Ernest Falls v. Mark Goins ( 2021 )


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  •                                                                                               12/21/2021
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT NASHVILLE
    October 5, 2021 Session
    ERNEST FALLS ET AL. V. MARK GOINS ET AL.
    Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County
    No. 20-0704-III   Ellen Hobbs Lyle, Chancellor
    No. M2020-01510-COA-R3-CV
    This case concerns the restoration of voting rights of a Tennessee citizen who was
    convicted of a felony in Virginia and subsequently granted clemency by the Governor of
    Virginia. Because the voting applicant did not provide evidence that he paid outstanding
    court costs, restitution, and/or child support as is required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-
    202, the election commission denied his application to vote. The voting applicant appealed
    the election commission’s decision to the circuit court. The circuit court upheld the
    election commission’s decision as valid. We agree with the trial court and affirm the trial
    court’s judgment.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed
    ANDY D. BENNETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT,
    JR., P.J., M.S., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, J., joined.
    William L. Harbison, Lisa K. Helton, and Christopher C. Sabis, Nashville, Tennessee, and
    Danielle Marie Lang, Blair Bowie, and Caleb Jackson, Washington, D.C., for the appellant,
    Ernest Falls.
    Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, Andrée Blumstein, Solicitor
    General, Janet Irene M. Kleinfelter, Deputy Attorney General, and Alexander S. Rieger,
    Assistant Attorney General, for the appellees, Mark Goins, in his official capacity as
    Coordinator of Elections for the State of Tennessee, Tre Hargett, in his official capacity as
    Secretary of State of the State of Tennessee, and Herbert Slatery, III, in his official capacity
    as the Attorney General for the State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    In 1986, Ernest Falls was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in Virginia. He
    served his sentence and was released from prison in 1987. Mr. Falls relocated to Grainger
    County, Tennessee in 2018. In February 2020, the Governor of Virginia restored his rights
    of citizenship in Virginia. The document restoring Mr. Falls’s rights states:
    COMMONWEALTH of VIRGINIA
    Executive Department
    TO ALL WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME – GREETINGS
    WHEREAS, Ernest L. Falls after being convicted and sentenced for
    crime(s) committed prior to January 14, 2020, when the Executive completed
    review of the particulars of the individual’s case; and
    WHEREAS, Ernest L. Falls, by reason of conviction(s), suffers
    political disabilities, to wit denial of the right to vote, to hold public office,
    to serve on a jury, to be a notary public and to ship, transport, possess or
    receive firearms; and
    WHEREAS, it appears that Ernest L. Falls has rejoined society free
    from state supervision and it seems appropriate to the Executive to remove
    certain of those political disabilities by restoring the right to vote, hold public
    office, serve on a jury, and to be a notary public;
    NOW, THEREFORE, I, Ralph S. Northam, Governor of the
    Commonwealth of Virginia, by virtue of the authority vested in me, do
    hereby remove the political disabilities, except the ability to ship, transport,
    possess or receive firearms, under which Ernest L. Falls labors by reason of
    conviction as aforesaid, and do hereby restore the rights to vote, hold public
    office, serve on a jury, and to be a notary public.
    On June 4, 2020, Mr. Falls attempted to register to vote in Tennessee and disclosed
    his 1986 felony conviction. The Grainger County Administrator of Elections denied his
    registration because Mr. Falls failed to provide evidence that he owes no fees or restitution
    for his Virginia conviction.1
    1
    There is no evidence in the record that Mr. Falls actually owes any fees, restitution, or child support;
    however, he has not provided evidence that he does not owe any of these financial obligations.
