Kevin Tolliver v. Jeffrey Noble ( 2018 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATON
File Name: 18a0506n.06
No. 17-3367
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
KEVIN A. TOLLIVER, ) Oct 12, 2018
Plaintiff–Appellant, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
)
v.
)
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
JEFFREY NOBLE, Warden; DWO
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
TAYLOR; INVESTIGATOR CHRISTLER;
) THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF
INVESTIGATOR SIBALSKI; INSPECTOR
) OHIO
BLACKWELL; LT. WEBB; LT.
)
WESTFALL; SGT. LEVAN; C.O. PYLES,
)
Defendants–Appellees. OPINION
)
Before: SUHRHEINRICH, MOORE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Kevin A. Tolliver appeals the district
court’s sua sponte dismissal of his pro se prisoner civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Because we determine that the district court abused its discretion by failing to provide plaintiff
with leave to amend his complaint, we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal and REMAND
with instructions to permit Tolliver to amend his complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from Tolliver’s initial pro se filing1, marked by the district
court clerk as his “Complaint” on the docket. See R. 1.2 Tolliver is an inmate in the custody of
1
Although Tolliver is now represented by counsel on appeal, he acted pro se throughout
the district court proceedings at issue in this case.
2
As will be discussed in further detail below, Tolliver did not entitle the document filed at
Record 1 as his “Complaint.” Rather, it appears the Clerk of Court designated it as such. As filed,
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (“ODRC”). While incarcerated, Tolliver
successfully requested that an independent contractor providing inmates with religious services be
removed. Id. ¶ 9 (Page ID #4). However, after being transferred to the London Correctional
Institution (“London”), Tolliver again encountered the same contractor. See id. ¶ 12 (Page ID #5).
Tolliver notified Blackwell, a prison employee, regarding his previous history with the contractor
and explained that he did not require the contractor’s religious services. Id. Blackwell assured
Tolliver that there was no problem. Id.
However, the contractor later filed a “false report” in an attempt to raise Tolliver’s security
status. Id. On September 6, 2016, Tolliver was placed in segregated housing. Id. ¶ 1 (Page ID
#2). Tolliver claims his placement in segregated housing was “an act of retaliation for [F]irst
Amendment protected conduct (i.e. grievances which resulted in a contractor for religious services
being terminated)” and asserts his “due process rights have been violated by a flawed DRC 2099
form which among other facts created an invalid transfer hearing.” Id. ¶ 9 (Page ID #4).
Tolliver claims that on the same day he was placed in segregated housing, prison officials
confiscated various legal documents “full of current criminal and civil files,” including “critical
items of New Evidence, Original Affidavits, [his] 3500 page transcript [for his criminal trial], notes
and irreplaceable research.” Id. ¶¶ 2, 22 (Page ID #2, 7–8). These files related to his criminal
conviction, which he has been “actively fighting” for fifteen years, as well as an “active [§] 2244
petition” and a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”),
Record 1 is entitled “Notice of Denial of Access to Court and Emergency Request for Order
Directing Access.” R. 1 at Page ID #1.
2
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
which he intended to file. Id. ¶ 22 (Page ID #7–8); see also id. ¶ 27 (Page ID #9) (explaining that
his denial of access “rel[ie]ves [him] of the evidence for his RLUIPA claim challenging 72 REG
1 thr[ough] 12”). Tolliver asserts that because he does not have access to these documents, “[h]e
has been unable to fairly defend transfer, or perform any act of research, nor proper filing.” Id.
¶ 22 (Page ID #8).
Tolliver asserts that prison officials told him that his placement in segregated housing was
“not disciplinary” and that he had done nothing wrong. Id. ¶ 10 (Page ID #4). Following his
placement in segregated housing, prison officials informed Tolliver that, because of his “nexus”
with the religious contractor, he would need to be transferred from London.3 See id. ¶¶ 11–12
(Page ID #5) (explaining that he has seen a “nexus used as an abuse of process” and that, in his
case, the nexus was unwarranted because he had not interacted with the contractor since coming
to London and the contractor had not requested the nexus but, rather, had filed a “false report”
against Tolliver).
On October 20, 2016, Tolliver was taken to view both his investigatory documents, as well
as his personal property, all of which had been seized when he was placed in segregated housing.
Id. ¶ 16 (Page ID #6). When Tolliver noticed that none of his investigatory documents were
included, he filed a theft/loss report on October 21, 2016. Id. ¶ 17 (Page ID #6). Tolliver was
subsequently transferred from London to Pickaway Correctional Institute, where he now resides.
See R. 8 (Notice of Change of Address). Tolliver asserts that Defendants “Noble, Taylor, Christler,
A “nexus” is a preexisting relationship between an inmate and a prison official, including
3
independent contractors. See Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., Policy No. 31-SEM-07.
3
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
Sibalski, Webb, Westfall and Levant all intend I be transferred without my ‘investigator’s pack-
up’ [b]ecause: 1.) it’s punishment, 2.) it rel[ie]ves [me] of the evidence for [my] RLUIPA claim
challenging 72 REG 1 thr[ough] 12, and 3.) will cripple my criminal appeals.” R. 1 (¶ 27) (Page
ID #9).
On October 25, 2016, Tolliver filed five documents with the district court. The document
labeled “Complaint” on the docket was in fact entitled “Notice of Denial of Access to Court and
Emergency Request for Order Directing Access.” See R. 1. In the order of how they appear on
the district court’s docket, Tolliver also filed: a “Motion for Temporary Restraining Order”
(entitled “Motion to Come Forth and Show Cause: Emergency Temporary Restraining Order” by
Tolliver), see R. 2; a “Judicial Notice” (entitled as such by Tolliver), see R. 3; a “Supplemental
Affidavit” (entitled “Supplemental Affidavit and Notice of Appeal Rights Violation in Transfer”
by Tolliver), see R. 4; and a “Motion for Respondent to Provide Documents to the Court” (entitled
as such by Tolliver), see R. 5. On November 22, 2016, Tolliver also filed a “Notice of Transfer to
Pickaway Correctional Institute, Partial Return of Investigator’s Pack-Up, Continuation of
Retaliation.” See R. 7. This document included seven exhibits. Id. Finally, in response to an
order from the magistrate judge, Tolliver filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on
November 23, 2016. See R. 9.
