Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp. , 858 F.3d 996 ( 2017 )


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    Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
    File Name: 17a0117p.06
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    LIVINGSTON CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS,                             ┐
    Plaintiff-Appellant,     │
    │
    >      No. 16-2060
    v.                                                 │
    │
    │
    GENOA CHARTER TOWNSHIP,                                   │
    Defendant-Appellee.       │
    ┘
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
    No. 2:15-cv-12793—George C. Steeh, District Judge.
    Argued: April 26, 2017
    Decided and Filed: June 2, 2017
    Before: MERRITT, GILMAN, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
    _________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Robert K. Kelner, COVINGTON & BURLING, LLP, Washington, D.C., for
    Appellant. T. Joseph Seward, SEWARD PECK & HENDERSON, Royal Oak, Michigan, for
    Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert K. Kelner, COVINGTON & BURLING, LLP, Washington,
    D.C., Hiram S. Sasser III, Stephanie N. Taub, FIRST LIBERTY INSTITUTE, Plano, Texas, for
    Appellant. T. Joseph Seward, Lindsey A. Peck, SEWARD PECK & HENDERSON, Royal Oak,
    Michigan, Carol A. Rosati, Anne McClorey McLaughlin, JOHNSON ROSATI SCHULTZ
    & JOPPICH, Farmington Hills, Michigan, for Appellee.
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge.                 Livingston Christian Schools (LCS) is a
    private, nondenominational Christian school with a mission of providing a religiously oriented
    No. 16-2060            Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                 Page 2
    education to students in Livingston County, Michigan. After operating for several years in the
    town of Pinckney, LCS sought to relocate. LCS entered into a lease agreement with Brighton
    Nazarene Church (the Church), located in Genoa Charter Township (the Township), so that LCS
    could operate its school on the Church’s property. Shortly thereafter, the Township informed
    LCS that an amended special-use permit would be required before the Church property could be
    used for the school. The Church then applied for such a permit (hereinafter referred to as the
    “special-use permit”) on LSC’s behalf. In a four-to-three vote, the Township Board denied the
    application.
    The Board’s action prompted LCS to file a complaint against the Township in the United
    States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. LCS alleged that the denial of the
    application for a special-use permit violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
    Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.          The Township moved for summary
    judgment in its favor, which the district court granted. For the reasons set forth below, we
    AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A.     Factual background
    1. LCS’s attempt to relocate its operations to the Church
    LCS describes its mission as providing a Christian education “for the Livingston County
    Community.” From 2006 to 2015, LCS carried out this mission at a building in Pinckney (the
    Pinckney property). Pinckney is located in the southernmost portion of Livingston County,
    which is outside of the Township.
    A declaration by LCS’s treasurer, Scott Panning, notes that Pinckney is “without easy
    access to the interstate or major commuter roads,” that the Pinckney area is less populated than
    the central area of Livingston County, and that Pinckney’s population is declining. In addition,
    Panning explained that the building on the Pinckney property needed extensive, costly
    maintenance.
    No. 16-2060               Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                Page 3
    LCS asserts that these problems have led to financial difficulties. At a meeting in
    November 2012, the LCS Board decided that remaining at the Pinckney property on a long-term
    basis “will end in the dissolution of the school due to lack of enrollment and income.” So LCS
    resolved to search for another location. LCS wanted to relocate to either “the Brighton or
    Howell area,” both of which are within Livingston County. There are both cities and townships
    by the names of Brighton and Howell; LCS did not specify whether the “area” that it had in mind
    refers to the city, the township, or both. See Municipalities, Livingston County, Michigan,
    https://www.livgov.com/Pages/Municipalities.aspx (last visited May 31, 2017). Several options
    within these areas were explored, but LCS asserts that only the Church property was suitable.
    LCS then entered into an agreement to lease the Church’s building for use as a school.
    According to Panning, LCS was unaware when signing the lease agreement that the Church
    would need to amend its special-use permit to allow LCS to so operate. After entering into the
    lease agreement, LCS prepaid the Church $70,000 in rent and began advertising its new location
    to prospective students.
    The Township eventually heard about LCS’s plans to operate at the Church and informed
    the Church that the existing special-use permit would have to be amended in order for LCS to
    use the Church’s building as a school. In March 2015, the Church applied for the permit. Two
    public hearings were held, where several neighbors of the Church expressed concerns about the
    application. The primary complaints were that (1) LCS’s operations would worsen already
    heavy traffic, and (2) the Church had a history of failing to comply with its previous special-use
    permits by using its property in ways that neighboring residents found disruptive.
    After the second meeting, the Township’s Planning Commission reviewed the application
    and a traffic study submitted by the Church. The Planning Commission then recommended that
    the Township Board approve the Church’s application with several conditions attached.
    Despite the Planning Commission’s recommendation, the Township Board voted to deny
    the special-use permit in a four-to-three decision at the July 2015 Board meeting. The July
    meeting minutes did not explain the reasons for the denial, but the August 3, 2015 meeting
    minutes did. These reasons included traffic concerns, inconsistency with the single-family
    No. 16-2060             Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                    Page 4
    residential zoning of the surrounding area, the failure of the Planning Commission’s proposed
    conditional approval to mitigate these problems, and the Church’s history of noncompliance with
    the zoning ordinance and with the conditions on the Church’s prior special-use permits.
    2. LCS’s use of other properties
    After the denial of the special-use permit, LCS entered into a short-term lease with the
    Whitmore Lake School District in August 2015, which allowed LCS to use the District’s former
    public middle-school building located in neighboring Washtenaw County for LCS’s school.
