/or
    Martin Wood Company, Inc. and/or Stoneham Mill, Inc., the owner,
    from account number(s) 1003706 and 1047786 at First Bank of
    Conroe, N.A., with the intent to deprive the owner of the property,
    and said property was obtained pursuant to one scheme or continuing
    course of conduct which began on January 28, 2008[,] and continued
    until on or about December 16, 2008.
    On April 28, 2014, the jury returned a guilty verdict against Lawrence as charged
    in the indictment. Before the sentencing and entry of a judgment, the State and
    Lawrence reached an agreement wherein Lawrence agreed to “10 years probated
    over 10 years, [and] $350,000 to be paid within 180 days of [September 17, 2014,]
    and $125,000 to be paid over the next 10 years.” On September 17, 2014, pursuant
    to the agreement between the State and Dirden, the trial court sentenced Lawrence
    to ten years’ confinement in the TDCJ, to be probated, with a list of conditions of
    probation and with a requirement as agreed between the parties that Lawrence pay
    restitution of $350,000 within 180 days of the date of the hearing, and $125,000 to
    be paid over the next ten years.
    Two of the conditions of probation included that Lawrence would:
    together. A jury found Lawrence and Denise guilty. We previously issued our
    Memorandum Opinion affirming Denise’s conviction, wherein we outlined the
    underlying facts and testimony presented at trial. See generally Dirden v. State,
    No. 09-14-00330-CR, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 9213 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Aug.
    24, 2016, no pet.).
    2
    c. Not use or consume alcohol or controlled substances; [and]
    ....
    q. Pay $390.00 Court costs; $350,000.00 TO BE PAID WITHIN 180
    DAYS $125,000.00 TO BE PAID OVER 10 YEAR PERIOD ALL
    TO BE PAID INSTANTER restitution for the benefit of
    STONEHAM MILL, INC. P.O. BOX #1828 CLEVELAND, Tx
    77328; $0 Court appointed attorney fees; and $0.00 fine, all in one
    lump sum payment to the Montgomery County District Clerk on the
    day this Judgment is entered  pay in installments, the total sum
    of the foregoing to the Montgomery County District Clerk, including
    $2.00 fee for each payment made (pursuant to Article 102.072,
    T.C.C.P.), as set forth in the Collection Agreement which is
    incorporated herein and made part of this judgment as if copied
    verbatim[.]
    On July 22, 2015, the State filed a Motion to Revoke Community
    Supervision alleging Lawrence had violated the terms and conditions of his
    community supervision, as follows:
    I.
    Defendant failed to pay $350,000.00 restitution within 180 days from
    the date Judgment was signed.
    The State requested an order of arrest and that the trial court revoke the community
    supervision and pronounce sentence. After his arrest, Lawrence filed a Motion of
    Incarcerated Defendant for Prompt Revocation Hearing, wherein he alleged that he
    was granted community supervision in his Judgment dated September 17, 2014,
    and then later arrested on November 9, 2015, for an act alleged to be a violation of
    3
    the terms of his community supervision. On December 2, 2015, the trial court
    released Lawrence on a Personal Recognizance Bond (PR Bond). After being
    notified that the “Defendant tested positive for alcohol in random urinalysis
    conducted on January 19, 2016[,]” the trial court then revoked the PR Bond and
    issued a capias for Lawrence.
    The State filed an Amended Motion to Revoke Community Supervision
    (Amended Motion) dated February 18, 2016, and file stamped by the clerk on
    February 19, 2016. In the Amended Motion, the State alleged that on September
    17, 2014, Lawrence was convicted and placed on community supervision for a
    period of ten years on terms and conditions as set forth in the Judgment and that he
    subsequently violated the terms and conditions for his community supervision as
    follows:
    I.
    Defendant tested Positive for alcohol in random urinalysis conducted
    on January 19, 2016.
    II.
    Defendant failed to pay $350,000.00 in restitution within 180 days
    from the date of the judgment as ordered by the Court.