On January 13, 2017, the magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation,
recommending that the district court deny Tolliver’s two motions (i.e., his motion requesting
Defendants provide certain documents, R. 5, and his motion for a temporary restraining order,
R. 2) and also dismiss the complaint. R. 11. Specifically, after conducting an initial screening per
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No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)4, the magistrate judge recommended finding that the court lacked
jurisdiction to hear Tolliver’s complaint, stating that Tolliver “cites no laws, statutes, or general
legal principles” regarding the court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 2 (Page ID #85). Second, the magistrate
judge reasoned that Tolliver had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, noting
“it is unclear what [Tolliver]’s legal basis is for this lawsuit involving the ‘investigator packups’”
and therefore “Defendants have no notice of the law or laws they allegedly violated.” Id. at 3–4
(Page ID #86–87). The magistrate judge also determined that, because prison officials cannot be
liable under § 1983 for failing to remedy an alleged constitutional violation, Tolliver’s claims
failed. Id. at 4 (Page ID #87). Finally, the magistrate judge noted that although Tolliver mentioned
“a potentially cognizable legal claim” in relation to his First Amendment and Due Process Clause
rights, “this allegation is not supported by any factual allegations in the Complaint” and should be
dismissed. Id. at 5 (Page ID #88). Although the magistrate judge noted the additional documents
that Tolliver filed on October 25, 2016, the Report and Recommendation considered only the
allegations contained in the “Complaint.” See generally R. 11.
On January 24, 2017, Tolliver signed and mailed his objections to the Report and
Recommendation, in which he surmised that the court had not yet received his “Notice and Motion
for Leave to Amend Complaint” or “Amended Complaint,” which he asserted he had placed in the
prison mail system on January 12, 2017. R. 12 (Page ID #90). Tolliver explained that the amended
4
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) provides: “The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or,
in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”
5
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
complaint “addresses the deficiencies of the original ‘Motion to Come Forth and Show Cause:
Emergency Temporary Restraining Order’” and noted that without the TRO, he “did suffer all
damages.” Id.5 Tolliver included an affidavit, in which he stated he had mailed the amended
complaint on January 12, 2017 and that he intended to file the amended complaint again. Id. at 2
(Page ID #91). Tolliver also explained that “[p]rior to the recommendation the defendants did
what I sought to be protected from and violated my U.S. Constitutional Rights under the First,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. Finally, Tolliver attached to his objections a “Notice
and Filing Of: Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint.” Id. at 4 (Page ID #93). The notice was
dated January 11, 2017 and requested that the court “accept the enclosed amended complaint for
the original filings[, which] were prepared under known hardship and likely failed to meet basic
standards of sufficiency.” Id.
Rather than file the aforementioned amended complaint, on February 13, 2017, Tolliver
signed and mailed a “Motion for Extension of Time (30 Days to Amend Complaint),” docketed on
February 17, 2017. R. 13. Tolliver asserted that, since filing his previous Notice (and objections)
on January 30, 2017, “the Chief Inspector of the ODRC has provided new answers to additional
issues directly affecting the matter sub judice,” and thus he needed additional time to file an
amended complaint. Id. at 1 (Page ID #95). Tolliver requested thirty additional days to “properly
amend[ ]” his complaint. Id.
5
Tolliver also explained that although his TRO request had been docketed at Record 2, he
had actually sent that document before the “Complaint,” filed at Record 1. See R. 12 at 2 (Page
ID #91).
6
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
On March 8, 2017, the district judge filed an order adopting the magistrate judge’s Report
and Recommendation. R. 14. Noting Tolliver’s objections, the district court “consider[ed] the
matter de novo.” Id. at 1 (Page ID #97). The district judge explained, however, that while Tolliver
argued he “filed a Motion to Amend his Complaint, [he] actually . . . has filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to file an Amended Complaint, which has been received and docketed by the
Court as ECF No. 13.” Id. Determining that Tolliver’s “objections present the same issues
presented to and considered by the Magistrate Judge,” the district court concluded Tolliver “failed
to establish any basis for reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions that his Complaint
fails to state a claim which relief may be granted by this Court.” Id. at 2 (Page ID #98).
Consequently, the district court adopted the Report and Recommendation and overruled Tolliver’s
objections, dismissing the complaint and denying Tolliver’s motion for extension of time to file
his amended complaint as moot. Id.
On March 22, 2017, the district court docketed Tolliver’s “Motion for Leave to File an
Amended Complaint,” to which he attached a thirty-page amended complaint; the motion was
signed and mailed by Tolliver on March 9, 2017. See R. 16 (Mot. to Amend); R. 16-1 (Am.
Compl.). On March 24, 2017, the magistrate judge denied his motion, explaining “[b]ecause final
judgment has been entered in this action, [Tolliver]’s Motion is DENIED. [Tolliver] is instructed
that no further filings shall be made in this case.” R. 17 at 1 (Page ID #132). This timely appeal
followed.6
6
Although the district court denied Tolliver’s motion to appeal in forma pauperis, certifying
that his appeal was not taken in good faith, see R. 21, we permitted Tolliver to proceed with his
appeal in forma pauperis, additionally noting that “[i]n light of the relative complexity of some of
7
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
On appeal, Tolliver makes two arguments. First, Tolliver asserts that the district court
erred when it sua sponte dismissed his case for failure to state a claim, arguing that 1) the district
court did not consider Tolliver’s additional documents on the docket, which he contends provide
further factual support for his legal allegations; and 2) standing alone, the document labeled
“Complaint” sufficiently stated a plausible claim for relief. Appellant Br. at 23–36. Second,
Tolliver contends the district court abused its discretion by not permitting him to file an amended
complaint, despite his multiple efforts to do so, both before and after final judgment was issued.
Id. at 36–42. Because we determine that the district court abused its discretion by failing to allow
Tolliver to amend his complaint, we need not consider the sufficiency of his original filings.
II. JURISDICTION
Despite what the magistrate judge recommended, the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction over Tolliver’s complaint, as Tolliver explicitly raised claims asserting a denial of his
access to the courts, a violation of his Due Process rights, and retaliation under the First
Amendment.7 See R. 1 (¶ 9) (Page ID #1, 4) (asserting that Defendants “have continued to deny
access to the court by not giving permission to see, use, or know the location of” his legal materials
and explaining that his placement in segregated housing “is an act of retaliation for [F]irst
the issues presented in this appeal, Tolliver should proceed with appointed counsel.” See D. 17
(6th Cir. Order, December 14, 2017) (Page 1).
