United States v. Shannon Shields , 480 F. App'x 381 ( 2012 )

File Name: 12a0490n.06
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
No. 10-5097 FILED
May 11, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT LEONARD GREEN, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
SHANNON SHIELDS, ) WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
BEFORE: MERRITT, CLAY, and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.
MERRITT, Circuit Judge. This is a direct appeal from a jury conviction for: (1)
kidnapping resulting in the death of the victim, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a); (2) carrying and
using a firearm during and in relation to kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and (3)
attempted escape, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a). The defendant-appellant, Shannon Shields,
received a sentence of life imprisonment for the kidnapping charge, ten consecutive years of
incarceration for the firearms charge, and five consecutive years of incarceration for the escape
charge. A prior adjudication that determined Defendant to be mentally retarded rendered him
ineligible to receive the death penalty. Defendant appeals the jury’s verdict and his sentences on
several grounds: (1) that there is insufficient evidence to sustain Defendant’s convictions for the
kidnapping and firearms charges; (2) that the District Court improperly admitted certain testimony
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and otherwise denied Defendant a fair trial; (3) that the District Court erred in denying Defendant’s
motion to suppress incriminating, post-arrest recorded statements that he made to the police; and (4)
that Defendant’s sentence of life imprisonment for the kidnapping charge, imposed pursuant to a
statutorily mandated minimum sentence, is disproportionate to his level of culpability and therefore
violates the Eighth Amendment’s bar against cruel and unusual punishment. These claims of error
are insubstantial. The evidence against Defendant is very strong.
I. Background
The pertinent facts are as follows. On the evening of May 19, 2004, Defendant and his
cousin, Sonny Shields, carjacked and abducted Jerrell Lott at the Corner Grocery Store in Memphis,
Tennessee. In addition to surveillance camera footage confirming that Defendant and Sonny Shields
approached Lott’s car (a silver 1994 Mitsubishi Diamante) on that evening, there was one eyewitness
to the crime itself, a thirteen year-old boy named Tony Tapplin. At trial, Tapplin testified that he
saw two men approach Lott’s car once Lott, whom Tapplin recognized as his neighbor, had left the
store and gotten back inside the vehicle. According to Tapplin, the men spoke briefly with Lott, at
which point one of the men pulled out a gun and pointed it at Lott while the other ran around to the
passenger side and demanded that Lott unlock the car and let him inside. Lott complied. Tapplin
further testified that the man holding the gun then jumped into the backseat, and that Lott drove away
while the man held the gun to the back of his head. On May 25, six days after witnessing the
carjacking, Tapplin identified Sonny Shields from a police photo spread as the man who had pulled
the gun on Lott. However, Tapplin was unable to identify Sonny Shields a second time when police
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showed him a new photo spread on May 30, five days later, and he was never able to identify
Defendant as the second perpetrator.
The testimony of other witnesses pieced together events subsequent to Lott’s carjacking and
abduction and culminating in his murder. Soon after leaving the Corner Grocery, Defendant and
Sonny Shields pulled over, forced Lott to strip to his underwear, beat him, and locked him in the
trunk of his car. After locating Lott’s ATM card, Defendant and Sonny Shields then drove to a local
bank and used the card to withdraw $800 in cash.1 Next, they drove across town to the house of
Sonny Shields’ friend, Lendzo Parker, at 917 Polk Street. Parker testified at trial as to the events that
occurred at the Polk Street address. According to him, Defendant and Sonny Shields arrived at the
house around midnight in a silver Mitsubishi Diamante. He further testified that Defendant, upon
exiting the car, announced “I got a nigger in the trunk,” prompting Sonny Shields to explain to
Parker that he and Defendant had just robbed a man, that the man had seen their faces, and that they
needed Parker to help them get rid of the car. Parker agreed. Parker and two other witnesses who
were also present at the Polk Street address, Parker’s sister, Lauren Parker Turner, and Parker’s
friend, Kevin Jordan, testified that they also observed Defendant flashing a large wad of cash.
Jordan further testified that Defendant told him to stay away from the Diamante because it was “hot.”
