Moncibaez v. Stericycle, Inc. CA2/4 ( 2021 )


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  • Filed 12/8/21 Moncibaez v. Stericycle, Inc. CA2/4
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION FOUR
    ERIK MONCIBAEZ,                                                B304079
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                             (Los Angeles County
    Super. Ct. No. 19STCV25328)
    v.
    STERICYCLE, INC. et al.,
    Defendants and
    Appellants.
    APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
    Los Angeles County, Maureen Duffy-Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
    Littler Mendelson, Monica Martelli Quinn, Sara Ashley
    Zimmerman, Charles Cannizzaro for Defendants and Appellants.
    Reisner & King, Adam J. Reisner, Tessa M. King; Benedon
    & Serlin, Douglas G. Benedon and Kian Tamaddoni for Plaintiff
    and Respondent.
    INTRODUCTION
    Erik Moncibaez sued his employer, Stericycle, Inc., and
    others alleging sexual harassment, racial discrimination, and
    retaliation. Stericycle moved to compel arbitration, and
    presented an arbitration agreement that Moncibaez purportedly
    signed electronically when he began working for Stericycle.
    Stericycle also submitted a declaration stating that Moncibaez
    and his supervisor accessed and signed the document through an
    online portal. Moncibaez opposed the motion, asserting that
    although he “clicked through” several documents, he did not
    recall seeing or signing the arbitration agreement. He also noted
    that the signature line stated “Paul Moncibaez,” a version of
    Moncibaez’s name he did not typically use. The trial court denied
    the motion, finding that Stericycle failed to meet its burden to
    demonstrate an enforceable arbitration agreement. Stericycle
    appealed.
    We affirm. Stericycle did not authenticate Moncibaez’s
    electronic signature as required by Civil Code, section 1633.9,
    subdivision (a). Moncibaez and his supervisor both had access to
    the arbitration agreement, and Stericycle did not meet its burden
    to prove the electronic signature was “the act of” Moncibaez.
    Substantial evidence therefore supports the trial court’s ruling.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    A.     Complaint
    Moncibaez filed a complaint against Stericycle, district
    sales manager Joshua Amaya, and territory sales manager
    Matthew Toner on July 19, 2019. Moncibaez asserted seven
    causes of action for sexual harassment, racial discrimination,
    retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
    Moncibaez alleged that he began working as a sales executive for
    2
    Stericycle on July 10, 2017, and that he was still employed there.
    He alleged that Toner harassed him “by making graphic sexual,
    lewd, and crude comments to [Moncibaez] as a means of singling
    him out, for personal gratification and to demean and upset him.”
    Moncibaez complained to Amaya about Toner, but Amaya
    “pursued no remedial action,” harassed Moncibaez, and told
    Toner that Moncibaez had complained about him. Moncibaez
    further alleged that he spoke with Stericycle’s human resources
    department, but his concerns were “summarily disregarded.” In
    addition, Moncibaez alleged that although he was “generating
    more sales than all of the sales executives on his team,” he was
    written up for low performance and reassigned to a lower-
    producing sales territory. He alleged that after returning to work
    following a short illness in February 2019, he discovered that he
    had been locked out of his office and denied access to the
    company’s remote work computer system. Thereafter, Stericycle
    refused Moncibaez’s requests to return to work. Moncibaez
    requested actual damages, declaratory relief, injunctive relief,
    punitive damages, and attorney fees.
    Stericycle and Amaya answered the complaint; Toner was
    not served with the complaint and did not appear below.
    Hereafter, we refer to Stericycle and Amaya collectively as
    “defendants.”
    B.    Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration
    Defendants moved to compel arbitration and stay the
    superior court proceedings. Defendants asserted that on July 10,
    2017, Moncibaez signed an arbitration agreement. The three-
    page arbitration agreement attached to the motion stated that
    “any and all disputes, claims or controversies arising out of the
    employment relationship between the parties or the termination
    3
    of that relationship, shall be resolved by final and binding
    arbitration.” The arbitration agreement stated that it covered
    any claims by an employee against Stericycle or Stericycle
    employees, and it was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act
    (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1. It also stated that an employee receiving the
    agreement had 30 days to opt out of arbitration, and if no opt-out
    notice was received, the arbitration agreement “will become fully
    effective and binding upon the date” the agreement was signed.