    Counsel for LCS explained at oral argument that LCS is currently using the Whitmore Lake
    property under what is essentially a year-to-year lease. But the Whitmore Lake School District
    has informed LCS that the School District might reoccupy the school building at some point in
    the future. LCS asserts that the Whitmore Lake property is therefore not a viable long-term
    option for its school. According to LCS, the Whitmore Lake property is also inadequate for
    several additional reasons. One is that the property is inconveniently located for LCS’s students.
    The conditions of the lease, moreover, inhibit LCS’s efforts to recruit prospective students, to
    effectively run sports programs, to keep the property secure, and to serve lunch to its students.
    In addition to leasing the Whitmore Lake property, LCS is the owner of the Pinckney
    property from which it sought to relocate in 2015. Even though LCS owns the Pinckney
    property, it decided not to continue its operations there when the special-use permit for the
    Church property was denied. LCS has instead leased the Pinckney property to the Light of the
    World Academy (LOTWA), a publicly funded charter school, for a term of seven years. The
    lease was executed on August 20, 2015, after the Township officially denied the Church’s
    application for a special-use permit on August 3, 2015 and after LCS filed its original complaint
    on August 7, 2015.
    B.     Procedural background
    In its original complaint, LCS alleged that the Township’s denial of the special-use
    permit violated RLUIPA’s substantial-burden provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). LCS later
    amended its complaint to add alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. But
    No. 16-2060            Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                    Page 5
    neither of these constitutional claims are before us on appeal because LCS has not raised these
    issues in its brief.
    LCS filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
    injunction, which the district court denied. The Township then moved for summary judgment.
    LCS did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment but, in its response to the Township’s
    motion, LCS informally asked the district court to grant summary judgment in its favor pursuant
    to Rule 56(f)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(f)(1) allows the district court
    to grant summary judgment in favor of a nonmoving party “[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable
    time to respond.”
    The district court did not act on LCS’s request. It instead granted summary judgment in
    favor of the Township, concluding that the Township’s denial of the application did not impose a
    substantial burden on LCS because LCS had both the Pinckney and Whitmore Lake properties as
    adequate alternatives to the Church property. Noting that the parties made essentially the same
    arguments in the summary-judgment proceedings as in the emergency-motion proceedings, the
    court “incorporate[d] by reference” its ruling denying LCS’s motion for a temporary restraining
    order and a preliminary injunction.
    II. ANALYSIS
    A.      Standard of review
    We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Williams v. AT&T
    Mobility Servs., 
    847 F.3d 384
    , 391 (6th Cir. 2017). Summary judgment is proper when there is
    no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that
    a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
    Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 248 (1986). “We must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the
    nonmoving party in making this determination.” 
    Williams, 847 F.3d at 391
    .
    As for the substantial-burden inquiry, the ultimate decision on whether the Township’s
    actions imposed a substantial burden on LCS under RLUIPA is a question of law for us to
    No. 16-2060             Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                   Page 6
    decide. See Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 
    724 F.3d 78
    , 93 (1st
    Cir. 2013) (explaining that the existence of a substantial burden is a question of law because “the
    corollary question of whether the government’s interest is compelling is generally treated as a
    question of law,” and because of the importance of appellate courts conducting de novo reviews
    of the legal aspects of First Amendment claims, which are “corollaries” of RLUIPA claims). But
    see World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago, 
    591 F.3d 531
    , 539 (7th Cir. 2009)
    (assuming with little reasoning that the substantial-burden inquiry is a factual question, and
    noting that no other court at that point in time had specified whether this was a question of law or
    of fact).
    B.      LCS’s leasehold interest is protected under RLUIPA.
    RLUIPA explicitly protects “leasehold” interests in property. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-
    5(5). “Leasehold” and “ownership” interests are listed in the same provision and are therefore
    presumably entitled to the same level of protection. LCS clearly possessed a leasehold interest in
    the Church property by way of the lease agreement. The Township does not dispute that LCS
    had such an interest. Rather, the Township argues that the district court correctly concluded that
    the denial of the special-use permit did not violate RLUIPA because the denial did not
    effectively bar all religious exercise on the Church’s property.
    But the religious institution at issue here is LCS, not the Church, and the land interest at
    issue is LCS’s leasehold interest, not the Church’s ownership interest.          In addition, LCS
    persuasively argues that taking into account the Church’s ability to use the property for its own
    purposes as a factor against LCS’s RLUIPA claim would result in treating LCS differently from
    a religious institution that leased property from a secular landlord. We will therefore consider
    only LCS’s ability to exercise its religious mission (and not the Church’s) in evaluating whether
    there was a substantial burden on LCS.
    No. 16-2060             Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                    Page 7
    C.     The test for whether a substantial burden exists
    RLUIPA does not define the term “substantial burden.” Its only reference to the term is
    contained in the following provision:
    No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that
    imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a
    religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that the
    imposition of the burden . . . (A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
    interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
    governmental interest.