Sometime thereafter, Defendant and Sonny Shields left 917 Polk Street in the Diamante, with Lott
still trapped in the trunk. Parker and Parker’s friend, James Stafford, followed behind in Parker’s
Honda. Both Turner and Jordan witnessed and testified to the cars’ departure.
1
At trial, a records custodian for the bank testified that the bank’s ATM video camera captured an individual
withdrawing money from Lott’s bank account on the evening of May 19, 2004.
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Parker’s trial testimony provides an account of what happened next. After departing from
917 Polk Street, the four men crossed the Mississippi River into Arkansas before stopping at a gas
station to buy gas and a plastic gas can. Stafford filled up the latter with gas at the pump. The four
men then left the gas station and drove for some time before turning onto a secluded road, and
finally, parking on an adjoining unpaved field road. Once parked, Defendant and Sonny Shields
exited the Diamante, opened the trunk, and directed Lott to get out. Lott begged for his life, to no
avail. When Lott attempted to run away, Sonny Shields drew his gun and fired at the fleeing figure.
At this point, Defendant grabbed the gun from Sonny, and exclaimed “You can’t do nothing right”
before running after Lott, firing shots as he ran. Sonny Shields followed. Parker testified that,
although the three men disappeared from his line of sight, he heard several more shots before
Defendant and Sonny Shields returned to the parked cars. Sonny Shields, shoeless and carrying the
pistol, collected the gas can from Stafford and walked back across the field with Defendant to burn
Lott’s body. After some time, Defendant and Sonny Shields returned to the cars, and all four men
drove away.
On the road back to Memphis, the men stopped at a different gas station to refill the gas can.
Sonny Shields noticed that the gas cap was missing and grew concerned that he had accidentally left
it behind. Consequently, all four men returned to the field and searched, unsuccessfully, for the
errant item. As they attempted to depart for the second time, both cars became stuck in the muddy
field, forcing the men to get out and push them free, muddying their clothes and shoes in the process.
Once back in Memphis, the men drove around looking for a place to burn Lott’s car. They
eventually stopped at a location near Hernando and Kerr streets, where Sonny Shields got out of the
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Diamante and joined Parker and Stafford in the Honda. Defendant proceeded to burn the Diamante
in a nearby field. The car exploded as it burned, injuring Defendant’s arms and face. He ran back
to the others, yelling that he was hurt, and directed them to take him to his aunt’s house. Sonny
Shields, Parker, and Stafford complied and dropped Defendant off at his aunt’s address sometime
between 3a.m. and 4a.m. on the morning of May 20. Defendant’s aunt, Stephanie Long, greeted him
at the door and immediately noticed that he was muddy, burned, and reeking of gasoline. Defendant
told his aunt and his aunt’s husband, Tony Long, that he had been working on a car and had gotten
injured when the car’s battery caught fire. After changing clothes and shoes, Defendant asked his
aunt to drive him to a place where he could meet up with his girlfriend, Frenchetta Leavy. His aunt
agreed, and Defendant and his aunt met Leavy in Grenada, Mississippi. Defendant told Leavy that
he’d injured himself in a barbecuing accident.2 Leavy then drove Defendant to a nearby hospital,
where he checked in under the pseudonym “Willie Oliver.” He continued to use this false name
when the hospital transferred him to a burn center in Greenville, Mississippi.
The Memphis Police Department became aware of Defendant’s involvement in Lott’s
abduction and murder when Sonny Shields turned himself in to local investigators on the evening
of May 21, 2004. By this point, the police investigation was already underway.3 Sonny Shields
made a number of inculpatory statements, but largely shifted the blame to Defendant. He also told
2
Once in custody, Defendant told Leavy that he had been present when Sonny Shields shot a man and that he’d
gotten burned when he set someone’s car on fire.
3
Police officers had already found both Lott’s body and the charred Diamante, and local television stations had
begun airing the surveillance camera footage showing two men approaching Lott’s car in the Corner Grocery parking
lot.
