United States v. Anthony McCaster , 410 F. App'x 955 ( 2011 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 11a0106n.06
No. 09-6331 FILED
Feb 14, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN
ANTHONY McCASTER, DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
Defendant-Appellant.
/
Before: KEITH, MERRITT, and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Anthony McCaster appeals
his sentence on grounds of procedural and substantive reasonableness. For the following reasons,
we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Memphis police stopped McCaster for a traffic violation and found 129.4 grams of marijuana
and a stolen pistol in his car. Additionally, McCaster gave a statement to police explaining that he
sold marijuana and powder cocaine, regularly buying as much as an ounce or two of powder cocaine
at a time intended for resale. McCaster pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent to
distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and one count of possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).
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The Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report recommending that
McCaster’s base offense level for count one should be fourteen pursuant to United States Sentencing
Guidelines § 2D1.1. In reaching this recommendation, the Probation Office considered not only the
129.4 grams of marijuana McCaster had when he was arrested, but also one ounce of powder
cocaine—a typical amount purchased by McCaster for resale. Count two carried a statutory
minimum sentence of five years of imprisonment to be served consecutive to his sentence for count
one. The Probation Office also applied a two-level reduction for accepting responsibility, resulting
in a total offense level of twelve. McCaster’s criminal history category was VI.
At his sentencing hearing, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee followed the recommendations of the Probation Office. The resultant advisory Guidelines
sentencing range was two years and six months to three years and one month of imprisonment for
count one, and the court sentenced McCaster to two years and ten months of imprisonment. The
court imposed the statutory minimum sentence of five years of imprisonment for count two. The two
sentences are to be served consecutively, totaling seven years and ten months. Additionally,
McCaster received three years of supervised release.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, McCaster claims that his sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable.
We review these claims for plain error because McCaster did not object after the district court issued
the sentence and asked him if he had any objections. United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 332, 340 (6th
Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872-73 (6th Cir. 2004)). Therefore, to
succeed on appeal, McCaster must identify a clear or obvious error that affected his rights and the
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fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Id. (citing United States v.
Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
First, McCaster claims that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district
court failed to address his request for a below-Guidelines sentence for count one. If the court had
applied the Guidelines considering only the drugs actually found on McCaster, his sentencing range
for count one would have been six months to one year of imprisonment. Considering the ounce of
powder cocaine that McCaster regularly purchased for resale, as the court could properly do,
increased the range to two years and six months to three years and one month of imprisonment.
McCaster’s attorney argued that this increase over-represented the seriousness of the crime; adding
at least two years to McCaster’s sentence for drugs that police never found. The court did not
expressly address this specific request, but this did not constitute error, let alone a clear and obvious
one. Cf. id. The district court was not required to “explicitly state that it has considered and rejected
each of [McCaster]’s arguments” because the sentence was “imposed within the applicable
Guidelines range.” Id. (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 357 (2007)). Furthermore, the
court sufficiently explained reasons for the sentence rather than giving no reason whatsoever, see id.at 340-41 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)), such as McCaster’s criminal history, his personal
information, and the need for deterrence. Accordingly, McCaster has not established plain error
through his first claim.
Second, McCaster claims that his sentence for count one is substantively unreasonable
because it is excessive for his actual offense and it deters cooperation with police. The sentence is
presumptively reasonable because it falls within the applicable sentencing range. Cf. United States
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v. Walls, 546 F.3d 728, 737 (6th Cir. 2008). However, “[a] sentence is substantively unreasonable
if the district court selects the sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails
to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent
factor.” Id. (citation omitted). Here, the district court recited lengthy reasons supporting the
sentence it issued as we already mentioned. Additionally, the district court emphasized that the
sentence was appropriate when juxtaposed with McCaster’s extensive criminal history, his young
age, and his relationship with his family and young children. From the age of twelve to twenty-three
when McCaster was sentenced, he had accumulated a litany of convictions ranging from drug
possession to theft to violent crimes. The court recognized that McCaster must “change” during his
time in prison if he wants to be a better father to his children and son to his parents. Accordingly,
McCaster has not established plain error through his second claim.
Furthermore, we acknowledge that cooperation between defendants and police should be
encouraged, and we highlight that district courts may, and often do, take cooperation into
consideration when determining sentences. That courts may also give defendants higher sentences
based upon admissions they make while attempting to cooperate, such as occurred here, reveals
conflicting motivations in our judicial process. Nevertheless, we cannot say that this conflict created
plain error, or even an abuse of discretion, by the district court here.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM McCaster’s sentence.