United States v. Christopher Saddler , 498 F. App'x 524 ( 2012 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 12a0973n.06
11-3903
FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Sep 04, 2012
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee. )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
) SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
CHRISTOPHER SADDLER, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
Before: MARTIN and DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judges; MALONEY*, District Judge.
MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Christopher Saddler
entered a conditional guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 18 U.S.C. 924(a), while reserving the right to contest the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress the contents of a safe seized from his front yard
during a police investigation that resulted from a 911 burglary-in-progress call directing
officers to his residence. We are asked to reverse the district court’s decision that the safe
was validly seized and taken to police headquarters, where it was secured for some 22
hours until a search warrant for the safe was obtained. We conclude that under the totality
of the circumstances, the warrantless seizure of the safe was not unconstitutional, given
*
The Hon. Paul L. Maloney, United States District Judge for the W estern District of Michigan, sitting
by designtion.
No. 11-3903
United States v. Saddler
the exigent circumstances that existed at the time. We therefore affirm the judgment of the
district court.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Based on testimony at a suppression hearing, the district court made the following
findings of fact:
On June 6, 2010, Cincinnati Police received an initial radio run for shots fired
and a second radio call for a burglary at the same location. At approximately
1:24 a.m., as a result of those radio runs, Sergeant Scott Fritz, a seventeen-
year Cincinnati [p]olice [o]fficer and first relief supervisor with experience in
drug trafficking, responded to 1313 Considine Avenue, in the area of West
Liberty and Considine.
Arriving on the scene shortly thereafter, Officer Taylor noticed a pair of ladies
shoes in the middle of the street, but no victim or complainant was present.
A neighbor reported that he saw a black male and a black female jump into
a white car and speed away after shots were fired. Officers observed the
1313 Considine side door open, bullet holes in the house, which was empty,
and no victims or perpetrators present. They also observed bullet fragments
and fresh shell casings in the street. Officers Grote and Weyda appeared
and participated in a protective sweep of the residence securing the scene.
The location and presence of the bullet fragments and shell casings were
consistent with shots being fired from the street toward the house. Police
[o]fficers observed a safe outside the residence and, inside the residence,
they observed a cubby hole in the wall from which the refrigerator had been
pulled away. Officer Weyda made the same observations as Sergeant Fritz
regarding the bullet holes and bullet fragments and participated in the
clearance sweep of the residence.
Approximately five to ten minutes after the security sweep of the residence
was completed the [d]efendant returned home in a white car. After initially
being confronted by [o]fficers, the [d]efendant informed police that people
were shooting at him from his house. He further indicated that he was
unarmed and that he was not permitted to carry firearms as an ex-felon. The
[d]efendant recounted that he had called 911 and reported that as he
returned home he saw two men exiting the side door of his home. One man
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was carrying what appeared to be a television. The other man was armed
with a firearm and proceeded to fire the weapon toward [the] [d]efendant as
he arrived. The [d]efendant informed the 911 operator that he fled the
scene, taking his girlfriend back to her home.
Based on the physical evidence at the scene and its placement, which
contradicted [the] [d]efendant’s story, the police believed that gun fire had
come from the street, not the residence as [the] [d]efendant reported . . .
As stated above, a locked safe had been removed form the premises and left
in the yard along with a book bag. Both rested on the ground at the side
entrance of the house. Sergeant Fritz asked the [d]efendant if he owned the
safe, and [Saddler] stated that he did. Sergeant Fritz then asked the
[d]efendant to open the safe and confirm that nothing had been stolen. The
[d]efendant stated that he did not remember the combination. When
Sergeant Fritz asked the [d]efendant if he would allow him to open the safe,
the [d]efendant responded by saying that it really was not his safe and that
he was holding it for his brother.
