Minassian, Bedros Nobar ( 2015 )

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
CAUSE NO. PD-1091-15
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS
*****
BEDROS NOBAR MINASSIAN, Petitioner / Appellant
VS.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Respondent / Appellee
*****
On Petition from a Decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth District of Texas, Dallas Division
in Cause No. 05-13-00936-CR
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
THOMAS G. PAPPAS
BURLESON PATE & GIBSON, L.L.P.
TEXAS BAR CARD NO. 15455300
900 Jackson Street, Suite 330
Dallas, Texas 75202
Telephone: (214) 871-4900
Facsimile: (214) 871-7543
September 16, 2015
Email: tpappas@bp-g.com
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER/APPELLANT
BEDROS NOBAR MINASSIAN
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Table of Contents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Identity of Parties.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Index of Authorities.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Statement Regarding Oral Argument. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Statement of the Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Statement of Procedural History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Court of Appeals Opinion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Grounds for Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Reason for Review.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Analysis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Prayer for Relief. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Certificate of Service.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Appendix “A”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Opinion and Judgment dated July 16, 2015
i
IDENTITY OF PARTIES
Bedros Nobar Minassian, Petitioner
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
Thomas G. Pappas
Burleson, Pate & Gibson, L.L.P.
900 Jackson Street, Suite 330
Dallas, Texas 75202
ATTORNEYS FOR STATE
Appellate attorneys:
Susan Hawk
Michael Casillas
Dallas County District Attorney's Office
133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB 19
Dallas, Texas 75207
Revocation hearing attorneys:
Craig Watkins
David Bunger
Dallas County District Attorney's Office
133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB 19
Dallas, Texas 75207
Lisa C. McMinn
State Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 13046
Austin, Texas 78711
PRESIDING JUDGE
Honorable Teresa Hawthorne
203rd Criminal District Court
133 N. Riverfront Blvd., 7th Floor
Dallas, Texas 75207
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871 (1993) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2, 3
Johnson v. State, 386 S.W.3d 347 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2012, no pet.). . . . 2, 3, 4, 5
Statutes and Rules:
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure
Rule 4.1 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Rule 68.2(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
iii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The Petitioner requests oral argument.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Petitioner was charged by Indictment with the offense of Felony Driving
While Intoxicated (DWI 3rd). The Petitioner pled guilty on July 8, 2008 and was
sentenced to five (5) years in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice probated for
a period of ten (10) years. On June 27, 2012, a Motion to Revoke Probation was
filed. Subsequent to that, four (4) Amended Motions to Revoke Probation were filed.
The latest was filed on March 5, 2013. (CR at 58-59). On March 29, 2013, the
hearing was held on the most recent Motion to Revoke. The Petitioner pled not true.
The State proceeded on two (2) of the allegations. The Court found the allegations
to be true, revoked the Petitioner’s probation and sentenced him to nine (9) years in
the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. (CR at 60-64).
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas at Dallas in an Opinion
dated July 16, 2015 affirmed the revocation of the Petitioner’s community
supervision and sentence of nine (9) years in the Texas Department of Criminal
Justice. A Petition for Discretionary Review is timely filed if a request for extension
is filed by August 17, 2015 and the Petition for Discretionary Review is filed by
September 16, 2015. Rules 4.1 and 68.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
iv
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
CAUSE NO. PD-1091-15
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS
*****
BEDROS NOBAR MINASSIAN, Petitioner / Appellant
VS.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Respondent / Appellee
*****
On Petition from a Decision of the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth District of Texas, Dallas Division
in Cause No. 05-13-00936
PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
COMES NOW, BEDROS NOBAR MINASSIAN, Petitioner herein, and
Appellant before the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas at Dallas, Texas,
and seeks discretionary review from this Honorable Court from an opinion affirming
his conviction.
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The Court of Appeals reviewed the transcript and some of the evidence (the
Petitioner’s “probation file” was offered and allowed into evidence over the
Petitioner’s objection, but was not made part of the appellate record) of the Trial
Court’s proceeding and determined that the State met its burden of proving that the
1
Petitioner violated the terms of his community supervision.
GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
1. The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the Trial Court’s finding where
there was no evidence that the person before the Court was the same
person that was placed on probation.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in upholding the Trial Court’s finding that
the State met its burden of proving that the Petition violated the terms
of his community supervision by traveling outside Dallas County
without having first obtained written permission by admitting “into”
evidence an unmarked probation file under the guise of a custodian of
the business record exception to the hearsay rule.
