Short v. Oak Corr Facility , 129 F. App'x 278 ( 2005 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 05a0334n.06
Filed: April 29, 2005
No. 03-2089
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FLORENCE SHORT, Personal Representative of )
the Estate of Jonathon Cross, deceased, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN
) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
)
OAKS CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al., )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
Before: DAUGHTREY and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; FORESTER, District Judge.*
KARL S. FORESTER, Chief District Judge. The Plaintiff-Appellant in this § 1983
action alleges that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to her son’s serious medical needs
while he was incarcerated, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, and appeals the district
court’s grant of the defendants’ motions for summary judgment prior to the taking of any
discovery. We AFFIRM the district court’s decision.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-Appellant Florence Short is the mother and personal representative of the estate
of her son, Jonathan Cross (“Cross”). On May 10, 2000, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Cross, a
*
The Honorable Karl S. Forester, Chief United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
24-year old inmate at the Oaks Correctional Facility (“Oaks”) in East Lake, Michigan, began
experiencing what the Plaintiff-Appellant describes as “obvious signs and symptoms” of a
serious medical condition. Cross was seen by various personnel at Oaks, and was ultimately
transported by ambulance to the West Shore Hospital Emergency Room, where he arrived at
approximately 1:10 a.m. that night. At 1:35 a.m., Cross suffered cardiac arrest and was
pronounced dead at 2:02 a.m. An autopsy revealed that Cross had severe heart disease and had
suffered at least two prior heart attacks.
Plaintiff-Appellant originally filed suit against Duane Waters Hospital, a healthcare
facility operated by the Michigan Department of Corrections, and Oaks, as well as a number of
Oaks administrators, employees, and medical personnel. In this complaint, filed on November
19, 2002, the Plaintiff-Appellant alleged violation of her son’s Eighth Amendment rights based
on deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs, and brought several claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiff-Appellant also claimed a number of violations of Michigan state
law.
In response to the original complaint, the state entities and the Oaks employees filed a
motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment, arguing that as to the nurses named in the
complaint, Plaintiff-Appellant had not stated any allegations against them at all, not even to
mention their names. The defendants also argued that the two state governmental entities, the
hospital and Oaks, had immunity from suit pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, and that the
remaining defendants were entitled to dismissal based on qualified immunity. These motions
were supported by affidavits and documentation.
According to Plaintiff-Appellant, she was still in the process of serving the individual
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defendants with the complaint when the defendants filed their motions. Thereafter, the Plaintiff-
Appellant filed an amended complaint on March 17, 2003, which omitted the state entities (the
hospital and Oaks) as defendants, as well as Warden David Gundy, and added allegations in the
body of the complaint regarding the two nurses named as defendants, Addie Briske, R.N., and
Anita Young, R.N. The Plaintiff-Appellant also served the defendants with a discovery request
on March 19, 2003. In response to the amended complaint, Defendants-Appellees Briske and
Young filed a motion for summary judgment. That same day, the Oaks employees filed a motion
to stay discovery until the court had issued a decision on the pending dispositive motions.
The Plaintiff-Appellant filed responses to the pending dispositive motions on May 8,
2003. She apparently did not respond to the Oaks defendants’ motion to stay discovery.
In her responses in the district court, she essentially argued that courts have routinely held that it
is premature to grant a motion for summary judgment prior to the conclusion of discovery and
requested that she be given an opportunity to conduct discovery prior to any ruling. She also
requested oral argument on the motions. The Plaintiff-Appellant did not make any further
motion or file any affidavit detailing her need for additional discovery in the case.
On July 16, 2003, without hearing oral argument, the district court entered judgment in
favor of the defendants, holding that no reasonable jury could find on the evidence presented that
the defendants had violated Cross’s constitutional rights or acted in gross negligence. This
appeal followed.
