United States v. Walls , 134 F. App'x 825 ( 2005 )


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  •                   NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 05a0392n.06
    Filed: May 12, 2005
    No. 04-5391
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                                 )
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                             )
    )   ON APPEAL FROM THE
    v.                                                        )   UNITED STATES DISTRICT
    )   COURT FOR THE WESTERN
    WYNILE WALLS,                                             )   DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
    )
    Defendant-Appellant.                            )
    Before:          BOGGS, Chief Judge; ROGERS, Circuit Judge; and SHADUR, District Judge.1
    PER CURIAM. Defendant-Appellant Wynile Walls (hereinafter Walls) appeals
    his conviction, after a jury trial, on six counts of possession of stolen mail, altering postal money
    orders, and making a false, fraudulent, and fictitious material statement to postal inspectors. He
    contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We
    affirm.
    I
    On December 7, 2000, Terry Ling, a businessman in Memphis, purchased four postal
    money orders and an Express Mail envelope from a postal clerk named Calvin Walls, the
    Appellant’s brother, at the United States Postal Service Air Mail Center in Memphis. Ling made
    1
    The Honorable Milton I. Shadur, United States District Judge for the Northern District
    of Illinois, sitting by designation.
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    the money orders out to You Jin, a business in New York City. When he had completed filling
    out the forms and sealed the money orders in the envelope, Calvin Walls was no longer
    available, and Mr. Ling handed the envelope to another postal clerk. Although the envelope was
    registered as entering the Postal Service tracking system, it subsequently disappeared.
    When the now-cashed money orders were located, the payee’s name had been changed
    on each. One order was made out to and endorsed by Wynile Walls and listed Wynile Walls’s
    driver’s license number. The second was made out to and endorsed by Carl Marshall. A Postal
    Service forensic handwriting expert testified that the payees’ names and endorsements on these
    two money orders were, with qualified certainty, written by Walls.2 The second money order
    also had Walls’s fingerprint on it. The third money order was made out to Tasha White, and the
    fourth to Ramona Parker. Walls did not write anything on these two orders.
    The last two money orders were cashed by women who worked as dancers at the Club
    Flamingo, where Walls was a manager. According to the testimony of the women, Walls came
    to the apartment of one of them, Aundrea Carrick, and asked her to cash a $400 money order.
    She testified that the money order was already made out to Tasha White and that she simply
    signed her name on the back. The second dancer, Cicely Thomas, was also at Carrick’s
    apartment at the time. Carrick picked up a $700 money order, which was lying on a coffee table,
    2
    With regard to the signed endorsements, the forensic expert testified that, “this is not a
    full identification as we would describe it, there is a slight uncertainty only because of the extent
    of the exemplars did not demonstrate the speed and execution and it was my opinion that he
    probably wrote it, however, it is not a full certainty . . . .” However, he further added that it was
    his “highest level of opinion” that Walls did print the names of the payees on the front of the
    money orders.
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    and handed it to Thomas for her to cash. Thomas wrote the name Ramona Parker on the front
    and signed her own name on the back. Carrick, Thomas, and Walls then went to two different
    post offices, where first Thomas, then Carrick separately cashed their money orders. Carrick
    gave $300 back to Walls and kept the $100 he told her she could have for cashing the order.
    After cashing her money order, Thomas gave the cash to Walls, who gave her back $200 to pay
    off a debt Carrick owed Thomas.
    The defense put on Derek Jackson, formerly a bouncer at the Club Flamingo, who
    testified that in December 2000, Walls asked him to watch the Club while he took Carrick to
    cash a money order. Jackson also testified that “Checks and money orders, all that come through
    the club,” as the means by which patrons paid “for their service through the females.” Jackson
    acknowledged that he did not see any money orders at the time.
    According to the testimony of a postal inspector, Walls denied knowing Thomas or
    Carrick, though the inspector did not show him their pictures or identify them to Walls by their
    respective stage names. The inspector showed Walls the money orders and testified that Walls
    “adamantly denied that he had ever cashed a money order in his life.” With regard to the theft of
    the money order, the inspector also said that Walls “basically . . . denied the entire thing.”
