United States v. Goins , 113 F. App'x 131 ( 2004 )


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    NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 04a0052n.06
    Filed: October 28, 2004
    Case No. 03-6281
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                  )        ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
    )        STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
    Plaintiff-Appellant,         )         THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
    )               TENNESSEE
    v.                                         )
    )
    PARKE GOINS,                               )
    )
    Defendant-Appellee.          )
    Before: BATCHELDER and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges; and STAFFORD, District Judge.*
    STAFFORD, District Judge. Appellant, the United States of America (the
    “government”), appeals the sentence given to the defendant, Parke Goins (“Goins”),
    following his guilty plea to dealing in firearms without a license to do so. Specifically, the
    government appeals the district court’s five-level downward departure from the
    sentencing guidelines. We vacate and remand for resentencing.
    I.
    On June 5, 2002, Goins was charged with four counts of firearms violations
    occurring between May, 2001, and April 17, 2002. In Count One, Goins was charged
    with willfully engaging in the unlicensed business of dealing in firearms, including but
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    * The Honorable William Stafford, Senior United States District Judge for the
    Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation.
    not limited to those firearms identified in the remaining three counts, in violation of 18
    U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A) and 924(a)(1)(D). Goins pleaded guilty to Count One on March
    26, 2003. The government agreed to move for dismissal of the remaining three counts
    at the time of sentencing.
    On September 2, 2003, after filing a motion for downward departure, Goins
    appeared before the district court for sentencing. At the time of sentencing, Goins was
    69 years old. In 1997, he suffered a heart attack that required quadruple bypass
    surgery. He suffers from diabetes and psoriasis; has been diagnosed with coronary
    artery disease, congestive heart failure and hypertension; has poor circulation in his legs
    which causes him to use a cane to walk at times; and takes daily medication, including
    nitroglycerin tablets, for his various conditions. In the district court’s words:
    [Defendant is] 69 years old; he has got congestive heart
    failure, hypertension, coronary artery disease, diabetes,
    psoriasis; he has got all kinds of problems; [he’s] as gray as
    he can be. He looks like he has got some problems with
    circulation just looking at him right now. He doesn’t look well
    at all. He came in here staggering on a cane. He doesn’t
    belong in the penitentiary.
    J.A. at 93.
    Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, the probation officer calculated Goins’s base
    offense level to be twelve (12). That base offense level was increased six (6) levels
    pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) for possession of between twenty-five (25) and
    ninety-nine (99) firearms. Taking into account a three-level reduction for acceptance of
    responsibility, Goins’s adjusted total offense level was fifteen (15). With a criminal
    history category I, Goins’s guideline range for imprisonment was eighteen (18) to twenty-
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    four (24) months. Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1(b), Goins was not eligible for a sentence
    of probation.
    Rejecting the government’s objections to a downward departure, the district court
    sentenced Goins to probation for a term of five (5) years. The district court explained:
    It is felt that this sentence of probation will afford more than
    adequate deterrence and provide just punishment in your
    case, particularly in lieu, in view of the fact that you are in a
    very fragile physical condition, not only by your appearance,
    but by what I have learned about your medical problems.
    You look frail. You look pale; you look sick. I find that that is
    an extraordinary physical impairment. It gives me reason to
    impose a sentence below the applicable guideline range that
    you are seriously infirm. Home detention is as efficient and
    certainly is less costly than prison. You have diabetes,
    psoriasis, coronary artery disease, congestive heart failure,
    hypertension. You are required to use a cane because of
    arthritis of the right hip, poor circulation in your legs. You
    take medication for all these conditions, that you have to use
    nitroglycerin for severe chest pain on a regular basis.
    J.A. at 100.
    The government filed a timely notice of appeal on September 29, 2003.
    II.
    18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) spells out the standard of review as follows:
    The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity
    of the district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses,
    and shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless
    they are clearly erroneous and, except with respect to
    determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), shall give
    due deference to the district court’s application of the
    guidelines to the facts. With respect to determinations under
    subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), the court of appeals shall review
    de novo the district court’s application of the guidelines to the
    facts.
    Subsection (e)(3)(B) provides that “the court of appeals shall determine whether the
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    sentence..is outside the applicable guideline range, and...departs from the applicable
    guideline range based on a factor that (i) does not advance the objectives set forth in
    section 3553(a)(2); or (ii) is not authorized under section 3553(b); or (iii) is not justified by
    the facts of the case.”
    In United States v. Johnson, 
    71 F.3d 539
    , 544-45 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
    
    517 U.S. 1113
    (1996), the court explained how to review departures as follows:
    In reviewing departures from the guideline range, we apply a
    three-part test: (1) whether the case is sufficiently unusual to
    warrant departure, a legal question subject to de novo review;
    (2) whether the circumstances, if legally sufficient, are
    actually present, a factual question subject to a clearly
    erroneous standard of review; (3) whether the direction and
    degree of departure is reasonable.
    III.
    A sentencing court must impose a sentence within the applicable guideline range
    “unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
    kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
    Commission.” United States v. Reed, 
    264 F.3d 640
    , 646 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
    