    -2-
    On July 21, 2020, Mr. Falls and Arthur Bledsoe, a Tennessee citizen who had been
    convicted of a felony in North Carolina,2 filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory and
    Injunctive Relief against state officials, Mark Goins, Tre Hargett, and Herbert Slatery, III
    in their official capacities as Tennessee’s Coordinator of Elections, Secretary of State, and
    the Attorney General, respectively (collectively referred to as “Defendants”). The trial
    court entered a memorandum and order denying the motion for temporary injunction,
    finding that Mr. Falls had not demonstrated a “substantial likelihood of success on the
    merits.” On August 21, 2020, Mr. Falls filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that
    his full rights of citizenship had been restored by the Governor of Virginia, as required by
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3), and therefore, he was entitled to vote in Tennessee. He
    asserted that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202, a statute requiring disenfranchised voters to
    pay restitution, court costs, and any outstanding child support, did not apply to him.
    Defendants filed their response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment
    asserting that until Mr. Falls provided evidence of compliance with the re-enfranchisement
    provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202, he was not entitled to vote in Tennessee.
    The chancery court denied Mr. Falls’s motion for summary judgment but granted
    summary judgment to Defendants upon its conclusion that Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202
    requires that Mr. Falls “must pay the court costs and restitution associated with [his]
    criminal conviction[] before [he is] eligible to vote in Tennessee.” The trial court noted
    that “[r]equiring the Plaintiffs to comply with the laws of this state, including complying
    with child support obligations, restitution orders, and other court orders, is both rational
    and constitutional.” Mr. Falls appeals raising the following issue for our review:
    Whether Appellant Ernest Falls has been unlawfully denied the right to vote
    under the Tennessee Constitution Art. I, § 5 and Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-
    143(3)—which states that Tennesseans convicted of felonies in other states
    are disenfranchised unless they have their full rights of citizenship restored
    by the governor of the state of conviction, by the law of the state of
    conviction, or under the law of Tennessee—where Appellant Falls only has
    a felony conviction from Virginia and has had his full rights of citizenship
    restored by the Governor of Virginia.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This appeal arises from the grant of summary judgment by the trial court. We
    review a trial court’s summary judgment determination de novo, with no presumption of
    correctness. Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 
    477 S.W.3d 235
    , 250 (Tenn.
    2015). This means that “we make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of
    Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied.” 
    Id.
     Summary
    judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
    2
    Mr. Bledsoe has not joined in this appeal; therefore, this Opinion will focus solely on Mr. Falls.
    -3-
    admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
    as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
    law.” TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.04.
    In this case, the parties agree that there are no factual disputes. Rather, the dispute
    hinges on statutory construction and application of the statutes to the undisputed facts of
    Mr. Falls’s situation. “The proper interpretation of a statute is an issue of law that may
    commonly be decided on summary judgment.” Najo Equip. Leasing, LLC v. Comm’r of
    Revenue, 
    477 S.W.3d 763
    , 766 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015). Our review of the construction and
    application of statutes is de novo, affording no deference or presumption of correctness to
    the decision of the lower court. Heirs of Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 
    71 S.W.3d 705
    , 710 (Tenn.
    2002).
    Our Supreme Court has explained that when interpreting a statute, we must
    “‘ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly restricting or expanding
    [the] statute’s coverage beyond its intended scope.’” Memphis Publ’g Co. v. Cherokee
    Child. & Fam. Servs., Inc., 
    87 S.W.3d 67
    , 74 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting Owens v. State, 
    908 S.W.2d 923
    , 926 (Tenn. 1995)). When determining legislative intent, “we first must look
    to the text of the statute and give the words of the statute ‘their natural and ordinary
    meaning in the context in which they appear and in light of the statute’s general purpose.’”
    Coleman v. Olson, 
    551 S.W.3d 686
    , 694 (Tenn. 2018) (quoting Mills v. Fulmarque, Inc.,
    
    360 S.W.3d 362
    , 368 (Tenn. 2012)). We need not consider sources of information outside
    the text of the statute when the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. 
    Id.
