Omni Manor Nursing Home v. US Dep't of Health & Human Services , 512 F. App'x 543 ( 2013 )


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  •                 NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 13a0096n.06
    No. 12-3223
    FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Jan 28, 2013
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                        DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    OMNI MANOR NURSING HOME,                                 )
    )       ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
    Petitioner,                                       )       OF A FINAL DECISION OF
    )       T H E U N IT E D S T A T E S
    v.                                                       )       DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
    )       AND HUMAN SERVICES
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH                       )       DEPARTMENTAL APPEALS
    AND HUMAN SERVICES,                                      )       BOARD
    )
    Respondent.                                       )                          OPINION
    BEFORE:        COLE and DONALD, Circuit Judges; RUSSELL, District Judge.*
    COLE, Circuit Judge. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) imposed
    a civil money penalty on Omni Manor Nursing Home (“Omni Manor”) for failing to comply with
    several Medicare regulations over a twenty-eight-day period. Both an administrative law judge
    (“ALJ”) and the Departmental Appeals Board (“DAB”) of the United States Department of Health
    and Human Services upheld the imposition of the penalty and its duration. We affirm their findings
    and accordingly deny the petition for review.
    I.
    A.
    Omni Manor is a skilled nursing facility in Ohio that participates in the Medicare program.
    As a condition of its participation, Omni Manor must abide by certain safety requirements set forth
    *
    The Honorable Thomas B. Russell, United States District Judge for the Western District
    of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
    No. 12-3223
    Omni Manor v. HHS
    in federal statutes and regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3 (2010). The Ohio Department of Health
    (the “state agency”) conducts periodic unannounced inspections—known as surveys—on behalf of
    the CMS and the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (the
    “Secretary”) to evaluate compliance with the requirements.          See 
    id. § 1395aa;
    42 C.F.R.
    §§ 488.10(a)(1), 488.308(a). During these surveys, the state agency documents any discovered
    instance of noncompliance—known as a deficiency—as well as its scope and severity. 42 C.F.R.
    § 488.404(b). Federal regulations identify several severity categories for deficiencies, ranging from
    ones that result in “[n]o actual harm with a potential for minimal harm” on the low end to ones that
    result in “immediate jeopardy to resident health or safety” on the high end. 
    Id. § 488.404(b)(1).
    CMS has the authority to impose a civil money penalty (among other remedies) for any
    deficiency the state agency discovers and documents. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(h)(2). The amount
    is pegged to the relevant severity category, with a possible penalty of $50 to $3,000 per day for
    deficiencies that do not rise to the level of immediate jeopardy. See 
    id. § 1395i-3(h)(2)(A)(ii);
    42
    C.F.R. § 488.438(a)(1)(ii). The penalty generally accrues until the date on which a “revisit” survey
    confirms that a facility has corrected all deficiencies. See 42 C.F.R. § 488.440(h)(1). The duration
    of the penalty may be reduced if a facility can demonstrate through “written credible evidence” that
    it made the necessary corrections on a date prior to the revisit survey. 
    Id. §§ 488.440(h)(1),
    488.454(e).
    B.
    With that background in mind, we turn now to the facts giving rise to this petition. The state
    agency conducted a periodic survey of Omni Manor that concluded on April 24, 2008. The survey
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    led to the discovery of several deficiencies, two of which are especially relevant here. The state
    agency first documented an instance in which Omni Manor’s staff failed to provide care to a resident
    showing obvious signs of respiratory distress even though a physician had ordered the staff to keep
    close tabs on the resident less than an hour earlier. The state agency also documented an instance
    in which Omni Manor’s staff failed to remove a painful urinary tract catheter from a resident until
    long after it was medically necessary. As a result of these incidents, the state agency determined that
    Omni Manor was noncompliant with 42 C.F.R. § 483.25, which requires a skilled nursing facility
    to provide each resident with the kind of care needed to attain the highest practicable physical,
    mental, and psychosocial well-being; and with 42 C.F.R. § 483.25(d), which requires a facility to
    promptly discontinue the use of any medically unnecessary catheter. The state agency further
    determined that Omni Manor was noncompliant with ten other regulations—resulting in a grand total
    of twelve deficiencies.