    It further stated, “I acknowledge that I have carefully reviewed
    this agreement and that I understand that I have thirty (30) days
    to opt out of arbitration if I do not wish this agreement to apply
    to me.” The arbitration agreement had blank lines for the
    employee’s signature, a signature for Stericycle, and dates for
    each. The version attached to defendants’ motion to compel
    arbitration was blank; it had no dates or signatures.
    Defendants submitted the declaration of Amanda Beezley,
    Stericycle’s human resources compliance manager. She stated
    that she managed “Stericycle’s relations with its third-party
    vendor Red Carpet, the online portal utilized by Stericycle for
    maintenance and signature of employment-related documents.”
    Beezley stated that she had “administrative access to Red Carpet
    as it pertains to employees,” and therefore could “log on and view
    which documents have been signed. The only details I can see
    are things such as document title, date and time of access, and
    date and time of acknowledgement.” Regarding Moncibaez’s
    documents, Beezley attached a “screenshot entitled ‘Version
    History’ show[ing] the date(s) and time(s) the Arbitration
    Agreement was accessed, and by whom.” The screenshot had a
    section titled “ARBITRATION AGREEMENT,” and it had what
    appeared to be links to the arbitration agreement in English and
    4
    Spanish. Below the links, it stated, “I acknowledge that I have
    carefully reviewed this agreement and that I understand that I
    have thirty (30) days to opt out of arbitration if I do not wish this
    agreement to apply to me.” In the “Acknowledgement of Receipt”
    section, the employee signature line stated, “Paul Moncibaez
    (Electronically Signed),” with a date of July 11, 2017. The section
    for a Stericycle representative stated, “Chris Ramirez
    (Electronically Signed)” on the same date. Beezley explained that
    Ramirez was Moncibaez’s manager.
    A second portion of the screenshot page showed what
    Beezley described as “the date(s) and time(s) the Arbitration
    Agreement was accessed, and by whom.” The table included the
    following information:
    Version    Description   Label            Date         Publisher   Action
    4          Record of     Published        07/11/2017   Chris       View
    published     07/11/2017       12:46:41     Ramirez     Delete
    content       12:46:41                                  Rollback
    3          Record of     Published        07/11/2017   Chris       View
    published     07/11/2017       12:46:41     Ramirez     Delete
    content       12:46:41                                  Rollback
    2          Record of     Published        07/11/2017   Erik        View
    published     07/11/2017       12:25:02     Moncibaez   Delete
    content       12:25:02                                  Rollback
    1          Record of     Published        07/10/2017   Chris       View
    published     07/10/2017       11:53:33     Ramirez     Delete
    content       11:53:34                                  Rollback
    Beezely explained that this version history shows Moncibaez
    “electronically acknowledged the Arbitration Agreement at
    approximately 12:25:02 on July 11, 2017. The Arbitration
    Agreement also required signature by . . . manager Chris
    5
    Ramirez, which accounts for the additional entries on the Version
    History.”
    Defendants contended the arbitration agreement was valid
    and enforceable under the FAA and California law. They
    asserted that Moncibaez electronically signed the arbitration
    agreement, and defendants had properly authenticated his
    electronic signature. Defendants also argued that even if
    Moncibaez had not signed the arbitration agreement, “his
    continued employment constitutes an assent to be bound by the
    terms of the agreement.”
    Moncibaez opposed the motion, asserting that defendants
    failed to meet their burden to show that a valid arbitration
    agreement existed. Moncibaez submitted a declaration stating
    that he was not given the opportunity to review any documents
    before signing them, he did not recall signing the arbitration
    agreement, and he was not provided any opportunity to ask
    questions about the arbitration agreement. He stated that as his
    employment with Stericycle began, Ramirez asked Moncibaez “to
    complete some online forms at his desktop computer. I was asked
    to sit on a chair next to Supervisor Ramirez and use the computer
    at his desk to complete forms so that I could begin my training.”
    He continued, “I was not given the opportunity to review any of
    the documents before signing and have no recollection of ever
    seeing, much less agreeing to, the Arbitration Policy.” Moncibaez
    stated that he “felt rushed and forced to click through the online
    prompts,” while Ramirez “told me, ‘let’s get through this,’ urging
    me to hurry up and sign without reviewing the information.”