     (citing
    Frazier v. State, 
    495 S.W.3d 246
    , 249 (Tenn. 2016)). However, “statutes should not be
    interpreted in isolation. The overall statutory framework must be considered, and ‘[s]tatutes
    that relate to the same subject matter or have a common purpose must be read in pari
    materia so as to give the intended effect to both.’” Coffee Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. City of
    Tullahoma, 
    574 S.W.3d 832
    , 846 (Tenn. 2019) (quoting In re Kaliyah S., 
    455 S.W.3d 533
    ,
    552 (Tenn. 2015)). When “resolving potential conflicts between statutes, courts seek a
    reasonable construction which avoids statutory conflict and provides for harmonious
    operation of the laws.” O’Neal v. Goins, No. M2015-01337-COA-R3-CV, 
    2016 WL 4083466
    , at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July, 29 2016) (citing LensCrafters Inc. v. Sundquist, 
    33 S.W.3d 772
    , 777 (Tenn. 2000)). Furthermore, when two statutes exist on the same topic,
    “the more specific of two conflicting statutory provisions controls.” Tennessean v. Metro.
    Gov’t of Nashville, 
    485 S.W.3d 857
    , 872 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Graham v. Caples, 
    325 S.W.3d 578
    , 582 (Tenn. 2010)); see also Cont’l Tenn. Lines, Inc. v. McCanless, 
    354 S.W.2d 57
    , 58-59 (Tenn. 1962) (quoting Wade v. Manning, 
    28 S.W.2d 642
    , 649 (Tenn.
    1930)) (“‘Specific provisions relating to a particular subject must govern in respect to that
    subject, as against general provisions in other parts of the law which might be broad enough
    to include it.’”). Finally, “a more recent enactment will take precedence over a prior one
    to the extent of any inconsistency between the two.” Moorcroft v. Stuart, No. M2013-
    02295-COA-R3-CV, 
    2015 WL 413094
    , at *10 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2015). With these
    principles in mind, we turn to the substance of the appeal.
    -4-
    ANALYSIS
    We begin with the Constitution of the State of Tennessee which states that “the right
    of suffrage . . . shall never be denied to any person entitled thereto, except upon a conviction
    by a jury of some infamous crime, previously ascertained and declared by law, and
    judgment thereon by court of competent jurisdiction.” TENN. CONST. art. I, § 5.3 The
    Tennessee Constitution further provides that every voter who meets constitutional
    qualifications “shall be entitled to vote in all federal, state, and local elections held in the
    county or district in which such person resides” except that “[l]aws may be passed
    excluding from the right of suffrage persons who may be convicted of infamous crimes.”
    Id. at IV, §§ 1, 2. Under the Tennessee Constitution, suffrage is a “self-executing”
    constitutional right; however, the legislature is empowered to curtail the right of suffrage
    when a person has been convicted of an infamous crime. Crutchfield v. Collins, 
    607 S.W.2d 478
    , 481 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980). “[A] state may constitutionally disenfranchise
    convicted felons, . . . and . . . the right of felons to vote is not fundamental.” Wesley v.
    Collins, 
    791 F.2d 1255
    , 1261 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Johnson v. Bredesen, 
    624 F.3d 742
    ,
    746 (6th Cir. 2010) (reiterating that felons who lose their right to vote no longer have a
    “fundamental interest [in voting] to assert”).
    The Tennessee Legislature has exercised its authority to disenfranchise persons
    convicted of “infamous” crimes and has also enacted laws to restore the right to vote to
    some citizens with such convictions. Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-112
    considers infamous crimes to include “any felony” conviction. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-
    112 (“Upon conviction for any felony, it shall be the judgment of the court that the
    defendant be infamous and be immediately disqualified from exercising the right of
    suffrage.”). Subsection (3) of Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143 concerns the right of suffrage
    for persons convicted of out-of-state infamous crimes and states:
    (3) No person who has been convicted in another state of a crime or
    offense which would constitute an infamous crime under the laws of this
    state, regardless of the sentence imposed, shall be allowed to register to vote
    or vote at any election in this state unless such person has been pardoned or
    restored to the rights of citizenship by the governor or other appropriate
    authority of such other state, or the person’s full rights of citizenship have
    otherwise been restored in accordance with the laws of such other state, or
    the law of this state.