    CMS acted on these findings in a letter to Omni Manor dated May 6, 2008. Based on the
    relatively less severe nature of the deficiencies, CMS imposed a civil money penalty of $550 per day
    starting on April 24, 2008, and continuing until Omni Manor returned to “substantial compliance”
    with federal regulations. Omni Manor responded by submitting a plan of correction (“POC”) to
    CMS with a list of ameliorative steps it intended to take. The state agency then conducted a revisit
    survey on May 22, 2008. At this time, the state agency determined that Omni Manor had adequately
    corrected all of its earlier deficiencies and thus achieved substantial compliance. Accordingly, CMS
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    Omni Manor v. HHS
    lifted the per-day penalty as of May 21, 2008. CMS ultimately penalized Omni Manor $15,400 for
    failing to comply with applicable regulations over a period of twenty-eight days.
    Omni Manor requested a hearing before an ALJ to contest CMS’s determination. Omni
    Manor did not dispute the “factual and legal basis” for the penalty imposed, but did dispute the
    narrow issue of the penalty’s duration. Omni Manor asserted that the period of its noncompliance
    ended on April 29, 2008—twenty-three days earlier than CMS had determined. The second ALJ
    assigned to the appeal found that Omni Manor had failed to prove its assertion and accordingly
    affirmed CMS’s determination. Omni Manor then appealed to the DAB, which likewise affirmed.
    Omni Manor now petitions for our review of the DAB’s decision under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(e).
    II.
    Omni Manor raises but one issue in this petition. It challenges the DAB’s finding that the
    duration of the penalty imposed did not exceed the period of noncompliance. Omni Manor
    maintains, as it has since the beginning, that it returned to substantial compliance on April 29, 2008,
    rather than May 22, 2008.
    A.
    The DAB’s findings of fact are conclusive “if supported by substantial evidence on the record
    considered as a whole.” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(e); see also Claiborne-Hughes Health Ctr. v.
    Sebelius, 
    609 F.3d 839
    , 843 (6th Cir. 2010). This includes a finding that a skilled nursing facility
    has failed to substantially comply with federal participation requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-
    3(h)(2); see also 42 C.F.R. § 488.301 (defining “substantial compliance” as a “level of compliance
    with the requirements of participation such that any identified deficiencies pose no greater risk to
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    Omni Manor v. HHS
    resident health or safety than the potential for causing minimal harm”). It also includes a finding that
    a facility previously noncompliant with participation requirements has returned to substantial
    compliance. 
    Id. §§ 488.440(h)(1),
    488.454(e).
    Our review of the DAB’s findings of fact is highly deferential. See Golden Living Ctr. v.
    Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
    656 F.3d 421
    , 425 (6th Cir. 2011). Under the substantial-evidence
    standard, we may consider “whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the evidence,”
    but it is not our place to resolve evidentiary conflicts or questions of witness credibility. Claiborne-
    
    Hughes, 609 F.3d at 843
    . When it comes to the determination of the duration of a penalty in
    particular, we will reverse only if “left with a definite and firm conviction that the [DAB] committed
    a clear judgment error in reaching its conclusion after weighing the relevant factors.” Golden Living
    
    Ctr., 656 F.3d at 429
    (citing United States v. Haywood, 
    280 F.3d 715
    , 720 (6th Cir. 2002)).
    B.
    That brings us to the sole issue presented in this petition. The CMS determined that Omni
    Manor was noncompliant with certain regulations, including 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.25 and 483.25(d), as
    of April 24, 2008—the date of the state agency’s initial survey—and did not achieve substantial
    compliance until the revisit survey on May 22, 2008. Omni Manor disputed the latter finding on
    administrative appeal. It argued that it made the necessary corrections and achieved substantial
    compliance by April 29, 2008. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 488.440(h)(1), 488.454(e). As proof, Omni Manor
    submitted written evidence of its CMS-approved POC, a declaration from its compliance director,
    records of disciplinary and re-training measures directed toward the staff members responsible for
    the deficiencies, and audit forms used to evaluate the staff’s performance in several relevant areas.
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    Omni Manor v. HHS
    The gist of Omni Manor’s case was that it returned to substantial compliance immediately after
    meting out punishment and providing limited re-training for its staff. The DAB, like the ALJ before
    it, was not convinced. The DAB upheld the ALJ’s conclusion that Omni Manor did not provide
    sufficient proof to demonstrate that it had returned to substantial compliance at some point prior to
    the revisit survey. The DAB found that Omni Manor did not prove that its staff received the training
    required under its POC before May 22, 2008, nor did Omni Manor prove that its staff implemented
    the training they did receive.