    42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. Nor has the Supreme Court had occasion to focus on the substantial-burden
    inquiry under RLUIPA in the land-use context, although it has done so in the institutionalized-
    persons context. See Holt v. Hobbs, 
    135 S. Ct. 853
    , 862 (2015) (holding that a prison’s policy
    forbidding a prisoner to grow a beard of a certain length, which the prisoner sincerely believed
    was required by his religion, substantially burdened the prisoner even though the prison
    permitted him to engage in other religious practices, such as following a specified diet and
    keeping a prayer rug in his cell). Even in Holt, the Supreme Court did not articulate a definition
    of “substantial burden,” but rather explained that the ability to engage in other religious practices
    did not prevent a prisoner from making a substantial-burden claim as to the rule against growing
    a half-inch beard. We will therefore turn to caselaw from this court and other circuits regarding
    the substantial-burden inquiry.
    1. Sixth Circuit cases
    There are only two cases in this circuit, both of which are unpublished, that address the
    question of whether a land-use regulation imposed a substantial burden under RLUIPA. The
    first is DiLaura v. Township of Ann Arbor, 112 F. App’x 445 (6th Cir. 2004), where this court
    affirmed the district court’s conclusion that a substantial burden existed based on a zoning
    ordinance that required the plaintiffs, who wanted to establish an overnight religious retreat, to
    operate as a bed-and-breakfast establishment. 
    Id. at 446.
    In DiLaura, the court noted that
    restrictions on such establishments prevented the plaintiffs from serving Communion wine and
    meals other than breakfast. The plaintiffs would also have been required to charge their guests a
    fee for lodging. Because the plaintiffs’ plan was to operate a prayer retreat that would provide
    No. 16-2060             Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                     Page 8
    free lodging, and to serve lunch, dinner, and Communion wine, the court found that the plaintiffs
    would be “effectively barred . . . from using the property in the exercise of their religion” if their
    property were designated as a bed and breakfast. 
    Id. The court
    did not provide any other
    explanation for its holding or articulate a test for whether a substantial burden existed.
    The other Sixth Circuit case is Living Water Church of God v. Charter Township of
    Meridian, 258 F. App’x 729 (6th Cir. 2007), where this court reversed the district court’s
    conclusion that a substantial burden existed. 258 F. App’x at 742. In Living Water, the plaintiff
    was a church that wanted to construct an additional building on its property for use both as a
    religious school and as extra space for the church. 
    Id. at 731.
    A special-use permit that was
    needed for the building was granted insofar as it allowed a school on the residentially zoned
    property. 
    Id. at 732.
    But the permit restricted the church to a total of 25,000 square feet of floor
    space amongst all of its buildings, thwarting the church’s efforts to construct a single building of
    almost 35,000 square feet. 
    Id. at 731–32.
    The court in Living Water explicitly “decline[d] to set a bright line test” to determine
    whether a substantial burden exists, but announced “a framework to apply to the facts before us.”
    
    Id. at 737.
    That framework asks: “[D]oes the government action place substantial pressure on a
    religious institution to violate its religious beliefs or effectively bar a religious institution from
    using its property in the exercise of its religion?” 
    Id. The court
    also stated that a land-use
    regulation “may make religious exercise more expensive or difficult” without necessarily
    imposing a substantial burden. 
    Id. Applying this
    framework, the court concluded that the church
    had not been substantially burdened because the church remained free to construct a school
    building. 
    Id. at 738–39.
    The court concluded that there was no evidence in the record that a new
    building of the permitted size would be so inadequate as to constitute a substantial burden. 
    Id. at 739.
      Although the court acknowledged testimony that the church would be burdened by
    incurring additional expenses to develop plans for a smaller building, and by not having space
    for a gymnasium, the court concluded that these were “mere inconvenience[s].” 
    Id. In a
    concurring opinion, Judge Moore cautioned that Living Water’s framework was
    “inadvisable” because the effective-bar prong was “so broad as to swallow the substantial-burden
    inquiry.” 
    Id. at 742
    (Moore, J., concurring). We agree. The language of the effective-bar prong
    No. 16-2060            Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                    Page 9
    would mean that, any time that a land-use regulation completely barred the religious use of a
    property, a substantial burden would automatically exist. See, e.g., Andon, LLC v. City of
    Newport News, 
    813 F.3d 510
    , 516 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that any framework that would
    essentially create an “automatic exemption” from land-use regulations for religious plaintiffs
    would contravene RLUIPA’s intent).
    Moreover, the effective-bar prong of Living Water fails to take into account
    circumstances that other circuits have considered in the substantial-burden inquiry, such as
    whether a religious institution has ready alternatives to carry out its mission, or whether the
    religious institution’s inability to use available land was self-imposed. See Part II.C.3. below.
    Judge Moore also noted that no other circuit had adopted the effective-bar language. Living
    Water, 258 F. App’x at 742 (Moore, J., concurring). Nor are we aware of any other circuit that
    has done so since Living Water was decided.
    Finally, the court in Living Water was apparently trying to avoid creating a precedent,
    specifically crafting “a framework to apply to the facts before us.” 258 F. App’x at 737. The
    factual context in the present case is materially different from that in Living Water. We therefore
    decline to follow the Living Water framework and will instead focus directly on RLUIPA’s test
    of whether the “land-use regulation . . . imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of
    [the] institution.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
    2. The meaning of “substantial burden” under RLUIPA
    One principle that clearly emerges from both Living Water and our sister circuits’
    decisions is that not just any imposition on religious exercise will constitute a violation of
    RLUIPA. Instead, a burden must have some degree of severity to be considered “substantial.”
