United States v. Matthew Kroffke ( 2019 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 19a0292n.06
No. 18-3922
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Jun 06, 2019
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
MATTHEW KROFFKE, THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO
Defendant-Appellant.
BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; SILER and CLAY, Circuit Judges.
CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Matthew Kroffke appeals the sentence imposed by the
district court following Kroffke’s pleading guilty to armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a) and (d), and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). We find that the district court’s sentence, which fell at the bottom end of the
guidelines range, was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 28, 2018, the grand jury returned a two-count indictment against Kroffke,
charging him with armed bank robbery and brandishing a weapon during a crime of violence.
Kroffke pleaded guilty to both counts without a plea agreement. In preparation for sentencing,
probation filed a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”). The PSI determined that Kroffke’s
Criminal History Category was I. The PSI calculated Kroffke’s total offense level for Count 1 as
19, resulting in a guidelines range of 30 to 37 months of imprisonment, and found that Count 2
Case No. 18-3922, United States v. Kroffke
triggered a statutory mandatory minimum term of 84 months of imprisonment, to run
consecutively to any sentence imposed for Count 1. After combining the 30 to 37 month guideline
range for Count 1 and the 84-month mandatory minimum term for Count 2, Kroffke faced a
guideline prison term of 114 to 121 months.
Kroffke filed a sentencing memorandum in which he asked the district court to vary
downward from the guidelines range and impose an 84-month sentence. Kroffke argued that
mitigating personal circumstances warranted a downward variance. He stated that he had a long
employment history and had lived a law-abiding life until he began experiencing debilitating hip
pain in June of 2016. The hip pain forced him to take a leave of absence from his employment as
a carpenter, caused him to move back in with his parents to receive proper medical care, and
ultimately necessitated surgery, which confined him to bed for approximately six months.
Kroffke’s injury coincided with his wife’s filing for divorce and leaving him for another man, who
moved into the house Kroffke had shared with his wife and three children. According to Kroffke,
these unfortunate events plunged him into a deep depression, caused him to suffer severe anxiety,
and precipitated his robbing a bank at gunpoint out of desperation. Kroffke additionally argued
that a downward variance was warranted because he continues to experience severe hip pain and
because the government exercised its discretion to charge him with Count 2, which carried an 84-
month mandatory minimum sentence. Kroffke filed eighteen letters in support along with his
sentencing memorandum. The government also filed a sentencing memorandum in which it
requested that the district court impose a sentence within the guidelines range.
The district court held a sentencing hearing on September 21, 2018. The court stated that,
according to the PSI, Kroffke’s guidelines range was 114 to 121 months. Kroffke and the
government agreed that this was the correct guidelines range. The court then stated that it “read
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carefully the defendant’s sentencing memorandum, the government’s sentencing memorandum,
and the victim impact statements that were provided.” (R. 37 at 3:20–23.) Next, the court heard
from Kroffke’s counsel, who reiterated the arguments articulated in Kroffke’s sentencing
memorandum and requested a downward variance and an 84-month sentence. The court then heard
from Kroffke, who apologized to his family, his former wife, and the four women who were in the
bank when he committed the armed robbery, explained that he was “desperate, sick, and not
thinking clearly” on the day of the crime, and asked the court for leniency. (Id. at 11:9–13:3.) The
court next heard from the government, which argued for a guidelines range sentence, emphasizing
the seriousness of the offense, Kroffke’s purported problems with drugs and alcohol abuse, and
the need to protect the public and deter future criminal conduct. The court also heard statements
from two women who were working as tellers at the bank when Kroffke robbed it at gunpoint.
Next, the court imposed sentence. The court began by stating that it had reviewed the PSI,
the sentencing memoranda, the letters Kroffke had provided in support of his request for a
variance, and the victim impact statements, and had considered all of the testimony provided in
court. The court then stated that the “touchstone of sentencing is 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” (Id. at
22:7.) The court explained that, when sentencing Kroffke, it must “consider everything [it] can
learn” about him and his crimes, compute and consider the guidelines range, and ultimately impose
“a sentence that is sufficient but not longer than necessary to accomplish the four statutory
purposes of sentencing: [p]unishment, deterrence, protecting the community, and rehabilitation.”