    Omni Manor now argues that the DAB’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
    It is well-established that the burden of proving a facility has resumed complying with federal
    regulations on any given date falls squarely on the facility. See Golden Living 
    Ctr., 656 F.3d at 425
    .
    Thus, Omni Manor asks us to hold not only that it met its burden to prove substantial compliance
    as of April 29, 2008, but that there is inadequate evidence in the record to support the DAB’s
    conclusion to the contrary. This we cannot do. We affirm the finding that the duration of the penalty
    imposed did not exceed the period of noncompliance for two reasons.
    First, Omni Manor failed to live up to the commitments made in its own POC by April 29,
    2008. To address deficiencies under 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.25 and 483.25(d), Omni Manor’s POC
    proposed re-training its entire nursing staff on how to assess a resident’s change in condition and
    how to provide appropriate incontinence care. But the attendance sheets from those sessions indicate
    that many staff members never showed up. This fact is an especially significant one because Omni
    Manor itself—by virtue of its POC—held out proper re-training as a critical step in preventing the
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    Omni Manor v. HHS
    recurrence of instances of the sort for which it was penalized. It is no answer to note as a general
    matter that a fully implemented POC is not a strictly necessary predicate to proving a return to
    substantial compliance. Indeed, re-training was the fundamental element of Omni Manor’s POC,
    and as evidence of a return to substantial compliance it fails on its own terms. Because the burden
    remains on Omni Manor to affirmatively prove that it returned to substantial compliance by April
    29, 2008—and not on the DAB to prove noncompliance in the period preceding the revisit survey
    on May 22, 2008—the DAB was justified in affirming the duration of the penalty.
    Second, Omni Manor did not proffer the kind of proof that would tend to show it adequately
    corrected its deficiencies and achieved substantial compliance prior to the revisit survey. Consider
    the deficiency under 42 C.F.R. § 483.25. Omni Manor does not dispute that its staff’s treatment of
    the resident in respiratory distress fell short of accepted standards of professional care, due in large
    measure to its staff’s failure to obey a physician’s explicit orders. One would thus expect evidence
    grounded in observation and evaluation to demonstrate that such failures would not recur—in other
    words, evidence reflecting the nature and magnitude of the deficiency. One would not expect
    evidence consisting only of more orders. Yet that is precisely what Omni Manor relies on: It
    proffers evidence of disciplinary measures and change-in-condition re-training but barely any that
    goes to whether its staff implemented the new orders. Given the practical impossibility of
    successfully monitoring and evaluating re-trained staff within the span of one or two days—the time-
    frame implicit in Omni Manor’s return date—this omission is not particularly surprising. To its
    credit, Omni Manor did proffer evidence of “chart audits” used to ensure its staff properly
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    Omni Manor v. HHS
    documented changes in residents’ conditions. Even so, this alone is insufficient to convince us that
    the record as a whole undermines the DAB’s finding that Omni Manor did not resume complying
    with regulations a mere five days after the state agency first discovered its deficiencies.
    In sum, Omni Manor had the burden of proving it returned to substantial compliance on a
    date preceding the revisit survey. The DAB found that Omni Manor had not carried its burden
    because of significant shortcomings in the proffered evidence. Because we are not left with a
    definite and firm conviction that the DAB erred based on our review of the record, we likewise
    affirm the duration of the penalty.
    C.
    Omni Manor also argues that the DAB erroneously required Omni Manor to prove the
    absence of noncompliance for the period between April 29, 2008 and May 22, 2008—or, in its
    words, the DAB required it to “prove the negative.” This argument is styled as an objection to the
    legal standard employed by the DAB. We may only reverse on an issue of law if the DAB abused
    its discretion. Golden 
    Living, 656 F.3d at 425
    (citing St. Francis Health Care Ctr. v. Shalala, 
    205 F.3d 937
    , 943 (6th Cir. 2000)). Here, the DAB did not. Omni Manor simply misunderstands the
    nature of the DAB’s decision. It held nothing more than that the proffered evidence was inadequate
    to demonstrate a return to substantial compliance prior to the revisit survey on May 22, 2008. Given
    that the DAB placed the proper burden of proof on Omni Manor, we see no reversible error.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the DAB’s findings and accordingly deny Omni
    Manor’s petition for review.
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