    See, e.g., Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 
    673 F.3d 1059
    , 1067
    (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that a substantial burden “must impose a significantly great
    restriction or onus upon [religious] exercise” (quoting San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan
    Hill, 
    360 F.3d 1024
    , 1034 (9th Cir. 2004))); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside,
    
    366 F.3d 1214
    , 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (concluding that a substantial burden is “more than an
    inconvenience”). As this court recognized in Living Water, taking seriously the requirement that
    No. 16-2060              Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                 Page 10
    a burden be “substantial” is necessary in order to avoid an interpretation of RLUIPA that would
    exempt religious institutions from all land-use regulations. 258 F. App’x at 729, 736 (“If the
    term ‘substantial burden’ is not to be read out of the statute, RLUIPA cannot stand for the
    proposition that a construction plan is immune from a town’s zoning ordinance simply because
    the institution undertaking the construction pursues a religious mission.”).
    Other circuits have persuasively explained that land-use regulations do not typically
    compel plaintiffs to “violate their beliefs” in the way that, for example, prison rules might
    require an inmate to engage in conduct that goes against his or her religious tenets. See, e.g.,
    Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery Cty. Council, 
    706 F.3d 548
    , 555–57 (4th Cir.
    2013) (explaining that the government does not have “absolute control” over religious
    institutions in the land-use context in the same way that a prison has control over inmates, so that
    land-use decisions will “rarely” force a religious institution to violate its beliefs). But land-use
    regulations can prohibit a plaintiff from engaging in desired religious behaviors, causing some
    courts to define a substantial burden as something that places significant pressure on an
    institutional plaintiff to modify its behavior. See 
    id. at 555.
    3. Several factors from our sister circuits’ caselaw are helpful in determining
    whether LCS was substantially burdened by the Township’s action.
    Our sister circuits have identified several factors that are helpful in determining whether a
    land-use regulation has imposed a substantial burden on a religious institution. One factor,
    which the district court properly considered here, is whether the religious institution has a
    feasible alternative location from which it can carry on its mission. See Westchester Day Sch. v.
    Vill. of Mamaroneck, 
    504 F.3d 338
    , 352 (2d Cir. 2007). Whether the religious institution will
    suffer “substantial ‘delay, uncertainty, and expense’” due to the imposition of the regulation is
    another factor. 
    Id. at 349
    (quoting Saints Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v.
    City of New Berlin, 
    396 F.3d 895
    , 901 (7th Cir. 2005).
    The plaintiff’s own actions have also been found relevant in determining whether a
    burden is considered substantial. Several circuits have held that, when a plaintiff has imposed a
    burden upon itself, the government cannot be liable for a RLUIPA substantial-burden violation.
    For example, when an institutional plaintiff has obtained an interest in land without a reasonable
    No. 16-2060             Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                 Page 11
    expectation of being able to use that land for religious purposes, the hardship that it suffered
    when the land-use regulations were enforced against it has been deemed an insubstantial burden.
    See, e.g., 
    Andon, 813 F.3d at 515
    (concluding that a burden was not substantial because it was
    self-imposed when the plaintiff entered into a contingent lease agreement for a property despite
    knowing that the property failed to meet applicable setback requirements and having been
    informed that the application for a zoning variance would be denied); Petra Presbyterian Church
    v. Vill. of Northbrook, 
    489 F.3d 846
    , 851 (7th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the plaintiff was not
    substantially burdened when it had imposed the burden upon itself by purchasing property in an
    industrial zone for use as a church after having been informed that its special-use application
    would be denied because the relevant zoning ordinance banned churches in that zone).
    Whether LCS had a feasible alternative location, whether LCS faced substantial delay,
    uncertainty, and expense, and whether LCS’s burden was self-imposed are helpful factors for us
    to consider in determining whether the Township’s action placed a substantial burden on LCS in
    this case. We therefore discuss in Part III.D. below how these factors apply to the case before us.
    As a final matter to consider, we note one often-cited factor: whether there is evidence
    that the municipality’s decisionmaking process was arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory. See,
    e.g., 
    Westchester, 504 F.3d at 350
    –51; Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y v. Cty. of Sutter, 
    456 F.3d 978
    ,
    989–91 (9th Cir. 2006); Saints 
    Constantine, 396 F.3d at 900
    –01. We deem this factor irrelevant
    in the present case because LCS has not argued that it faced a substantial burden as a result of
    any discriminatory decisionmaking by the Township. LCS instead alleges that the Township’s
    decision was discriminatory only with regard to the Township’s purported lack of a compelling
    interest for denying the special-use permit application.
    In any event, although several other circuits have taken evidence of alleged
    discrimination into account in considering whether there was a substantial burden on religious
    exercise, we decline to adopt this approach. Evidence of improper decisionmaking is more
    appropriately considered when evaluating whether a governmental action was narrowly tailored
    to serve a compelling state interest—an inquiry that the court should undertake only after finding
    that a substantial burden exists. See Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian,
    258 F. App’x 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2007) (declining to consider evidence of arbitrary
    No. 16-2060             Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                  Page 12
    decisionmaking by the municipality where the church had failed to first show that a substantial
    burden existed, noting that proof of the municipality’s motive is not relevant to the substantial-
    burden inquiry).
    RLUIPA, moreover, contains a separate prohibition on discrimination in the
    implementation of land-use regulations, which does not require that the regulation impose a
    substantial burden. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1)–(2) (prohibiting governmental entities from
    “impos[ing] or implement[ing] a land use regulation in a manner that” either “treats a religious
    assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution” or
    “discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or religious
    denomination”). Finding a substantial burden due to evidence of discrimination would obviate
    the need for § 2000cc(b)(1)–(2).     See Bethel World Outreach 
    Ministries, 706 F.3d at 557
    (concluding that requiring proof of religious discrimination in order to make out a substantial-
    burden claim “would render the nondiscrimination provision superfluous”).
