Ballah Passewee v. Eric Holder, Jr. ( 2012 )


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  •                   NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 12a1267n.06
    No. 11-4359                                   FILED
    Dec 10, 2012
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    BALLAH MOMOLU PASSEWEE,                                )
    )
    Petitioner,                                  )
    )
    v.                                                     )      ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
    )      FROM THE UNITED STATES
    ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,                 )      BOARD OF IMMIGRATION
    )      APPEALS
    Respondent.                                  )
    )
    BEFORE: BOGGS and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; CARR, District Judge.*
    PER CURIAM. Ballah Momolu Passewee petitions this court for review of an order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals affirming the denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of
    removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We deny the petition for
    review.
    On January 13, 2007, Passewee, a native and citizen of Liberia, entered the United States as
    a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure with authorization to remain for a temporary period. Before the
    expiration of that period, Passewee filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
    protection. The Department of Homeland Security commenced removal proceedings against
    Passewee by serving him with a notice to appear, charging him with removability under the
    *
    The Honorable James G. Carr, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern District
    of Ohio, sitting by designation.
    No. 11-4359
    Passewee v. Holder
    Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(1)(B), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(1)(B), as an alien who remained
    in the United States longer than permitted. Passewee appeared before an immigration judge (IJ) and
    conceded that he had overstayed his visitor visa.
    The IJ ordered Passewee’s removal in absentia when he failed to appear for his merits
    hearing. The IJ subsequently reopened the case. At the rescheduled hearing, Passewee testified that
    he left Liberia because his life was threatened by John Yekeh, a senior consultant for the Liberian
    National Police. According to Passewee, Yekeh sought to eliminate him because of his past role as
    an advocate for the people and because of his assets, but “the prime reason is because he’s also
    falling into a relationship with my wife. . . . Yekeh is mainly targeting me because he has coerced
    my wife to fall into a relationship with him.” At the conclusion of Passewee’s testimony, the IJ
    opined that the asylum application was frivolous, giving examples of Passewee’s inconsistent and
    implausible testimony and pointing out the apparently fraudulent nature of his supporting documents.
    The IJ continued the hearing to give Passewee additional time to address these issues. After a second
    hearing, the IJ denied Passewee’s applications for relief, ordered his removal to Liberia, and found
    that he knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application. The IJ determined that Passewee was not
    credible and that, even if he were credible, he failed to demonstrate that any harm he might suffer
    was related to a statutorily protected ground, that he had a well-founded fear of future persecution,
    or that it was more likely than not that he would be subjected to torture if he returned to Liberia.
    Passewee filed a timely appeal, which the BIA dismissed in part and sustained in part. The
    BIA upheld the IJ’s adverse-credibility finding as not clearly erroneous. The BIA further determined
    that the IJ correctly concluded in the alternative that Passewee’s asylum claim lacked the required
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    No. 11-4359
    Passewee v. Holder
    nexus between any harm in Liberia and a statutorily protected ground; that Passewee, having failed
    to establish eligibility for asylum, failed to satisfy the more stringent standard for withholding of
    removal; and that Passewee’s speculation was insufficient to establish a clear probability of torture.
    The BIA sustained Passewee’s appeal from the IJ’s frivolity finding.
    Passewee now petitions this court for review. Where, as here, “the BIA reviews the
    immigration judge’s decision and issues a separate opinion, rather than summarily affirming the
    immigration judge’s decision, we review the BIA’s decision as the final agency determination.”
    Khalili v. Holder, 
    557 F.3d 429
    , 435 (6th Cir. 2009). “To the extent that the BIA has adopted the
    IJ’s reasoning, however, we also review the IJ’s decision.” Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 
    585 F.3d 980
    ,
    991 (6th Cir. 2009). We review factual findings, including an adverse-credibility finding, under a
    substantial-evidence standard, upholding the agency’s determination “as long as it is supported by
    reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Parlak v.
    Holder, 
    578 F.3d 457
    , 462 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Abdulahad
    v. Holder, 
    581 F.3d 290
    , 294 (6th Cir. 2009). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive
    unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4)(B).
    Passewee contends that the IJ’s adverse-credibility finding was not based on issues going to
    the heart of his claims for relief. But Passewee filed his applications for relief after the enactment
    of the REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 
    119 Stat. 231
     (2005), which allows an adverse-credibility
    determination to be made “without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes
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    No. 11-4359
    Passewee v. Holder
    to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(iii); see
    also El-Moussa v. Holder, 
    569 F.3d 250
    , 256 (6th Cir. 2009).
    The IJ found that Passewee’s testimony was internally inconsistent as well as inconsistent
    with his application and his corroborating evidence. The IJ also noted that Passewee often elected
    not to answer the question asked and that he was instead “intent upon trying to tell his story in some
    sort of narrative form which suggests to the Court that he was not being candid.” Passewee attributes
    the IJ’s findings to a misunderstanding of his testimony, referencing the numerous times that the IJ
    expressed difficulty understanding him. The record, however, reflects that the IJ interjected when
    he could not understand Passewee’s testimony to allow Passewee to repeat or explain his answers.
    Cf. Ahmed v. Gonzales, 
    398 F.3d 722
    , 726-27 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that the IJ himself created the
    confusion and held it against the petitioners). The testimony cited by Passewee as a “confused
    exchange” in fact demonstrates his evasiveness; the quotation in his brief omits his repetition of the
    question, reflecting that he understood what he was being asked.
    The IJ found that two documents submitted by Passewee—medical slips from the New Age
    Medical Clinic purporting to document his treatment for injuries sustained from beatings—were
    fraudulent. Passewee asserts that he did not know that the documents were false, ignoring their
    patent falsity. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 
    439 F.3d 273
    , 277 (6th Cir. 2006) (“An applicant must take
    reasonable measures to verify the authenticity of any documents accompanying an application.”).
    The medical slips appear to be pre-printed forms with Passewee’s name filled in, contain a
    misspelling in the letterhead, and conflict with Passewee’s own testimony about his injuries and
    treatment.
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    Passewee v. Holder
    Passewee contends that the IJ overestimated his ability to obtain corroborating documents
    from post-civil-war Liberia. Given that Passewee received emails from his brother in Liberia and
    had recently obtained a photo of his wife, a reasonable trier of fact would not be compelled to
    conclude that a statement from his wife was unavailable. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(4); Shkabari v.
    Gonzales, 
    427 F.3d 324
    , 331 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, Passewee’s testimony was not
    “otherwise credible.” 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(B)(ii) (“Where the trier of fact determines that the
    applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence
    must be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the
    evidence.”). Where an applicant’s testimony could be viewed as incredible, inconsistent, or
    incoherent, as in this case, the failure to provide corroborating evidence may provide further support
    for an adverse-credibility determination. See Zhao v. Holder, 
    569 F.3d 238
    , 248-49 (6th Cir. 2009);
    Pilica v. Ashcroft, 
    388 F.3d 941
    , 954 (6th Cir. 2004).
    Given Passewee’s inconsistencies, his submission of patently false documents, and his lack
    of corroboration, substantial evidence supports the adverse-credibility finding. That finding is “fatal
    to all three of [Passewee’s] claims for relief.” El Moussa, 
    569 F.3d at 256
    . Accordingly, we deny
    the petition for review.
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