United States v. Randall Willis , 362 F. App'x 531 ( 2010 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 10a0057n.06
No. 08-5076
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Jan 28, 2010
LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
RANDALL D. WILLIS, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
BEFORE: NORRIS, COOK, and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Randall Willis was convicted by a jury on multiple counts of conspiracy to
distribute, possession with intent to distribute, and distribution of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and 846; possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense and
possession of an unregistered short-barreled shotgun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) and 26
U.S.C. § 5861(d); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, contrary to 21 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)
and 924(e)(1). On appeal, Willis challenges the district court’s determination that he was competent
to stand trial. Willis also argues that his within-Guidelines sentence is substantively and
procedurally unreasonable because the district court failed to grant a downward departure in light
of his diminished mental capacity. We disagree and affirm.
I.
No. 08-5076
United States v. Willis
The facts of this case are not in dispute. On March 2, 2006, a federal grand jury in
Lexington, Kentucky, returned a thirteen-count indictment charging numerous drug-related and
weapons offenses against Willis and another individual. The indictment stemmed from an
investigation by the Kentucky State Police into Willis’s illegal trafficking of narcotics. From March
2005 through November 2005, the police, with the assistance of a confidential informant, conducted
four controlled purchases of cocaine from Willis and his cohort. A search warrant was executed on
December 1, 2005, at Willis’s residence, yielding drug paraphernalia, a loaded sawed-off shotgun,
assorted ammunition, marijuana, four plastic baggies containing cocaine residue, and twenty-one pit
bulls, five of which were dead.
Willis entered a plea of not guilty to the charges. Shortly before his jury trial was scheduled
to begin, defense counsel raised concerns about Willis’s mental state and filed a motion for a
competency hearing. The district court granted the motion and ordered a psychological evaluation
of Willis. Willis was committed to the Federal Medical Center in Lexington, Kentucky, and,
following a two-month evaluation, the examining psychologist recommended that Willis was
incompetent to stand trial. In a September 2006 forensic report, the psychologist noted that Willis
exhibited odd behavior by, inter alia, pacing for hours in a circular pattern and talking to himself as
if he heard voices. Willis expressed paranoid delusions about local law enforcement officials and
irrational beliefs about the identity of an arresting officer and the reasons for his arrest. The
psychologist provisionally diagnosed Willis with a psychotic disorder that significantly impaired his
reasoning. However, the psychologist noted the possibility that Willis was “malingering or
-2-
No. 08-5076
United States v. Willis
pretending mental illness in order to avoid prosecution.” The psychologist opined that further
treatment was warranted and that Willis’s symptoms should improve with the use of anti-psychotic
medication. There was “a substantial probability [Willis] will attain the capacity to permit a trial to
proceed in the foreseeable future” if treated and stabilized.
At a subsequent competency hearing in October 2006, the district court determined, on the
basis of the forensic report, that Willis was not competent to stand trial and committed him to the
Bureau of Prisons for further evaluation. A team of mental health professionals monitored Willis
at the Federal Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina, from December 2006 until April 2007. The
evaluators opined at the end of this time period that Willis was competent to stand trial; his psychotic
symptoms were in remission, and he was now able to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him and assist in his defense. These findings were incorporated in a May 2007
forensic report, accompanied by a certificate of restoration of competency to stand trial filed in
accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 4241(e). In the report, the evaluators identified one point of concern
– Willis still “verbalized a possible delusional, persecutory belief that the charges could be dropped
because they were based on the false allegations of a person posing as an arresting officer.”
However, Willis also demonstrated the ability to function at a high level in a structured environment,
and he interacted appropriately with staff and peers. Most importantly, Willis exhibited a “rational
and realistic understanding of his charges and ability to consult with his attorney” and “was able to
discuss the options available to him as a defendant in a criminal case in a lucid and organized
-3-
No. 08-5076
United States v. Willis
manner.” It was therefore the opinion of the evaluators that Willis was not suffering from any
mental disease rendering him incompetent to stand trial.
In July 2007, upon receipt of the second report, the district court conducted another
competency hearing. The district court stated that it had reviewed the May 2007 forensic report and
found, consistent with the evaluation, that Willis was competent to stand trial. The prosecutor and
defense counsel both concurred in this ruling. Specifically, defense counsel informed the court that
he had consulted with Willis prior to the hearing and was of the opinion that Willis understood the
nature of the charges against him and could assist with his defense.
The case proceeded to trial in October 2007. The jury found Willis guilty on seven counts
of drug and weapons offenses. At sentencing, the district court took into account Willis’s criminal
history category of VI, his classification as an armed career criminal and career offender, and the
recommended sentencing Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment, before it imposed
a sentence of life imprisonment. Willis now timely appeals his convictions and sentence.
II.