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the police where they could find Defendant. Consequently, the Sheriff’s Department in Washington
County, Mississippi, took Defendant into custody on the evening of the same day. Three days later,
on May 24, Memphis police detectives Joseph Pearlman and Jasper Clay drove to Greenville, and,
pursuant to a federal warrant, interviewed Defendant as he waited in a holding cell prior to his initial
court appearance. Pearlman and Clay advised Defendant of his Miranda rights, and he waived them
both orally and in a written statement. He thereafter made a tape-recorded statement that was self-
serving but incriminating. Defendant admitted to being present throughout Lott’s carjacking,
abduction, and murder, but placed primary blame on his cousin, just as Sonny Shields had done to
him. Defendant’s statement was admitted at trial, where the jury returned guilty verdicts on all three
counts of the indictment.
II. Discussion
1. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The evidence is clearly sufficient to support the jury’s verdict. Defendant first asserts that
the government failed to adequately link him to Lott’s kidnapping because the only non-accomplice
eyewitness to the crime, thirteen year-old Tapplin, was never able to identify Defendant as one of
the perpetrators. This argument ignores the Corner Grocery Store surveillance video showing
Defendant and Sonny Shields approaching the location where Lott was sitting in his car on the
evening of May 19, 2004. Tapplin, moreover, identified Sonny Shields in the first of two police
photo spreads as the man who held the gun.
Second, Defendant contends that Parker’s testimony was biased and that the jury should not
have credited it in light of the fact that Parker testified pursuant to a plea agreement under which he
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will receive a reduced sentence of twenty years imprisonment for the kidnapping charge and a
dismissal of the firearms charge. The jury, however, knew of Parker’s plea agreement; it was their
function to judge his credibility. Further, those portions of Parker’s testimony which connect
Defendant to Lott’s stolen Mitsubishi Diamante, and to events that transpired at 917 Polk Street on
the night of Lott’s abduction, are strongly corroborated by the statements of other, non-accomplice
eyewitnesses. Defendant himself admitted – both to the police and to his girlfriend – that he was
present in the Arkansas field when, according to Defendant, Sonny Shields shot and killed Lott.4
Thus, even conceding the possibility that Defendant may never have pulled the trigger, there was
ample evidence to convince a rational trier of fact that Defendant was guilty of the charged offenses.
See U.S. v. Henderson, 626 F.3d 326, 341 (6th Cir. 2010).
2. Prejudicial Effect of Various District Court Rulings
Defendant next asserts that the District Court made a variety of rulings that unfairly
prejudiced the jury against him. These include: (1) improperly allowing expert opinion testimony
from a lay witness; (2) improperly allowing testimony regarding Defendant’s medical treatment and
use of a pseudonym to obtain such treatment; (3) refusing to permit Defendant to appear at trial in
street clothes instead of prison garb; and (4) failing to sever Defendant’s charge for escape from the
kidnapping and firearms charges.
4
Defendant also argues on appeal that his statement to the police should have been suppressed. This assertion
is addressed, and dismissed, later in the opinion.
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(a) Evidentiary Rulings
Defendant contends that the District Court wrongly permitted Dale Arnold of the Arkansas
State Police to highlight for the jury “what appeared to be similarities” between the tread on
Defendant’s muddy shoes and a photograph of the shoe prints found near Lott’s body, despite
lacking “specialized training in footprint or shoe identification.” (Appellant’s Brief at 29.) This
argument lacks merit. It is true that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits any witness
from providing opinion testimony based on scientific, technical, or other specialized areas of
knowledge unless that witness first qualifies as an expert. SeeFED . R. EVID . 702. However, Rule
701 supplies an important corollary: a witness may nonetheless offer lay opinion testimony that is
rationally based on the witness’s perception, or that will help the jury understand the testimony or
determine a fact in issue, so long as it is not otherwise restricted by Rule 702. See id. 701.