In this appeal, the Plaintiff-Appellant asserts that (1) the district court abused its
discretion in granting the defendants’ motions to dismiss and/or for summary judgment without
allowing any opportunity for discovery; (2) the district court erred in granting the individual
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defendants’ summary judgment based on qualified immunity; (3) the district court erred in
finding that the defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Cross’s serious medical needs; (4)
the district court erred in granting the nurses’ motion to dismiss where Plaintiff-Appellant had
filed an amended complaint; (5) the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff-Appellant’s claims
for failure to train without allowing any opportunity for discovery; and (6) the district court erred
in dismissing the state law claims because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the defendants were grossly negligent.
ANALYSIS
The District Court’s Decision to Rule on Motions Without Permitting Discovery
We review a district court’s decision to enter summary judgment without allowing
additional discovery for abuse of discretion. Ball v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.3d 713, 720
(6th Cir. 2004); Vance v. United States, 90 F.3d 1145, 1149 (6th Cir. 1996).
The Plaintiff-Appellant’s primary argument on appeal is that the district court erred in
ruling on the defendants’ motions for summary judgment before any discovery had been taken
and without providing her an opportunity to conduct discovery. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure permits a defending party “at any time, [to] move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in the party’s favor . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b) (emphasis
supplied). Thus, the rule contemplates that a defending party may move for summary judgment
even before any discovery has been taken. However, it accounts for this possibility in subsection
(f), which states as follows:
(f) When Affidavits are Unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify the party’s opposition, the court may refuse the
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application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) (emphases supplied). This subsection of the rule provides a mechanism for
a plaintiff and the courts to give effect to the well-established principle that “the plaintiff must
receive ‘a full opportunity to conduct discovery’ to be able to successfully defeat a motion for
summary judgment.” Ball, 385 F.3d at 719 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 247 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); White’s Landing Fisheries,
Inc. v. Buchholzer, 29 F.3d 229, 231-32 (6th Cir. 1994)).
In deciding whether the district court improperly denied a plaintiff a full opportunity to
conduct discovery, the Ball panel noted the following:
The district court’s decision to deny further discovery is, however,
generally unreviewable unless the appellant has filed “a Rule 56(f) affidavit or a
motion that gives the district court a chance to rule on the need for additional
discovery.” Plott v. Gen. Motors Corp., 71 F.3d 1190, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995).
“Beyond the procedural requirement of filing an affidavit, Rule 56(f) has been
interpreted as requiring that a party making such a filing indicate to the district
court its need for discovery, what material facts it hopes to uncover, and why it
has not previously discovered the information.” Cacevic v. City of Hazel Park,
226 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir. 2000).
Ball, 385 F.3d at 720. In other words, a plaintiff opposing a motion for summary judgment
cannot simply argue that it needs more discovery – instead, the plaintiff must file a Rule 56(f)
affidavit or a motion that indicates to the district court “what material facts it hopes to uncover”
by the additional discovery requested.
It is not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny the discovery request
when the party “makes only general and conclusory statements [in its affidavit]
regarding the need for more discovery and does not show how an extension of
time would have allowed information related to the truth or falsity of the
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[document] to be discovered.” Ironside v. Simi Valley Hosp., 188 F.3d 350, 354
(6th Cir. 1999). It is also not an abuse of discretion to reject a Rule 56(f) affidavit
as insufficient to support further discovery when the affidavit lacks “any details”
or “specificity.” Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874 F.2d 351, 357 (6th Cir. 1989).
Id.In the present case, the Plaintiff-Appellant filed a response to the motions for summary
judgment, but did not file a Rule 56(f) affidavit and did not file a motion giving the district court
a chance to rule on the need for additional discovery. In her response to the nurses’ motion, the
Plaintiff-Appellant requested oral argument and stated in relevant part the following:
Courts have routinely held that it is premature to grant a Motion for
Summary Judgment prior to the conclusion of discovery. In Young v. Jamrog,
172 F. Supp.2d 919 (E.D. Mich 2001) the court denied the Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Judgment where no discovery had been taken. The Court concluded
that Plaintiff should be given an opportunity to develop their case.