(Id. at 22:11–14.) The district court then found that “a sentence within the advisory range is
sufficient but not greater than necessary” to accomplish these goals, and sentenced Kroffke to 114
months, the lowest end of the guideline range. (Id. at 22:16–19.)
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The district court explained that it had “considered carefully” Kroffke’s argument for a
downward variance, but had concluded that “if I went to 84 months,” as Kroffke had requested, “I
would be giving no credit or punishment or deterrence for not just a robbery and not just an armed
robbery, but a very vicious and terrifying one . . . .” (Id. at 22:20–25.) The district court stated that
Kroffke had “sadly changed the lives of all those women, and not for the better,” and explained
that while it recognized “the physical pain and the anguish [Kroffke was] suffering for over two
years” when he committed the crime, the court nonetheless could not understand why Kroffke
would think that “terroriz[ing] and traumatiz[ing] four people and put[ing] them in fear of their
lives” was a “good solution.” (Id. at 23:1–8.) After providing this explanation, the court found that
its chosen sentence of 114 months of imprisonment was “sufficient but not longer than necessary.”
(Id. at 23:8–9.)
After the court imposed sentence, Kroffke objected to the court’s declining to grant him a
downward variance. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Introduction
We review a defendant’s sentence for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion
standard. United States v. Donadeo, 910 F.3d 886, 893 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v.
Jeross, 521 F.3d 562, 569 (6th Cir. 2008)). Reasonableness has two components: procedural and
substantive. Id. (citing United States v. Keller, 498 F.3d 316, 322 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Kroffke contends that his sentence violates both procedural and substantive
reasonableness. Kroffke argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district
court failed to adequately explain its reasons for denying Kroffke’s request for a downward
variance and for ultimately imposing a sentence of 114 months of imprisonment. Kroffke also
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asserts that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to
sufficiently consider the § 3553(a) factors.
B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Imposing a Procedurally
Unreasonable Sentence
1. Relevant Legal Principles
A sentence satisfies procedural reasonableness if the district court:
(1) properly calculated the applicable advisory Guidelines range; (2) considered the
other [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors as well as the parties’ arguments for a sentence
outside the Guidelines range; and (3) adequately articulated its reasoning for
imposing the particular sentence chosen, including any rejection of the parties’
arguments for an outside-Guidelines sentence and any decision to deviate from the
advisory Guidelines range.
United States v. Adams, 873 F.3d 512, 517 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Bolds, 511
F.3d 568, 581 (6th Cir. 2007)).
“For a sentence to be procedurally reasonable, ‘a district court must explain its reasoning
to a sufficient degree to allow for meaningful appellate review.’” United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d
558, 566 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Brogdon, 503 F.3d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Accordingly, “‘the record must contain the district court’s rationale for concluding that the
sentence imposed is sufficient but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of
sentencing set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).’” United States v. Cochrane, 702 F.3d 334, 344 (6th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Bolds, 511 F.3d at 580). “An explanation is typically adequate if it addresses
the factors from 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) that are relevant to the district court’s sentencing decision.”
U.S. v. Solano-Rosales, 781 F.3d 345, 351 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Trejo-Martinez,
481 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2007)). “[P]rocedural reasonableness does not require that a district
court provide a rote listing or some other ritualistic incantation of the relevant § 3553(a) factors.”
Trejo-Martinez, 481 F.3d at 413 (citing United States v. Collington, 461 F.3d 805, 809 (6th Cir.