7
As Tolliver’s counsel notes, the district court did not rely upon this jurisdictional concern
as a basis to dismiss Tolliver’s complaint. Rather, the district court examined only whether
Tolliver had stated a plausible claim for relief. See R. 14 at 2 (Page ID #98) (explaining in its
conclusion that “Plaintiff’s Complaint is hereby DISMISSED for failure to state a claim”).
8
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
Amendment protected conduct” and that his “due process rights have been violated”). Those
claims all “aris[e] under the Constitution . . . of the United States” and thus establish subject matter
jurisdiction, despite Tolliver’s failure explicitly to state this in a jurisdictional section. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331; see also Smith Barney, Inc. v. Sarver, 108 F.3d 92, 95 (6th Cir. 1997) (determining
diversity jurisdiction existed despite the plaintiff’s failure to “affirmatively allege diversity
jurisdiction”), abrogated on other grounds by Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009); City
of Detroit Pension Fund v. Prudential Secs., Inc., 91 F.3d 26, 29–30 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding the
district court had diversity jurisdiction based on the facts “in the record,” even though the district
court had erroneously determined it had federal question jurisdiction). Defendants do not contest
that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction based on Tolliver’s clearly articulated federal
claims.
Moreover, we have appellate jurisdiction. Specifically, the district court granted final
judgment on all of Tolliver’s claims on March 8, 2017, dismissing his complaint. R. 15 (Page ID
#99). Tolliver filed a timely notice of appeal with this court on April 7, 2017, which was docketed
on April 11, 2017. See R. 18; see also Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (explaining that a party in a civil
case has thirty days after entry of judgment to file an appeal); Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1)(A), (B)
(explaining that an inmate in prison is deemed to have filed his appeal on the date the appeal is
deposited in the prison’s internal mail system, provided either the inmate includes “a declaration
. . . setting out the date of deposit and stating that first-class postage is being prepaid” or “the court
of appeals exercises its discretion to permit the later filing of a [satisfactory] declaration”).
Tolliver’s notice of appeal, dated April 7, 2017, stated “[b]y turning them over to the internal mail
9
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
system here at [Pickaway Correctional Institute] with first class U.S. postage paid by me.” R. 18
(Page ID #133). Thus, we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of leave to amend a complaint.
Kreipke v. Wayne State Univ., 807 F.3d 768, 781 (6th Cir. 2015). However, following an adverse
judgment, plaintiffs seeking to amend must “shoulder a heavier burden.” Leisure Caviar, LLC v.
United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2010). Additionally, although
“[t]he decision to dismiss with prejudice is a harsh sanction, [because] the choice lies within the
discretionary power of the district court, . . . we will not reverse absent a clear showing of abuse
of discretion.” Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485, 495 (1990); see also Printup v.
Dir., Ohio Dep’t of Job & Family Servs., 654 F. App’x 781, 791 (6th Cir. 2016) (determining the
district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice after
concluding that the plaintiff’s “claims were barred by the statute of limitations such that any
amendment would have been futile and where [the plaintiff] had not sought to amend her complaint
in any event”). Finally, district courts must afford pleadings filed by pro se plaintiffs additional
leniency, given their unfamiliarity with pleading and procedural requirements. See Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 (1989) (noting “indigent plaintiffs so often proceed pro se and
therefore may be less capable of formulating legally competent initial pleadings”); Williams v.
Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers’ and should therefore by liberally construed.”
(quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004))).
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No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
IV. DISCUSSION
The key question on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying
Tolliver leave to amend. Tolliver contends that the district court erred when it dismissed Tolliver’s
complaint for failure to state a claim and then denied as moot his motion for extension of time to
file an amended complaint. Appellant Br. at 36–41. Additionally, Tolliver maintains that the
district court should have considered his amended complaint, which was filed after final judgment
was issued, as a motion to set aside or vacate judgment under Rule 59(e) or a motion for relief
from judgment under Rule 60(b). Id. at 42. Defendants contend that because Tolliver’s motion to
amend came after judgment had been entered and he had not first filed a motion to alter, set aside,
or vacate judgment, the magistrate judge did not abuse its discretion by denying Tolliver’s motion
to amend. Appellee Br. at 30–34. Furthermore, Defendants assert that because Tolliver had not
attached an amended complaint before the district court’s dismissal order, the court did not abuse
its discretion when it dismissed Tolliver’s complaint. Id. at 32–33. We conclude that given
Tolliver’s previous request to amend his complaint before final judgment, the district court’s
failure to consider Tolliver’s additional filings before dismissing his complaint, and the timing of
his motion to amend after judgment, the district court abused its discretion when it dismissed
Tolliver’s complaint while simultaneously denying Tolliver’s motion for an extension of time to
amend as moot. We consider each issue in turn.
A. Motion for Extension of Time to Amend & Amended Complaint
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), “[a] party may amend its pleading once as a
matter of course within . . . 21 days after serving it” or within twenty-one days after service of a
11
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
responsive pleading or certain motions. “In all other cases, . . . [t]he court should freely give leave
[to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)–(2). Additionally, since “[t]he
[Prison Litigation Reform Act]’s screening requirements—28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1)
& 1915(e)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)—say nothing about whether a district court can allow a
prisoner to amend his complaint,” we have held that courts may grant leave to amend even if the
inmate’s complaint is otherwise subject to dismissal under the PLRA. LaFountain v. Harry,
716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 214 (2007) (“[T]he
PLRA’s screening requirement does not––explicitly or implicitly––justify deviating from the usual
procedural practice beyond the departures specified by the PLRA itself.”).
In the present case, Defendants do not contend that they were ever served with Tolliver’s
original filings. Additionally, Defendants never responded to Tolliver’s filings or filed any motion
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12. Thus, Tolliver was free to file an amended complaint
as a matter of right at any time before his complaint was dismissed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1).
However, before judgment was issued, Tolliver filed motions for leave to amend his complaint
and a motion for an extension for leave to amend, rather than an amended complaint. Therefore,
although the court below did not consider the applicability of Rule 15(a) to Tolliver’s claims, we
will limit our consideration to Tolliver’s motions regarding his amended complaint.