    On February 22, 2016, the parties agreed to set the revocation hearing for
    February 25, 2016. On February 25, 2016, the trial court held a revocation hearing,
    and the State and Lawrence appeared with their respective attorneys. Lawrence and
    4
    his trial counsel executed a sworn “Stipulation of Evidence” (Stipulation), which
    was filed into the clerk’s record at 4:30 p.m. on the date of the hearing. The
    Stipulation, which was signed by Lawrence, his attorney, and the trial court judge,
    reads in relevant part as follows:
    . . . I have read the State’s Original Motion to Revoke
    Community Supervision filed with the District Clerk on or about
    February 18, 2016 and I hereby agree and confess that all the acts and
    allegations in Paragraphs I, II thereof are true and correct, and all of
    said conduct constituted violations of the conditions of my community
    supervision and occurred during the period in which the conditions of
    my community supervision were mandatory.
    According to the Reporter’s Record, the following exchange occurred at the
    beginning of the revocation hearing:
    THE COURT: . . . Okay. I have the State’s amended motion to revoke
    community supervision dated February 19th, 2016. So is there
    anything more recent than that, Ms. [State’s Attorney]?
    [State’s Attorney]: No, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: Okay. Has the defense been given a copy of that?
    [State’s Attorney]: You have a copy of it, right?
    [Defense Attorney]: We received a copy of it yesterday, yes, sir, Your
    Honor.
    THE COURT: Okay. You received a copy yesterday? So are you --
    you’re saying the State didn’t give you a copy earlier or why didn't
    you have it 10 days?
    [Defense Attorney]: No, sir. We just got it yesterday.
    5
    THE COURT: Okay.
    [Defense Attorney]: We’re ready and prepared though, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: Okay. Well, you’re ready to go. State ready?
    [State’s Attorney]: Yes, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: All right. Call your first witness.
    Both attorneys then proceeded to present an opening statement to the trial
    court, and the State called its first witness, Anthony Gaskill (Gaskill), a drug test
    administrator. Gaskill testified that he works for Davis Investigation Services, the
    company that holds a contract with Montgomery County Probation to administer
    drug testing and that tests everyone who is on bond or probation. During the
    questioning of Gaskill, the following exchange occurred:
    [State’s Attorney]: Okay. Do you have any special training to conduct
    these tests?
    [Gaskill]: Just on-si[te] training.
    [State’s Attorney]: Now, were you asked to conduct a urinalysis
    specimen or urinalysis test on Lawrence Dirden?
    [Gaskill]: Yes, sir.
    [State’s Attorney]: And do you recall when you were requested to
    perform that specimen?
    [Defense Attorney]: May it please the Court? We’re going to object to
    this testimony whatsoever because this is a new allegation that was
    joined on February the 19th, an allegation that allegedly occurred on
    January the 19th. It was filed within 7 days before the date of the
    6
    hearing; and therefore, it should not be allowed under section 42.12,
    subparagraph 21.
    [State’s Attorney]: May I respond, Your Honor?
    THE COURT: Sure.
    [State’s Attorney]: Before the hearing, he brought up the issue that he
    had not had 10 day’s [sic] notice. He said he was willing and ready to
    go forward.
    THE COURT: I agree. Objection is overruled.
    [Defense Attorney]: Note our exception, Your Honor?
    THE COURT: Noted.
    Gaskill testified that Lawrence appeared on the date requested for a
    urinalysis and that, after Lawrence provided a sample, Gaskill labelled it and sent
    the sample to Redwood Laboratory in California for testing. The defense made a
    hearsay objection to the testimony, and argued that Gaskill was testifying from a
    document not admitted into evidence. The court overruled the objections. Gaskill
    testified that alcohol testing was performed on the sample Lawrence provided.
    John Martin (Martin), a toxicologist with the Redwood Laboratory in
    California, testified by telephone. Lawrence objected to Mr. Martin’s telephonic
    testimony stating that Lawrence was entitled to prior notice of the State’s intent to
    admit telephonic testimony. The Court overruled Lawrence’s objection. Martin
    7
    testified as to the validity of the laboratory test results on Lawrence’s urine sample
    and that Lawrence’s test result demonstrated Lawrence had consumed alcohol.