Arnold’s testimony fits squarely within the limitations contemplated by Rule 701. First,
Arnold led the police discovery of Lott’s body and thus had sufficient personal knowledge to testify
about whether the prints in the field were similar to the tread on Defendant’s shoes. And second,
the jury benefitted from Arnold’s testimony in light of the fact that Arnold had enjoyed significantly
more time to study and compare the evidence. See U.S. v. Zepeda-Lopez, 478 F.3d 1213, 1222 (10th
Cir. 2007). The District Court did not err by admitting it.
Defendant also asserts that the District Court improperly admitted testimony regarding
Defendant’s medical treatment in Mississippi, including his use of the pseudonym “Willie Oliver”
to obtain such treatment. Defendant maintains that this evidence lacked probative value, as it
occurred after the crime was completed, and that it unfairly prejudiced the jury against him. We
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disagree. The mere fact that evidence relates to activities committed after completion of a crime
does not render it inadmissible. Rather, it is elementary that post-crime evidence is admissible when
it tends to show consciousness of guilt and is not unfairly prejudicial. See e.g., U.S. v. Cody, 498
F.3d 582, 591-92 (6th Cir. 2006). In this case, evidence that Defendant sought medical treatment
well over one hundred miles from Memphis, and under a false name, tended to prove that Defendant
hoped to avoid apprehension for his crimes. Further, evidence relating to the treatment itself tended
to link Defendant, through his injuries, to the burning of Lott’s car.
(b) Denial of Defendant’s Request to Appear in Street Clothes at Trial
Defendant next contends that the District Court denied him a fair trial by refusing his request
to stand before the jury in street clothing. Although it is well-established that a trial court cannot
force a criminal defendant to appear before the jury in prison garb, no compulsion was present in this
case. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05 (1970); U.S. v. Brown, 367 F.3d 549, 553-54
(6th Cir. 2004). To the contrary, Defendant strategically chose to appear in prison clothes, only
changing his mind the first morning of trial. And while Defendant did at this point object to
appearing before the jury in an orange jumpsuit, the District Court made all reasonable efforts, short
of delaying trial, to accommodate him. Echoing Brown, this Court recently held that a trial court is
not required to either furnish alternate clothing for a defendant or else delay trial, so long as the court
makes clear that it would allow the defendant to change clothes if substitute attire could feasibly be
made available. See U.S. v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758, 767 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Brown, 367 F.3d at
554). The District Court clearly provided Defendant with an opportunity to change his clothes, even
suggesting that Defendant’s counsel borrow a jacket from a colleague on Defendant’s behalf. As
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such, the District Court’s refusal to delay trial at the last minute did not amount to compelling
Defendant to appear in prison clothes in violation of his constitutional rights.
(c) Failure to Sever Escape Charge from Other Charges
Defendant also claims that the District Court prejudiced his defense by failing to sever his
charge for escape from the other charges against him. Because Defendant failed to renew his pretrial
motion to sever at the close of all the evidence, we review for plain error. See U.S. v. Walls, 293
F.3d 959, 966 (6th Cir. 2002). Defendant concedes that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
permit the joinder of related offenses, but supports his argument by invoking a court’s discretionary
ability to sever certain offenses if it appears that prejudice would otherwise result. See FED . R. CRIM .
P. 8(a), 14. Defendant, however, suffered no additional prejudice from a concurrent trial on all
charges. Evidence of his attempted escape would have been admissible circumstantially as tending
to prove consciousness of guilt in a separate trial on the kidnapping and firearms charges. See U.S.
v. Williams, 295 F.3d 817, 819 (8th Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Hankins, 931 F.2d 1256, 1261 (8th Cir.
1991). Thus, as to the joinder of counts, the District Court committed no error, much less plain
error. See Williams, 295 F.3d at 819.
3. Denial of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress the tape-recorded statement he gave to police on
May 24, 2004, on the ground that it was not voluntary, despite Defendant’s oral and written waiver
of his Miranda rights. The District Court denied the motion and admitted the statement at trial.
Defendant now contends, for the first time, that the District Court’s pretrial adjudication of his
mental retardation, which rendered him ineligible to receive the death penalty, also invalidated his
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waiver of rights because it was not made knowingly and intelligently. Defendant also asserts that,
because he is mentally retarded, his statement was the product of inherent police coercion.