Our review of the record before us indicates that, despite Defendants’ contentions, Tolliver
attempted to amend his complaint on at least two occasions before the district court sua sponte
dismissed his case. First, in his objections to the Report and Recommendation signed on January
24, 2017, Tolliver explained that although the court had apparently not received his previously
12
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
mailed “Notice and Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint” and his “Amended Complaint,” he
intended to promptly resend the amended complaint. See R. 12 at 1–2 (Page ID #90–91).
In support of this, Tolliver attached a motion for leave to amend his complaint (signed January 11,
2017), explaining that “because these first documents were meant to prevent a harm that has now
occurred, but the same issues and relief must continue in a modified posture, Plaintiff requests the
court grants this amendment freely.” Id. at 4 (Page ID #93). Thus, Tolliver not only noted that
the amended complaint would cure the “deficiencies” of his previous filings, but explained the
reason for the requested amendment (his conditions had changed, i.e., he had been transferred, and
his previous request for a TRO did not fully respond to his current needs). Id. at 1–4 (Page ID
#90–93).
It is true that Tolliver did not send the promised amended complaint following his
objections and his motion for leave to amend. However, on February 13, 2017 (three weeks after
sending his objections and motion to amend), Tolliver filed a motion for extension of time to file
his previously described amended complaint. R. 13. Tolliver again explained the reasoning for
his delay: “the Chief Inspector of the ODRC has provided new answers to additional issues
directly affecting the matter sub judice. These answers have effectively changed the exhaustion
date on inextricably linked issues to January 20, 2017. Also, additional names and addresses of
parties currently named as John and/or Jane Doe Defendants have become known.” Id. at 1 (Page
ID #95). Tolliver specifically asked for thirty additional days “to provide the court with this
properly amended complaint.” Id.
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No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
Rather than responding either to Tolliver’s request for leave to amend his complaint
(attached to his objections) or his request for an extension of time to file an amendment, the district
court dismissed Tolliver’s complaint on March 8, 2017 and denied his motion for an extension of
time to amend as moot. R. 14.8 This was before the thirty days Tolliver had requested within
which to file his amendment. Furthermore, on March 9, 2017, after the district court dismissed his
case but before Tolliver conceivably received the notice, Tolliver (apparently working under the
reasonable conclusion that his motion for an extension of time had not been denied) signed a
“Notice and Filing of the Original: Amended Complaint,” and attached a thirty-page amended
complaint. See R. 16 (Page ID #100) (“Now comes plaintiff . . . pursuant to the February 13, 2017
request for extension of time to amend complaint, and files said document. Since plaintiff has not
received a ruling upon that request, and he is unclear of the specifics of procedure, it is prayed the
court will accept this verified complaint correcting the issues of the Magistrate[’]s
recommendation for dismissal.”).9 Tolliver made no mention of having received the district
court’s March 8th order dismissing his claim.
8
In its order adopting the Report and Recommendation, the district court appeared to
review only Tolliver’s motion for an extension of time to amend his complaint, rather than
Tolliver’s motion to amend his complaint, which was attached to Tolliver’s objections: “Plaintiff
objects . . . by arguing that he has filed a Motion to Amend his Complaint, but actually he has filed
a Motion for Extension of Time to file an Amended Complaint.” R. 14 at 1 (Page ID #97).
9
Although Tolliver’s amended complaint was filed after the district court dismissed his
complaint, and thus could not form the basis of the district court’s determination as to the merits
of his amendment, the timing of Tolliver’s amended complaint suggests that Tolliver in good faith
understood he was complying with his previous request for an extension of time to amend, despite
the district court’s refusal to rule on Tolliver’s motion.
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No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
On this record and under these unique circumstances, we conclude the district court abused
its discretion by failing to permit Tolliver to amend his complaint. Generally, “[i]f it is at all
possible that the party against whom the dismissal is directed can correct the defect in the pleading
or state a claim for relief, the court should dismiss with leave to amend.” 6 Charles A. Wright, et
al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1483 (3d ed. 2010). Despite clear evidence that Tolliver
intended to file an amended complaint which he believed would cure “deficiencies” in his previous
filings, Tolliver was cognizant of the timeline for doing so, and had articulated his reasons for his
delay, the district court did not provide Tolliver with the chance to file his amended complaint and
did not respond to Tolliver’s procedurally defective requests. This refusal is particularly
problematic given the fact that Tolliver did in fact file his promised amended complaint within the
thirty days he had requested (and which the district court had not denied).10 This is thus
distinguishable from other cases involving post-judgment amendments, as Tolliver was seemingly
(and reasonably) unaware of the dismissal before filing his amended complaint, had previously
requested leave to amend, and sent the amended complaint just one day after the dismissal. See
Leisure Caviar, LLC, 616 F.3d at 617 (“A claimant who seeks to amend a complaint after losing
10
In their appellate brief, Defendants appear to suggest implicitly that Tolliver is being
untruthful regarding the date he filed his amended complaint, as the motion listed the certificate of
service date as March 9, 2017, but it was not filed with the district court until March 22, 2017. See
R. 16 (Page ID #100). However, the magistrate judge did not make such a finding when it denied
Tolliver’s motion to amend, see R. 17, and Defendants have not pointed to any evidence suggesting
Tolliver has been untruthful in his assertions besides the delay in receiving the document. Given
the intricacies and various delays involved in mailing documents from prison, see generally Fed.
R. App. P. 4(c)(1), we will not consider Defendants’ unsupported conjectures regarding Tolliver’s
amendment.
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No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
the case must provide a compelling explanation to the district court for granting the motion.”);
Auletta v. Ortino (In re Ferro Corp. Derivative Litig.), 511 F.3d 611, 624 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting
that following an entry of final judgment, a plaintiff must move to alter, set aside, or vacate a
judgment before moving to amend). Additionally, because we conclude that the district court
failed to consider adequately all of Tolliver’s connected filings when dismissing this case, see infra
Section IV.B, and because Defendants have not yet been served, the dual considerations of finality
and prejudice usually at play in post-judgment amendments are not readily applicable to Tolliver’s
situation. See Leisure Caviar, LLC, 616 F.3d at 615–16 (noting courts analyzing a post-judgment
motion to amend should consider the interests of “protecting the finality of judgments and the
expeditious termination of litigation” (quoting Morse v. McWhorter, 290 F.3d 795, 800 (6th Cir.