    Moncibaez further stated that although the arbitration
    agreement was purportedly signed by “Paul Moncibaez,” “I
    typically sign my name as ‘Erik Moncibaez’ and do not recall ever
    6
    typing ‘Paul Moncibaez’ on any Stericycle document.” He stated
    that he “solely completed the electronic forms under fear of losing
    an employment opportunity. As such, I did not execute the
    alleged agreement.” (Emphasis in original.)
    Moncibaez argued that defendants failed to establish the
    existence of a valid arbitration agreement, because there was no
    meeting of the minds. He further argued that the arbitration
    agreement was substantively and procedurally unconscionable.
    In their reply, defendants asserted that Moncibaez failed to
    refute the existence of a binding arbitration agreement.
    Defendants also argued that the arbitration agreement was not
    unconscionable. They did not submit any additional evidence.
    C.     Hearing and ruling
    At the hearing on the motion, the parties briefly argued
    their positions. The court stated that the arbitration agreement
    “does not, to the court, appear to be unconscionable. There’s no
    sort of stance of unconscionability, at best a small amount of
    procedural unconscionability.” The court continued, “[B]ut
    there’s a question there if there’s a contract at all. Therein lies
    the rub.” The court therefore stated that “the defendant fails to
    meet their burden and this motion is denied.” Defense counsel
    argued again that there was a valid agreement, and asserted that
    the electronic signature was valid. The court stated, “I thought
    there was a lot of hearsay from the defense’s argument, and that
    signed document, that’s questionable to the court.” The court
    also stated, “There wasn’t any testimony that the plaintiff was
    told about what he could or could not do also. This may just fall
    into that narrow trough of I still don’t think you’re carrying your
    burden. [¶] I know what the state of the law is, and in some
    circumstances, I would be willing to find for the defense in this
    7
    regard, but in this instance, I’m uncomfortable doing that.” In its
    minute order, the court stated, “The Motion to Compel
    arbitration and to stay Judicial proceedings . . . is Denied.
    Defendant fails to meet the burden of proof.”
    Defendants timely appealed. (Code Civ. Proc, § 1294.)
    DISCUSSION
    Defendants contend that “the only issue on appeal is the
    existence of an agreement to arbitrate.” They assert that
    Moncibaez “admitted to signing the Agreement,” and “as a matter
    of law, a valid contract existed between [Moncibaez] and
    Stericycle.” Moncibaez contends that he did not sign the
    agreement, and asserts that defendants did not carry their
    burden to show the existence of an enforceable agreement.
    Where the trial court resolved contested issues of fact in deciding
    a motion to compel arbitration, such as whether an arbitration
    agreement existed, we review the court’s factual findings for
    substantial evidence. (See Luxor Cabs, Inc. v. Applied
    Underwriters Captive Risk Assurance Co. (2018) 
    30 Cal.App.5th 970
    , 977.)1
    1 As Moncibaez points out, some courts hold that when a
    trial court’s order denying a motion to compel arbitration is based
    on the court’s finding that the moving party failed to carry its
    burden of proof, the question for the reviewing court is whether
    that finding is erroneous as a matter of law. (See, e.g., Fabian v.
    Renovate America, Inc. (2019) 
    42 Cal.App.5th 1062
    , 1066
    (Fabian); Garcia v. KND Development 52, LLC (2020) 
    58 Cal.App.5th 736
    , 744.) We do not address this discrepancy in the
    case law; the outcome here would be the same under either
    standard.
    8
    “[W]hen a petition to compel arbitration is filed and
    accompanied by prima facie evidence of a written agreement to
    arbitrate the controversy, the court . . . must determine whether
    the agreement exists and, if any defense to its enforcement is
    raised, whether it is enforceable. Because the existence of the
    agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the
    petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a
    preponderance of the evidence.” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin.
    Securities Corp. (1996) 
    14 Cal.4th 394
    , 413; see also Engalla v.
    Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 
    15 Cal.4th 951
    , 972.)
    Parties moving to compel arbitration “may meet their
    initial burden to show an agreement to arbitrate by attaching a
    copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the
    opposing party’s signature.” (Espejo v. Southern California
    Permanente Medical Group (2016) 
    246 Cal.App.4th 1047
    , 1060
    (Espejo).) If the opposing party challenges the validity of that
    signature, however, the moving party must “establish by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the signature was authentic.”
    (Ibid.)