    3
    The United States Constitution allows for disenfranchisement for “participation in rebellion, or other
    crimes.” U.S. CONST., amend XIV, § 2; Richardson v. Ramirez, 
    418 U.S. 24
    , 54 (1974) (“[T]he exclusion
    of felons from the vote has an affirmative sanction in s 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
    -5-
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3). Accordingly, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-112
    and Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143, any person convicted of a felony is disenfranchised in
    Tennessee until the franchise is restored.4
    There is no dispute that Mr. Falls was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in
    Virginia, a felony that constitutes an infamous crime in Tennessee. His loss of voting rights
    survives his sentence and remains in effect until his right of suffrage is restored. It is also
    undisputed that Mr. Falls was disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage when he
    moved to Tennessee in 2018. The central question in this appeal is whether, pursuant to
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3), Mr. Falls was immediately re-enfranchised in Tennessee
    when the Governor of Virginia restored his Virginia citizenship rights in 2020, or whether
    he is subject to the additional preconditions to re-enfranchisement established by Tenn.
    Code Ann. § 40-29-202(b) and (c).
    In 2006, the General Assembly enacted Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-29-201 to -205,
    providing a voting-rights-restoration pathway to “any person who has been disqualified
    from exercising” the right to vote due to being convicted of an infamous crime if he or she
    meets certain criteria.5 Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-201(a). Tennessee Code Annotated
    section 40-29-201(a) states in full that the “provisions and procedures of this part shall
    apply to and govern restoration of the right of suffrage in this state to any person who has
    been disqualified from exercising that right by reason of a conviction in any state or federal
    court of an infamous crime.”6 Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-202 states:
    (a) A person rendered infamous and deprived of the right of suffrage by the
    judgment of any state or federal court is eligible to apply for a voter
    registration card and have the right of suffrage restored upon:
    4
    We note that there is a gap in Tennessee’s disenfranchisement history in which persons convicted of
    an infamous crime between January 15, 1973 and May 17, 1981 are not deprived of the right to vote. See
    Crutchfield v. Collins, 
    607 S.W.2d 478
    , 481 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); see also Restoration of Voting Rights,
    TENNESSEE SECRETARY OF STATE, https://sos.tn.gov/elections/guides/restoration-voting-rights (last
    accessed Dec. 13, 2021).
    5
    Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-29-201 to -205 were ostensibly adopted to “streamline and
    standardize” felony disenfranchisement laws and to eliminate “any requirement that a person seeking
    [voting] restoration petition for that right and litigate the issue in court.” Voting Rights Restoration Efforts
    in Tennessee, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
    work/research-reports/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-tennessee; See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-29-201 to -
    204 (providing a pathway for persons rendered infamous to petition the circuit court for restoration of their
    right to vote).
    6
    Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-204 provides a list of certain persons with criminal
    convictions that will “never be eligible to register and vote in this state” including, inter alia, those
    convicted for voter fraud, treason, murder in the first degree, or aggravated rape.
    -6-
    (1) Receiving a pardon, except where the pardon contains special
    conditions pertaining to the right of suffrage;
    (2) The discharge from custody by reason of service or expiration of
    the maximum sentence imposed by the court for the infamous crime;
    or
    (3) Being granted a certificate of final discharge from supervision by
    the board of parole pursuant to § 40-28-105, or any equivalent
    discharge by another state, the federal government, or county
    correction authority.
    (b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a person shall not be eligible to apply for
    a voter registration card and have the right of suffrage restored, unless the
    person:
    (1) Has paid all restitution to the victim or victims of the offense
    ordered by the court as part of the sentence; and
    (2) Beginning September 1, 2010, notwithstanding subsection (a), a
    person shall not be eligible to apply for a voter registration card and
    have the right of suffrage restored, unless the person has paid all court
    costs assessed against the person at the conclusion of the person’s
    trial, except where the court has made a finding at an evidentiary
    hearing that the applicant is indigent at the time of application.
    (c) Notwithstanding subsection (a), a person shall not be eligible to apply for
    a voter registration card and have the right of suffrage restored, unless the
    person is current in all child support obligations.