The investigating officer suspected that possibly drugs or money, as the
target of the burglary, were secreted in the safe. A canine unit was not
available at the time to confirm these suspicions. However, the safe was
portable so Officer Weyda put gloves on and placed it in the back of his car
for transport. In recovering the safe, Officer Weyda took measures not to
contaminate it in order to have it possibly fingerprinted as evidence from the
crime scene. The safe was stored at an annex to avoid possible
contamination from articles in the standard police property room. The safe
was marked with a sign stating, “Do Not Touch, being held for Prints and Dog
Sniff.” Officers left a voice mail with a canine officer to have the safe
“sniffed” the following day.
At 1:45 p.m the following afternoon, police conducted a canine sniff on the
safe at the police department . . . After the dog alerted on the safe, an
affidavit for a search warrant was prepared, and at 11:16 p.m. that same
evening, a judge issued a search warrant. At 11:45 p.m., Sergeant Fritz
pried open the safe and removed a white purse containing a small amount
of marijuana, two digital scales, two loaded semi-automatic pistols,
correspondence letters, and photo identification of Mr. Saddler.
At the close of the hearing, Saddler moved to suppress all evidence obtained from
the safe, contending that the officers seized it without obtaining a search warrant, without
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his consent, and without probable cause. The district court concluded that the warrantless
seizure of the safe was constitutional, based on four alternative legal theories. First, the
district court found that the seizure of the safe was justified under the plain view exception
to the warrant requirement. Second, the district court found that the seizure was also valid
under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Third, the district court
determined, sua sponte, that because Sadler briefly denied ownership of the safe, he
lacked standing to challenge the seizure. Finally, the district court found that
circumstances on the night of the attempted burglary gave rise to exigent circumstances,
in light of the officers’ legitimate concern that Saddler or others might remove the safe or
tamper with the contents if it were left at the scene. Based on these findings, the district
court held that the warrantless seizure was reasonable and denied Saddler’s motion to
suppress. He now appeals that determination.
DISCUSSION
“When reviewing the district court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we use a
mixed standard of review: we review the findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of
law de novo.” United States v. See, 574 F.3d 309, 313 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
“When a district court has denied a motion to suppress, this [c]ourt reviews the evidence
in the light most likely to support the district court’s decision.” United States v. Adams, 583
F.3d 457, 463 (6th Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects “against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A seizure of personal
property is “per se unreasonable . . . unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial
warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized.”
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983). However, where law enforcement
authorities have both probable cause to believe that a container holds contraband or
evidence of a crime and the “exigencies of the circumstances demand it,” seizure of the
container pending issuance of a warrant to examine the contents has been upheld. Id.
(citing cases). Nevertheless, “a seizure lawful at its inception can . . . violate the Fourth
Amendment [if] its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable seizures.” United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984). The government has the burden of proving
the legality of a warrantless seizure. United States v. Beal, 810 F.2d 574, 577 (6th Cir.
1987) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974)).
Probable Cause
“In the ordinary case, the Court has viewed a [warrantless] seizure of property as
per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Place, 462 U.S. at
701. “Probable cause, however, can support the detention of property without a warrant,
if the exigencies demand it or some other recognized exception to the warrant requirement
is present.” United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 349 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
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As the Supreme Court has frequently noted, “[P]robable cause is a flexible common-sense
standard. It merely requires that facts available to the officer would warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be contraband or stolen property
or useful as evidence of a crime.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
At the suppression hearing, Officer Fritz testified that, in his opinion, “somebody did
know where the safe was at and stole it out of [Saddler’s] house.” As a result, Fritz wanted
an opportunity to dust the safe for fingerprints and to inspect the contents to establish a
possible motive for the attempted theft of the safe and perhaps even the identity of the
burglars. When Saddler refused to open the safe, Fritz decided to seize it, pending a
warrant to examine its contents. The circumstances of this case – a burglary investigation
that turned up evidence that the burglary had been interrupted by shots fired from the
street, with the apparent object of the break-in left lying in the yard, together with evasive
answers about its contents – were sufficient to provide the officers with probable cause to
believe that the safe would produce evidence related to the attempted burglary. Moreover,
given these circumstances, a reasonable officer could conclude that the safe contained
contraband. Indeed, Fritz testified that except for the late hour, he would have called a
canine unit to the scene, in order to run a “dog sniff” of the safe.