    122 S. Ct. 1374
    (2002). The guidelines provide that both age and physical condition
    may be valid grounds for a downward departure. Specifically, U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4
    provides, in relevant part:
    Physical condition or appearance, including physique, is not
    ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should
    be outside the applicable guideline range. However, an
    extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to impose
    a sentence below the applicable guideline range; e.g., in the
    case of a seriously infirm defendant, home detention may be
    as efficient as, and less costly than, imprisonment.
    U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1 provides:
    Page 5 of 7
    Age (including youth) is not ordinarily relevant in determining
    whether a sentence should be outside the applicable
    guideline range. Age may be a reason to impose a sentence
    below the applicable guideline range when the defendant is
    elderly and infirm and where a form of punishment such as
    home confinement might be equally efficient as and less
    costly than incarceration.
    See also 
    Johnson, 71 F.3d at 545
    (noting that,”[l]egally, we find it possible that an aged
    defendant with a multitude of health problems may qualify for a downward departure
    under § 5H1.4...[but] such downward departures are rare").
    In United States v. Tocco, 
    200 F.3d 401
    , 434 (6th Cir. 2000), the defendant was
    72 at the time of his original sentencing, and he was suffering from “debilitating health,”
    including arterioscleriotic disease, coronary artery disease, hypertension, renal
    insufficiency, labrynthitis, and diverticulosis, all of which required periodic monitoring.
    The district court granted a four-level downward departure on the basis of the
    defendant’s age and health. On appeal, this court remanded the case to the district
    court with instructions to “make more specific findings as to whether defendant has ‘an
    extraordinary physical impairment,’ or combination of impairments, worthy of departure.”
    
    Id. at 435.
    The district court was also instructed that its findings should be based upon
    “independent and competent medical evidence to determine the extent of Tocco’s
    infirmities.” 
    Id. Furthermore, the
    district court was told to consider “the prison system’s
    ability or inability to accommodate” the defendant’s infirmities. 
    Id. On remand,
    the
    district court found that the defendant’s physical infirmities were not so extraordinary as
    to warrant a downward departure. See United States v. Tocco, 
    306 F.3d 279
    , 295 (6th
    Cir. 2002) (explaining that the district court’s refusal--on remand--to depart downward on
    the basis of Tocco’s health was unreviewable).
    Page 6 of 7
    In Johnson, the district court granted a departure based on the 65-year-old
    defendant’s medical problems, including diabetes, hypertension, hypothyroidism, ulcers,
    potassium loss and major depressive disorder, all conditions for which he was receiving
    
    medication. 71 F.3d at 544-45
    . As in Tocco, this court remanded the case to the district
    court for “more thorough fact-finding as to defendant’s medical condition.” 
    Id. at 544.
    Specifically, the district court was directed to
    make more specific findings as to whether defendant has ‘an
    extraordinary physical impairment,’ or combination of
    impairments, worthy of departure. Toward this end, more
    evidence than the letters produced by the defendant [one
    from his treating physician and one from his psychiatrist] may
    be necessary to determine the extent of defendant's
    infirmities and the prison system's ability or inability to
    accommodate them.”
    
    Id. at 545.
    In United States v. Bostic, 
    371 F.3d 865
    , 869-70 (6th Cir. 2004), the district court
    granted the defendant’s motion for a downward departure, departing downward eleven
    (11) levels based on the defendant’s age (82) and infirmities (emphysema, anemia, and
    coronary artery disease). The United States appealed. This court reviewed the
    departure for plain error because the government had failed to make an explicit objection
    to the departure at the time of sentencing. 
    Id. at 871.
    The court of appeals concluded
    that the district court indeeed committed plain error by granting an eleven-level
    downward departure without complying with the methodology set forth in Johnson and
    Tocco. 
    Id. at 877.
    The defendant’s sentence was accordingly vacated, and the case
    was remanded for resentencing. 
    Id. Consistent with
    Tocco, Johnson, and Bostic, when considering a downward
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    departure for medical reasons, a district court must determine (1) whether the defendant
    has demonstrated, by independent medical evidence, that his or her medical condition is
    exceptional or outside the heartland of similar cases; and (2) whether the BOP can
    efficiently and economically accommodate the defendant’s medical needs. At the
    sentencing hearing in this case, neither Goins nor the district court referred to the
    medical records that were attached to Goins’s motion to depart. Those medical records,
    moreover, contain very little information about Goins’s medical condition in 2003 when
    he was sentenced. They also do not contain a physician’s opinion as to Goins’s current
    condition. Indeed, in granting Goins’s departure motion, it appears that the district court
    relied not at all on an independent medical evaluation of Goins’s condition. Rather, the
    district court relied on its own visual inspection of Goins and on Goins’s testimony about
    his various ailments. Furthermore, the district court failed to address whether the BOP
    would be able to accommodate Goins’s medical needs. The district court thus failed to
    comply with the requirements of Johnson and Tocco, making a remand for resentencing
    necessary.
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court erred by granting
    Goins’s departure motion without making the findings required by the applicable
    caselaw. Accordingly, we VACATE Goins’s sentence and REMAND for resentencing.