    We must apply Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202
    to the case at hand keeping in mind that “‘[s]tatutes that relate to the same subject matter
    or have a common purpose must be read in pari materia so as to give the intended effect
    to both.’” Coffee Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 574 S.W.3d at 846 (quoting In re Kaliyah S., 455
    S.W.3d at 552). These statutes both relate to the restoration of an out-of-state felon’s right
    to vote. Mr. Falls insists that Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3) functioned to automatically
    restore his right to vote once his citizenship rights were restored in Virginia. However,
    adopting Mr. Falls’s interpretation would require us to ignore another section of the code
    that our legislature implemented to “govern restoration of the right of suffrage in this state.”
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-201(a). We must read the two statutes in pari materia rather
    than in isolation.
    Mr. Falls is now a citizen of the state of Tennessee. Tennessee is empowered to
    legislate different standards than other states for restoration of its citizens’ rights to vote.
    When Mr. Falls moved to Tennessee in 2018, he was disqualified from voting in Tennessee
    because of his Virginia conviction: “No person who has been convicted in another state of
    a crime or offense which would constitute an infamous crime under the laws of this state,
    regardless of the sentence imposed, shall be allowed to register to vote or vote at any
    election in this state.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3). Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §
    -7-
    40-20-201, he is, regardless of his Virginia pardon in 2020, a “person who has been
    disqualified from exercising [the right to vote] by reason of a conviction in any state or
    federal court of an infamous crime.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-201. Therefore, the
    procedures and provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202 apply to him. Those
    procedures impose preconditions to the restoration of a convicted felon’s voting rights
    related to the satisfaction of certain court-ordered financial obligations. Specifically, Mr.
    Falls was required to confirm he had paid restitution and court costs related to his
    conviction as well as to show he was current on child support obligations. “Tennessee
    possesses valid interests in promoting payment of child support, requiring criminals to
    fulfill their sentences, and encouraging compliance with court orders.” Johnson, 624 F.3d
    at 747. It is undisputed that Mr. Falls has not provided evidence that these financial
    obligations have been satisfied, and therefore he is not eligible to vote in Tennessee until
    he does so.
    We have reviewed the caselaw Mr. Falls cites in support of his assertion that Tenn.
    Code Ann. § 2-19-143(3) operated to immediately re-enfranchise him such that he was not
    subject to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202, and we are not persuaded that the cases he cites
    operate to vitiate the additional re-enfranchisement requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-
    29-202. Indeed, none of the cases he cites—Burdine v. Kennon, 
    209 S.W.2d 9
     (Tenn.
    1948); Crutchfield v. Collins, 
    607 S.W.2d 478
     (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980); Gaskin v. Collins,
    
    661 S.W.2d 865
     (Tenn. 1983)—involve the interplay between and applicability of the
    statutes at issue in this case. While these cases do stand for the proposition that our general
    assembly must specifically enact legislation before persons convicted of infamous crimes
    are disenfranchised or re-enfranchised, our legislature has done so via Tenn. Code Ann. §§
    40-20-112; 2-19-143; and 40-29-202. We cannot put Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143 into a
    silo and ignore subsequent legislative enactments regarding re-enfranchisement. Because
    we must construe the statutes in pari materia and harmoniously, with more recent
    enactments taking precedence, we hold that the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-
    29-201 to -205 supplement the provisions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 2-19-143 by providing
    additional requirements for the reinstatement of voting rights for convicted felons
    regardless of their state of conviction. See Coffee Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 574 S.W.3d at 846;
    O’Neal, 
    2016 WL 4083466
    , at *4. The additional prerequisites outlined in Tenn. Code
    Ann. § 40-29-202 apply to Mr. Falls, and he cannot be re-enfranchised until he provides
    evidence that he has paid court-ordered restitution and costs related to his crimes (if
    applicable) and has satisfied his child support obligation (if any exists).
    -8-
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s entry of summary judgment to
    the Defendants. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the appellant, Ernest Falls, for
    which execution may issue if necessary.
    _/s/ Andy D. Bennett________________
    ANDY D. BENNETT, JUDGE
    -9-