    Based on this evidence, the jury convicted Walls of three counts of unlawful possession
    of a United States Postal Money Order, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708; two counts of falsely
    altering a money order, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 500; and one count of making a false,
    fraudulent, and fictitious material statement to a postal inspector, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
    1001. The judge sentenced Walls to three years’ probation and a fine.
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    II
    Walls now contends that the jury had insufficient evidence to find him guilty beyond a
    reasonable doubt. We review a sufficiency of the evidence claim de novo, considering “whether,
    after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
    could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v.
    Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 319 (1979); United States v. Wood, 
    364 F.3d 704
    , 716 (6th Cir. 2004).
    The Appellant’s burden is very heavy because the reviewing court does not judge the credibility
    of witnesses or weigh evidence, and it draws all reasonable inferences in the government’s favor.
    United States v. Walls, 
    293 F.3d 959
    , 967 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Tocco, 
    200 F.3d 401
    ,
    424 (6th Cir. 2000).
    Walls was indicted and convicted for unlawfully possessing the money order on which he
    was named as payee, the one that he asked Carrick to cash, and the one that Thomas cashed. To
    sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1708 for stealing a piece of mail, the Government must
    prove (1) that the matter described in the indictment was mail matter, (2) that the mail matter
    was stolen, (3) that the defendant knew it was stolen, and (3) that defendant possessed the stolen
    mail matter. The evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the Postal Service
    money orders had been stolen from the mail. Ling, the original purchaser, bought the money
    orders. He had a receipt identifying each money order; the Postal Service tracking system had
    the envelope entering the system and then disappearing; and the money orders later turned up,
    with different payees’ names written in and in the possession of people other than the original
    intended payee.
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    A rational juror could also conclude, based on the circumstantial evidence, that Walls
    knew the money orders were stolen. They were originally made out to You Jin, and they were
    all placed together in a single envelope. After disappearing from the system, one of the money
    orders reappeared with Walls’s name as payee and endorser. The handwriting was identified as
    Walls’s. Furthermore, as all of the orders had been placed into the mail together, if Walls knew
    that one of them was stolen, a rational juror could reasonably infer that Walls also knew that the
    others were stolen. In addition, the jury had sufficient evidence to find that Walls possessed the
    money orders. His handwriting was identified on one of them. Carrick testified that Walls gave
    her another money order. And although Thomas testified that Carrick, not Walls, handed her the
    third money order, she also testified that after she had cashed the money order, she handed the
    cash over to Walls.
    Next, Walls was indicted and convicted of falsely altering the money orders that named
    himself and Carl Marshall as payees. Under 18 U.S.C. § 500, the government must prove four
    elements to sustain a conviction of falsely altering a postal money order: (1) that the document
    was a money order; (2) that it was falsely altered; (3) that the alteration was material; and (4)
    that the defendant altered the document with intent to defraud. The prosecution produced
    evidence that Ling bought four money orders and made them out to You Jin. Based on
    handwriting analysis, the Government demonstrated that Walls replaced You Jin’s name with his
    own name and that of Carl Marshall, enabling him to cash the checks. These changes
    represented false and material alterations. Finally, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to
    find that Walls knew the money orders were stolen, so that if he also altered them, he did so with
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    intent to defraud.
    Finally, Walls was indicted and convicted of making a false statement representing that
    “he had never possessed” the money order on which he had written his own name as payee and
    endorser. To sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), the Government must prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) made a statement; (2) that the statement was
    false; (3) that the defendant knew the statement was false; (4) that the false statement was
    material; and (5) that the statement relates to “any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive,
    legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States.”
    After waiving his right to remain silent, Walls told the postal inspector that he had never
    “cashed a money order in his life,” and he denied his involvement in the theft, alteration, and
    cashing of the four money orders under investigation. The inspector’s testimony does not state
    that Walls specifically denied possessing the money order. However, the postal inspector
    testified that he showed Walls each money order and asked him about each one. Coupled with
    Walls’s general denial of involvement in the theft, a rational juror could find that Walls did deny
    that he possessed the order.
    The remaining elements of Section 1001(a)(2) are easily met by the evidence placed
    before the jury. Walls’s handwriting was identified, with a great degree of certainty, on the
    money order, and his driver’s license number was also written on the money order. From this a
    jury could find that his claim that he did not possess the money order was false and that he knew
    it was false. The statement was clearly material because it went to the essence of the crime, and
    the statement concerns a U.S. Postal Money Order, making this a matter within the jurisdiction
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    of the Executive Branch, and meeting the last prong of the statute.
    III
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Walls’s conviction on all counts.
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