    Here, the court found the “signed document” to be
    “questionable,” and held that defendants failed to carry their
    burden. Defendants say little on the issue of authentication in
    their opening brief, asserting instead that Moncibaez “admitted
    to signing the Agreement because he clicked through the online
    prompts and completed the electronic forms.” Moncibaez,
    however, notes that he stated in his declaration that he “did not
    execute” the arbitration agreement, he had no recollection of ever
    seeing the arbitration agreement, he typically signs his name
    “Erik Moncibaez,” and he did not recall typing the name “Paul
    Moncibaez” on any Stericycle documents. Moncibaez asserts that
    9
    Beezley’s “conclusory statement” in her declaration that
    Moncibaez signed the agreement is insufficient to meet
    defendants’ burden to authenticate the signature. In their reply
    brief, defendants assert that Beezley’s declaration met the
    requirements to authenticate the electronic signature.
    Civil Code section 1633.9 governs the authentication of
    electronic signatures. It states, in full, “(a) An electronic record
    or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act
    of the person. The act of the person may be shown in any
    manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security
    procedure applied to determine the person to which the electronic
    record or electronic signature was attributable. [¶] (b) The effect
    of an electronic record or electronic signature attributed to a
    person under subdivision (a) is determined from the context and
    surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation, execution,
    or adoption, including the parties’ agreement, if any, and
    otherwise as provided by law.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9.)
    Thus, to authenticate an electronic signature, the
    proponent of the evidence must show that the electronic
    signature “was the act of the person.” (Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd.
    (a).) Case law indicates that to meet this burden, the proponent
    of the evidence must show that the purported signatory—rather
    than another person—completed the act of electronically signing
    the document.
    Moncibaez compares this case to Ruiz v. Moss Bros. Auto
    Group, Inc. (2014) 
    232 Cal.App.4th 836
     (Ruiz), in which an
    employee, Ruiz, filed a wage and hour action against his
    employer, Moss Bros., which then moved to compel arbitration.
    (Id. at pp. 838-839.) The business manager of Moss Bros., Main,
    submitted a declaration in which she “summarily asserted that
    10
    Ruiz ‘electronically signed’ the 2011 agreement ‘on or about
    September 21, 2011,’” but “Main did not explain how Moss Bros.
    verified that Ruiz . . . electronically signed the 2011 agreement.”
    (Id. at p. 839.) In his opposition to the motion, “Ruiz argued that
    Main’s ‘conclusory statement’ that he electronically signed the
    2011 agreement was ‘not enough to prove by a preponderance of
    the evidence’ that he did, in fact, electronically sign the
    agreement. In his opposing declaration, Ruiz averred he did not
    recall signing any arbitration agreement on September 21, 2011,
    or at any other time, and if he had been presented with an
    agreement that limited his ability to sue Moss Bros. he would not
    have signed it.” (Id. at p. 840.) With the reply, Main submitted a
    second declaration, which explained, “Each employee is required
    to log into the Company’s HR system—each with his or her
    unique login ID and password—to review and electronically
    execute the Employee Acknowledgement form, which includes the
    arbitration agreement. While all employees are required to sign
    the form, they are free to review it at their leisure while logged
    into the HR system.” (Id. at pp. 840-841.) The Court of Appeal
    noted, “Still, Main did not indicate whether or if so how Moss
    Bros. ascertained that Ruiz electronically signed, or was the
    person who electronically signed, the employee acknowledgement
    form, including the 2011 agreement.” (Id. at p. 841.) The trial
    court held that Moss Bros. failed to establish that an agreement
    existed, and Moss Bros. appealed. (Ibid.)
    The Court of Appeal affirmed on the basis that “Moss Bros.
    did not present sufficient evidence to support a finding that the
    electronic signature on the 2011 agreement was the act of Ruiz.”
    (Ruiz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 842.) The court discussed
    authentication under Civil Code section 1633.9, and found that
    11
    Main’s declarations were insufficient to meet that standard.
    “Main summarily asserted in her initial declaration that Ruiz
    was the person who electronically signed the 2011 agreement . . .
    but she did not explain how she arrived at that conclusion or
    inferred Ruiz was the person who electronically signed the 2011
    agreement. . . . Main never explained how Ruiz’s printed
    electronic signature, or the date and time printed next to the
    signature, came to be placed on the 2011 agreement.” (Id. at pp.