Defendant’s claim of ineffective waiver is a losing one because it both has no merit and was waived.
There is case law to support the proposition that diminished mental capacity can, by limiting
a defendant’s ability to understand the nature of his or her rights and the consequences of abandoning
them, contribute to a determination that a waiver was invalid. See U.S. v. Garibay, 143 F.3d 534,
539 (9th Cir. 1998). But Defendant failed to raise this issue before the District Court, despite ample
opportunity. Specifically, the chronology of events was such that Defendant, once adjudicated
mentally retarded, could have filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to
suppress that specifically addressed the question of whether he was capable of signing a knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights. He did not. Defendant also did not object at trial to
the admission of his statement on this basis.5 As a general rule, this Court refuses to consider an
issue on appeal that a defendant did not first raise before the District Court, except in “‘exceptional
cases or particular circumstances’” not present here. See U.S. v. Pickett, 941 F.2d 411, 415 (6th Cir.
1991) (quoting Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Penn Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1461) (6th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 880 (1988)) (permitting appeal on the merits when both parties had
extensively briefed the “wholly legal” issues at stake). Defendant has therefore waived his claim.
Further, even absent waiver, Defendant’s claim fails on the merits. In Garner v. Mitchell,
557 F.3d 257, 264, 270-71 (6th Cir. 2009), this Court held that a defendant in the “‘borderline range
5
Defendant’s counsel objected to admission of the statement but on the basis that portions of it were
unintelligible, thus calling into question the accuracy of the text which ran across the screen as an aid to listeners.
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of intelligence’” who also suffered from a troubled upbringing and poor education knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Noting that “diminished mental capacity
alone does not prevent a defendant from validly waiving his or her Miranda rights,” we reasoned that
this factor must instead “be viewed alongside other factors, including evidence of the defendant’s
conduct during, and leading up to, the interrogation.” Id. at 264-65. In this case, the District Court
found that:
Defendant was alert and attentive and manifested no outward signs of being
incoherent or otherwise incapable of giving a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of his rights. Using the term “Miranda” specifically, Defendant stated he
knew his rights and wanted to make a statement.
(Order Denying Defendant’s Motion to Suppress at 3.) Defendant’s cooperativeness and
coherency thus demonstrate that he grasped both the nature of the charges against him and the
consequences that could flow from his interactions with police to effectuate a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. See Garner, 557 F.3d at 265. Moreover, retarded or
not, he was capable of recounting facts he had experienced.
4. Imposition of Mandatory Life Sentence for Kidnapping Charge
Defendant’s final argument relies heavily on Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) to
support the proposition that, because he is mentally retarded, his mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment for kidnapping resulting in the death of the victim violates his Eighth Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment. We review this constitutional challenge de novo.
In Atkins, the Supreme Court held that “death is not a suitable punishment for a mentally retarded
criminal.” 536 U.S. at 321. Indeed, Defendant was saved from the possibility of capital punishment
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by the District Court’s reliance on Atkins. Defendant now asks this Court to extend Atkins by
holding that his sentence of life imprisonment, made mandatory by statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a),
similarly violates the Eighth Amendment because it fails to account for his inherently reduced
culpability.
Atkins, however, has proven resistant to expansion beyond capital punishment. See U.S. v.
Tucker , 204 Fed. Appx. 518, 521-22 (6th Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Laffoon, 145 Fed. Appx. 964, 964 (5th
Cir. 2005). In Tucker, this Court explicitly held that “imposing a mandatory minimum sentence on
a defendant with limited mental capabilities does not violate the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel
and unusual punishment.” 204 Fed. Appx. at 521. Because we do not agree with Defendant’s
assertion that the distinction between capital and non-capital sentences is “artificial” when assessing
proportionality, we follow the holding in that case. See id. The Supreme Court and other courts
have consistently recognized the crucial difference between capital and non-capital sentences. See
e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994 (1991) (reasoning that “proportionality review is one
of several respects in which we have held that ‘death is different,’ and have imposed protections
which the Constitution nowhere else provides”). As a matter of retributive justice, life imprisonment
is not an unconstitutionally severe punishment for the crime of kidnapping and participating in the
murder of Lott.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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CLAY, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I write separately because Shannon Shields, a mentally
retarded defendant, suffered a serious injustice when the district court largely disregarded and
minimized his mental status during the trial proceedings. As a result, Shields’ right to a fair and
constitutionally adequate trial was seriously compromised. I therefore respectfully dissent.