REASONS FOR REVIEW
The Petitioner’s probation was without sufficient proof of violation of his
conditions of probation. He was sentenced to nine (9) years in prison.
On the issue of the Petitioner’s identity, the Appellate Court failed to properly
apply the law as set out by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Cobb v. State, 851
S.W.2d 871 (1993) in that the Appellate Court failed to apply a no-evidence standard
to proof of the Petitioner’s identity. Johnson v. State, 386 S.W.3d 347 (Tex.App.-
Amarillo 2012, no pet.). The Court improperly relied on the wrong standard from
Johnson (waiver for failure to assert) when Johnson clearly supports the Petitioner’s
claim of no evidence.
2
The Appellate Court failed to properly apply the law as it applies to the hearsay
testimony of a community supervision officer (Mr. Pacheco) who had no knowledge
of the Petitioner except from the duplicates of a file not properly authenticated or
offered into evidence. Since improperly admitted hearsay operates as having no
evidentiary value, the State failed to meet its burden of proof on violation of out of
county travel standard.
ANALYSIS
I.
The Appellate Court ruled that “the State must still prove the probationer’s
identity but failure to do so will not result in error on appeal unless the probationer
raises the issue at trial.” Johnson v. State, 386 S.W.3d 347, 350 (Tex.App.-Amarillo
2012, no pet.). However, the Appellate Court relied on the wrong legal standard.
The proper standard is a “no evidence” standard. Where, as here, the Trial Court had
no evidence that the Defendant before it was the same Defendant who was placed on
probation and given the Conditions of Probation in 2008. The proper Appellate Court
ruling should be reversal. Especially where the Court of Criminal Appeals explicitly
addresses the necessity of proving the violation. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871(1993).
The Appellate Court cites Johnson as standing for the premises that failure to
raise identity waives the issue. That is not accurate. Johnson states “the record here,
therefore contains evidence to support the Trial Court’s conclusion that the State
3
established by a preponderance of the evidence that the appellant is the individual
who was placed on community supervision by order signed April 23, 2003, for
murder in trial court cause number 44,703-B ... The Trial Court did not abuse its
discretion by finding that a preponderance of the evidence established that appellant
was the individual subject to the terms and conditions of the 2003 order placing him
on community supervision.”
There was no evidence at the revocation hearing to establish that the man in
court is the same man given the conditions of probation and placed on probation in
2008. A comparison between the evidence presented on identity on Johnson and the
absence of identity evidence in the Petitioner’s case highlights how fundamentally
flawed the Trial Court’s ruling was:
1. In Johnson, the Court addressed the defendant, who admitted he was the
same man who was placed on probation.
“Court: And Mr. Johnson, are you the same Lavalle Raphael
Johnson who was here originally on April 23rd of 2003
and pled guilty to murder?
Defendant: Yes sir.”
In the Petitioner’s case, there are no such admissions.
2. In Johnson, the defendant’s probation officer testified and identified the
defendant as the person he supervised. In the Petitioner’s case, the State
4
did not bring a community supervision officer who had any knowledge
of the case or who had ever supervised the Petitioner. The witness was
only familiar with the name of the Petitioner. (RR 3 at 10).
3. In Johnson, there were originals of documents introduced into the file.
In the Petitioner’s case, the State was only able to produce duplicates
(RR 3 at 11) and the file was never properly authenticated, offered into
evidence, or made a part of the record.
II.
A probation file was admitted into evidence over the Petitioner’s objection
when that file was not properly authenticated or marked or even offered into
evidence. Any testimony from that file would be inadmissible hearsay which has no
evidentiary value.
Q: (By Mr. Bunger) Sir, are you the custodian of the
business records for the Dallas County Community
Service Supervision and Corrections Department?
A: (By Mauricio Pacheco) I am.
Q: And is this the regular course of business of Dallas
County to keep these kinds of records?
A: It is.
Q: And you have before you the actual file on Bedros
5
Minassian; is that correct?
A: That’s correct.
Q: Are you familiar with Mr. Minassian?
A: Just the name only.
Q: Name only?
A: Yes.
Q: And did an employer, a representative of Dallas County
CSCD make these records as part of their course of
business in the Community Service Department? Is that
correct?