    D.     The district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Township was proper
    because, as a matter of law, LCS failed to put forth sufficient evidence to establish
    that the Pinckney property was an inadequate location for its religious mission.
    LCS argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the Township
    on the basis that the Pinckney and Whitmore Lake properties were “ready alternatives” for LCS.
    Several of our sister circuits have addressed the issue of when the availability of other properties
    defeats a substantial-burden claim. Where plaintiffs have had access to other properties close to
    the property affected by the challenged land-use regulation, the courts have generally found that
    no substantial burden exists. See World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago, 
    591 F.3d 531
    , 539 (7th Cir. 2009) (concluding that there was no substantial burden when the plaintiff was
    denied permission to demolish a historic building on its property and construct a new building,
    given that the plaintiff owned other empty space on its campus where it could construct the
    building); Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 100 F. App’x 70, 73, 77
    (3d Cir. 2004) (concluding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on a
    substantial-burden claim when the plaintiff was denied a variance for property that it had
    purchased, reasoning that the plaintiff was able to fully operate at a rented location just across
    the street from the property at issue); see also Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside,
    No. 16-2060             Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                  Page 13
    
    366 F.3d 1214
    , 1227–28 (11th Cir. 2004) (concluding that walking a few additional blocks was
    not a substantial burden where the zoning ordinance required the plaintiff, an Orthodox Jewish
    synagogue whose members’ beliefs forbade them from using motorized vehicles on the Sabbath,
    to be located a few blocks away from its desired location).
    On the other hand, RLUIPA plaintiffs have survived a motion for summary judgment
    where they have raised a genuine dispute as to whether their current location was adequate for
    their religious mission. See, e.g., Bethel World Outreach 
    Ministries, 706 F.3d at 558
    (holding
    that the plaintiff church had put forth sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment where
    the already-existing facilities were so overcrowded that the church had to hold four services each
    Sunday, to shorten each one, to change its Communion and “Altar Call” practices, and to turn
    people away); Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 
    673 F.3d 1059
    ,
    1068–69 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the plaintiff church had demonstrated that its current
    facility was inadequate because the church’s “core beliefs” required it to assemble in one
    worship service, yet it had to hold three Sunday services in its existing facility); Westchester Day
    Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 
    504 F.3d 338
    , 352 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that there was a
    substantial burden on the plaintiff school, in part because the school had demonstrated that it was
    expanding and that its existing buildings did not have sufficient space).
    In each of the cases ruling in the plaintiffs’ favor, the plaintiffs had demonstrated that
    they were unable to carry out some core function of their religious activities due to the
    inadequacy of their current facilities. The school in Westchester Day School, for example,
    presented evidence from architects and other experts that existing buildings did not have enough
    space to incorporate planned expansions for new classrooms, labs, art and music rooms, and
    other facilities, all of which would be used for educational purposes that integrated religious
    
    teachings. 504 F.3d at 346
    , 352.      In Bethel, the church likewise put forth evidence that
    Communion and Altar Call practices had to be modified, and that worshippers had to be turned
    away, due to the fact that the services were 
    overcrowded. 706 F.3d at 558
    . The church in
    Foursquare also demonstrated that its current facilities did not provide sufficient space for the
    congregation to worship in one service, preventing the unity of worship that was central to its
    
    beliefs. 673 F.3d at 1069
    . When such central religious beliefs are in question, courts must be
    No. 16-2060              Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                      Page 14
    especially deferential to testimony from the religious institution about the truth of that belief. 
    Id. (explaining that
    the plaintiff had clearly alleged that its “core beliefs” were at stake, and that the
    Supreme Court has cautioned that “while a court can arbiter the sincerity of an individual’s
    religious beliefs, courts should not inquire into the truth or falsity of stated religious beliefs”).
    Unlike the plaintiffs in the aforementioned cases, LCS put forth only conclusory evidence
    that the Pinckney property is inadequate, and LCS did not allege that any of its core religious
    functions cannot be carried out at Pinckney. LCS submitted declarations from its principal and
    its treasurer as evidence of dwindling enrollment. These declarations state that “the fulfillment
    of [LCS’s] religious mission of operating a Christian school to serve the entire Livingston
    County community necessitated a move from the Pinckney Property . . . to a facility more
    centrally located in Livingston County”; that LCS’s enrollment increased due to the anticipated
    move to the Church and decreased upon denial of the permit; that the Pinckney property is
    “without easy access to the interstate or major commuter roads,” making attracting students
    difficult; that Pinckney is “much less populated than the central area of Livingston County”; that
    Pinckney’s population has recently declined; that the Pinckney property “required extensive
    maintenance and was in need of expensive repairs”; and that the Church was a superior
    alternative to the Pinckney property because LCS would be able to attract families affiliated with
    the Church.
    LCS also submitted its Board’s meeting minutes stating the Board’s fear that remaining
    at the Pinckney property would eventually cause LCS to go out of business. In addition, LCS
    argues that the Pinckney property is inadequate because LOTWA had to switch its model from
    being a private religious school to being a publicly funded charter school in order to operate
    there. Excerpts of a deposition of LOTWA’s president, Laura Burwell, are offered in support of
    this claim.
