Antoinette Marconi and Roy Marconi v. Brandywine Chrysler Jeep, Inc. ( 2014 )


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  •   IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE
    IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
    ANTOINETTE MARCONI, and                         )
    ROY MARCONI                                     )
    )
    Plaintiffs,                      )
    )
    )     C.A. No.: CPU4-13-003182
    )
    v.                                    )
    )
    BRANDYWINE CHRYSLER JEEP, INC.,                 )
    CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC, and JIFFY                  )
    LUBE SERVICE CENTER #312,                       )
    )
    Defendants.                      )
    Submitted:   September 19, 2014
    Decided:     November 7, 2014
    Matthew M. Bartkowski, Esq.                           Matthew E. O’Byrne, Esq.
    Heather Long, Esq.                                    Casarino, Christman & Shalk
    Kimmel, Carter, Roman & Peltz, P.A.                   405 N. King Street, Ste 300
    Plaza 273                                             P.O. Box 1276
    P.O. Box 8149                                         Wilmington, DE 19899
    Newark, DE 19714                                      Attorney for Defendant Jiffy Lube
    Attorneys for Plaintiffs
    Nichole T. Whetham Warner, Esq.
    Marshall, Dennehey, Warner,
    Coleman & Goggin
    1220 Market Street, 5th Floor
    P.O. Box 8888
    Wilmington, DE 19899
    Attorney for Chrysler Defendants
    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
    This is an appeal from the Justice of the Peace Court pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 9571.
    Plaintiffs Antoinette and Roy Marconi (“Plaintiffs”) brought this breach of contract action
    against Defendants Brandywine Chrysler Jeep, Inc. and Chrysler Group, LLC (collectively,
    “the Chrysler Defendants”) and Defendant Jiffy Lube Service Center #312 (“Jiffy Lube”)
    for damages to Plaintiff’s vehicle, which was sold and manufactured by the Chrysler
    Defendants, and serviced by Jiffy Lube.
    On October 9, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal from an Order of the Justice
    of the Peace Court dismissing with prejudice Plaintiffs’ case against the Chrysler Defendants,
    holding that the statute of limitations had run.
    On December 16, 2013, the Chrysler Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (“the
    Motion”) arguing that the Court does not have jurisdiction over this matter because
    Plaintiffs failed to perfect the appeal under Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 72.3(c) and the
    mirror image rule, and that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of limitations pursuant
    to 6 Del. C. § 2-725. On September 19, 2014, this Court held a hearing on the Motion. The
    Court found that Plaintiffs complied with Rule 72.3(c), however it reserved decision on the
    Chrysler Defendants’ mirror image rule argument and statute of limitations argument.
    At the hearing, the parties stipulated that with regard to the Chrysler Defendants’
    statute of limitations argument, the Motion relied on matters outside of the pleadings,
    thereby converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.1
    Accordingly, the Court afforded Plaintiffs ten days to file a supplemental argument, and the
    Chrysler Defendants to file a supplemental affidavit.
    1   See Furman v. Delaware Dept. of Transp., 
    30 A.3d 771
     (Del. 2011).
    2
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    On June 19, 2009, Plaintiffs purchased a 2008 Chrysler Pacifica (“vehicle”) from
    Defendant Brandywine Chrysler Jeep, Inc. (“Brandywine Chrysler”).                            This vehicle was
    manufactured by Defendant Chrysler Group, LLC (“Chrysler Group, LLC”). On April 18,
    2012 the Plaintiffs took the vehicle to be serviced at Jiffy Lube, and Jiffy Lube changed the
    vehicle’s oil and oil filter.2 On December 15, 2012, about three years and six months after
    purchasing the vehicle, Plaintiffs brought the vehicle to Brandywine Chrysler stating that the
    ‘check engine’ light was on, and that the engine stalled while driving and subsequently would
    not start.3 Upon inspection, Brandywine Chrysler observed damage to the crank-shaft and
    “oil starvation” in the engine.4 Plaintiffs however, “declined further work,” as evidenced by
    an invoice from Brandywine Chrysler.5 At that point, the Chrysler Defendants denied
    coverage of the engine repair, and Plaintiffs brought this breach of contract action.6
    On March 22, 2013 Plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Justice of the Peace Court
    against the Chrysler Defendants and Jiffy Lube. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that “the
    defendants improperly repaired, maintained and/or manufactured the plaintiff’s [sic] 2008
    Chrysler causing the engine to malfunction.”7 Plaintiffs sought damages for the cost of the
    2   Jiffy Lube also provided other services, however they are not relevant to this matter.
    3   Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at paragraph 18.
    4   Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Exhibit F.