A: Yes, that’s correct.
Q: And were records made at or near the time the events
described therein occurred?
A: Yes.
Q: And did the person making the records or entries have
actual knowledge of these events as part of the conduct of
the business of doing?
Mr. Pappas: Well, Your Honor, I’m going to object. He doesn’t
know what they did or didn’t have actual
knowledge of. He doesn’t know anything other
6
than the name of the defendant here. That calls for
speculation on the part of this witness.
Mr. Bunger: Your Honor, it’s a standard to get the
evidence in the file that’s used to keep up
with what’s going on with Minassian’s case
as it’s being maintained throughout his term
of probation.
The Court: Objection overruled.
Mr. Bunger: Thank you, Your Honor.
Q: (By Mr. Bunger) Now, are these duplicates or originals
in the documents there in the file?
A: Specifically what are you talking about?
Q: The content of that file, is that the original documents or
duplicates?
A: Duplicates.
Q: Okay. Do you know where the originals may be kept?
A: Do not. Court jacket perhaps but I’m not sure where they
are right now.
Q: Is there anything in the file that indicates written
permission to travel outside of Dallas County?
7
A: No.
Q: Is there any – are there any identification of vehicles as
part of his conditions under paragraph – I believe it’s
paragraph Q – that indicate what vehicles Mr. Minassian
has that are equipped with the interlock device, is there
any record in there that indicates those vehicles?
A: I have no knowledge of that.
Q: You have no knowledge of that. So you can’t testify as
to what – any vehicles Mr. Minassian has reported to his
probation officer as part of his record as to what vehicles
may have or may not have interlock devices on it?
A: That’s correct.
Q: And you have no record in which he has been granted
permission to leave Dallas County; is that correct?
A: That’s correct.
Q: Is it a condition of probation that he not leave Dallas
County?
A: It is a condition.
Q: Is it also a condition of his – under his probation terms,
it was July 8, 2008, I believe, that he not operate a motor
8
vehicle without a deep lung breath analysis mechanism?
A. That’s correct.
Q: Is that correct?
A: That’s correct.
(RR 3 at 9-12).
Q: (By Mr. Pappas) Now, a couple questions. At some point
between 2008 and today, Dallas County adult probation
went online and began to keep their records or probation
officer notes online on the computer. Is that correct?
A: (By Mr. Pacheco) I’m not sure about the exact date but I
would say, yes.
Q: Okay. Andy you have before you a file there; is that
correct?
A: That’s correct.
Q: Okay. And do you print out the things that are on line
and add those to the file or not?
A: I do not personally. I just look at the computer for notes.
Q: And you don’t have any independent knowledge of this
case?
A: I do not.
9
Q: You just were given the guy’s name and told to pull his
probation file?
A: Pretty much, yes.
Q: So you can’t tell us whether what’s on the computer is
also contained on – what’s in the file?
A: I could not.
(RR 3 at 13).
Without the file that was discussed, there is no way to know exactly what was
done or not done by the Community Supervision Officer vis-a-vis its Probationer.
What can be said with certainty is that the testifying witness, Mr. Pacheco, had no
personal or first-hand knowledge regarding the Petitioner. Therefore, his hearsay
testimony has no evidentiary value as to any of the elements of the alleged violation
of traveling outside the county. Merely because the probation revocation proceedings
are not a jury trial does not excuse the State or the Trial Court from following
evidentiary rules and the law. Mr. Pacheco gave hearsay from “duplicates” (unknown
originals) in a probationer’s file, a file that was never offered into evidence, much less
marked and numbered as an exhibit. Further, that file appeared to be, in part, a paper
file and, in part, a computer file. Finally, nothing from that file made its way into the
record for the Trial Court or the Appellate Court to review. As such, Mr. Pacheco’s
improper hearsay testimony can only be treated as having no evidentiary value.
10
Therefore, the State’s proof of a violated probation condition fails as a matter of law
under the no-evidence standard.
This Court must insist by its rulings that courts follow rules and that people not
be sent to prison when the courts fail to follow those rules. A review of the Appellate
Court’s ruling will clarify and reinforce a trial court’s necessity of following the law
in probation revocation proceedings.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
The Petitioner respectfully prays that this Court grant the Petition for
Discretionary Review, after briefing and argument, reverse the Court of Appeals’
opinion, and reinstate his probation.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Thomas G. Pappas
_______________________________
THOMAS G. PAPPAS
TEXAS BAR CARD No.15455300
BURLESON PATE & GIBSON, L.L.P.
