Danielle Berry v. Commissioner of Social Securit , 289 F. App'x 54 ( 2008 )


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  •                        NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
    File Name: 08a0479n.06
    Filed: August 8, 2008
    No. 07-4083
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    DANIELLE BERRY,                                       )
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                           )
    )
    v.                                                    )    ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
    )    STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
    )    THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,                      )    OHIO
    )
    Defendant-Appellee.                            )
    Before: SILER and COLE, Circuit Judges; CLELAND, District Judge.*
    SILER, Circuit Judge. Danielle Berry appeals the denial of her claims for disability and
    supplemental social security income benefits. The administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that Berry
    was not totally disabled and denied benefits. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. We
    AFFIRM the district court.
    BACKGROUND
    Berry alleges that she became disabled in September 1998 after being involved in a car
    accident. She characterizes her impairment as a psychologically-based chronic pain syndrome. She
    has also been diagnosed with fibromyalgia and depression. Berry testified that she cannot work due
    to problems with lifting, walking, and remembering. She also complained of headaches, depression,
    *
    The Honorable Robert H. Cleland, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
    Michigan, sitting by designation.
    No. 07-4083
    Berry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
    and incontinence. Numerous doctors and health care professionals have evaluated Berry’s condition
    since 1998.
    Berry worked as a file clerk in the military until she received a hardship discharge to care for
    her mother in February 1999. She was twenty-eight years old at the time of the ALJ’s decision, and
    she lived with her son, who was born in April 2005. She cared for her newborn son and performed
    regular household activities, including cooking, washing dishes, grocery shopping, and doing
    laundry. For much of the relevant period, she also provided childcare for her cousin’s baby. In
    December 2000, she traveled to Alabama to visit friends and reported that she felt less pain while
    on the trip. At various times, she was doing yoga, aerobics, and Tae-Bo for exercise. She also
    participated in physical therapy, kinesiotherapy, and aquatic therapy.
    Berry applied for disability benefits in 2000. Upon initial review, an ALJ denied Berry’s
    claims. The Appeals Council vacated that initial decision and remanded for further administrative
    proceedings. On remand, a different ALJ heard additional expert testimony. At this new hearing,
    Dr. Schweid, a psychiatrist, testified that Berry has severe impairments, including chronic pain
    syndrome and depression, but he opined that she could perform light work with certain limitations.
    A vocational expert testified that based on the limitations stated by Dr. Schweid, Berry would be
    capable of performing her past relevant work as a file clerk; in addition, she could perform other jobs
    that exist in the national economy, including a housekeeper, mail clerk, and car wash attendant.
    The ALJ ruled that Berry was not entitled to disability benefits. The Appeals Council denied
    review, and the district court affirmed the ALJ’s decision.
    DISCUSSION
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    No. 07-4083
    Berry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
    Our review of the ALJ’s decision to deny Social Security benefits “is limited to determining
    whether it is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.”
    Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    486 F.3d 234
    , 241 (6th Cir. 2007). To qualify for Social Security
    disability benefits, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful
    activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
    expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
    not less than 12 months.” 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 423
    (d)(1)(A), 1328c(a)(3)(A). Further, the claimant must
    “not only be unable to do his previous work,” but unable to “engage in any other kind of substantial
    gainful work which exists in the national economy,” meaning “work which exists in significant
    numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.” 
    Id.
    §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1328c(a)(3)(B).
    The crux of Berry’s claim is that she has a psychologically-based pain condition that renders
    her disabled, and she argues that the ALJ’s decision to the contrary is not supported by substantial
    evidence. Pain may render an individual disabled for Social Security purposes. See Rogers, 
    486 F.3d at 243-44
     (stating that fibromyalgia can be a severe impairment, and objective tests are of little
    assistance in determining its existence or severity). The origin of Berry’s pain is irrelevant for
    purposes of evaluating disability under the Social Security Act, because “pain resulting from the one
    source is just as real to a claimant and just as disabling as that resulting from the other.” Combs v.
    Gardner, 
    382 F.2d 949
    , 956 (6th Cir. 1967). We must decide not whether the record would support
    a decision in Berry’s favor, but whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence
    based on the record as a whole.