    5   
    Id.
    6   Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at paragraph 18.
    7
    Plaintiffs’ JP Complaint Page 1.
    3
    engine repair and the cost of the rental car that Plaintiffs used while the repairs were being
    made on their vehicle.
    On September 24, 2013, the Justice of the Peace Court dismissed the action after
    finding that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations pursuant to
    6 Del.C.§ 2-725. The court concluded that Plaintiffs’ claims were filed two years after the
    expiration of the four-year statute of limitations because Plaintiffs filed their complaint on
    March 22, 2013, and the cause of action accrued on September 24, 2007.
    On October 9, 2013, Plaintiffs filed the Complaint on Appeal in this Court,
    maintaining that the vehicle “suffered catastrophic failure” after the ‘check engine’ light
    turned on, and that Brandywine Chrysler and Jiffy Lube were negligent in servicing and
    inspecting the vehicle. Plaintiffs also allege that the Chrysler Defendants breached express
    or implied warranties for the vehicle. Plaintiffs also aver that the Chrysler Defendants
    “failed to warn the [P]laintiffs below, appellants[,] of the potential hazard existing in the
    engine of the 2008 Chrysler Pacifica,” and that they “failed to inform the [P]laintiffs below,
    appellants[,] of the proper service procedures for the 2008 Chrysler Pacifica.”8
    On December 16, 2013, the Chrysler Defendants filed the present motion, which
    was heard on September 19, 2014.
    PARTIES’ CONTENTIONS
    In its motion, the Chrysler Defendants contend the following: (1) that Plaintiffs failed
    to comply with Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 72.3(c) by failing to state the grounds of the
    8   Id.
    4
    appeal; (2) that Plaintiffs’ Complaint on Appeal violates the Mirror Image Rule codified in
    Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 72.3(f); and (3) that Plaintiffs’ cause of action is barred by the
    statute of limitations imposed by 6 Del. C. § 2-725(1).9
    Regarding the Chrysler Defendants’ argument of the Mirror Image Rule, they claim
    that Plaintiffs have added new language to the complaint on appeal that is different from the
    complaint below. The Chrysler Defendants allege that the “failed to warn” and “failed to
    inform” language in the complaint on appeal but not in the complaint below, is new
    language and as such is a violation of the Mirror Image Rule.
    With respect to the third argument concerning the statute of limitations, the Chrysler
    Defendants contend that Plaintiffs filed the complaint below outside of the applicable
    statute of limitations. The Chrysler Defendants contend the vehicle is covered by a repair
    and replace warranty, governed by 6 Del. C. § 2-725. Under § 2-725, an action for breach of
    contract must commence within four years after the cause of action accrued. The Chrysler
    Defendants further maintain that under Delaware law, the date Chrysler LLC., delivered the
    vehicle to Brandywine Chrysler is the accrual date, and because the vehicle was delivered on
    September 24, 2007, Plaintiffs’ claims, filed on March 22, 2013, are outside of the statute of
    limitations.
    In response to the Chrysler Defendants’ latter two claims, Plaintiffs contend that the
    complaint on appeal does not violate the Mirror Image Rule because the complaint on
    appeal merely asserts with specificity those causes of action that were before the Justice of
    the Peace Court; Plaintiffs also contend that there are genuine issues of material fact
    9 Since I already found that Plaintiffs complied with Rule 72.3(c), I will not address the Chrysler Defendants’
    first claim in detail.
    5
    regarding the Chrysler Defendants’ statute of limitations argument, rendering consideration
    of the Motion premature.
    Plaintiffs further argue that the complaint on appeal does not violate the Mirror
    Image Rule because it does not raise any new issues. Plaintiffs maintain that by including the
    “failed to warn” and “failed to inform” language, the complaint on appeal merely states the
    claims from the complaint below with specificity and does not alter the subject matter of the
    case below. They go on to contend that there is no mirror image rule violation because such
    language falls within the manufacturing issues asserted in the complaint below.
    Plaintiffs also argue that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the
    Chrysler Defendants’ statute of limitations argument because the actual type of warranty that
    covered the vehicle is unclear.       The type of warranty which covers the vehicle is
    determinative when the cause of action accrued and thus, when the statute of limitations
    under 6 Del. C. § 2-725 runs. Additionally, Plaintiffs contend that the Vehicle Information
    Detail Report, which contains the date of delivery, is unclear and creates another genuine
    issue of material fact since the delivery date triggers the start of the four-year statute of
    limitations applicable to repair and replace warranties.