900 Jackson Street, Suite 330
Dallas, Texas 75202
Telephone: (214) 871-4900
Facsimile: (214) 871-7543
Email: tpappas@bp-g.com
COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER /
APPELLANT BEDROS NOBAR
MINASSIAN
11
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This will certify that a copy of the foregoing was delivered via electronic filing
and/or certified mail, return receipt requested to the following:
Susan Hawk Lisa C. McMinn
Michael Casillas State Prosecuting Attorney
Craig Watkins P.O. Box 13046
David Bunger Austin, Texas 78711
Dallas County District Attorney's Office
133 N. Riverfront Blvd., LB 19
Dallas, Texas 75207
DATED the 16th day of September, 2015.
/s/ Thomas G. Pappas
_______________________________
THOMAS G. PAPPAS
12
APPENDIX “A”
Affirmed as Modified; Opinion Filed July 16 , 2015.
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-13-00936-CR
BEDROS NOBAR MINASSIAN, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F-0854609-P
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Lang, Brown and Whitehill
Opinion by Justice Lang
This is an appeal from a judgment revoking community supervision. In July 2008,
Bedros Nobar Minassian was convicted of third degree felony driving while intoxicated and
placed on community supervision for five years. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 49.04(a),
49.09(b)(2) (West Supp. 2014). On the State’s motion, the trial court revoked Minassian’s
community supervision and sentenced him to nine years’ imprisonment. In two issues,
Minassian asserts the State failed to meet its burden of proving he violated the terms of his
community supervision. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
The State moved to revoke Minassian’s community supervision in June 2012 based on
alleged violations in February 2012 of certain terms of community supervision. The State
amended its motion four times and proceeded at the revocation hearing on allegations in its
March 3, 2013 motion that Minassian violated, “on or about February 12, 2012 through February
19, 2012,” condition (g), requiring, in relevant part, he obtain written permission from the trial
court or supervising officer before traveling outside Dallas County, and violated, “on or about
February 12, 2012 and the week to follow,” condition (q), requiring he not drive unless the car is
equipped with a deep lung breath analysis mechanism.1 The State did not call Minassian’s
supervision officer as a witness. However, Mauricio Pacheco, the custodian of business records
for the community service supervision and corrections department testified that the terms of
community supervision included Minassian not travel outside Dallas County without written
permission and that he not drive a car that was not equipped with a deep lung breath analysis
mechanism or interlock device. Pacheco also testified nothing in Minassian’s paper or electronic
file reflected Minassian had obtained written permission to travel outside the county, but he
could have received verbal permission.
The State also called Secret Service special agent Troy Sarria and Minassian’s friends
James Epstein and Anna Saenz-Taylor. These witnesses testified they had seen Minassian
driving without the required interlock device on more than one occasion. Sarria specifically
recalled seeing Minassian drive without the device in 2012 on a day when it was “warm
outside,” and Epstein specifically recalled seeing Minassian drive without the device in February
2012. According to Epstein, he and Minassian drove from Chicago to Dallas during that month.
1
The State also alleged he violated condition (a), prohibiting him from violating state laws, condition (j), requiring him to pay community
supervision fees, and condition (o), prohibiting him, in part, from consuming alcohol. The parties do not dispute the State abandoned these
allegations.
–2–
Minassian did not call any witnesses. but offered, without objection, the district clerk’s
computer log of the trial court’s activity as an exhibit. This exhibit reflected that on January 5,
2010, the trial court signed an “interlock removal order.”2
II. MOTION TO REVOKE
Minassian’s two issues assert the State’s proof had “numerous holes” and did not satisfy
the required preponderance of the evidence standard. Specifically, he contends the State failed to
(1) ask the trial court to take judicial notice of its file; (2) establish he was the same person who
had been convicted and placed on probation; (3) establish he was served with the community
supervision terms or “even what [those terms] were;” and (4) establish any violation occurred
during the alleged time frame. He further asserts, with respect to the allegation that he violated
condition (q) by driving without the required interlock device, that the district clerk’s log of the
trial court’s activity specifically showed the trial court ordered removal of the device. With
respect to the allegation that he violated condition (g), he asserts also that the State failed to
“offer the probation file into evidence or bring[] a supervision officer who had actually
supervised [his] probation.”