Saddler argues that the officers had no intention of investigating the burglary,
pointing out that they never actually analyzed the safe for fingerprints. In truth, after
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officers executed the search warrant and discovered firearms inside the safe, the focus
was trained on Saddler, and the safe and any further investigation of the burglary were
scrapped. Given these developments, Saddler contends that the seizure of the safe never
was related to the burglary investigation, but was simply pretextual and thus not supported
by probable cause. As a legal matter, however, the officers’ actual motives in seizing the
safe are irrelevant, because “the Fourth Amendment’s concern with ‘reasonableness’
allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.”
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996) (emphasis in original).
Exigent Circumstances
We review a district court’s legal decision as to exigency de novo and will disturb the
court’s factual findings only if they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Gaitan-Acevedo,
148 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir. 1998). A finding is clearly erroneous if we are left with the
“definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” after viewing the entirety
of the evidence. United States v. Wheaton, 517 F.3d 350, 367 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation and
quotation mark omitted). In reviewing the district court’s findings that sufficient exigent
circumstances existed to justify a warrantless seizure, we consider the “totality of the
circumstances and the inherent necessities of the situation.” Brooks v. Rothe, 577 F.3d
701, 708 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1511 (6th Cir.
1996)). “The inquiry focuses not on an officer’s subjective intentions, but on whether an
objectively reasonable officer could have believed that exigent circumstances existed.”
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Rothe, 577 F.3d at 708 (citing O’Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 23 F.3d 990, 999 (6th Cir.
1994)).
“This court has long recognized, along with many others, that exigent circumstances
will be present when there is an urgent need to prevent evidence from being lost or
destroyed.” United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1511 (6th Cir. 1988). To
establish exigent circumstances under this exception, the government must first show “an
objectively reasonable basis for concluding that the loss or destruction of evidence is
imminent.” Id. at 1512. Second, the court must “balance the interests by weighing the
governmental interests being served by the intrusion against the individual interest that
would be protected if a warrant were required.” United States v. Plavcak, 411 F.3d 655,
664 (6th Cir. 2005).
Thus, we first evaluate whether the officers had an objectively reasonable basis for
concluding that evidence would be tampered with or destroyed if the safe were not seized
immediately pending issuance of a search warrant. At the suppression hearing, Officer
Fritz testified:
It was obvious that the safe had been removed [from the residence]. As I
said, during my protective sweep I had noticed one of the refrigerators had
moved away from the wall – or had been moved away from the wall. There
was a cubby hole about the same size of the safe that was in the kitchen
area, like the safe would have been secreted back to hide it. So my theory
was that somebody did know where that safe was at and stole it out of
[Saddler’s] house . . . .
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This type of offense, my training, experience would tell me that it’s somehow
drug related or drugs and/or money, being that safe was secreted inside of
a house like that, and shots were fired . . . .
Based on the evidence educed at the hearing, the district court relied on the fact that the
safe was portable and likely contained something valuable or illegal to establish probable
cause.
We cannot say that the district court was clearly erroneous in concluding that the
officers reasonably feared that Saddler or someone else would attempt to destroy the
evidentiary value of the safe or its contents. Because the safe was small and easy to
transport, the burglar or burglars had very nearly succeeded in stealing it from inside the
house. The officers hoped to preserve any fingerprints that could be lifted from the safe
and did not want others to compromise the prints. When Saddler initially admitted that he
owned the safe but refused to open it, moreover, it was objectively reasonable for the
officers to believe that Saddler or a third party might remove the evidence from inside the
safe, take the safe from the scene, or otherwise tamper with it. Given Saddler’s evasive
responses to questioning, the size of the safe, its location, and its importance to the
investigation, we conclude that it was not unreasonable for the police to seize the safe.