    6
    DISCUSSION
    Addressing the issues seriatim:
    A. The Mirror Image Rule
    The Mirror Image Rule, as codified by Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 72.3(f),
    provides that an appeal to this Court that “fails to join the identical parties and raise the
    same issues that were before the court below shall result in a dismissal on jurisdictional
    grounds.”10 Delaware courts have found that “[a]bsent good reason . . . the rule should not
    be applied to preclude a court from possessing subject matter jurisdiction.”11 In determining
    whether there is good reason to apply the rule, the Court must conduct a case-specific
    factual inquiry, looking for actual or potential prejudice resulting from the noncompliance at
    issue.12 Moreover, where a litigant’s complaint on appeal sets forth more specific legal
    claims, without shifting the subject matter of the case below, there is no mirror image rule
    violation.13
    The language in the complaint on appeal, while not identical to the language in the
    complaint below, it brings the same claims and embraces the same subject matter. Both
    complaints allege that the Chrysler Defendants’ action, or inaction, caused the engine of
    Plaintiffs’ vehicle to malfunction. Moreover, while Plaintiffs vaguely claim that the Chrysler
    Defendants improperly repaired, maintained and/or manufactured the vehicle causing the
    engine to malfunction, the complaint on appeal unpacks this causation claim so that it may
    10   CCP CIV. R. 72.3(f).
    11   Pavetto v. Hansen, 
    2004 WL 241964
     at *2 (Del. Super. 2004).
    12   
    Id.
    13   Sparks v. Kalicharan, 
    2011 WL 3035227
     at 4 (Del. Com. Pl. May 27, 2011).
    7
    better focus on the applicable legal theories. Therefore, I find the pleadings on appeal do
    not violate the Mirror Image Rule.
    B. The Applicable Statute of Limitations
    As noted supra, in the matter at hand, the Chrysler Defendants converted the motion
    to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment by attaching documents not within the
    pleadings to the motion. Accordingly, the Court will analyze the Motion under the summary
    judgment standard, as provided by Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 12(b).
    The Court will grant a motion for summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of
    material fact, and the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.14 In
    considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts in a light most
    favorable to the non-moving party and accept, as established, all undisputed factual
    assertions.15 A motion for summary judgment will not be granted where “a more thorough
    inquiry into the facts is desirable to clarify the application of the law to the circumstances.”16
    In the matter at hand, a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning the type of
    warranty that covered the vehicle. The Chrysler Defendants maintain that the vehicle is
    covered by a three year/36,000 mile express limited warranty, which is in fact, a repair and
    replace warranty. On September 19, 2014, at the hearing on the motion, although the
    Chrysler Defendants’ counsel argued that the warranty in question is a repair and replace
    warranty, counsel did not provide any documents to support this statement. To date, the
    14   McLaren v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC., 
    2006 WL 1515834
     at 2; CCP CIV. R. 56.
    15   
    Id.
     (citing Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 
    606 A.2d 96
     (Del. 1992).
    16   Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 
    180 A.2d 467
    , 465 (Del. 1962).
    8
    Chrysler Defendants have failed to provide the Court with documents indicating the terms
    of the vehicle’s warranty.
    Plaintiffs argue that the warranty in question is a guarantee, or future performance
    warranty. Plaintiffs further maintain that this type of warranty is “of endless duration,” and
    is subject to a different accrual time period, than a repair and replace warranty. To support
    this statement, Plaintiffs provided the Court with a ‘frequently asked questions’ document
    from Chrysler Group LLC.’s website entitled “New Chrysler Lifetime Powertrain Warranty
    Customers – Q&A.”17 The document lists model year vehicles covered by this warranty, and
    not covered by this warranty, and Plaintiffs’ vehicle is listed as covered.          Finally, the
    document poses the question, “What does lifetime mean?” to which it provides the answer:
    “Lifetime means lifetime.”
    In viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, I find that
    there is a genuine issue of material fact as to what type of warranty covers the vehicle. A
    more thorough inquiry into the facts is needed to clarify the application of the statute of
    limitations and proper accrual date as provided by 6 Del. C. § 2-525. Accordingly, because I
    conclude that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to the type of warranty covering the
    vehicle, the date which the vehicle was delivered to Brandywine Chrysler by Chrysler Group
    LLC, becomes relevant upon the determination of that question, which is reserved.
    17   Plaintiffs’ Response to Motion to Dismiss Exhibit M.
    9
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the Chrysler Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss/Motion for
    Summary Judgment is DENIED.
    The Clerk shall schedule the matter for trial.
    SO ORDERED
    _________________________________
    Alex J. Smalls
    Chief Judge
    Marconi-OP Nov 2014
    10
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CPU4-13-003182

Judges: Smalls

Filed Date: 11/7/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/17/2014