2002))); cf. In re Ferro Corp. Derivative Litig., 511 F.3d at 624 (denying post-judgment
amendment when the plaintiffs had eighteen months to amend their complaint before judgment
was issued and only sought discovery to determine whether facts existed to support their claim);
see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 614–16 (6th Cir. 2011) (permitting a pro se
prisoner plaintiff to amend his complaint based on post-judgment evidence, even though the
plaintiff did not file a motion for leave to amend or a motion to vacate the judgment).11
The reasoning announced in Brown v. Matauszak is particularly persuasive. Like Tolliver,
the plaintiff in Brown was a pro se prisoner plaintiff whose access to the courts claim was
11
We do not mean to determine whether the court erred by refusing to read Tolliver’s post-
judgment amended complaint as a motion under Rule 59 or 60. Rather, we mention these
considerations to underline the unique posture of Tolliver’s filings and the timeliness of his
multiple attempts to amend.
16
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 415 F. App’x at 608–09. Although this court
determined that neither Brown’s complaint nor his resistance to the defendant’s motion to dismiss
on remand sufficiently alleged the necessary “claim within a claim” required for his access claim,
we nonetheless took notice of Brown’s motion for relief from judgment, filed in his separate state
case. Id. at 614. Noting the “troubling” nature of the district court’s refusal to allow Brown leave
to amend his complaint given the appellate court’s knowledge of the non-frivolous allegations in
Brown’s state motion, we remanded to permit Brown to amend his district court complaint. Id. at
614. This was so even though Brown had not requested leave to amend before the district court.
Id. at 614–15 (“Particularly where deficiencies in a complaint are attributable to oversights likely
the result of an untutored pro se litigant’s ignorance of special pleading requirements, dismissal of
the complaint without prejudice is preferable.” (quoting Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124,
126 (10th Cir. 1990))). Not only does Tolliver likewise point to a more detailed amended
complaint, see R. 16-1, but Tolliver is arguably even more deserving of being permitted to amend
than Brown, as he did request the opportunity to amend his complaint before the sua sponte
dismissal.
Finally, we note the inherent difficulty in pleading a “claim within a claim,” as required
for Tolliver’s access-to-the-court claim, as well as the fact that Tolliver’s amended complaint, filed
after the dismissal order, more fully detailed his allegations and provided a comprehensive
overview of his case as it evolved. See generally R. 16-1; see also infra Part IV.B (explaining
Tolliver’s repeated attempts to apprise the district court of his changing conditions). This is
particularly troubling as Tolliver repeatedly reminded the district court he was a pro se prisoner
17
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
plaintiff who was unaware of the appropriate procedures for filing his allegations. See, e.g., R. 12
(Page ID #93); R. 2 (Page ID #15); R. 4 (Page ID #27).
By refusing to permit, or apparently even to consider, Tolliver’s requested extension, the
district court did not afford Tolliver’s pro se pleadings the appropriate “leniency” required. See
Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1200 (6th Cir. 1990) (explaining “it is clear that leniency in
the strictures of pleading should be shown to pro se plaintiffs”); Brown, 415 F. App’x at 616
(finding the district court had abused its discretion by dismissing the plaintiff’s access claim,
despite his failure to request an amendment, and remanding the case to allow the plaintiff to amend
his complaint when post-dismissal filings suggested plaintiff had a valid claim); Gordon v.
England, 354 F. App’x 975, 981–82 (6th Cir. 2009) (remanding for leave to amend based on
allegations presented to the appellate court, since the plaintiff “was proceeding pro se and was
likely to have been unaware of the requirements of Rule 15”). Given these considerations, the
district court abused its discretion when it refused to allow Tolliver requested time to amend his
complaint and, instead, dismissed Tolliver’s complaint and denied his motion for an extension of
time as moot. Consequently, we remand this case in the interest of justice to allow Tolliver to
amend his complaint.
B. Consideration of Additional Documents
Although it is not dispositive as to Tolliver’s claim regarding leave to amend, we briefly
note the concerns this case has raised regarding the documents that the district court reviewed in
its determination. Specifically, in denying as moot Tolliver’s motion for an extension of time to
amend, the district court noted “Plaintiff’s objections present the same issues presented to and
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No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
considered by the Magistrate Judge . . . . He has [thus] failed to establish any basis for
reconsideration of the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions that his Complaint fails to state a claim [on]
which relief may be granted.” R. 14 at 2 (Page ID #98). However, the district court did not
examine the allegations contained in the additional documents that Tolliver filed in October and
November 2016 when determining whether Tolliver had sufficiently stated a claim for relief and,
therefore, whether his motion to amend was “moot.” By not examining these additional filings or
the factual allegations that they contained, the district court’s decision to dismiss Tolliver’s motion
for an extension of time to amend was necessarily incomplete and unresponsive to the consistent
effort Tolliver made to inform the district court. Put simply, Tolliver’s additional documents
provided necessary context for both his objections to the Report and Recommendation and his
request for an extension of time to amend his filings. These concerns, detailed below, further
support our decision to remand to permit Tolliver to amend.
Defendants maintain that the district court was required to examine only the factual
allegations contained in Tolliver’s “Complaint” and that district courts should not be required to
“cobble together causes of action as if it were piecing together an elaborate jig-saw puzzle.”
Appellees Br. at 9. Defendants rely on Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, and the
plain language of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for support. Id. at 18–20. However, neither
Twombly nor Iqbal discussed the documents which may make up a party’s pleadings; rather, in
both cases, the Supreme Court merely considered the factual allegations that such pleadings must
contain. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Furthermore,
although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a) explains that a “pleading” consists of, among other
19
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
things, “a complaint,” Defendants’ argument ignores the cases in this court, as well as other
Circuits, suggesting that, when the pleadings are filed by pro se plaintiffs, the court may consider
additional, supporting documents which either serve to elaborate on a complaint or amend the
initial filing. See Brown, 415 F. App’x at 613–14 (determining that although the plaintiff’s
response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss did not provide sufficient factual support, the district
court should have granted plaintiff leave to amend based on the allegations contained in his motion
for relief from judgment in the plaintiff’s separate state-court case); Flournoy v. Seiter, No. 87-
3535, 1987 WL 24129, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 1987) (unpublished) (explaining that when a court
was considering whether plaintiff’s complaint was frivolous, “plaintiff’s affidavits should be read
as part of the pleadings”); see also Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 151–52
(D.C. Cir. 2015) (determining the district court erred by failing to consider the pro se plaintiff’s
complaint “in light of” all filings, including his response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss);
Pearson v. Gatto, 933 F.2d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting that the pro se plaintiff “clearly
attempted to preserve his rights when he wrote the judge a letter before the statute [of limitations]
had run” which included additional factual allegations, and determining the court erred by not
considering the letter).