Willis first challenges the district court’s determination that he was competent to stand trial.
He contends that, in light of notations in the May 2007 forensic report that the delusional behavior
identified in the September 2006 forensic report persisted, the district court should have conducted
a more comprehensive evidentiary hearing and appointed an independent psychologist to review the
records and evaluate Willis. Willis further maintains that the sentencing record demonstrates his
lack of understanding of the nature and consequences of the criminal proceedings against him – i.e.,
-4-
No. 08-5076
United States v. Willis
he believed that his lawyer and the prosecutor conspired against him and confused the present
offenses with events related to his 1986 manslaughter conviction for a fatal stabbing.1
“A defendant’s competence is a question of fact, which we review for clear error.” Harries
v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2005).
By statute, a defendant or the Government “may file a motion for a hearing to
determine the mental competency of the defendant,” and such a motion must be
granted “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be
suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the
extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him or to assist properly in his defense.”
United States v. Denkins, 367 F.3d 537, 545 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)). Even
in the absence of a motion, “the district court has not only the prerogative, but the duty, to inquire
into a defendant’s competency whenever there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant is
incompetent to stand trial.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Pertinent to the
present appeal, subsection (e) of § 4241 provides:
(e) Discharge. – When the director of the facility in which a defendant is hospitalized
pursuant to subsection (d) determines that the defendant has recovered to such an
extent that he is able to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him and to assist properly in his defense, he shall promptly file a certificate
to that effect with the clerk of the court that ordered the commitment. The clerk shall
send a copy of the certificate to the defendant’s counsel and to the attorney for the
Government. The court shall hold a hearing, conducted pursuant to the provisions
of section 4247(d), to determine the competency of the defendant. If, after the
hearing, the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has
recovered to such an extent that he is able to understand the nature and
1
Willis had several prior adult criminal convictions, including a 1986 Kentucky conviction
for first-degree manslaughter stemming from a bar fight, during which he fatally stabbed the victim
six times.
-5-
No. 08-5076
United States v. Willis
consequences of the proceedings against him and to assist properly in his defense,
the court shall order his immediate discharge from the facility in which he is
hospitalized and shall set the date for trial or other proceedings.
18 U.S.C. § 4241(e) (emphasis added).
“[T]he bar for incompetency is high: a criminal defendant must lack either a ‘sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding’ or ‘a
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’” United States v. Miller,
531 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). In making this determination, the district court must consider several
factors, including the defendant’s demeanor, any prior medical opinion regarding competency, and
evidence of irrational behavior. Miller, 531 F.3d at 348; Williams v. Bordenkircher, 696 F.2d 464,
466 (6th Cir. 1983). An attorney’s opinion about his client’s competency is likewise a relevant
factor. United States v. Tucker, 204 F. App’x 518, 520 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Owens v. Sowders,
661 F.2d 584, 586 (6th Cir. 1981)); United States v. Jackson, 179 F. App’x 921, 933 (6th Cir. 2006).
Moreover, although a defendant may show signs of paranoia or other mental illness, “such an illness
would not necessarily render [the] defendant incompetent to stand trial.” Miller, 531 F.3d at 349
(citing United States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286, 1290 (6th Cir. 1996)). In short, “[t]here are . . . no fixed
or immutable signs which invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to
proceed; the question is often a difficult one in which a wide range of manifestations and subtle
nuances are implicated.” Williams, 696 F.2d at 466 (quoting Drope, 420 U.S. at 180).
-6-
No. 08-5076
United States v. Willis
We find no clear error in the district court’s determination, consistent with the diagnosis in
the May 2007 forensic evaluation, that Willis was no longer suffering from a mental disease or defect
that prevented him from understanding the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him
or from assisting in his defense. The September 2006 and May 2007 forensic reports were not
contradictory. The first report suggested that Willis’s mental health could improve under controlled
conditions; the second report indicated that Willis in fact regained his competency after undergoing
treatment and close supervision at the federal medical center. At the competency hearing, defense
counsel – the same attorney who initially questioned Willis’s competency – did not challenge the
May 2007 forensic evaluation and agreed with the district court that Willis was now competent to
stand trial. In fact, there is no indication in the record that Willis’s behavior during the trial raised
competency concerns. Under these circumstances, the district court did not clearly err in finding
Willis competent to stand trial. See United States v. Baker, No. 6:07-58-KKC, 2008 WL 138075,
at *2 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 11, 2008) (finding that the defendant was competent to stand trial where there
was no irrational or erratic conduct that would indicate a current competency deficit, the forensic
report concluded that the defendant was competent, and defense counsel stipulated to the
admissibility and substance of the report).