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s order revoking community supervision for
abuse of discretion. Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Because the
trial judge is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to give the evidence, in
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, an appellate court reviews the evidence
in the light most favorable to the order. See id.; Lee v. State, 952 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1997, no pet.) (en banc) (citing Garrett v. State, 619 S.W.2d 172, 174 (Tex. Crim. App.
2
This order is contained in the clerk’s record and states removal of the interlock device was authorized because Minassian’s car “was
inoperable.”
–3–
[Panel Op.] 1981)). An appellate court will conclude the trial court abused its discretion if the
State failed to meet its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the probationer
violated the terms of community supervision. Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 897. The State meets its
burden when the greater weight of the credible evidence creates a reasonable belief that the
probationer violated the terms of community supervision during “a time period anterior to the
filing of the motion to revoke and within the period of probation.” See Rickels v. State, 202
S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Scamardo v. State, 517 S.W.2d 293, 298
(Tex. Crim. App. 1974)); Diaz v. State, 516 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). Because
the execution of the sentence of a probationer is delayed contingent upon the successful
completion of the community supervision conditions, a probation revocation hearing is an
extension of the original sentencing hearing, and proof of the judgment of conviction and terms
of community supervision is unnecessary. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 873-74 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1993). The State must still prove the probationer’s identity, but failure to do so will not
result in error on appeal unless the probationer raises the issue at trial. Id; Johnson v. State, 386
S.W.3d 347, 350 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.) (citations omitted). When, as here, the
State’s motion to revoke alleges multiple violations of the terms of community supervision,
proof of any one of the alleged violations is sufficient to support the revocation order. See Smith
v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
B. Application of Law to Facts
Minassian argues the State had to offer his file into evidence or call his supervision
officer in order to establish the terms of community supervision and that he was served with
those terms and establish either of the alleged violations occurred during the time period alleged.
However, the State’s burden was to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Minassian
violated condition (g) or condition (q) prior to the June 2012 filing of the motion to revoke and
–4–
within the five-year period of probation that began in July 2008. See Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 342;
Diaz, 516 S.W.2d at 156; Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 897. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we conclude the State met its burden. Minassian’s identity
was not at issue at trial, and Pacheco’s and Epstein’s testimonies established Minassian traveled
outside Dallas County without written permission. Their testimony “created a reasonable belief”
that Minassian violated condition (g) of the terms of community supervision and was sufficient
to support the trial court’s order revoking Minassian’s community supervision. We decide
Minassian’s issue challenging the State’s proof with respect to the allegation that he violated
condition (g) against him. In light of this, we do not address his issue challenging the State’s
proof with respect to condition (q). See Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 342.
III. MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT
We note the judgment incorrectly recites that Minassian pleaded true to the allegations in
the motion to revoke and that the trial court found Minassian violated the conditions of
community supervision as set out in the “State’s Original Motion to Revoke Community
Supervision.” Because an appellate court has the authority to modify an incorrect judgment to
make the record speak the truth, we modify the judgment to reflect Minassian pleaded not true
and was found to have violated the conditions of community supervision as set out in the State’s
March 3, 2013 “Motion to Revoke Community Supervision.” See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b);
Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526,
529-30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d).
–5–
IV. CONCLUSION
As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Douglas S. Lang/
DOUGLAS S. LANG
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
130936F.U05
–6–
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
BEDROS NOBAR MINASSIAN, Appellant On Appeal from the 194th Judicial District
Court, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-13-00936-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. F-0854609-P.
Opinion delivered by Justice Lang. Justices
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Brown and Whitehill participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, we MODIFY the trial court’s judgment as
follows:
(1) in the section entitled “Plea to Motion to Revoke:,” the plea of “TRUE” is
replaced with “NOT TRUE;” and,
(2) the statement in the judgment that “The Court FINDS Defendant has violated
the conditions of community supervision as set out in the State’s ORIGINAL
Motion to Revoke Community Supervision as follows:
See attached Motion to Revoke Community Supervision.”
is replaced with “The Court FINDS Defendant has violated the terms of
community supervision as set out in the State’s March 3, 2013 Motion to Revoke
Community Supervision.”
As MODIFIED, we AFFIRM the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment entered this 16th day of July, 2015.
–7–