    Although the above evidence provides a modicum of support for the proposition that the
    Pinckney property’s location is inadequate, it is not sufficient to meet LCS’s burden of surviving
    the Township’s motion for summary judgment. The meeting minutes and other statements
    fearing that LCS will eventually be forced to close are little more than speculation because they
    are not substantiated by facts in the record. See Alexander v. CareSource, 
    576 F.3d 551
    , 560
    No. 16-2060            Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                  Page 15
    (6th Cir. 2009) (“Conclusory statements unadorned with supporting facts are insufficient to
    establish a factual dispute that will defeat summary judgment.”). As this court stated in Living
    Water, whether a substantial burden exists must be evaluated at the present moment, not based
    on speculation about whether such a burden might arise in the future. Living Water Church of
    God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 258 F. App’x 729, 738 (6th Cir. 2007).
    When faced with the burden of producing sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a
    genuine dispute of material fact existed, LCS had the obligation to provide evidence to
    substantiate its claims. LCS conceded at oral argument that it failed to provide its financial
    records to document the extent of its present loss of funds. Likewise, LCS acknowledged that it
    had not provided enrollment statistics to demonstrate the alleged drop in student enrollment that
    prompted LCS to relocate. The declarations provided by LCS did establish that 139 students
    were enrolled during LCS’s last year at Pinckney, that 59 new students had enrolled after the
    announcement of LCS’s move to the Church, and that 18 new students and 15 returning students
    unenrolled after the special-use permit was denied. But the declarations provide no historical
    enrollment data to indicate how LCS performed before its last year at Pinckney.
    Moreover, LCS failed to produce evidence that would be admissible at trial about why the
    alleged drop in enrollment occurred. To make out a substantial-burden claim under RLUIPA,
    LCS must demonstrate that the land-use regulation implemented by the Township—the denial of
    the Church’s special-use permit application—imposed a substantial burden on LCS.               See
    42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. LCS cannot prevail if the burden of declining enrollment was caused by
    something other than its inability to relocate to the Church. See Andon, LLC v. City of Newport
    News, 
    813 F.3d 510
    , 515 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that burdens are not substantial if they are
    self-imposed).
    Although LCS could have introduced evidence regarding the reasons for its drop in
    enrollment by providing declarations or depositions from the families of students who unenrolled
    after the Church’s special-use permit was denied, LCS did not do so. Panning’s declaration
    states that Pinckney’s remote location was the reason for the declining enrollment. But this
    explanation of the students’ alleged reasons for unenrolling is based on hearsay. The statement
    would therefore be inadmissible at trial if offered to prove that the actual cause of the declining
    No. 16-2060            Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                 Page 16
    enrollment was Pinckney’s remote location.       See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (providing that an
    affidavit or declaration may be used as evidence at the summary-judgment stage only if it is
    “made on personal knowledge” and “set[s] out facts that would be admissible in evidence”);
    Alpert v. United States, 
    481 F.3d 404
    , 408–09 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that statements in an
    affidavit that amounted to hearsay cannot be considered at the summary-judgment stage).
    Similarly, the evidence about LOTWA’s decision to become a publicly funded charter
    school instead of remaining a religious school is insufficient because it does not explain the
    reason for LCS’s financial difficulties. Even the testimony of LOTWA’s president Burwell, on
    which LCS heavily relies for its argument that the Pinckney property is unsuitable, indicates that
    LOTWA’s experience cannot be compared to LCS’s. Burwell stated in her deposition that
    LOTWA became a charter school because it was “having a difficult time keeping our enrollment
    numbers up at a tuition-based school” after relocating to Pinckney. When asked whether she
    knew why the Pinckney property did not fit LCS’s needs, however, Burwell stated that “I don’t
    know if Livingston Christian had the same experience.”           The record contains only five
    nonconsecutive pages of Burwell’s deposition and provides no other context about LOTWA’s
    finances, enrollment statistics, or student demographics that might allow for a persuasive
    comparison of LOTWA to LCS.
    And even if we were to assume that LCS’s characterization of Pinckney as a remote,
    inaccessible area is supported by record evidence that would be admissible at trial, we conclude
    as a matter of law that remaining at the Pinckney property would not have imposed a substantial
    burden on LCS. The Pinckney property, located at 550 E. Hamburg St., Pinckney, Michigan, is
    a 12.1-mile drive from the Church, located at 7669 Brighton Road, Brighton, Michigan. See
    maps.google.com. Because LCS insists that the Church would have been a more convenient
    location for many students, the Pinckney property’s distance from the Church is relevant. In
    addition, the Pinckney property is 11.1 miles from what the Township pinpoints as the
    geographic center of Livingston County, whereas the Church is 9.9 miles from that geographic
    center. We may take judicial notice of maps showing the distances between these locations. See
    Carpenter v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 
    145 F.3d 1330
    (Table), 
    1998 WL 199723
    , at *4 (6th Cir.
    1998) (explaining that the trial court can “take judicial notice of general time/distance
    No. 16-2060              Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                Page 17
    calculations”); Fed. R. Evid. 201, Advisory Comm. Notes (f) (noting that judicial notice “may be
    taken at any stage of the proceedings, whether in the trial court or on appeal”). Treating the
    center of Livingston County as the area from which LCS hopes to attract more students, locating
    its school at the Pinckney property instead of the Church property would increase travel distance
    by a mere 1.2 miles.