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2006)). However, “[s]imply ‘list[ing] the § 3553(a) factors and various characteristics of the
defendant’ without ‘refer[ing] to the applicable Guidelines range’ or ‘explaining [the] decision to
[stay within or] deviate from that range’ is insufficient.” Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 580 (6th Cir. 2007)
(quoting United States v. Cousins, 469 F.3d 572, 577 (6th Cir. 2006) (alteration in original)). While
a district court must adequately explain its chosen sentence, “‘[a] lengthy explanation may be
particularly unnecessary where a defendant’s arguments are straightforward [and] conceptually
simple and where a sentencing court imposes a within-Guidelines sentence.’” Cochrane, 702 F.3d
at 344 (quoting United States v. Duane, 533 F.3d 441, 451 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
“[W]hen a defendant raises a particular argument in seeking a lower sentence, the record
must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge
explained the basis for rejecting it.” Bolds, 511 F.3d at 580 (quoting United States v. Jones, 489
F.3d 243, 251 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Reversible procedural error
occurs if the sentencing judge fails to ‘set forth enough [of a statement of reasons] to satisfy the
appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for
exercising his own legal decision making authority.’” Bolds, 511 F.3d at 580 (quoting Rita v.
United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).
2. Application to the Matter at Hand
The district court did not impose a procedurally unreasonable sentence. The district court
calculated the correct guidelines range. The court stated that “the touchstone of sentencing is 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)” and explicitly referenced several of § 3553(a)’s enumerated factors; it stated
that it would “consider everything [it] can learn” about Kroffke and his crimes and would impose
“a sentence that is sufficient but not longer than necessary to accomplish the four statutory
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purposes of sentencing: [p]unishment, deterrence, protecting the community, and rehabilitation.”
(R. 37 at 22:11–14.) The district court next considered Kroffke’s arguments for a downward
variance; it stated that it had reviewed Kroffke’s sentencing memorandum and read his letters in
support, and it heard from Kroffke and his attorney at the sentencing hearing. After considering
Kroffke’s argument for an 84-month sentence, the government’s argument in opposition, and the
statements from two of the victims, the court explained that it would not grant a downward
variance. The court stated that while it appreciated that Kroffke had been suffering from physical
and psychological pain for two years when he committed the armed robbery, a below-guidelines
sentence would not provide sufficient “credit or punishment or deterrence” for the “very vicious
and terrifying” armed robbery that “changed the lives of all those women” by “put[ting] them in
fear of their lives.” (Id. at 22:20–23:7.) While the court did not explicitly cite § 3553(a) again when
it imposed sentence, it justified its sentence by referencing several of the § 3553(a) factors, such
as Kroffke’s personal characteristics and the nature of his offense, and the need for punishment
and deterrence. See § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)–(C). The district court ultimately sentenced Kroffke to
the lowest end of the guidelines range. While the district court’s explanation for its sentence was
“admittedly brief,” we believe that “a fuller explanation was not warranted under the
circumstances.” Cochrane, 702 F.3d at 344. The district did not abuse its discretion by imposing
a procedurally unreasonable sentence.
Kroffke relies on four cases to argue that the district court violated procedural
reasonableness. But none of the cases he cites apply to the instant case. In United States v. Thomas,
498 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 2007), we held that the district court’s sentence was procedurally
unreasonable when the district court “never mentioned anything resembling the § 3553(a) factors,”
except for a generalized statement that it had considered them, and when the district court failed
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to acknowledge any of the defendant’s arguments for a lower sentence, “leav[ing] us unsure” about
whether the court considered the defendant’s arguments and about how the district court arrived
at the sentence it imposed. Id. at 341. In the instant case, the district court considered Kroffke’s
arguments for a downward variance, explained why it declined to impose Kroffke’s requested 84-
month sentence, and justified its decision by discussing several of the § 3553(a) factors. Thus,
Thomas is inapposite.
The second case that Kroffke relies on is similarly unpersuasive. In United States v.