The kidnapping and murder of Jerrell Lott was a senseless and shocking crime. Soon after
apprehending Shannon Shields and his cousin, Sonny Shields, the government announced its
intention to seek the death penalty against the two accused men. Shannon Shields then requested
a pretrial hearing to determine whether he was mentally retarded and thus ineligible to face the death
penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
The district court held an extensive eight-day evidentiary hearing on the matter. In the course
of the hearing, the defense presented the expert testimony of two psychologists, as well as the lay
testimony of Shields’ parents, his sister, his longtime girlfriend, several of his former educators, and
a prison counselor. The government presented the competing expert testimony of two additional
psychologists. After considering the evidence and post-hearing memoranda, the district court issued
a lengthy order finding Shields mentally retarded and thus ineligible to face the death penalty. (See
RE 557, Order on Mental Retardation.)
The hearing produced ample evidence to conclude that Shields is mentally retarded. In five
IQ tests administered over Shields’ lifetime, his scores ranged from 69 at the lowest to 73 at the
highest.1 Shields cannot live independently, and he does not work. He relies extensively on the
1
According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.–Text
Revision) (“DSM-IV”), “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” is defined as an IQ of 70
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assistance of his parents and his girlfriend to complete common, everyday tasks. Shields cannot
prepare his own food, follow a recipe, or shop for groceries. He cannot budget his own money, pay
his monthly bills, or master a checkbook. Concepts that are, to the normal-functioning person,
simple matters of common sense, are beyond Shields’ grasp. To cite but a few salient examples,
Shields does not understand the obligation to repay purchases made with a credit card. He does not
see the need for and lacks the follow-through to obtain an identification card. He does not grasp the
dangers of leaving a hot iron unattended.
Shields is completely unable to set his own priorities, to self-direct, or to complete even the
most rudimentary tasks without the continual supervision and frequent reminders of a parent or other
responsible adult. Although Shields has worked for brief periods in several unskilled positions, such
as a dishwasher and a furniture mover, he has never been able to maintain steady employment due
to his innate mental limitations. His inability to follow directions or to work productively without
continual direction has also hindered his job prospects. As a result of these limitations, Shields has
received some form of social security disability assistance since his teenage years.
Shields’ mental limitations became manifest early in his childhood education. Without
parental assistance, he struggled with grooming and personal hygiene, and he did not relate to his
classmates in “age-appropriate” ways. After a year in kindergarten, Shields was unable to even
recognize his own name in writing, let alone read or write it himself, despite his teacher’s personal
efforts to help him master this simple goal. In later years, Shields was disallowed from riding the
or below.
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school bus because of his lack of independence and his frequent outbursts. In the classroom, Shields
required constant individualized attention and instruction because he was unable to work
independently or to stay on task without a teacher’s direct supervision. Although Shields initially
started on a mixed track of special education and regular classes, he struggled with the regular
curricula and fell appreciably behind his peer group. By the ninth grade, school administrators
completely removed Shields from the regular classroom and placed him on track to receive a
“certificate of attendance” rather than a high school diploma. Shields’ special education
programming did not teach mainstream educational curricula, but instead focused on functional
skills, such as learning how to count money and how to write basic information, like his address and
his parents’ names. Ultimately, Shields dropped out of school entirely by the tenth grade.
Despite the extent of Shields’ mental deficiencies, his hindrances are not of the type that
would be readily apparent to the average observer. As an adult, Shields is now “careful about his
appearance” and “tries to keep himself well-groomed.” He can speak well, and he possesses some
limited reading skills, although his comprehension is sub-average, and he “lack[s] the ability to
engage in deep and meaningful conversation.” He is skilled at convincing others around him to
accomplish tasks on his behalf, he ignores social strictures (for example, he drives although he has
no license to do so), and he deceives others to achieve his personal objectives. Shields is often
deceptive and manipulative; however, his stratagems are “transparent” and “not well thought out.”
