Lee Ann Tincher v. Larry Owsley , 500 F. App'x 468 ( 2012 )


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  •                 NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 12a1018n.06
    No. 10-6123
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT                                Sep 18, 2012
    DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    LEE ANN TINCHER,                                       )
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                    )
    )     ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
    v.                             )     STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
    )     THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
    LARRY OWSLEY, et al.,                                  )     KENTUCKY AT LOUISVILLE
    )
    Defendants-Appellees.                     )
    )
    Before: SILER and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; TARNOW, District Judge.*
    TARNOW, District Judge. Appellant Lee Ann Tincher appeals the decision of the United
    States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky granting dismissal to Defendants in
    Plaintiff’s suit alleging a violation of a property interest in her employment and a deprivation of her
    due process rights.
    For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal.
    BACKGROUND
    Plaintiff Lee Ann Tincher is a former employee of Defendant University of Louisville. She
    was a Nurse Specialist in its Medical School’s Department of Pediatrics, Division of Pediatric
    Endocrinology (“Ped-Endo”). She worked there from 1987-1989 and from 1997-November 2007.
    In November 2007, Plaintiff’s employment was terminated for two reasons: (1) a three-day
    *
    The Honorable Arthur J. Tarnow, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
    Michigan, sitting by designation.
    No. 10-6123, Tincher v. Owsley, et al.                                                               Page 2
    suspension due to inappropriate comments she made about doctors at the University; and
    (2) complaints from Ped-Endo patients’ parents alleging discourteous, rude, and unprofessional
    behavior by Plaintiff towards them.
    The University has a handbook (“Policy”) that describes offenses for which employees may
    be disciplined and the appeals process following employment termination. (See R. 1., Ex. A.)
    Section PER 501 of the Policy describes forms of disciplinary actions and lists specific offenses for
    which employees of the University may be disciplined. It states:
    Disciplinary action may take the form of oral warning, written reprimand, suspension
    without pay, demotion or termination. The specific action taken will depend on the
    nature of the offense, the circumstances surrounding the offense, and the employee’s
    previous record. Suspending an employee with pay or assigning an employee to use
    his or her paid annual leave is not disciplinary action; the university reserves the right
    to take such action as it deems appropriate. Copies of written reprimands must be
    forwarded to the Human Resources Department.
    Any personnel action to suspend or terminate a regular status staff member must be
    reviewed by the Affirmative Action/Employee Relations Office, Human Resources
    Department before any action is taken. In cases of termination, a pre-termination
    hearing will be conducted in the Human Resources Department with a representative
    of the Employee Relations Office present.
    (Id.)
    Section PER 504 of the Policy states the University policies and procedures for appeals of
    suspensions and dismissals from employment. (Id.) PER 504 provides that:
    An appealable action may be reversed on appeal for only two reasons: (1) there was
    no reasonable basis for the university action; or (2) there was a substantial departure
    from university procedures which prejudiced the employee against whom the action
    was taken.
    (R. 1, Ex. A, PER 504, § III.) It goes on to state:
    No. 10-6123, Tincher v. Owsley, et al.                                                          Page 3
    I. POLICY STATEMENT
    A regular status employee may appeal a suspension without pay,
    an involuntary demotion, or a dismissal.
    …
    IV. PROCEDURES
    …
    D.     Pre-Hearing Conferences and Hearings
    1. There shall be an initial pre-hearing conference at which the parties to the
    appeal and the hearing officer in consultation with the Associate Vice
    President for Human Resources or his or her designee shall decide the issues
    to be addressed in the appeal, the advisors to be present at the hearings, the
    extent of the advisors’ participation at the hearings, and any other relevant
    procedures. The final decision on these and all other procedural matters rests
    with the Associate Vice President for Human Resources or his or her
    designee.
    2. There shall be a hearing at which the employee and the university shall
    have the opportunity to present evidence regarding the action taken, including
    testimony of witnesses. The hearing shall be informal; strict rules of
    evidence shall not apply.
    3. The Associate Vice President for Human Resources or his or her designee
    shall be present at all hearings and pre-hearing conferences. The Staff
    Grievance Officer shall be informed in writing of all hearings and pre-hearing
    conferences and may attend all such meetings at his or her direction.
    4. The employee and the appropriate supervisor may each have an advisor
    present at all pre-hearing conferences and hearings. And advisor may only be:
    a. a licensed attorney, or
    b. a university faculty or staff member.
    5. If an employee wishes to be assisted by an advisor but is unable to locate
    an advisor, the employee may contact either the Staff Grievance Officer or
    the Associate Vice President for Human Resources or his or her designee,
    who will help the employee locate a university faculty or staff member to act
    as the employee’s advisor. The advisor may not participate in the pre-
    hearings unless:
    a. the advisor is an attorney; or
    b. the employee has received permission for the advisor’s
    participation from the Associate Vice President for Human Resources
    or his or her designee.
    E.     Hearing Officer’s Report
    1. After the hearing has been completed, the hearing officer shall issue a
    written report which shall:
    a. summarize the evidence presented at the hearing;
    b. state the hearing officer’s Findings of Fact and the basis for those
    findings; and
    No. 10-6123, Tincher v. Owsley, et al.                                                         Page 4
    c. state the hearing officer’s Recommendations for Action. This
    written report shall be submitted to the Associate Vice President for
    Human Resources or his or her designee within ten workdays of the
    completion of the hearing, unless the Associate Vice President for
    Human Resources extends that time period
    F.      Appeal Decision
    1. The Hearing Officer’s Report shall become the Appeal Decision seven
    workdays after the Report has been submitted to the President or his or her
    designee, unless the President or his or her designee determines that the
    Report, or any part of it is not in the best interest of the university.
    2. If the President or his or her designee determines that the hearing
    Officer’s Report, or any part of it, is not in the best interest of the
    university, the President or his or her designee shall issue an Appeal
    Decision within seven workdays of receipt of the Hearing Officer’s
    Report.
    3. The Associate Vice President for Human Resources or his or her designee
    shall forward the Hearing Officer’s Report or Appeal Decision, if any, to the
    employee, to employee’s supervisors, and any other appropriate individuals.
    4. The Associate Vice President for Human Resources or his or her designee
    shall be in charge of implementing the Appeal Decision and may take
    whatever action is necessary to do so.
    5. The Appeal Decision shall be final.
    (R. 1, Notice of Removal, 9/09/2009, Exhibit A, Part I, Complaint Exhibit B) (emphasis added).
    On October 15-16, 2008, a post-discharge due process hearing was held before Mr. Michael
    Head, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Administrative Hearings. On October 27, 2008, Head
    issued a report and Recommended Order. In the report, Head made findings of fact and conclusions
    of law. Head suggested that the University reverse Plaintiff’s discharge of employment and reinstate
    her with back pay and benefits.
    On November 17, 2008, Defendant Larry L. Owsley, acting as a designee of Defendant James
    Ramsey, rejected the Recommended Order and affirmed the Defendant University’s decision to
    terminate Plaintiff’s employment. The decision by Owsley states:
    Upon review of the hearing record, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
    Recommended Order and the Exceptions filed by counsel for the Department of
    No. 10-6123, Tincher v. Owsley, et al.                                                         Page 5
    Pediatrics, I hereby find that the Recommended Order issued by the Hearing Officers
    is not in the best interest of the University. As the President’s Designee, it is my
    ruling that the Recommended Order shall not be adopted as the Appeal Decision in
    this matter. Accordingly, I am affirming the decision to terminate Petitioner
    Tincher’s employment effective November 17, 2007, as previously rendered by the
    University of Louisville.
    (R. 1, Ex. C) (emphasis in original).
    On August 14, 2009, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Jefferson Circuit Court in Kentucky
    against Defendants University of Louisville, Larry Owsley, and James Ramsey. Plaintiff alleged
    deprivation of a property interest in her employment and a violation of her right to procedural due
    process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments under a § 1983 theory of liability. Defendants
    removed the action to the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky on
    September 8, 2009. Plaintiff appealed that Court’s decision. The appeal is now before us.
    Standard of Review
    “Whether an action is barred by the Eleventh Amendment is a question of law, and is
    reviewed de novo.” Barton v. Summers, 
    293 F.3d 944
    , 948 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal citation
    omitted). States “possess[] certain immunities from suit in . . . federal courts.” Ernst v. Rising,
    