Furthermore, given the timeline of Tolliver’s additional filings, as well as the questionable
designation of his “Complaint,” Defendants’ argument is ill-suited for this particular case.
Specifically, as noted above, on October 25, 2016, Tolliver filed, via the prison mail system, five
documents with the court; none of them were designated as a “Complaint.” Rather, the
“Complaint” was entitled “Notice of Denial of Access to Court and Emergency Request for Order
20
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
Directing Access” and was, in fact, the last document signed by Tolliver. See R. 1 (Compl.) (Page
ID #9) (signed October 21, 2016); R. 2 (Mot. for TRO) (Page ID #25) (signed October 18, 2016);
R. 3 (Judicial Notice) (Page ID #26) (not designating a date but noting it was filed in conjunction
with his previously filed motion for a TRO); R. 4 (Suppl. Affidavit) (Page ID #36) (signed October
19, 2016); R. 5 (Mot. for Docs.) (Page ID #42) (signed October 19, 2016). Tolliver noted this
inconsistency in his objections to the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation. See R. 12
at 1–2 (Page ID #90–91) (explaining the amended complaint would address the deficiencies in the
original motion for a TRO and noting that “Doc. 2 [the motion for a TRO] . . . was my first filing
but the court recorded second”).
When the filings are considered in the order of their signature date, rather than their docket
number, the “Complaint” designation becomes even more questionable. For instance, Tolliver’s
first-in-time signed filing (R. 2) articulates the general basis for his First Amendment retaliation
claim in the form of an unwarranted transfer in retaliation for his protected conduct of using the
prison grievance process, which he asserts will disrupt his Horizon re-entry program at London
and extend the distance between him and his family. See R. 2 at 10–13 (Page ID #22–25)
(explaining his concerns with being transferred out of London and concluding “I have been in
seg[regated] housing since Sept. 6, 2016 upon a false report me[a]nt as retaliation for my protected
conduct under the First Amendment’s right to redress grievances”). Thus, Tolliver requested that
the district court enter a temporary restraining order halting this transfer. Id. at 9 (Page ID #21).
He also generally mentions that since he has been placed in segregated housing, “apparently half
of his property has vanished.” Id. at 3 (Page ID #15). Three of the subsequent documents Tolliver
21
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
signed, R. 3–5, all elaborate on his concerns relating to his imminent transfer and support his
request for an order stopping the transfer; they do not reference the assertions made in his Notice
of Denial of Access. See R. 3 at 1 (Judicial Notice) (Page ID #26) (explaining that he was going
to be transferred to Pickaway, reaffirming his request that he should be able either to complete his
re-entry program or to be transferred to Marion, a comparable facility, and noting that although he
does not have “a right to choose prisons at will,” he does have “a right to be free of retaliation for
protected conduct”); R. 4 at 2, 6 (Suppl. Aff.) (Page ID #28, 32) (stating the affidavit was meant
to supplement facts not originally included in his TRO request, noting that the only “staff issue”
forming the basis for his transfer was “his First Amendment protected conduct resulting in
contractor dismissal,” and explaining he believed his transfer appeal was denied in violation of his
due process rights); R. 5 (Mot. for Docs.) (Page ID #37) (requesting the court review his transfer
form “to determine if said document is flawed in such a way that due process is being denied” and
asking the court to order documents relating to the religious contractor’s qualifications, Tolliver’s
discipline, the contractor’s complaint against Tolliver, and the ODRC’s nexus policy). The last
document Tolliver signed in the filings docketed on October 25, 2016 was his “Notice of Denial
of Access,” designated by the district court clerk as his “Complaint.” R. 1. This filing vaguely
reiterated his concerns regarding his transfer and instead primarily focused on his allegations
regarding his legal property. See generally R. 1. Finally, at least two of these filings were referred
to as “affidavits.” See R. 1 (Page ID #1); R. 4 (entitled “Supplemental Affidavit”). As this court
has noted, such affidavits may be considered as part of a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings. See Flournoy,
835 F.2d at 878.
22
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
Given these filings, it is apparent that, despite Record 1 being docketed as a “Complaint,”
Tolliver in fact intended Record 1 to be the last in a line of related filings in October 2016.
Furthermore, when considered together, Tolliver is supplementing his original motion, rather than
filing new, unconnected documents that raise novel legal issues. As Tolliver learned more about
the circumstances surrounding his solitary confinement, including the status of his legal documents
and the name of the prison he would ultimately be transferred to, Tolliver provided additional
information to the court, often within a day or two of the previous filing. Tolliver did so by
repeatedly apologizing to the court for his inartful pleadings and, as noted above, requesting the
court consider the documents together. See, e.g., R. 2 at 3 (Page ID #15) (“Tolliver apologizes for
this irregular motion.”); R. 4 at 1 (Page ID #27) (“Having only simple knowledge of process and
procedure, and less ability due to being in seg[regated] housing (with no access to law resources
or advice), he asks the court to forgive these irregular filings.”); R. 1 at 1 (Page ID #1) (“Once
again [ ] Tolliver ap[ ]ologizes to this court for not knowing or using the correct form to make this
request.”). Finally, Tolliver continued this trend by filing a detailed notice in November 2016 after
he was transferred to Pickaway and further understood the location of his legal property. See R.
7. The title of this document (“Judicial Notice Of: Transfer to Pickaway Correctional Institute,
Partial Return of Investigator’s Pack-Up, Continuation of Retaliation”) clearly indicates Tolliver’s
intention to supplement his previous filings due to his changed circumstances at Pickaway.
