United States v. Debra Williams , 505 F. App'x 426 ( 2012 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 12a1167n.06
No. 10-5028
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Nov 13, 2012
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DEBRA WILLIAMS, WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
Defendant-Appellant.
/
BEFORE: BOGGS and CLAY, Circuit Judges; STAFFORD, District Judge.*
CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Debra Williams appeals her sentence, arguing that the
district court failed to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553, and asks this court to remand the matter to
the district court for re-sentencing. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the sentence imposed
by the district court.
BACKGROUND
On August 6, 2009, a jury in the Western District of Tennessee convicted Defendant of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute at least 500 grams of methamphetamine in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) recommended that Defendant
*
The Honorable William H. Stafford, Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Florida, sitting by designation.
No. 10-5028
be sentenced according to a base offense level of 34, with a 2-point upward adjustment for
obstruction of justice,1 and a criminal history category of I. The guideline imprisonment range given
was 188–235 months. (PSR Addendum, at 2.) Prior to sentencing, Defendant requested a downward
adjustment in her criminal history category as a “minimal” or “minor” participant pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. She also presented arguments for mitigation of her sentence based on her family
circumstances, arguing that the court should consider a lesser sentence because she has five children
to care for.
The district court denied Defendant’s request for a downward adjustment, and declined to
adjust the sentence downward because of Defendant’s family circumstances. Ultimately, the court
sentenced Defendant to 188 months imprisonment. Defendant now appeals that sentence.
DISCUSSION
I. Minor or Minimal Participant Downward Adjustment
Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, “[i]f the defendant was a minor participant
in any criminal activity,” the court should decrease the offense level by 2 levels. U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.2(b). Defendant argues that the district court erred by failing to apply this reduction to her
base offense level.2 We find that the court did not err.
A defendant’s “degree of participation and culpability is a factual determination entitled to
review for only clear error.” United States v. Allen, 516 F.3d 364, 375 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United
1
Defendant does not ask this Court to review the application of that enhancement.
2
Defendant now argues that she was entitled to the minor-participant reduction, which would
reduce her offense level by 2, but she initially requested the 4-level reduction through trial counsel
at sentencing. (See Def. Br. at 14.)
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States v. Harris, 397 F.3d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 2005)). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when,
on the entire evidence, we are ‘left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.’” United States v. Valentine, 694 F.3d 665, 672 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v.
City of Bessemer City 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)); see also United States v. Lanham, 617 F.3d 873,
888 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Perry, 908 F.2d 56, 58 (6th Cir. 1990)).
“It is well settled that a defendant has a burden of proving mitigating factors, such as a
downward adjustment for being a minor participant, by a preponderance of the evidence.” United
States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). As Defendant concedes, “The determination
whether to apply [the downward adjustment], is based on the totality of the circumstances and
involves a determination that is heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular case.”
U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. 3, n.C.
Under the sentencing guidelines, a defendant can receive a reduction in her offense level if
she was a minimal or minor participant in the criminal activity. A minor participant’s offense level
is to be reduced by 2, while a minimal participant’s offense level is to be reduced by 4. U.S.S.G. §
3B1.2(a)–(b). A minimal participant is one “who [is] plainly among the least culpable of those
involved,” while a minor participant is one “who is less culpable than most other participants, but
whose role could not be described as minimal.” .S.S.G. § 3B1.2, cmt. 4–5; see also United States
v. Henderson, 307 F. App’x 970, 983 (6th Cir. 2009). This Court has further defined a minor
participant as one whose conduct was “substantially less culpable” than the average participant,
United States v. Lanham, 617 F.3d 873, 888 (6th Cir. 2010), and was not necessary to the success
of the enterprise. United States v. Allen, 516 F.3d 364, 375 (6th Cir. 2008). Therefore, because the
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guidelines define a minor participant as one who is more culpable than a minimal participant, and
places the burden of proof on defendants, if Defendant cannot show that her role was minor, it is
impossible for her to get the larger reduction for “minimal participation.”
Defendant’s role in the enterprise was not minor or minimal. Defendant repeatedly acted
as a courier for Victor Ray Thomas, a Memphis-based dealer of methamphetamine. She carried up
to two pounds of methamphetamine, by both plane and bus, on several occasions. (Gov’t Br. at 4–5.)
Courts in this Circuit have found that a defendant’s “role as courier was critical to the success of the
drug trafficking and money laundering conspiracies.” United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 783
(6th Cir. 2012) (upholding district court’s decision not to apply a downward adjustment). Courts
in other circuits have also found that couriers are not necessarily minor participants in drug
distribution operations. See, e.g., United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1207–08 (3d Cir. 1994);
Ajala v. United States Parole Comm’n, 997 F.2d 651, 656 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Lui, 941
F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 1991). Further, there is no dispute that Defendant’s conduct went beyond
acting as a courier. There was evidence that she observed transactions, and conducted transactions
herself, as well as evidence that she helped plan sales. In other words, a judge could have reasonably
found that she was as culpable as an “average participant” in the enterprise.
Accordingly, we find that the district court did not commit clear error when it refused to give
Defendant a downward adjustment as a minor participant.
II. Defendant’s Argument for Mitigation on the Basis of Family Circumstances
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Defendant also argues that the district court’s sentence was unreasonable, because the court
failed to consider her family circumstances when it imposed its sentence. Sentences are reviewed
for procedural and substantive reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The district court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, while
its findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 539–40 (6th
Cir. 2008). “In order for a district court's sentencing determination to be procedurally reasonable,
a ‘sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the
parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.’”
United States v. Gapinski, 561 F.3d 467, 474 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338 (2007)).
Defendant bases her argument on 18 U.S.C. § 3553, which states that a court, when
sentencing a defendant, “shall consider– (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Her claim is that the district
court should have interpreted that statute to mean that it was required to consider her family
circumstances, and that in failing to do so, the district court committed reversible error. The correct
rule, however, is that while family circumstances are permissible considerations under 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(1), they are disfavored under the sentencing guidelines. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6. and
§ 5K2.0, the guidelines permit consideration of such circumstances as mitigating factors only in
exceptional cases. Compare United States v. Reed, 264 F.3d 640, 653–54 (6th Cir. 2001) (reversing
where a district court improperly used family circumstances to mitigate a sentence), with United
States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758, 767 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming consideration of family circumstances
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but reversing the sentence as unjustified in that case), and United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318, 326
(6th Cir. 2007)).
We find that the district court followed this rule punctiliously. The court briefly mentioned
family circumstances when setting its custodial sentence, stating that: “[u]nder the guidelines, we
really don’t depart in terms of the calculation because of family circumstances, because everybody
has got family circumstances. I know you have got five children.” (R. 234 at 44.) This statement
matches the directive of the sentencing guidelines, which state that “family ties and responsibilities
are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be warranted.” U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6.
Furthermore, the court included a recommendation that the Bureau of Prisons place Defendant as
close to her children as possible. (R. 234 at 59–60.) The court also engaged in a lengthy explanation
of its sentencing methodology. See United States v. Gunter, 620 F.3d 642, 645 (6th Cir. 2010).
Finally, the district court pronounced a sentence at the bottom of the guidelines range. Therefore, we
find that the district court met its obligation to consider the arguments raised in mitigation and
explained why it rejected them.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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