    Lisa Foster (Foster) testified that she is a community supervision officer and
    that she did a presentence investigation in 2014 before Lawrence was sentenced.
    Foster explained that she met with Lawrence concerning restitution when she
    prepared the presentence investigation and also in January of 2016. According to
    Foster, when she was preparing her presentence investigation, Lawrence “said he
    would do anything necessary to make it right with the victims of the offense. He
    said he would sell his assets and do whatever he needed to do to make it right.”
    Foster explained that, at that time, Lawrence owned property, a house, a logging
    company, and a water business. Foster also testified that, in January of 2016,
    Lawrence said he was willing to sign over his interest in his house, but that “his
    wife would have to sign off on selling her half; and she’s not willing to do that.”
    Foster further testified that she sent him for alcohol testing when she met with him
    on January 19, 2016, but that she did not then have reason to believe he was
    drinking and she was “shocked” that the test results were positive for alcohol.
    Foster also agreed that Lawrence had made monthly restitution payments.
    Isaac Martin (Ike) testified that Lawrence and Denise took Ike’s money and
    used it to build a house, which Ike understood was appraised at about $800,000
    8
    and that there was a $25,000 lien against the house. According to Ike, Lawrence
    also owned several parcels of land, totaling about eighty acres. Ike testified that he
    understood that Lawrence was going to sign over his interest in the property, and
    that Ike had consulted with an attorney regarding Lawrence signing over his
    interest, but that Lawrence had failed to sign over his interest and Ike did not
    believe Lawrence was willing to do so. According to Ike, Lawrence’s land is listed
    for sale but Ike believed that the land was overpriced.
    Robert Clark (Clark), CEO of the Bank of San Jacinto County (the Bank),
    testified that Lawrence had been a client of the Bank for a long time and Lawrence
    had obtained numerous loans over the years. According to Clark, after September
    of 2014, Lawrence attempted to obtain a loan in the amount of $350,000 from the
    Bank and the Bank denied the loan. Clark explained that Lawrence owned three
    tracts of land that are mortgaged through the Bank, that Lawrence owed about
    $130,000 on the land at the time of the hearing, and that Lawrence owed about
    $230,000 total debt to the Bank. Clark testified that the approximate value of the
    three tracts of land was “in [the] range[]” of $800,000. Clark also testified that
    some of Lawrence’s loans were collateralized with equipment or vehicles.
    Lawrence did not testify and he offered no witnesses. At the close of the
    hearing, the trial court found the allegations in the motion to revoke “[t]rue[]” on
    9
    both “paragraphs one and two.” The trial court announced a sentence of ten years
    in the TDCJ and ordered that the fine, restitution, and court costs would carry over
    from the original case.
    ISSUES ON APPEAL
    On appeal, Appellant raises four issues challenging the trial court’s
    revocation of his community supervision. First, Appellant argues that the State
    filed an untimely motion to revoke community supervision which was “an error,
    defect, irregularity, or variance that affected appellant’s substantial rights.”
    Second, Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the
    State’s paragraph one in the Motion to Revoke Community Supervision “true”
    because the State’s only evidence for its allegation that Appellant tested positive
    for alcohol in random urinalysis was inadmissible. Appellant argues that the trial
    court erred in allowing the toxicologist to testify telephonically and contends that
    the lab report was not properly authenticated and was admitted erroneously.
    Consequently, Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support a
    finding that Appellant violated the terms of his community supervision by
    ingesting alcohol. Third, Appellant argues that the State failed to prove by a
    preponderance of the evidence that Appellant violated the terms of his community
    supervision because the State failed to establish that Appellant was “able to pay
    10
    and did not pay as ordered by the judge when the defendant refused to sell the
    homestead[]” and that “the State cannot infer from appellant’s refusal to abandon
    his homestead property that he intentionally failed to pay.” And, fourth, Appellant
    contends that the “revocation of defendant’s community supervision due to
    defendant’s inability to pay the restitution violated the equal protection clause
    under the Fourteenth Amendment.”