Shields is gullible, susceptible to the influence of his peers, and he seemingly lacks ambition or long-
term goals of his own. To quote the district court, Shields is an individual whose mental limitations
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render him “largely disconnected from the types of social responsibilities and tasks expected of
regularly functioning adults in society.”
The district court deserves commendation for the attention it devoted to Shields’ mental
retardation hearing and its evaluations of Shields’ eligibility for the death penalty. However, a
defendant is not mentally retarded for purposes of the death penalty alone. As with any factual
finding in a criminal proceeding, the district court’s rulings on mental retardation should have proven
salient throughout the remainder of Shields’ trial proceedings. Unfortunately, after making detailed
factual assessments about Shields’ mental limitations, the district court then inexplicably shelved
those facts and proceeded as though Shields’ innate limitations did not exist for the remainder of his
trial.
While defense counsel’s willingness to also ignore Shields’ mental retardation is
incomprehensible, it is equally inexcusable for the district court to have set aside its own factual
findings for the remainder of the trial. Although the district court was not obligated to try defense
counsel’s case, the court was not relieved of its duty to avoid glaring errors or to make independent
inquiries to ensure that Shields received his right to a fair trial.
Specifically, the district court should have considered Shields’ mental retardation when it
ruled on the motion to suppress. Shields freely admits that he received a Miranda warning and that
he waived his rights before he provided his recorded statement to police. See Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). However, for better or worse, Miranda’s now-familiar questions are an
imperfect and approximate instrument for measuring the validity of a suspect’s waiver. Ultimately,
whether a suspect validly waived his rights depends not only on whether the Miranda warning was
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properly given, but also on whether the waiver of the suspect’s Miranda rights was made
“voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.” Id. at 444–45.
This fact-sensitive inquiry has two distinct dimensions. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421
(1986) (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404
(1977)). For a waiver to have been “voluntary,” it must have been “the product of a free and
deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Id. For the waiver to have been
made “knowingly and intelligently,” it must have been made “with a full awareness of both the
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. “Only
if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal both an uncoerced choice and
the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights [were]
waived.” Id. (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (internal quotation marks and
additional citations omitted)).
Defense counsel only addressed the issue of voluntariness with respect to the Miranda
waiver, summarily arguing that Shields’ statement ought to be suppressed because “coercive police
activity overbore his will.” After considering the testimony of the interrogating officers, the district
court disagreed with defense counsel’s argument. It would appear that the district court correctly
decided the issue of voluntariness, inasmuch as no evidence was elicited to suggest that the officers
deliberately intimidated, coerced, or deceived Shields into giving an involuntary statement. See
Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257, 274 (2009) (en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting).
However, the district court never reached the second part of the waiver inquiry. The court
never asked whether Shields—with all his innate mental deficiencies—possessed “the maturity,
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intelligence, and competency to make a knowing and intelligent waiver.” Id. at 274. Despite the fact
that the district court’s own earlier, detailed ruling strongly cast doubt on that issue, the court simply
ignored Shields’ mental retardation and failed to take it into account for the purposes of the
suppression motion.
The government would have us fault defense counsel for this omission, arguing that Shields
waived the opportunity to raise the “knowing and intelligent” argument because counsel failed to
make that contention before the district court. If so, the government only highlights for our attention
a glaring ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Regardless of what defense counsel did or did not argue, however, the district court’s inquiry
should not have ended with respect to the officer’s conduct. Id. at 275–76. The waiver inquiry
encompasses two distinct parts, which work conjunctively, are therefore indivisible, and must both
be considered to determine whether a valid waiver was made. See id. at 275. Deciding the validity
of a waiver based solely on police conduct, without regard for whether the defendant had the capacity
to make a knowing and intelligent waiver, reads the second element out of the waiver inquiry, and
is clearly out of line with established Supreme Court Miranda jurisprudence. Id. In any event, it is
utterly perplexing that Shields’ mental retardation did not arise as a topic of concern during the
suppression hearing, whether spontaneously or by the court’s direction, given the obvious connection
between Shields’ mental limitations and his capacity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of
his Miranda rights.