    843-844.) Main explained that each employee logged into the
    company’s computer system “using his or her ‘unique login ID
    and password,’ to review and sign the employee acknowledgment
    form. Again, however, Main did not explain how, or upon what
    basis, she inferred that the electronic signature on the 2011
    agreement was ‘the act of’ Ruiz.” (Id. at p. 844.) The court
    continued, “In the face of Ruiz’s failure to recall electronically
    signing the 2011 agreement, the fact the 2011 agreement had an
    electronic signature on it in the name of Ruiz, and a date and
    time stamp for the signature, was insufficient to support a
    finding that the electronic signature was, in fact, ‘the act of’
    Ruiz.” (Ibid.)
    Moncibaez also relies on Fabian, supra, 
    42 Cal.App.5th 1062
    , in which a homeowner, Fabian, alleged problems with the
    installation of solar panels in her home. The defendant,
    Renovate, sought to compel arbitration based on a purported
    contract with Fabian; it submitted a contract bearing electronic
    initials and an electronic signature. (Id. at p. 1064-1065.)
    Fabian stated in a declaration that she did not sign any contract,
    and all of her communications with Renovate had been completed
    by phone. (Id. at p. 1065.) The parties conducted discovery
    regarding whether Fabian signed a contract. (Id. at p. 1066.)
    12
    Fabian maintained that she did not sign a contract, and Renovate
    stated that Fabian signed the document through DocuSign.
    (Ibid.) The trial court denied Renovate’s motion to compel
    arbitration.
    The Court of Appeal affirmed. The court rejected
    Renovate’s contention that “the Contract bearing Fabian’s
    electronic initials and signature is authenticated by DocuSign.
    Standing alone, that fact is not sufficient to compel a result in
    Renovate’s favor as a matter of law.” (Fabian, supra, 42
    Cal.App.5th at p. 1068.) The court noted that “Renovate offered
    no evidence about the process used to verify Fabian’s electronic
    signature via DocuSign,” including how the contract was
    provided to Fabian or “how Fabian’s identification was verified as
    the person who actually signed the Contract.” (Id. at p. 1069.)
    The declarations submitted by Anderson, a Renovate employee,
    did not fill the evidentiary gap; Anderson did not discuss how the
    contract was presented to Fabian, explain “the process used to
    obtain and verify Fabian’s ‘docusigned’ electronic initials and
    signature,” or state “how the electronic signature could have only
    been placed on the Contract by Fabian.” (Id. at pp. 1069-1070.)
    The court stated, “Most importantly, Anderson did not explain
    how Fabian’s electronic initials and signature were the ‘act of
    Fabian’ by offering evidence that DocuSign assigned Fabian a
    unique ‘identity verification code’ to initial and sign the
    Contract.” (Id. at p. 1070.)
    In another recent case, Bannister v. Marinidence Opco,
    LLC (2021) 
    64 Cal.App.5th 541
     (Bannister), the plaintiff,
    Bannister, was an employee of a skilled nursing facility that was
    purchased by the defendant, Marinidence. Bannister sued for
    employment-related claims, and Marinidence moved to compel
    13
    arbitration, attaching an arbitration agreement Bannister
    purportedly signed during an onboarding process after
    Marinidence took over the facility. (Id. at p.544.) To
    authenticate the electronic signature, Marinidence presented
    evidence that “[t]o access the online onboarding portal, an
    individual must enter an employee’s first and last name and
    Social Security number, in addition to entering Marinidence’s
    ‘Client ID’ and pin code (the same ‘Client ID’ and pin code for all
    employees). . . . Based on these requirements, according to
    Marinidence, the electronic signature on the arbitration
    agreement could only have been placed there by Bannister.” (Id.
    at p. 546.) Bannister, however, said that 20 or more employees
    were onboarded the same day by a Marinidence manager, who
    entered information into a laptop computer as employees
    answered questions. “No employee-specific user names or
    passwords were required to access the onboarding portal, and
    each employee’s Social Security number was available in the
    employee’s personnel file.” [The manager] did not inform
    Bannister or the other employees about an arbitration
    agreement. According to Bannister, she never saw the
    arbitration agreement and never clicked ‘I agree’ or otherwise
    signed the arbitration agreement during the onboarding process.”
    (Bannister, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 546 .) The trial court
    denied Marinidence’s motion to compel arbitration.