Penson, 526 F.3d 331 (6th Cir. 2008), we held that the district court’s sentence was procedurally
unreasonable when the district court failed to explain its sentencing decision in light of the
§ 3553(a) factors and allowed the government, but not defense counsel, to argue for a particular
sentence. Id. at 338. In the instant case, the district court considered several of the § 3553(a) factors
and heard from both Kroffke and his attorney at the sentencing hearing. Accordingly, Penson does
not apply.
In United States v. Ferguson, 518 F. App’x 458 (6th Cir. 2013), we held that the
defendant’s sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to adequately
consider the defendant’s history and characteristics and never mentioned the seriousness of the
crime or the need for punishment or deterrence. Id. at 467–68. In the instant case, the district court
considered Kroffke’s history and characteristics—it referenced the physical pain and
psychological anguish he had experienced for two years when he committed the armed robbery.
The district court discussed the severity of Kroffke’s offense, describing it as a “vicious and
terrifying” armed robbery. (R. 37 at 22:23–24.) And it explicitly mentioned the need for
“punishment or deterrence” when explaining its sentence. (Id. at 22:20–25.) Therefore, Ferguson
does not support Kroffke’s argument.
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Finally, in United States v. Jackson, 408 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2005), we held that the district
court violated procedural reasonableness when it granted an eight-level downward departure
without providing adequate explanation for its decision. In that case, the district court listed the
characteristics of the defendant, but failed to discuss any of the other § 3553(a) factors and never
provided any analysis for its sentence. Id. at 304–05. Jackson does not apply to the instant case.
When sentencing Kroffke, the district court mentioned several of the § 3553(a) factors, explained
why it declined to grant Kroffke’s request for a downward variance, and sufficiently explained the
sentence it ultimately imposed.
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Imposing a Substantively
Unreasonable Sentence
1. Relevant Legal Principles
“To be substantively reasonable, the sentence ‘must be proportionate to the seriousness of
the circumstances of the offense and offender, and sufficient but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes of § 3553(a).’” United States v. Sexton, 894 F.3d 787, 797 (6th Cir.
2018) (quoting United States v. Vowell, 516 F.3d 503, 512 (6th Cir. 2008)). “[A] sentence is
‘substantively unreasonable when the district court selects a sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence
on impermissible factors, fails to consider relevant sentencing factors, or gives an unreasonable
amount of weight to any pertinent factor.’” United States v. Williams, 762 F. App’x 278, 283 (6th
Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Sexton, 889 F.3d 262, 265 (6th Cir. 2018)). “In this circuit,
within-Guidelines sentences are afforded a ‘presumption of reasonableness.’” United States v.
Young, No. 18-3029, 2019 WL 1502307, at *1 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2019) (quoting United States v.
Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389–90 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). A defendant seeking to rebut this
presumption of reasonableness “bears no small burden.” Id. (quoting United States v. Massey, 663
F.3d 852, 860 (6th Cir. 2011)).
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2. Application to the Matter at Hand
Kroffke asserts that his sentence is substantively unreasonable “[f]or the same reasons that
[his] sentence is procedurally unreasonable,” namely that the district court failed to adequately
explain its sentence in terms of the § 3553(a) factors. (Appellant Br. at 21.) He also argues that
because the district court failed to adequately address the § 3553(a) factors, his guidelines-range
sentence is not entitled to the presumption of reasonableness. However, we have already found
that the district court sufficiently considered the § 3553(a) factors and that its sentence satisfied
procedural reasonableness.
Kroffke has failed to sustain his substantial burden of proving that his guidelines-range
sentence was unreasonable. As explained above, the district court adequately considered Kroffke’s
personal history and characteristics, mentioned several of the § 3553(a) factors, and explained why
it declined to grant Kroffke’s request for a downward variance. Further, the district court found
that the 114-month sentence it imposed was “sufficient but not longer than necessary” to
accomplish the purposes of § 3553(a). The district court could have certainly provided a more
extensive explanation for its sentence. However, under these circumstances, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by imposing a substantively unreasonable sentence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we affirm Kroffke’s sentence.
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