    427 F.3d 351
    , 358 (6th Cir. 2005). The amendment applies to suits brought against a state agency
    or state officers, and the action is for recovery of money from the state treasury. Martin v. Univ. of
    Louisville, 
    541 F.2d 1171
    , 1173-74 (6th Cir. 1976).
    Public universities are protected under the Eleventh Amendment. Hutsell v. Sayre, 
    5 F.3d 996
    , 999 (6th Cir. 1993). “Government officials who perform discretionary functions are entitled
    to qualified immunity from civil damages suits arising out of the performance of their official duties
    . . . .” Salehpour v. Univ. of Tenn., 
    159 F.3d 199
    , 207-08 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation and
    No. 10-6123, Tincher v. Owsley, et al.                                                         Page 6
    citation omitted).
    Here, Appellant brought suit against the University, Owsley in his official capacity, and
    Ramsey in his official capacity. Such claims were properly dismissed by the district court as barred
    by the Eleventh Amendment.
    Appellant also brought claims against Ramsey and Owsley in their individual capacities.
    Those claims were properly dismissed. “Whether the district court properly dismissed [a plaintiff’s]
    claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Hensley Mfg., Inc.
    v. ProPride, Inc., 
    579 F.3d 603
    , 608-09 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations
    omitted). “A complaint must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
    pleader is entitled to relief.’” Ctr. For Bio-Ethical Reform Inc. v. Napolitano, 
    648 F.3d 365
    , 369
    (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Although the standard does not require “detailed
    factual allegations,” it does require more than “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of
    the elements of a cause of action.” Hensley, 
    579 F.3d at 609
     (internal quotation marks omitted); see
    also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555 (2007). A complaint that simply “creates a
    suspicion of a legally cognizable right of action is insufficient.” Bishop v. Lucent Tech., Inc.,
    
    520 F.3d 516
    , 519 (6th Cir. 2008) (emphasis omitted).
    Plaintiff failed to state claims for prospective injunctive relief against Defendants Owsley
    and Ramsey. Plaintiff states in her complaint that the actions were “[u]ndertaken under color of the
    laws of the Commonwealth of Kentucky in the individual and official capacities of . . . Defendants
    Owsley and Ramsey . . . .” Comp., at ¶10(a). As noted by the district judge, the only factual
    allegation in the complaint with respect to Defendants Owsley and Ramsey is contained in paragraph
    8 of the complaint. It states:
    No. 10-6123, Tincher v. Owsley, et al.                                                          Page 7
    On November 17, 2008, the Defendant Larry L. Owsley, acting as the designee of the
    Defendant James Ramsey, rejected the Findings and Conclusions and
    “Recommended Order” . . . and “affirmed” the decision of the Defendant University
    of Louisville to discharge the Plaintiff from her employment with it, originally made
    on November 17, 2007.
    Id. at ¶ 8.
    Appellant’s statement that Defendants Owsley and Ramsey affirmed her termination does
    not establish facial plausibility of a constitutional violation. Because Appellant simply stated a legal
    conclusion with no factual support, we affirm the district court’s dismissal.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the dismissal by the district court.