See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 332 (2001) (finding it reasonable to conclude that
someone suspecting an imminent search “would, if given the chance,” get rid of contraband
quickly).
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Having concluded that the officers’ fear that evidence would be lost or destroyed
was objectively reasonable, we now weigh the government’s interest being served by the
intrusion against the individual interest protected by the warrant requirement. See
Plavack, 411 F.3d at 664. The government’s interest in solving crimes is significant, of
course, and the evidence seized was materially important to the investigation of the
burglary. See Wilson v. Collins, 517 F.3d 421, 427 (6th Cir. 2008). Because the officers
seized the safe but did not search it until they had a search warrant, the seizure affected
only Saddler’s possessory interest in the safe and did not implicate a privacy interest. See
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984). Notably, other circuits have
considered this lesser interference as a factor when upholding warrantless seizures. See
United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Licta, 761
F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir. 1985). Moreover, unlike the seizure of luggage in an airport, no
liberty interest was impinged by the seizure of the safe i.e., it did not lead to the effective
detention of Saddler. See Place, 462 U.S. at 708-09. The seizure was also of limited
duration; the officers received a warrant to search the safe 22 hours later.
In sum, considering the brief nature of the intrusion into Saddler’s possessory
interest, the fragility of the evidence, as well as the government’s significant interest in
solving crime, we conclude that the government’s interest outweighed the individual
interests at issue. Because it was reasonable for the officers to conclude that leaving the
safe risked the imminent destruction of evidence, and the balance of the interests justified
the government’s need to seize without a warrant, we uphold the district court’s
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determination that exigent circumstances existed. That conclusion, in conjunction with
probable cause to believe that the safe contained evidence related to the investigation of
a crime, justified the warrantless seizure.
Reasonable Execution of the Seizure
Though the government has met its burden by establishing that exigent
circumstances existed to justify a warrantless seizure, “a seizure lawful at its inception can
nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment because its manner of execution unreasonably
infringes possessory interests protected by the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
unreasonable seizures.” Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, we look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether it was reasonable
for the officers to seize the safe immediately, rather than leave officers at the scene and
wait until the next day to apply for a search warrant, depriving Saddler of possession of the
safe overnight. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 38 (1996) (“We have long held that
the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Reasonableness, in turn, is
measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances.”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Saddler argues that it was unreasonable to seize the safe because other, less
intrusive investigative methods were available to the officers. He suggests that, instead
of seizing the safe, the officers should have dusted for fingerprints at the scene and
remained there until a canine unit was available. But, Officer Fritz’s testimony detailed his
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reasons for seizing the evidence rather than leaving an officer at the scene to secure it.
First, he wanted to have a “canine sniff” of the safe before applying for the warrant, but it
was the middle of the night and the canine units were all off duty. Second, securing the
scene would have required having two or three officers remain at the scene, and he did not
want to tie up that many officers overnight. When Officer Fritz reported for his next shift,
at 8:00 p.m. the next day, he prepared an affidavit for a search warrant and did not open
the safe until he obtained the warrant.
Although it might have been less intrusive to order officers to remain on the scene,
the Fourth Amendment does not require officers to engage in the least intrusive search or
seizure.1 As the Supreme Court observed in United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675
(1985):
A creative judge engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can
almost always imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of
the police might have been accomplished. But the fact that the protection of
the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by less intrusive
means does not, itself, render the search unreasonable. The question is not
simply whether some other alternative was available, but whether the police
acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or pursue it.
1
The cases defendant cites as requiring officers to use the least intrusive m eans address the
detention of luggage in a traveler’s im m ediate possession. See Place, 462 U.S. at 708-09 (finding that seizing
a person’s luggage was equivalent to detention of the person and holding that a 90-m inute detention was
unreasonable); United States v. Sanders, 719 F.2d 882, 887 (6th Cir. 1983) (concluding that “detaining the
suitcase and the suspect for over three hours” was excessive in duration and not the least intrusive m eans
for accom plishing the investigation). Unlike the luggage in those cases, the seizure of the safe did not
am ount to an effective detention of Saddler. Moreover, seizure of the luggage in Place and Sanders was
based on reasonable suspicion, as contrasted to the probable cause that supported the seizure in this case.