As the majority correctly points out, finding a defendant mentally retarded does not preclude
him from validly waiving his Miranda rights. See Garner, 557 F.3d at 264–65 (Rogers, J., majority).
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However, the waiver inquiry is always fact-sensitive and dependent on the totality of the
circumstances—even more so in a case like this one. Id. In this instance, the evidence indicates that
Shields lacks basic life skills, is easily manipulated, and operates largely outside the realm of
common sense reasoning. Under such circumstances, Shields’ ability to mention Miranda by name
is not necessarily indicative of his grasp of the charges against him or his understanding of the
consequences of waiving his rights.2 Unfortunately, this Court has no basis on which to evaluate
Shields’ capacity to make a valid waiver, because the district court failed to make the necessary and
reasonable inquiries required to address the waiver issue.
The district court also should have taken Shields’ mental limitations into account when
Shields timely asked to wear street attire to his trial. Citing two prior cases from this Circuit, the
majority reasons that the district court was not obligated to significantly delay proceedings to
accommodate Shields’ last-minute request. See United States v. Brown, 367 F.3d 549, 553–54 (6th
Cir. 2004); United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758, 767 (6th Cir. 2011). However, Brown and
Williams are clearly distinguishable from the case before us, because neither of those cases involved
a mentally retarded defendant.
By contrast, in this case the district court was thoroughly aware that Shields’ mental
retardation may have rendered him slow to fully appreciate the nature and the seriousness of the
proceedings, including the effects his prison clothes might have on the jury’s impartiality. Rather
2
Of course, these findings also bear directly on the central factual dispute raised by the
defense—whether it was Defendant’s cousin, Sonny Shields, who was primarily responsible for
orchestrating the kidnapping and ultimately murdering Jerrell Lott.
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than accommodate Shields’ reasonable request, the district court instead offered the defense an even
more limited option than was granted by the courts in Brown and Williams. The district court’s
proposed solution—that Shields wear a sport coat over his prison uniform—was really no solution
at all. The court’s limited offer was insufficient to protect Shields’ right to an impartial jury,
particularly given that his request, though admittedly belated, was technically timely. Furthermore,
there was no substance to the district court’s contention that permitting a short recess to allow
Shields to change clothes would have significantly delayed the proceedings.
Finally, it is troubling that the escape charge was not severed from the rest of Shields’ trial.
At best, the evidence elicited on the escape count was minimal. Shields’ attempted “escape” was
childishly ill-planned and ill-thought out, which is perhaps unsurprising given his mental retardation.
While awaiting trial on the kidnapping and murder charges, Shields was segregated in a high-security
prison that allowed him one hour outdoors in an isolated pen housed within the prison’s recreation
yard. Shields and a fellow inmate pried loose the wire fence of their segregation pens, but they were
quickly apprehended clinging to the inner perimeter fence of the recreation yard. Even if Shields’
ineffective defense counsel unjustifiably waived its chance to request a severance of the escape
charge, its facts were obviously weak and entirely tertiary to the other issues at trial. The district
court should have been more vigilant in protecting Shields against the inclusion of this wholly
unrelated, but highly prejudicial charge. At a minimum, some inquiry by the district court with
respect to this issue would have been appropriate.
In any criminal trial, the presiding judge has an obligation to steward the proceedings in a
manner that takes into account the full range of facts before the court and that steers clear of obvious
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violations of the defendant’s constitutional rights. I cannot agree that Shields received this
consideration when the district court largely disregarded Shields’ mental deficiencies, shunted aside
its own detailed factual findings with respect to Shields’ mental retardation, and failed to take into
account the obvious inadequacies of the ineffective assistance defense counsel provided to the
defendant. Accordingly, and for the reasons discussed above, I respectfully dissent.
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