    ANALYSIS
    Standard of Review
    When reviewing an order revoking community supervision, the sole
    question before this Court is whether the trial court abused its discretion. See
    Rickels v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 759
    , 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). In a revocation
    proceeding, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
    defendant violated a condition of community supervision as alleged in the motion
    to revoke. 
    Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763-64
    ; Cobb v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 871
    , 874
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). In the context of a revocation proceeding, “a
    preponderance of the evidence” means “‘that greater weight of the credible
    evidence which would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a
    condition of his [community supervision].” 
    Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 764
    .
    11
    In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a revocation, we
    view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Jones v.
    State, 
    589 S.W.2d 419
    , 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The trial court abuses its
    discretion only if its decision “was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone
    within which reasonable persons might disagree.” Cantu v. State, 
    842 S.W.2d 667
    ,
    682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (citing Montgomery v. State, 
    810 S.W.2d 372
    , 391
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on reh’g)). Revocation is appropriate when a
    preponderance of the evidence supports at least one of the State’s allegations that
    the defendant violated a condition of his community supervision. See Leonard v.
    State, 
    385 S.W.3d 570
    , 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). A single violation of a term of
    community supervision is sufficient to support the trial court’s decision to revoke
    community supervision. Moore v. State, 
    605 S.W.2d 924
    , 926 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1980); Bessard v. State, 
    464 S.W.3d 427
    , 429 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
    2015, pet. ref’d). The trial court is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses
    and the weight to be given their testimony. Hacker v. State, 
    389 S.W.3d 860
    , 865
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
    12
    Amended Motion to Revoke
    Article 42.12, section 21(b-2) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
    imposes an obligation on the State to file and serve notice of an amended motion to
    revoke at least seven days before the revocation hearing.2 Tex. Code Crim. Proc.
    Ann. art. 42.12, § 21(b-2) (West Supp. 2016). An untimely motion to amend a
    motion to revoke community supervision is a statutory violation and thus subject to
    a harm analysis, under which any “error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does
    not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b); Lopez v.
    State, 
    318 S.W.3d 910
    , 916-17 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2010, no pet.)
    (untimely motion to amend motion to revoke community supervision is statutory
    violation, thus subject to Rule 44.2(b) harm analysis); see also Aguirre-Mata v.
    State, 
    992 S.W.2d 495
    , 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). When evaluating whether a
    defendant was harmed under Rule 44.2(b), we look to the record as a whole to
    determine whether the defendant’s “substantial rights” were affected. Davison v.
    State, 
    405 S.W.3d 682
    , 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
    2
    “In a felony case, the state may amend the motion to revoke community
    supervision any time up to seven days before the date of the revocation hearing,
    after which time the motion may not be amended except for good cause shown,
    and in no event may the state amend the motion after the commencement of taking
    evidence at the hearing. The judge may continue the hearing for good cause shown
    by either the defendant or the state.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12,
    § 21(b-2) (West Supp. 2016).
    13
    At the beginning of the revocation hearing, the trial court inquired whether
    the defense had received the amended motion to revoke, and the defense
    acknowledged it was “ready to go.” The Appellant did not lodge an objection to
    the timeliness of the amendment at that time. Appellant argues that his objection
    that he made during Gaskill’s testimony preserved his complaint that the Amended
    Motion was untimely. We disagree.
    Appellant indicated at the beginning of the proceeding that he was willing to
    proceed with the revocation hearing as to the allegations made within the Amended
    Motion. Appellant never sought a continuance nor did he ask for additional time to
    prepare for the hearing, Appellant did not argue that he was surprised by the
    allegations in the Amended Motion, and he did not argue that he would be harmed
    by proceeding with the hearing on the Amended Motion. By failing to timely
    object to the State’s amendment and by agreeing to proceed with a hearing on the
    Amended Motion, the Appellant waived his complaint on appeal that the State’s
    amendment was untimely. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Burns v. State, 
    835 S.W.2d 733
    , 735 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref’d) (failure to object at the
    commencement of a revocation hearing to the State’s amended motion to revoke
    waived error for appeal).
    14
    A party must make his objection at the earliest possible opportunity, and the
    point of error on appeal must comport with the objection made at trial. Yazdchi v.