    And even if the proper distance to consider is the distance between the Church and the
    Pinckney property, the additional travel distance is only 12.1 miles. Requiring students to travel
    an additional 12.1 miles is somewhat of a burden, but we conclude as a matter of law that this is
    not so significant as to “impose[] a substantial burden on the religious exercise of [LCS].” See
    RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc. As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit has held that walking
    an additional several blocks would not impose a substantial burden on religious adherents whose
    beliefs bar motor-vehicle travel on the Sabbath. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 
    366 F.3d 1214
    , 1227–28 (11th Cir. 2004). The Midrash Sephardi court even took into account the
    mobility difficulties that some members of the synagogue might have and the fact that walking in
    the Florida summer heat might pose additional problems—but not enough to impose a
    substantial burden. 
    Id. Likewise, families
    with especially tight budgets or busy schedules might find
    burdensome the additional expenses and time constraints of approximately 12.1 more miles of
    car travel each way, but this does not mean that such additional expense and time is so great as to
    constitute a substantial burden on LCS’s religious mission. This is more analogous to a “mere
    inconvenience” that would not be deemed a substantial burden under Living Water. See 258 F.
    App’x 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2007).
    We also note that LCS has not alleged that any functions of its religious school were
    unable to be carried out on the Pinckney property. LCS focuses on increasing enrollment and
    raising revenue, but has not identified any religious activity—or even any traditionally secular
    one—that could not be performed at the Pinckney property. The present case is therefore
    distinguishable from Bethel and Westchester Day School, both of which are discussed in more
    detail above. Even though the expansion in Westchester was designed to serve an existing
    school population that, like LCS, was not growing, the school in Westchester established that the
    No. 16-2060             Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                Page 18
    renovations would serve a religious-education mission that could not be performed using its
    existing space. See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 
    504 F.2d 338
    , 345–46 (2d Cir.
    2007) (explaining how the school’s philosophy tied Orthodox Jewish teachings into each and
    every aspect of the school curriculum, and how the expansion would further this mission). There
    is no such evidence in the present case.
    Finally, we note that no credence should be given to any argument that LCS faces a
    substantial burden because LOTWA now occupies the Pinckney property, thus preventing LCS
    from returning there. Any such argument would have no merit because LCS leased the Pinckney
    property to LOTWA only after the special-use permit application by the Church was denied and
    after this litigation commenced. The fact that LCS cannot now use the Pinckney property due to
    the seven-year lease is therefore due to LCS’s own actions. As discussed above, a burden is not
    substantial when the plaintiff imposes that burden upon itself. See, e.g., Andon, LLC v. City of
    Newport News, 
    813 F.3d 510
    , 515 (4th Cir. 2016); Petra Presbyterian Church v. Vill. of
    Northbrook, 
    489 F.3d 846
    , 851 (7th Cir. 2007).
    E.     As a matter of law, LCS was not substantially burdened even if we assume that LCS
    could establish that no alternative properties were available within Genoa
    Township.
    LCS alternatively argues that it is substantially burdened because there are allegedly no
    alternative facilities within Genoa Township where LCS can operate its school. If LCS were
    correct that a substantial burden results whenever a religious institution cannot find a suitable
    location within a particular local jurisdiction, then LCS’s present inability to use the Pinckney
    property and its concern about the long-term use of the Whitmore Lake property would be
    irrelevant because both of those properties are located outside the Township.
    We will assume, solely for the purpose of resolving this issue, that there are no
    alternative facilities available to LCS within the Township’s borders. Nevertheless, we conclude
    as a matter of law that LCS is not substantially burdened by the absence of such other properties
    because LCS has the Pinckney property as an adequate alternative.
    LCS cites Islamic Center of Mississippi, Inc. v. City of Starkville, 
    840 F.2d 293
    , 300 (5th
    Cir. 1988), for its argument that being unable to locate anywhere within the Township is itself a
    No. 16-2060              Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                         Page 19
    substantial burden. But that case involved a free-exercise challenge to a zoning ordinance that
    prohibited all churches within the city limits unless an exception was obtained. Under the zoning
    ordinance, the city had allowed exceptions to 25 Christian churches, but denied an exception to
    an Islamic Center. The court stated that “the availability of other sites outside city limits does
    not permit a city to forbid the exercise of a constitutionally protected right within its limits.” 
    Id. at 300
    (citing Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 
    452 U.S. 61
    , 76–77 (1981) (holding that a
    local government could not constitutionally ban all live entertainment from its borders by relying
    on the argument that live entertainment was available in neighboring jurisdictions)). In so ruling,
    the court focused on the extensive evidence of religious discrimination against the Islamic Center
    and the fact that the city’s denial of the exception was not narrowly tailored to an important
    governmental interest. 
    Id. at 300
    –03.
    The language that LCS relies on in Islamic Center and Schad is from a different context
    than the present case—a First Amendment challenge to laws that categorically prohibited
    religious assemblies or certain types of speech within a jurisdiction’s borders. In the present
    case, unlike in Islamic Center, there is no evidence that the Township’s zoning ordinance has
    completely banned religiously oriented schools from its borders (or banned them unless they can
    obtain zoning exceptions).
    And even if the Township’s denial of the special-use permit has effectively barred LCS
    from the Township’s borders, such a consequence does not automatically establish a RLUIPA
    violation. Our research has revealed only a few circuit cases that address this issue in the
    RLUIPA context. And most such cases involve challenges to land-use regulations that prohibit
    plaintiffs from using land in a certain area of a jurisdiction, not in the entire jurisdiction.