Discovery has just started in this case. On March 19, 2003 Plaintiff
served their [sic] First Interrogatories and Plaintiff’s Request for Production of
Documents upon Defendants. To date, Plaintiff has not received a response to the
discovery. Additionally, no depositions have been taken in this case.
Defendants argue that neither Nurse Young and [sic] Nurse Briske were
deliberately indifferent to Jonathon Cross’ [sic] serious medical needs, nor did
they engage in conduct that was so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of
concern for whether an injury resulted. Plaintiff respectfully submits that before
this Honorable Court rule on these issues presented, that Plaintiff be afforded the
opportunity to conduct adequate discovery of the case.
(J.A. at 162, citations omitted.)1 At most, the Plaintiff-Appellant simply requested that she be
given the opportunity for adequate discovery in the case, but did not request any specific
discovery and did not in any way state what material facts she hoped to uncover as a result of
additional discovery.
1
Plaintiff-Appellant offered essentially the same response in opposing the other
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. (J.A. at 181.)
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Based on the above, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling on
the motions for summary judgment without permitting Plaintiff-Appellant to engage in
discovery. The Plaintiff-Appellant did not file an affidavit or motion asking for additional
discovery,2 and while her response did generally indicate her need for discovery and why
discovery had not yet taken place, it did not “state how any discovery would have shed further
light on the issue” of deliberate indifference. Ball, 385 F.3d at 721. In the face of the motions
for summary judgment – which were supported by affidavits and other evidentiary
documentation – the Plaintiff-Appellant was required to come forward with more than a general
and conclusory statement regarding the need for discovery.
The Plaintiff-Appellant argues that the district court erroneously relied on cases
involving situations where at least some discovery had been conducted and the precise issue was
whether additional discovery should have been permitted. She asserts that this case is factually
dissimilar in that no discovery was permitted. However, this is a distinction without a
difference. There is nothing in the language of Rule 56(f) to differentiate between these two
factual situations; regardless of when the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, the
civil rule and the applicable rulings by this court required the Plaintiff-Appellant to file an
affidavit setting forth “to the district court [her] need for discovery, what material facts [she]
hope[d] to uncover, and why [she had] not previously discovered the information.” Cacevic v.
City of Hazel Park, 226 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir. 2000). The Plaintiff-Appellant did not satisfy
2
This court has suggested that failure to file a motion or Rule 56(f) affidavit will
be excused where the opposing party nonetheless explains its need for discovery to the district
court. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. American Eagle Outfitters, 280 F.3d 619, 627-28
(6th Cir. 2002).
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this burden in the present case.
The main case that Plaintiff-Appellant relies upon does not require a different conclusion.
In White’s Landing Fisheries, Inc. v. Buchholzer, 29 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 1994), a separate panel
of this court held that “summary judgment should not have been awarded until the plaintiffs were
allowed some opportunity for discovery” and that “a grant of summary judgment is improper if
the non-movant is given an insufficient opportunity for discovery.” Id. at 231, 232. As noted by
a subsequent panel, “[t]he non-movant bears the obligation to inform the district court of its need
for discovery, however.” Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 280 F.3d at 627. Fairness does not
blindly require a district court to grant a non-movant an opportunity for discovery where, as
here, the non-movant does not in any detail describe what discovery she needs or what material
facts she hopes to discover. It is not enough to state that discovery is needed without explaining
why it is needed. Because the Plaintiff-Appellant did not comply with either the technical or the
substantive aspects of Rule 56(f), we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
ruling on the motions when it did.