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    No. 07-4083
    Berry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
    The ALJ found that Berry “has severe impairment(s), namely chronic pain syndrome, major
    depressive disorder, and borderline personality disorder.” He further acknowledged that symptoms
    like pain are “difficult to prove or quantify,” and thus Berry’s allegations regarding her symptoms
    are “entitled to perceptible weight where they are properly and adequately documented by the
    medical evidence.” Berry produced evidence of impairments that could cause pain, but the ALJ
    found that “the evidence does not support that they render her totally disabled from employment.”
    The ALJ may discount a claimant’s credibility when there are “contradictions among the
    medical reports, claimant’s testimony, and other evidence.” Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    127 F.3d 525
    , 531 (6th Cir. 1997). In this case, there is contradiction among the medical reports in the
    record, and the record contains evidence of Berry’s ability to perform certain activities. Particularly,
    Berry’s ability to live independently and perform regular household activities belies her claim that
    she is totally disabled. See 
    id. at 532
     (“An ALJ may also consider household and social activities
    engaged in by the claimant in evaluating a claimant’s assertions of pain or ailments.”). This court
    must give due weight to the ALJ’s credibility determination. “Since credibility, especially with
    alleged pain, is crucial to resolution of the claim, the ALJ’s opportunity to observe the demeanor of
    the claimant ‘is invaluable, and should not be discarded lightly.’” Kirk v. Sec’y of Health & Human
    Servs., 
    667 F.2d 524
    , 538 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting Beavers v. Sec’y of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 
    577 F.2d 383
    , 387 (6th Cir. 1978)).
    Berry also claims that the ALJ failed to review the record as a whole. On the contrary, the
    ALJ’s opinion expressed the importance of considering the whole record. In evaluating the
    evidence, the ALJ gave “greatest weight” to the opinion of Dr. Schweid because he “had the benefit
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    No. 07-4083
    Berry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
    of listening to the claimant’s testimony as well as reviewing the record as a whole.” The ALJ also
    credited Dr. Felker’s opinion with great weight because he “had the opportunity to review more
    recent medical evidence of record, allowing for a fuller picture of the claimant’s condition.”
    Dr. Felker diagnosed Berry with depression and found her to have moderate difficulty in social and
    occupational functioning.
    Dr. Schweid testified that Berry has a chronic pain syndrome, depression, and a borderline
    personality disorder. Although these are severe impairments, they do not meet or equal any of the
    Social Security Listings of Impairments. Dr. Schweid stated that Berry’s chronic pain was largely
    somatoform in nature, but he did not believe that she was malingering. He opined that Berry retains
    the capacity to perform light work with some limitations.            The ALJ essentially adopted
    Dr. Schweid’s opinion in his finding with regard to Berry’s ability to work:
    The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform routine tasks at the light
    exertional level, as defined by the regulations, in a low-stress environment with no
    high production quotas with the restrictions of no intense, interpersonal interactions
    with the public and co-workers, no fine manipulations with either hand, and
    convenient access to restroom facilities.
    Based on this assessment and testimony from the vocational expert, the ALJ found Berry capable
    of returning to her past relevant work as a file clerk.
    Berry criticizes the ALJ for relying on the opinion of non-treating physicians, like
    Dr. Schweid, rather than on her treating physicians. “[W]hile it is true that a treating physician’s
    diagnosis is to be given greater weight in the scales than the government’s physician, that is only
    appropriate if the treating physician supplies sufficient medical data to substantiate the diagnosis.”
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    No. 07-4083
    Berry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
    Kirk, 
    667 F.2d at
    538 (citing 
    20 C.F.R. § 404.1529
    ). The ALJ is required to provide “good reasons”
    for discounting the opinion of a treating physician. Rogers, 
    486 F.3d at 243
    .
    In this case, the ALJ explained why he accorded less weight to the opinion of Berry’s treating
    physicians. For example, the ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of Nurse Myers-Bradley because
    she did not provide medical data to support her determination that Berry was disabled. The ALJ also
    addressed the opinion of Dr. Mathew, describing it as “vague, unsupported, and inconsistent with
    the record as a whole.” Dr. Mathew had treated Berry for less than one month, and his statement that
    Berry was “totally disabled” was written on a prescription pad that does not provide the basis for the
    statement. Under these circumstances, it was appropriate to give less weight to his opinion and
    greater weight to the opinions of doctors who had the opportunity to evaluate Berry’s disability based
    on the entire record.
    Evaluating the record as a whole, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that
    Berry was not entitled to disability benefits.
    AFFIRMED.
    -6-