We understand the need to ensure efficient and accurate considerations of the numerous,
and often insufficient, complaints filed by incarcerated individuals. See Bock, 549 U.S. at 203
(requesting “fewer and better prisoner suits”). Similarly, it is well established that a pro se litigant
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No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
may not disregard the rules of court. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 112 (1993). However,
these policies have their limits. Specifically, the district court in this case was not permitted to
rely solely on the allegations contained in the “Complaint” when a cursory review of the document
indicated that Tolliver had not, himself, designated the “Complaint” as such and had, in fact, filed
four additional documents dated before his “Complaint” was filed. Finally, Tolliver himself
informed the district court about this issue, noting it was his motion for a TRO, rather than his
notice of denial of access (R. 1), that he intended to amend.
Despite this evidence, the district court relied only on the allegations contained in
Tolliver’s “Complaint” when considering whether Tolliver’s request for an extension to amend or
his objections had provided additional facts beyond what the magistrate judge considered. These
allegations were understandably limited in detail due to the facts contained in Tolliver’s previous
filings. When considering a pro se complaint, district courts must be more cognizant of the context
of the plaintiff’s filings; refusal to examine the plaintiff’s allegations inappropriately imposes a
rigid, rather than lenient, standard previously endorsed by this court. See Williams, 631 F.3d at
383 (“Pro se complaints are to be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers.”); Taylor v. Larson, 505 F. App’x 475, 477–78 (6th Cir. 2012) (considering the pro se
plaintiff’s “elaboration on the factual allegations of the original complaint,” even though those
“elaborations” were contained in an amended complaint filed after judgment was entered); Martin
v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting a court’s duty to read pro se claims
forgivingly). Although we have already concluded the district court abused its discretion by failing
24
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
to allow Tolliver an extension to file an amended complaint, this issue further illustrates the need
to allow Tolliver to amend his complaint.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Tolliver’s
complaint and REMAND with instructions to permit Tolliver to amend his complaint within thirty
days of the issuance of our mandate.
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No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part. I agree with the majority that Tolliver’s First Amendment retaliation and access-to-the-
courts claims should not have been dismissed with prejudice. But, contrary to the majority, I do
not believe that the district court abused its discretion in similarly dismissing the due process claim.
My differences with the majority arise from a different understanding of cases in which district
courts abused their discretion by dismissing with prejudice pro se complaints. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Larson, 505 F. App’x 475, 477–78 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x
608, 616 (6th Cir. 2011); Berndt v. Tennessee, 796 F.2d 879, 882–83 (6th Cir. 1986).
Although we are to “hold [the pro se complaint] to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Brown, 415 F. App’x at 613 (citation omitted), we nonetheless
cannot “create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading,” id. (alteration in
original) (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975)).
This prohibition against creating claims that are “not spelled out” means that the court cannot take
on the role of an advocate and formulate theories of liability not sufficiently supported by facts
already stated by the plaintiff. See id.; Clark, 518 F.2d at 1169. If the district court cannot “identify
cognizable claims,” then it may sua sponte dismiss the complaint with prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b). To be sure, the “district court can allow a plaintiff to amend his complaint,”
LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013), but, after expiration of the 21-day period
for the plaintiff to amend as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15, the district court
need not allow amendment if the court cannot discern sufficient facts from the record before it to
support any claim. See id. I part ways with the majority opinion because it seems to preclude a
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No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
district court from dismissing a claim with prejudice even when the prisoner has not made this
requisite, predicate factual showing.
My differences with the majority opinion can be illustrated by considering Brown, where
this court reversed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice in view of additional allegations
discernable from the prisoner’s separate state case. See 415 F. App’x at 614. We reversed because
“[i]f [Brown were] simply allowed an opportunity to add the factual bases for [Brown’s]
underlying claims to [Brown’s] complaint, it would [have been] fully sufficient to proceed to the
merits.” Id. at 616. Thus, reversal of a dismissal with prejudice is “uniquely appropriate” if there
is information already within the knowledge of the court—for example, allegations by the prisoner
in another case that may be judicially noticed—that would cure the defect in the complaint. See
id. But this principle does not mean, as the majority opinion seems to suggest, that the dismissal
should always be reversed if the prisoner could conceivably make “more fully
detailed . . . allegations” or “point to a more detailed amended complaint,” Majority Opinion at 17,
regardless of whether the allegations made thus far by the prisoner are sufficient to fully support
at least one claim. Nor does this principle mean that when a prisoner provides a “comprehensive
overview of his case as it evolved,” reversal is warranted, as the majority suggests. Id.
Here, there are no allegations from another case, as in Brown, to fill in the gaps in the
complaint.1 But we do have other papers Tolliver filed in the district court from which to discern
the facts needed to fill in the gaps. I agree that those submissions are proper for consideration and
preclude dismissal of the First Amendment retaliation and the access-to-court claims with
1
By “complaint” I mean the document that the district court clerk labeled as such. R. 1.
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No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
prejudice. But even giving all of Tolliver’s filings the lenient consideration to which they are
entitled as pro se submissions, there still are not enough facts asserted to warrant reversing the
dismissal of the due process claim.
With respect to conduct protected by the First Amendment (the first element of the
retaliation claim), Tolliver alleges that his placement in solitary confinement “is an act of
retaliation for [F]irst Amendment protected conduct. (i.e. grievances which resulted in a contractor
for religious services being terminated[]).” R. 1 (Page ID #4). Protected conduct includes a
prisoner’s “undisputed First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials on his own
behalf,” provided that the grievances are not frivolous. Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415
(6th Cir. 2000). Although Tolliver’s pleading does not provide details about the filed grievances,
it does imply that they were not frivolous because they led to the termination of a contractor for
religious services.
Tolliver also alleges facts sufficient to show that defendants took adverse action against
him, which is the second element of a retaliation claim. An adverse action is one that is “capable
of deterring a person of ordinary firmness” from exercising his constitutional right, Bell v. Johnson,
308 F.3d 594, 606 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted), and “[e]ven the threat of an adverse action
can satisfy this element if the threat is capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness from
engaging in the protected conduct,” Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 472 (citing Pasley v. Conerly,
345 F. App’x 981, 985 (6th Cir. 2009)). Tolliver states that he was placed in solitary confinement
and that his previous religious services contractor “filed a ‘false report’ to try and have Tolliver’s
security status raised.” R. 1 (Page ID #5). This is adequate to plead adverse action. See Hill,
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No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
630 F.3d at 474 (“[R]estricting a prisoner’s housing by placing him in administrative segregation
constitutes an adverse action.”); Dunham-Bey v. Holden, 198 F.3d 244, 1999 WL 102370, at *2
(6th Cir. Nov. 5, 1999) (unpublished table opinion) (concluding that prisoner’s allegation that false
disciplinary actions were filed against him was sufficient to plead an adverse action and withstand
motion to dismiss).