The district court was further justified in ruling on the summary judgment motions when
it did because the motions raised the threshold issue of qualified immunity. In Saucier v. Katz,
533 U.S. 194 (2001), the United States Supreme Court emphasized that qualified immunity is
“immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability; . . . it is effectively lost if a case is
erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Id. at 200-01 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). As
later stated by this court,
when faced with a motion based on qualified immunity, a district court can not
[sic] avoid ruling on the issue. See e.g., Skousen v. Brighton High School, 305
F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2002). In the case of Skousen v. Brighton High School, we
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concluded that a district court committed legal error in dismissing a motion for
summary judgement based on qualified immunity solely because discovery was
not complete. See Skousen, 305 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2002). We held that, because
the defense of qualified immunity is a threshold question, if the defense is
properly raised prior to discovery, the district court has a duty to address it. Id.Rather than dismiss the [summary judgment] motion because discovery
was not complete, the district court was required to determine--prior to
permitting further discovery--whether [Plaintiff’s] complaint alleged the
violation of a constitutional right at all, and if so, whether that right was
clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.
Id. at 527. Only after the court inquires into whether any facts material to
Plaintiff’s claims are genuinely at issue, and only upon a finding that material
facts are in fact in dispute is a court at liberty to hold a motion for summary
judgment in abeyance pending additional discovery. Id.Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 886 (6th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff in Skousen failed to respond
to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity and failed to
file a Rule 56(f) affidavit explaining her inability to file affidavits in opposition to the
defendants’ motion. Faced with similar circumstances in the present case, the district court
found that there were no facts material to Plaintiff-Appellant’s claims that were genuinely at
issue and, therefore, it was proper to consider the motions prior to discovery.
Merits of the Federal Claims
On the merits of the Defendants-Appellees’ motion for summary judgment, the Plaintiff-
Appellant asserts that (1) the district court erred in granting the individual defendants summary
judgment based on qualified immunity; (2) the district court erred in finding that the defendants
were not deliberately indifferent to Cross’s serious medical needs; (3) the district court erred in
granting the nurses’ motion to dismiss where Plaintiff-Appellant had filed an amended
complaint; and (4) the district court erred in dismissing the state law claims because there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendants were grossly negligent.
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Addressing the first issue, in the court below, the Defendants-Appellees argued that they
were shielded from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the doctrine of qualified immunity. The
district court found that no reasonable jury could find that the Defendants-Appellees were
deliberately indifferent to Cross’s serious medical needs and, therefore, granted summary
judgment. (J.A. at 258-267.) Upon assessing the Defendants-Appellees’ conduct under the
standards of qualified immunity, we reach the same conclusion.
This court has described the analysis courts must take in a qualified immunity case as
follows:
Qualified immunity involves a three-step inquiry. First, we determine whether,
based upon the applicable law, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs show that a constitutional violation has occurred. Second, we consider
whether the violation involved a clearly established constitutional right of which a
reasonable person would have known. Third, we determine whether the plaintiff
has offered sufficient evidence “to indicate that what the official allegedly did
was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established constitutional
rights.” Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (citing
Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1996)); see also Saucier v.
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001).
Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 2003). One of the ultimate issues in this case is
whether the Defendants-Appellees were deliberately indifferent to Cross’s serious medical needs
in violation of the Eighth Amendment and § 1983. Having carefully considered the record on
appeal, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we find that the Plaintiff-Appellant failed
to show that a constitutional violation against Cross occurred. Because the reasoning which
supports this conclusion has been articulated by the district court in an extensive opinion, the
issuance of a detailed written opinion by this court would be duplicative and serve no useful
purpose. (J.A. at 252-66.) Likewise, we find that the Plaintiff-Appellant’s claim for failure to
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train fails for the reasons set forth in the district court’s opinion. (J.A. at 266.) Accordingly, we
affirm that portion of the district court’s Opinion upon the reasoning employed by the district
court in its Opinion dated July 16, 2003.
State Law Claim
The Plaintiff-Appellant also asserts that the district court erred in dismissing her claim
under Michigan law that the Defendants-Appellees were grossly negligent with respect to Cross.
Again, because the reasoning by the district court has been articulated in an extensive opinion,
the issuance of a detailed written opinion by this court would be duplicative and serve no useful
purpose. (J.A. at 266-67.) We affirm this portion of the district court’s Opinion dated July 16,
2003.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, we AFFIRM the Opinion of the district court dated July 16, 2003.
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