    The Court of Appeal affirmed, stating, “Substantial
    evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Marinidence
    failed to authenticate the electronic signature on the arbitration
    agreement as Bannister’s. Marinidence’s evidence did not
    establish that Bannister was assigned a unique, private user
    name and password such that she is the only person who could
    14
    have accessed the onboarding portal and signed the agreement;
    instead, the evidence showed that the requisite ‘Client ID’ and
    PIN code was not employee-specific, and [the manager] had
    access to the information necessary to access the onboarding
    portal via employee personnel records.” (Bannister, supra, 64
    Cal.App.5th at p. 547.) The appellate court stated that it would
    not disturb the trial court’s finding that Bannister’s version of
    events was more credible, and “[b]ecause Bannister’s evidence
    showed that she was not the only person who could have executed
    the arbitration agreement, we disagree that the trial court
    committed any legal error.” (Id. at p.548.)
    By contrast, in Espejo, supra, 
    246 Cal.App.4th 1047
    , this
    court held that the defendant employer, SCPMG, did sufficiently
    authenticate the electronic signature of the plaintiff employee,
    Dr. Espejo. This court stated that SCPMG’s declarant, Tellez,
    “concluded that the ‘[plaintiff’s] name . . . could have only been
    placed on the signature pages of the employment agreement and
    the DRP [dispute resolution procedure] by someone using Dr.
    Espejo’s unique user name and password. . . . [¶] Given this
    process for signing documents and protecting the privacy of the
    information with unique and private user names and passwords,
    the electronic signature was made by Dr. Espejo’ on the
    employment agreement and the DRP at the date, time, and IP
    address listed on the documents. These details satisfactorily
    meet the requirements articulated in Ruiz and establish that the
    electronic signature on the DRP was ‘the act of’ Espejo (Civ.
    Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a)), and therefore provide the necessary
    factual details to properly authenticate the document.” (Espejo,
    supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1062.)
    15
    Here, the evidence shows Moncibaez was not the only
    person who had access to, and could have signed, the arbitration
    agreement. As Beezley stated in her declaration, Ramirez
    accessed the document three times on July 10 and 11, 2017. The
    notations about access do not state that a signature was entered
    or that any other changes were made; each entry simply states
    that the document was “published” at a certain time. Beezley
    stated that “in the ordinary and usual course of business,
    prospective talent and employees are prompted to create a unique
    password upon initial login [to Stericycle’s online portal] so as to
    maintain security of their electronic documents.” However,
    Beezley did not state that a unique username and password was
    the only way to access the arbitration agreement, thus
    demonstrating that the electronic signature was “the act of”
    Moncibaez alone. To the contrary, Ramirez also had access to the
    document: he accessed it once before Moncibaez, and twice
    afterward. Moreover, the signature on the arbitration agreement
    reads “Paul Moncibaez,” a name Monciabaez states that he does
    not typically use, suggesting that he may not have been the
    person to enter his name into the online form. Because two
    people accessed the document, Moncibaez does not typically use
    the name entered on the form, and Moncibaez stated that he did
    not recall signing it, substantial evidence supports the court’s
    finding that defendants failed to meet their burden of
    authenticating the electronic signature as “the act of” Moncibaez.
    Defendants argue Moncibaez “supplied a litany of facts and
    admissions indicating that he had signed the Arbitration
    Agreement.” They cite Moncibaez’s statements that he was not
    allowed to review any documents “before signing,” and that he
    felt rushed as he clicked through the documents with Ramirez
    16
    looking on. However, it was defendants’ burden to prove the
    existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement by
    authenticating the purported electronic signature. We are not
    persuaded by defendants’ contentions that Moncibaez’s
    declaration was insufficient to contradict defendants’ evidence, or
    that the court should have afforded greater weight to certain
    statements in Moncibaez’s declaration. Under substantial
    evidence review, we neither judge the credibility of witnesses nor
    reweigh the evidence. (See Fabian, supra, 42 Cal. App.5th at p.
    1067.)
    Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s holding that
    defendants failed to authenticate the electronic signature, and
    therefore did not establish the existence of an enforceable
    arbitration agreement. We do not reach defendants’ remaining
    arguments about the enforceability of the agreement.
    DISPOSITION
    The trial court’s order denying defendants’ motion to
    compel arbitration is affirmed. Moncibaez is entitled to costs on
    appeal.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    COLLINS, J.
    We concur:
    MANELLA, P. J.
    CURREY, J.
    17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B304079

Filed Date: 12/8/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/8/2021