The pleading, however, does not sufficiently state the third element of a retaliation claim—
that the adverse action “was motivated at least in part by the prisoner’s protected conduct,” Hill,
630 F.3d at 475 (citing Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693, 699 (6th Cir. 2005)). In his complaint,
Tolliver asserts that defendants used a nexus transfer “as a tool to punish” him because of a false
report filed against him. R. 1 (Page ID #5). Without more, this statement does not sufficiently
allege facts to establish the requisite motivation. Nonetheless, even though the pleading is
deficient, there are factual allegations in Tolliver’s affidavit that, if incorporated into an amended
complaint, would withstand a motion to dismiss. See generally R. 4.
Tolliver explains that one defendant started an investigation into Tolliver’s conduct in
response to a complaint filed by the institution’s religious services contractor. This is the same
religious services contractor against whom Tolliver filed a grievance, leading to the contractor’s
termination. After reviewing the complaint filed against Tolliver, the investigator allegedly told
Tolliver: “I’m taking this as a false report but instead of writing you some bogus rule 17 to get rid
of you I’m going to nexus you.” R. 4 (Page ID #28). The investigator allegedly told Tolliver this
news two weeks after his being placed in solitary confinement. Thus, according to Tolliver’s
supplemental affidavit, the investigators continued to keep Tolliver in solitary confinement after
29
No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
concluding the report was false. Taken together, these allegations are sufficient to establish that
at least one defendant’s adverse action was motivated by Tolliver’s protected conduct. Therefore,
there are enough factual details in the record below that, if incorporated into an amended
complaint, would allow Tolliver’s complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.
The same can also be said of his access-to-the-courts claim, which requires a showing of
“actual prejudice to pending or contemplated litigation.” Fitts v. Sicker, 232 F. App’x 436, 442–
43 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted) (quoting Jackson v. Gill, 92 F. App’x 171, 173 (6th Cir. 2004))
(failure to state a claim where prisoner failed to “state[] what documents were stolen or sent away”
or “how the unavailability of [the] documents prejudiced” prisoner). The complaint alleges that
the materials seized by the defendants from Tolliver were “critical items of New Evidence,
Original Affidavits, Tolliver’s 3500 page transcript from his month long trial, notes and
irreplaceable research. He has [an] active 2244 Petition in the U.S. Court of Appeals, [a] RLUIPA
claim he’s been collecting documentation for 3 years and would have filed next month.” R. 1
(Page ID #7–8). There is no assertion in his complaint that the loss of his papers prejudiced his
past or current litigation. Nor does Tolliver contend that the documents collected for the RLUIPA
claim were needed to file that claim or that without those documents he would be unable to file.
Indeed, we may take judicial notice that Tolliver pleaded his RLUIPA claim in his March 22, 2017
amended complaint. Absent more details, these assertions are the same type of conclusory
allegations that this court has held are insufficient to state a claim. See Fitts, 232 F. App’x at 442–
43.
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No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
However, there are additional facts in the underlying record to support Tolliver’s access-
to-the-courts claim. Tolliver’s affidavit explained that the seized documents were “current and
necessary” to his legal claims. Importantly, Tolliver has not alleged he was only denied access to
his documents. See generally R. 7. Instead, he alleges that documents for some of his pending
legal challenges have either been stolen or gone missing because of defendants’ conduct. See id.
Further, unlike the prisoner in Fitts who did not “specifically state[] what documents were stolen
or sent away,” Tolliver explains in detail the specific documents that went missing from his legal
boxes. Fitts, 232 F. App’x at 442. Specifically, Tolliver explains that evidence to support his
“pending challenge to ODRC Policy 72-REG-1 thru 12” went missing after defendants seized his
materials in early September 2016. R. 7 (Page ID #51). Tolliver then provides an itemized list of
the missing evidence that he had used to support that challenge. Therefore, the district court erred
when it concluded that Tolliver failed to sufficiently allege an access-to-the-courts claim,2 and I
would reverse the district court’s dismissal of this claim with prejudice.
But the dismissal of Tolliver’s due process claim with prejudice should be affirmed. To
state this claim, Tolliver must plead that the state deprived him of a protected liberty interest. See
Swihart v. Wilkinson, 209 F. App’x 456, 458 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Zimmerman v. Burch, 494 U.S.
113, 125 (1981)). Under Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S 472 (1995), a transfer interferes with a
prisoner’s liberty interest if the transfer could affect the duration of an inmate’s sentence or inflict
an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prisoner
2
The alleged seizure of legal documents may also provide factual support for the adverse
action element of Tolliver’s retaliation claim. See Bell, 308 F.3d at 604; Kennedy v. Bonevelle,
413 F. App’x 836, 839 (6th Cir. 2011).
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No. 17-3367, Tolliver v. Noble et al.
life.” Id. at 484, 486–87. Whether a liberty interest is deprived under Sandin “requires a
situationally-based factual analysis.” Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346, 354 (6th Cir. 2000), aff’d
in relevant part, 545 U.S. 209 (2005). Tolliver’s complaint summarily asserts that his “due process
rights have been violated by a flawed DRC 2009 form which among other facts created an invalid
transfer hearing.” R. 1 (Page ID #4). But Tolliver fails to explain how his transfer imposed an
“atypical and significant hardship,” as is necessary to state a due process claim based on that
transfer under Sandin.3
Accordingly, I agree with the majority that reversal is warranted for the dismissal with
prejudice of the retaliation and access-to-the-courts claims, but I would affirm the district court’s
dismissal of the due process claims.
3
Tolliver also argues that his complaint supports a viable due process claim concerning the
seizure of his personal property. Appellant Br. at 34. But we should not make this inference,
given this court’s instruction not to “create a claim which [a pro se plaintiff] has not spelled out in
his pleading.” Brown, 415 F. App’x at 613. Tolliver’s complaint, fairly read, relates the seizure
of his personal property to his access-to-the-courts, not his due process, claim.
32