    The most analogous case is Andon, LLC v. City of Newport News, 
    813 F.3d 510
    , 515–16
    (4th Cir. 2016), in which the Fourth Circuit concluded that there was no substantial burden even
    though the plaintiff could not find another suitable location within the particular jurisdiction in
    question. Andon’s holding relied primarily on the fact that the plaintiff’s burden was self-
    imposed, as discussed above. But the Fourth Circuit also stated that the unavailability of other
    land in the particular jurisdiction “will not by itself support a substantial burden claim.” 
    Id. at 516.
     No. 16-2060              Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                  Page 20
    Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has held that a land-use regulation does not impose a
    substantial burden simply because of a “lack of affordable land” in Chicago or for other reasons
    “incidental to any high-density urban land use.” Civil Liberties for Urban Believers (CLUB) v.
    City of Chicago, 
    342 F.3d 752
    , 761 (7th Cir. 2003). CLUB, however, involved a substantial-
    burden challenge to a zoning ordinance on its face, not a challenge to a specific land-use
    decision. 
    Id. at 755–56,
    763. And the court noted that the plaintiffs had in fact been able to
    locate in other parts of Chicago. 
    Id. at 761.
    Because RLUIPA has been held to allow the courts to consider the reasonableness of a
    plaintiff’s expectations in being able to use the land in question for religious purposes, the courts
    should also be allowed to consider other factors relevant to the substantial-burden inquiry—such
    as whether the plaintiff had easy access to properties in a neighboring jurisdiction (as LCS had at
    the Pinckney property). Allowing a plaintiff to make out a substantial-burden claim where the
    plaintiff has burdened itself or in fact has easy access to suitable property in a neighboring
    jurisdiction is beyond the protection of RLUIPA. And as the Seventh Circuit has explained, the
    unavailability of land within a particular jurisdiction can result from the reality of competitive
    real-estate markets, not the municipality’s actions. See 
    CLUB, 342 F.3d at 762
    .
    The circumstances of the present case indicate that LCS was not substantially burdened
    within the meaning of RLUIPA despite the alleged unavailability of other land within Genoa
    Township. LCS had the Pinckney property as a ready alternative, to which LCS could have
    returned with little or no expense if it had not leased that property to LOTWA after this litigation
    commenced. And LCS’s stated mission is to serve Livingston County as a whole, not Genoa
    Township in particular.
    Genoa Township is relatively small—it has a total area of 36.3 square miles out of
    Livingston County’s total 565.25 square miles. See Genoa Township Profile, Genoa Township,
    https://genoa.org/community/profile (last visited May 31, 2017); QuickFacts, Livingston County,
    Michigan, U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/26093 (last
    visited May 31, 2017). The Township is located between Brighton and Howell—two “areas”
    that LCS has stated would suffice for its school, but that are located at least in part outside of
    Genoa       Township.        See      Municipalities,      Livingston       County,       Michigan,
    No. 16-2060             Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                    Page 21
    https://www.livgov.com/Pages/Municipalities.aspx (last visited May 31, 2017). We take judicial
    notice of the geographic map of Livingston County and the corresponding square-mileage
    calculations.
    Moreover, the boundaries of jurisdictions on the local-government level are often
    arbitrary in practice. Holding that a religious institution is substantially burdened any time that it
    cannot locate within such a small area—even if it could locate just across the border of the town
    limits—would be tantamount to giving religious institutions a free pass from zoning laws. See
    Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 258 F. App’x at 729, 736–37 (6th Cir.
    2007) (explaining that RLUIPA cannot be construed so as to give religious institutions immunity
    from zoning laws); see also, e.g., Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield,
    
    724 F.3d 78
    , 96 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that RLUIPA “does not provide religious institutions with
    immunity from land use regulation”) (quoting 146 Cong. Rec. S7776 (daily ed. July 27, 2000)
    (joint statement of Sens. Hatch and Kennedy)). In sum, RLUIPA does not automatically require
    every minor municipality to have at least one religious school within its borders.
    We therefore conclude that the proper inquiry should be more functional and factually
    driven. When a religious institution has an available alternative outside of a desired jurisdiction,
    and where the distance from the desired location to the alternative property is reasonably close,
    the artificial boundaries of a particular jurisdiction become less important. The record here does
    not indicate that traveling the roughly dozen miles to Pinckney would be unduly burdensome to
    LCS’s students. Nor does the record demonstrate that LCS’s religious beliefs required it to
    locate within Genoa Township specifically. LCS instead seeks to serve Livingston County as a
    whole. Under these circumstances, we hold as a matter of law that LCS was not substantially
    burdened simply because it could not relocate within Genoa Township.
    Our decision should not be taken to mean that a religious institution can never establish a
    RLUIPA claim based on the inability to locate within a particular jurisdiction. We simply hold
    that the determination of whether a substantial burden exists due to geographical limitations is
    factual in nature.    A religious institution, for example, might have a mission of catering
    specifically to lower-income individuals located in an urban center, which might be thwarted by
    relocating to a suburb that lacked public transportation. See Islamic Center of Miss., Inc. v. City
    No. 16-2060            Livingston Christian Sch. v. Genoa Charter Twp.                   Page 22
    of Starkville, 
    840 F.2d 293
    , 299 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that members of a mosque, many of
    whom were students living in an urban area located near a university campus, would be
    substantially burdened if they had to travel to the mosque using an automobile). But the
    circumstances in the present case simply do not constitute a substantial burden on LCS.
    III. CONCLUSION
    For all of the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.