Moreover, contrary to Willis’s claim, his behavior at sentencing did not signal a need to
further evaluate his competency. Willis argues that in light of purportedly irrational comments he
made during his allocution, the district court should have doubted his competency and required
-7-
No. 08-5076
United States v. Willis
additional evaluation. In United States v. Harlan, 480 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1973), we considered and
rejected a similar argument.
In Harlan, the prosecutor filed a pre-trial motion for a mental examination of the defendant,
alleging that the defendant had a history of mental illness and institutionalization. 480 F.2d at 516.
The district court granted the motion, and Harlan was examined by psychiatrists at a federal facility.
Id. The first of two resultant forensic reports deferred psychiatric diagnosis; the second report
concluded that Harlan was competent to stand trial. Id. At the subsequent competency hearing,
counsel for both parties, and Harlan himself, concurred in the findings in the forensic reports. Id.
The district court therefore declared Harlan competent to stand trial, and Harlan subsequently entered
a guilty plea to a charge of armed bank robbery. Id. At the sentencing hearing, the court engaged
in a dialogue with Harlan and acknowledged that he had “some mental problem,” but proceeded with
sentencing because neither of the psychiatric reports indicated that Harlan suffered from a psychosis.
Id.
On appeal, Harlan asserted that the district court erred in failing to inquire further into his
competency at the guilty plea and sentencing stages. We disagreed:
It is true that in its opinion in United States v. Davis, [365 F.2d 251 (6th Cir. 1966)],
this Court stated that under the facts of that case the District Court had an obligation
to hold another hearing, 365 F.2d at 255. That opinion, however, also recognized the
rule of Beltran v. United States, 302 F.2d 48, 50 (1st Cir. 1962), that a trial judge has
no affirmative duty to conduct, sua sponte, a second inquiry into an accused’s
competency “unless the court is on notice that something is amiss.” See Id.
***
-8-
No. 08-5076
United States v. Willis
Significantly, most of the . . . factors [cited by the defendant] merely relate to
Appellant’s past and apparently persisting personality disorders, of which the District
Court was made fully aware at the competency hearing through the psychiatric
reports. Although these reports certainly did not give Appellant a clean bill of mental
health, the one nonetheless recommended a finding of competency and the other
deferred psychiatric diagnosis, and no contradictory evidence was presented to the
Court at the competency hearing. With this competent and uncontradicted evidence
supporting the District Court’s finding of competency, we find no basis for upsetting
that determination. See Wolcott v. United States, 407 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 879 (1969).
Beyond the factors of which the District Court was thus fully aware at the
competency hearing, it appears that only two episodes – the rejection by Appellant
of an opportunity to plead guilty to the lesser offense of unarmed robbery and his
statement at the sentencing hearing that he had experienced two “seizures” since he
underwent psychiatric examination – might be said to have given the Court notice of
a possible change in Appellant’s condition subsequent to the competency hearing.
We are unable to say that these episodes gave rise to an affirmative duty on the part
of the Court to conduct, sua sponte, an additional inquiry into Appellant’s
competency and that the Court’s failure to do so constituted prejudicial error,
requiring that Appellant’s guilty plea be set aside.
Harlan, 480 F.2d at 516-17; see also Beltran, 302 F.2d at 50 (“There can be no affirmative duty to
investigate unless the court is on notice that something is amiss. Where the most recent word was
a well-qualified medical report of present competency, an earlier contrary report does not seem to
us to put the court on notice with respect to the present even though the court had endorsed an earlier
report by formally finding it to be correct.”).2
2
Cf. Denkins, 367 F.3d at 547-48 (holding that the defendant’s statements at his plea hearing
that he suffered a head injury and associated mental problems were not so indicative of
incompetency that the district court’s acceptance of his plea violated due process, where there was
no exhibition of irrational behavior or other evidence of incompetency, a professional evaluation
confirmed the court’s competency assessment, and the defendant and his counsel assured the court
that the defendant understood the nature of the charges and consequences of the plea); Miller, 531
F.3d at 350 (holding that the district court did not err in failing to order sua sponte a competency
-9-
No. 08-5076
United States v. Willis
Under the present analogous circumstances, Willis’s behavior at sentencing did not suggest
that something was amiss so as to trigger an affirmative duty on the part of the district court to
reevaluate his competency. Although Willis, when given the opportunity to allocute, made a
rambling reference to the events surrounding his 1986 manslaughter conviction, his comments were
insufficient to give the court cause to question his competency. Our review of the sentencing
transcript shows that Willis was well-acquainted with the legal system and displayed a clear
understanding of the current legal proceedings when he requested an appeal because he was
dissatisfied with his attorney and protested the court’s consideration of his violent propensities –
specifically, his prior manslaughter conviction:
[WILLIS]: All right. You’re saying I had violence in this case, where is the violence
at? I ain’t been convicted of no violence.