    State, 
    428 S.W.3d 831
    , 844 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing Wilson v. State, 
    71 S.W.3d 346
    , 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). In this case, Appellant’s counsel not
    only did not object to having received the Amended Motion the day before the
    hearing, but expressly stated on the record “[w]e’re ready and prepared[.]” Failure
    to lodge a timely objection and the Appellant’s express agreement to proceed with
    the hearing constitutes a waiver of any issue regarding the timeliness of the State’s
    amended motion. See 
    Burns, 835 S.W.2d at 735
    . Appellant has not preserved error
    on this issue for our review. 
    Id. Accordingly, we
    overrule Appellant’s first issue.
    Testimony of Toxicologist and Sufficiency
    of Evidence Regarding Alcohol
    In his second issue, Appellant complains about the trial court’s admission of
    the testimony of the toxicologist who testified at the hearing by telephone.
    Appellant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the witness to testify by
    telephone, and because such evidence was improperly admitted, the evidence was
    insufficient to support a finding that Appellant violated the terms of his community
    supervision by ingesting alcohol.
    When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court must
    consider all evidence in the record, regardless of whether that evidence was
    15
    admissible or inadmissible. See Winfrey v. State, 
    393 S.W.3d 763
    , 767 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2013) (citing Powell v. State, 
    194 S.W.3d 503
    , 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006);
    Conner v. State, 
    67 S.W.3d 192
    , 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); and Dewberry v.
    State, 
    4 S.W.3d 735
    , 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)).
    The State argues that Appellant’s challenge regarding the evidence
    pertaining to alcohol “is based entirely on arguments regarding the admissibility of
    the evidence, and he does not complain that the evidence actually admitted was
    insufficient.” To the extent Appellant is challenging the admission of such
    evidence at trial, we review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under an
    abuse of discretion standard. See Johnson v. State, 
    490 S.W.3d 895
    , 908 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2016) (citing Tillman v. State, 
    354 S.W.3d 425
    , 435 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2011)). A trial court has broad discretion regarding the mode and order of
    examining witnesses. See Tex. R. Evid. 611; Dang v. State, 
    154 S.W.3d 616
    , 619
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). This Court has previously acknowledged that a trial court
    has the discretion to permit remote testimony in certain instances without violating
    the Sixth Amendment, and has further acknowledged that the application of the
    Confrontation Clause to a punishment hearing remains an open question. See
    Rivera v. State, 
    381 S.W.3d 710
    , 713 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2012, pet. ref’d);
    Peluso v. State, No. 09-11-00049-CR, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 5122, at **4-7 (Tex.
    16
    App.—Beaumont June 27, 2012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
    publication). We need not engage in a Sixth Amendment or Confrontation Clause
    analysis in this matter because Appellant did not make any such objections at trial,
    nor does he include such in his appellate brief. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a);
    
    Yazdchi, 428 S.W.3d at 844
    (failure to make a timely objection at trial waives error
    for appeal).
    The only objection raised by Appellant at trial and now on appeal is that he
    was entitled to “previous notice[]” if the State intended to present the witness’s
    testimony by telephone. Appellant argues on appeal that Article 39.02 authorized
    the State to admit a witness’s testimony by deposition, and Article 39.04 of the
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure explains that the taking of depositions shall be
    governed by the rules prescribed in civil cases. Appellant contends that the civil
    rules require a party to take a deposition of the witness as a prerequisite to the use
    of telephonic testimony, and therefore the State was forbidden from utilizing
    telephonic testimony in the revocation hearing without first complying with the
    deposition requirement contained in the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
    See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 30.012 (West 2015). Appellant further cites to
    Frangias v. State, 
    450 S.W.3d 125
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2013), to support Appellant’s
    17
    conclusion that the trial court erred in allowing the State to use telephonic
    testimony at the hearing.
