United States v. Christopher Tucker ( 2021 )


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  •                                     UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 19-4805
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    CHRISTOPHER LEWIS TUCKER,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
    Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, Chief District Judge. (1:17-cr-00221-TDS-1)
    Submitted: September 13, 2021                               Decided: September 24, 2021
    Before KING, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
    Remanded with instructions by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Christopher R. Clifton, Michael A. Grace, Greer B. Taylor, GRACE, TISDALE &
    CLIFTON, P.A., Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Matthew G.T. Martin,
    United States Attorney, Eric L. Iverson, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
    THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    A federal grand jury indicted Christopher Lewis Tucker for two counts of attempted
    production of child pornography, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2251
    (a); transportation of
    child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1); receipt of child pornography,
    in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A); and possession of firearms and ammunition by
    an unlawful user of—and a person addicted to—a controlled substance, in violation of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(3). After Tucker underwent extensive psychological examinations, the
    district court concluded that he was incompetent to stand trial and ordered an additional
    evaluation to determine whether there was a substantial probability that he could be
    restored to competency in the foreseeable future. During this first restoration period and
    the second, Tucker was intermittently compliant with his medication regimen. Tucker’s
    failure to voluntarily take his medications on a consistent basis led the Government to move
    for an order authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication,
    pursuant to Sell v. United States, 
    539 U.S. 166
     (2003). The district court concluded that
    the Government established each of the four Sell factors by clear and convincing evidence
    and ordered the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to restore Tucker’s
    competency. This Sell order included the specific dosages prescribed by Dr. Logan
    Graddy, the Chief Psychiatrist at the Federal Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina
    (“FMC-Butner”). The district court stayed the order pending this interlocutory appeal. 1
    1
    Tucker argues that we should first consider his pro se appeal of the district court’s
    order finding him incompetent to stand trial and ordering the first period of competency
    restoration. But the district court never docketed an appeal of that order. Indeed, Tucker’s
    2
    Proceedings continued in the district court during the pendency of this appeal. The
    court committed Tucker for a third restoration period, during which he was compliant
    with—and responded well to—his medications. Thereafter, the COVID-19 pandemic
    broke out, and Tucker was transferred to a local jail. The medical records from the jail
    indicated that Tucker had been compliant with his medications, though his compliance
    could not be confirmed. Unfortunately, Tucker’s condition regressed during his stay in the
    local jail. Dr. Tanya Cunic, FMC-Butner’s Chief of Psychology, surmised that Tucker’s
    regression may have been precipitated by stress caused by the legal proceedings, a recent
    altercation, or forced isolation due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Dr. Cunic recommended
    an additional restoration period, explaining that defendants who are restored to competency
    once are likely to be restored again. Dr. Cunic further suggested that Tucker’s medications
    may need to be adjusted, considering that he regressed during a period in which he was
    purportedly compliant with his medication regimen. Upon the Government’s motion, the
    court ordered a fourth restoration period, but Tucker’s transfer from the local jail to FMC-
    Butner was delayed. Tucker consistently refused to take his medications during this fourth
    restoration period.
    At this point, we asked the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing whether
    recent developments in Tucker’s case require a remand to the district court for
    reconsideration of its Sell order. The Government has moved to remand the case so that
    motion for an extension of time in which to appeal the order is still pending in the district
    court.
    3
    the district court may reconsider its Sell order based on the events that have occurred during
    the pendency of this appeal. Tucker opposes the motion.
    In Sell, the Supreme Court held that involuntary administration of antipsychotic
    medication for the sole purpose of restoring a mentally ill defendant to competency is
    appropriate only if the court finds that (1) “important governmental interests are at stake”;
    (2) “involuntary medication will significantly further those concomitant state interests”;
    (3) “involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests”; and (4) “administration
    of the drugs is medically appropriate.” Sell, 
    539 U.S. at 180-81
    .
    We have emphasized that “the forcible administration of antipsychotic medication
    constitutes a deprivation of liberty in the most literal and fundamental sense.” United
    States v. Watson, 
    793 F.3d 416
    , 419 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Accordingly, we have cautioned that the forcible administration of antipsychotic
    medication “for the sole purpose of rendering [a defendant] competent to stand trial . . . is
    the exception, not the rule,” and that “courts must be vigilant to ensure that such orders,
    which carry an unsavory pedigree, do not become routine.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks
    omitted). To that end, “we have set a deliberately high standard for the government to
    satisfy before it may forcibly medicate solely to render an inmate competent to stand trial”:
    the government must establish each of the Sell factors by clear and convincing evidence.
    
    Id. at 420
    . Under this standard, the government must put forth “evidence of such weight
    that it produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy,
    as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, or evidence that proves the facts
    at issue to be highly probable.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    4
    The issue here is whether we should consider the merits of Tucker’s arguments
    challenging the Sell order or remand the case to the district court so that it may reconsider
    the Sell order based on the events that have occurred during the pendency of this appeal.
    Recognizing the factfinding responsibility of the district court and the caution that must be
    exercised before ordering forcible administration of antipsychotic medication, we conclude
    that remand is appropriate in this case and grant the Government’s motion. While it is
    clear after the fourth restoration period that Tucker has ceased voluntarily taking his
    antipsychotic medication, there is some evidence from Dr. Cunic’s testimony that the
    dosage or type of antipsychotic originally prescribed by Dr. Graddy is not sufficient to
    restore Tucker to competency. Thus, it is unclear at this juncture whether the second Sell
    factor still weighs in favor of forcible medication—that is, whether the administration of
    drugs, as currently prescribed, “is substantially likely to render [Tucker] competent to stand
    trial.” 2 Sell, 
    539 U.S. at 181
    ; see Watson, 793 F.3d at 420 (stating clear and convincing
    standard).
    While we remand for further consideration, we do not vacate the district court’s Sell
    order or express any view of the merits of the order. Allowing the order to stand will permit
    the district court to reopen the Sell process to the extent necessary to consider the
    developing evidence in Tucker’s case. We instruct the court to maintain the stay of the
    Sell order during its consideration of the developing evidence and during the pendency of
    2
    Of course, the district court is free to reconsider whether the remaining Sell factors
    still weigh in favor of forcible medication.
    5
    any future appeal of the order, in the event the court maintains or revises the order upon
    remand.
    We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
    adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
    decisional process.
    REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-4805

Filed Date: 9/24/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2021