***
[WILLIS]: I ain’t trying to cause nothing over this, all I’m saying it’s like this here:
You’re talking about something that I’m supposed to have done 20 years ago. Just
because I’m charged with it now, I wasn’t found guilty of it. You’re taking and
accusing me of something or you’re judging me on something that I ain’t been found
guilty of. Now, if I was guilty of it or said I was guilty of it, now, 1992, yes, I pled
guilty to a little stabbing charge there, and yes –
[THE COURT]: I’m sorry, did you say a little stabbing charge?
hearing where defense counsel did not raise questions at or before trial regarding the defendant’s
mental health and the defendant, who exhibited symptoms of paranoia, demonstrated that he
understood the proceedings by stating, in response to the court’s question as to how he could afford
to retain counsel, “I am borrowing the money from five different people. This is my life that is on
the line here . . . . If I lose, I am going to jail for a long time.”).
- 10 -
No. 08-5076
United States v. Willis
[WILLIS]: Yes, because it was barely right there, a little nick is the reason I said little
stabbing charge.
[THE COURT]: Is this the one in the bar in Richmond that the man died?
[WILLIS]: That would be called a big stabbing charge.
[THE COURT]:Yeah, that would be a big one, wouldn’t it, six times stabbing
someone. It sure would.
[WILLIS]: Right.
Defense counsel did not raise any concerns regarding Willis’s competency during the
sentencing hearing.3 In sum, with the benefit of two court-ordered psychiatric evaluations and
competency hearings, the district court was well aware of Willis’s mental health issues and was
presented with no independent evidence to contradict the evaluators’ findings that those problems
were in remission and that Willis’s competency was restored. We therefore conclude, under these
circumstances, that the district court more than adequately protected Willis’s due process rights and
did not clearly err in its competency determination.
III.
Willis next claims that his sentence is substantively and procedurally unreasonable because
the district court failed to grant a downward departure, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13,4 from the
3
Cf. Tucker, 204 F. App’x at 521 (holding that district court did not err in failing to hold
competency hearing and noting that none of the defendant’s successive lawyers expressed doubt
about his competence before he pled guilty or at sentencing).
4
Under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13,
[a] downward departure may be warranted if (1) the defendant committed the offense
- 11 -
No. 08-5076
United States v. Willis
applicable Guidelines range in light of his mental disorder and borderline IQ. Willis admits,
however, that he never moved for a downward departure, based upon diminished capacity, of his
within-Guidelines sentence.
“[W]e do not review a district court’s decision not to depart downward unless the record
shows that the district court was unaware of, or did not understand, its discretion to make such a
departure.” United States v. Santillana, 540 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2008). “[W]e presume that the
district court understood its discretion, absent clear evidence to the contrary.” Id. Absent such clear
evidence, we review the district court’s decision “only if (1) the sentence was imposed in violation
of the law; (2) it was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the guidelines; (3) the
sentence represented an upward departure; or (4) the sentence was imposed for an offense for which
there is no Sentencing Guideline and is plainly unreasonable.” Id. (citations and internal quotation
while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity; and (2) the significantly
reduced mental capacity contributed substantially to the commission of the offense.
Similarly, if a departure is warranted under this policy statement, the extent of the
departure should reflect the extent to which the reduced mental capacity contributed
to the commission of the offense.
However, the court may not depart below the applicable guideline range if (1) the
significantly reduced mental capacity was caused by the voluntary use of drugs or
other intoxicants; (2) the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s offense indicate
a need to protect the public because the offense involved actual violence or a serious
threat of violence; (3) the defendant’s criminal history indicates a need to incarcerate
the defendant to protect the public; or (4) the defendant has been convicted of an
offense under chapter 71, 109A, 110, or 117, of title 18, United States Code.
See also United States v. Cole, 359 F.3d 420, 430 (6th Cir. 2004).
- 12 -
No. 08-5076
United States v. Willis
marks omitted). If review is warranted, the plain error standard applies where the defendant failed
to object to his sentence before the district court. Id. Further, even if review is unwarranted, “we
are still free to review a defendant’s claim that his sentence is excessive based on the district court’s
unreasonable analysis of the section 3553(a) factors in their totality.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
The district court’s decision not to depart is not reviewable. There is no clear evidence that
the district court did not understand its discretion to make a downward departure. To the contrary,
in imposing the maximum sentence within the Guidelines range, the court noted Willis’s violent
propensities and danger to the public – rendering him ineligible for the diminished capacity departure
under § 5K2.13.
Willis has not otherwise shown that the district court plainly erred in imposing the sentence
of life imprisonment or that this sentence was unreasonable. See generally United States v. Baker,
559 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 385-86 (6th Cir. 2008)
(en banc).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Willis’s convictions and sentence.
- 13 -