See Place, 462 U.S. at 698; Sanders, 719 F.2d at 883.
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Id. at 686-87 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Although, as Saddler suggests,
an alternate path might have been to seek a warrant immediately or leave officers behind
to maintain the status quo, we cannot say Fritz was unreasonable in choosing to seize the
safe. Other circuits considering this issue have agreed that, in circumstances such as this,
“the Fourth Amendment does not require the least intrusive alternative; it only requires a
reasonable alternative.” United States v. Prevo, 435 F.3d 1343, 1348 (11th Cir. 2006).
See also United States v. Brooks, 367 F.3d 1128, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2004) (rejecting
defendant’s suggestion that the officer was required to adopt a less intrusive alternative);
United States v. LaFrance, 879 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1989) (refusing to create a standard
“tantamount to requiring government agents to adopt the least intrusive means possible.”).
Next we consider the length of time the safe was detained. See LaFrance, 879 F.2d
at 6 (“[T]hough the duration of a detention is an important consideration in evaluating the
intrusiveness of a package’s determent, it is neither the mirror image of unreasonableness
nor the yardstick against which the suitability of police procedures must inevitably be
measured.”). Here, the warrantless seizure lasted approximately 22 hours.2 Because
seizure of containers affects only possessory interests and not the privacy interests vested
in their contents, lengthy seizures of containers have been upheld by other courts. See,
e.g., United States v. Martin, 157 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) (upholding 11-day seizure
2
Fritz testified that he seized the safe around 1:30 a.m . He filled out the application when he cam e
on duty at 8:00 p.m . and obtained the search warrant at 11:16 p.m . that evening. Thus, the warrantless
portion of the seizure lasted approxim ately 22 hours.
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because of delays in ability to acquire a warrant); United States v, Mayomi, 873 F.2d 1049,
1054 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding a 48-hour detention of mailed packages and noting that
privacy interest was not disturbed); United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 253
(1970) (upholding a 29-hour warrantless seizure of a mailed package, based upon an
unavoidable delay in obtaining a warrant and the minimal nature of the intrusion on the
defendant’s possessory interest).
Considering the evidence in the record, we cannot say that Fritz lacked diligence in
applying for the search warrant within a reasonable time. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 687
(“Respondents presented no evidence that the officers were dilatory in their investigation.”).
Fritz did not prepare a search warrant before going to Saddler’s house because he was
responding to an emergency call. He could not have known what he would find at the
scene or have anticipated that Saddler, the victim of the burglary and attempted theft,
would refuse to assist in the investigation. When he realized that the safe, in addition to
being evidence of the burglary, might also contain contraband, he responded reasonably.
Given the totality of the circumstances, we can not say that the seizure was unreasonable.
Our decision in United States v. Respress, 9 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 1993), supports this
conclusion. There, we noted that “[t]he practice of seizing an item based on probable
cause in order to secure a search warrant” has long been approved. Id. at 486 (citing
cases). We then considered whether the duration of the seizure pending the issuance of
a search warrant was reasonable. Id. at 488. We concluded that “the time between the
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seizure of the suitcase and the issuance of the warrant was approximately ten hours, and,
given the time of day, this was not an unreasonable length of time for preparing an
affidavit, submitting it to a magistrate, having it reviewed, and getting the warrant issued.”
Id. at 488. Although the seizure here was longer, there was adequate justification for the
delay.
Because we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that probable
cause, coupled with exigent circumstances, justified the seizure of the safe as evidence
in connection with the burglary of Saddler’s residence, we find it unnecessary to review the
court’s other analyses.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, we decline to reverse the denial of Saddler’s motion
to suppress and, therefore, AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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