    Frangias concerned a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel where the
    defendant’s trial counsel sought to have an out-of-town witness testify by
    telephone and trial counsel had not deposed the witness prior to trial or sought a
    continuance to secure the witness’s testimony. See generally 
    id. The Court
    of
    Criminal Appeals explained that, although the witness was “the only witness who
    could directly corroborate the [defendant’s] account[,]” defendant’s trial counsel
    had not obtained a sworn affidavit from the witness and had not offered any formal
    proof that the witness was incapable of travelling to trial. 
    Id. at 137,
    138. The
    Court further concluded that trial counsel’s own affidavits showed that defense
    counsel should have been able to meet the standard for admitting testimony by
    deposition or for requesting a continuance. 
    Id. at 140-44.
    The Court determined
    that the intermediate appellate court erred in concluding that trial counsel’s
    performance was not deficient and remanded the case for a determination of
    prejudice under Strickland. 
    Id. at 144
    (citing Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984)).
    We find Frangias inapposite. The State’s use of telephonic testimony in the
    case at bar was unrelated to a claim of ineffective assistance or to the
    18
    guilt/innocence determination on which Lawrence’s original conviction was based.
    Rather, the telephonic testimony in this case occurred in a revocation proceeding.
    We note that the record also includes Lawrence’s sworn and signed Stipulation to
    Evidence, wherein he “waive[d] the appearance, confrontation and cross-
    examination of witnesses and consent[ed] to the introduction of testimony by oral
    stipulations, affidavits, written statements and other documentary evidence[.]”3
    Accordingly, by this Stipulation, Appellant waived any challenge to the
    appearance of John Martin and also waived any challenge to the toxicology report,
    including Appellant’s argument on appeal that the toxicology report was not
    properly authenticated.4
    The Judgment states that the trial court granted the State’s motion to revoke
    “[a]fter hearing the State’s motion, Defendant’s plea, the evidence submitted, and
    3
    We also note that, in the sworn and signed Stipulation of Evidence,
    Appellant “agree[d] and confess[ed] that all the acts and allegations in Paragraphs I
    [and] II” of the “State’s Original Motion to Revoke Community Supervision filed
    with the District Clerk on or about February 18, 2016,” are “true and correct, and
    all of said conduct constituted violations of the conditions of my community
    supervision and occurred during the period in which the conditions of my
    community supervision were mandatory.” The Stipulation is signed by Appellant
    and his trial attorney.
    4
    Despite the presence in the record of a signed Stipulation of Evidence,
    during the trial Appellant objected to State’s Exhibit 1, the toxicology report, on
    the basis that it had not been properly authenticated. The trial court overruled the
    objection.
    19
    reviewing the record[.]” The Stipulation constituted a judicial admission and
    Appellant thereby “waived his right to put the government to its proof” as to the
    evidence to which Appellant stipulated. See Bryant v. State, 
    187 S.W.3d 397
    , 402
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).5 Therefore, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient
    to establish that Lawrence violated a condition of community supervision and the
    trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s motion to revoke. See
    
    Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763-64
    .
    We overrule Appellant’s second issue.
    Nonpayment of Restitution
    Appellant contends in his third issue that there was legally and factually
    insufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision to revoke his community
    supervision regarding non-payment of restitution because the State failed to prove
    that Appellant was able to pay and did not pay, and that the State failed to establish
    that Appellant acted intentionally. And, in his fourth issue, Appellant contends that
    it is fundamentally unfair and violates his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
    protection to revoke his community supervision because of his inability to pay. We
    need not address issues three and four because a single violation of a term of
    community supervision is sufficient to support the trial court’s decision to revoke
    5
    Neither Appellant nor the State discuss or reference the Stipulation of
    Evidence in appellate briefs.
    20
    community supervision. See 
    Moore, 605 S.W.2d at 926
    ; 
    Bessard, 464 S.W.3d at 429
    . We have already concluded herein that the evidence was sufficient to
    establish that Appellant violated a condition of his community supervision by
    ingesting or consuming alcohol as alleged by the State. We overrule issues three
    and four.
    Having overruled all of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the judgment of the
    trial court.
    AFFIRMED.
    _________________________
    LEANNE JOHNSON
    Justice
    Submitted on October 11, 2016
    Opinion Delivered December 7, 2016
    Do Not Publish
    Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.
    21