United States v. Cedric Adams ( 2013 )


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  •                          RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
    File Name: 13a0190p.06
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    _________________
    X
    Plaintiff-Appellee, -
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    -
    v.                                    -
    -
    No. 12-6400
    ,
    >
    Defendant-Appellant. N
    CEDRIC MARKEITH ADAMS,
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis.
    No. 2:12-cr-20172-1—S. Thomas Anderson, District Judge.
    Decided and Filed: July 23, 2013
    Before: KEITH and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges; WATSON, District Judge.*
    _________________
    COUNSEL
    ON BRIEF: Needum L. Germany, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
    Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellant. Frederick H. Godwin, UNITED STATES
    ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Memphis, Tennessee, for Appellee.
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge. Defendant appeals the district court’s
    judgment revoking supervised release and imposing a thirteen-month sentence based on
    Defendant’s guilty plea to four violations of his supervised release conditions.
    The parties do not dispute the facts in this case. In 2009, the District Court for
    the Northern District of Mississippi sentenced Defendant to a period of incarceration to
    be followed by two years of supervised release for the sale of counterfeit obligations.
    *
    The Honorable Michael H. Watson, United States District Judge for the Southern District of
    Ohio, sitting by designation.
    1
    No. 12-6400        United States v. Adams                                           Page 2
    Defendant’s term of supervised release began on November 2, 2010. On June 6, 2012,
    the district court for the Northern District of Mississippi entered an order transferring
    jurisdiction of Defendant’s supervised release to the Western District of Tennessee. On
    July 13, 2012, the District Court for the Western District of Tennessee consented to
    jurisdiction. However, the Clerk of the Court for the Northern District of Mississippi did
    not enter the order accepting jurisdiction from the District Court for the Western District
    of Tennessee until August 23, 2012.
    Before jurisdiction was transferred, Defendant left the judicial district without
    permission from a probation officer on four occasions. Also before jurisdiction was
    transferred, Defendant was arrested twice for promoting prostitution. On August 21,
    2012, a probation officer filed a Petition for Warrant or Summons for Offender Under
    Supervision in the District Court for the Western District of Tennessee alleging two
    supervised release violations against Defendant.        The first violation alleged that
    Defendant was arrested in Nashville for promoting prostitution on January 6, 2012 and
    again June 27, 2012.      The second violation alleged that Defendant violated his
    supervised release by leaving the judicial district without permission from a probation
    officer on January 6, 2012; April 12, 2012; June 27, 2012; and August 10, 2012.
    At a hearing held on October 24, 2012, in the District Court for the Western
    District of Tennessee, Defendant pleaded guilty pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 11 to a supervised release violation. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to the
    second violation—involving leaving the judicial district without permission four times
    during supervised release. In exchange, the Government agreed to drop the first
    violation—involving the two arrests for promoting prostitution during supervised
    release. The Government recommended a thirteen-month sentence. Defendant waived
    his right to appeal if the district court accepted the Government’s sentencing
    recommendation. At the hearing, the district court sentenced Defendant to thirteen
    months of incarceration. Defendant timely appealed to this Court.
    On appeal, Defendant argues that his guilty plea is invalid because the violations
    upon which it was based occurred before jurisdiction of his supervised release had been
    No. 12-6400        United States v. Adams                                            Page 3
    transferred to the Western District of Tennessee. Alternatively, Defendant argues that
    his guilty plea is invalid because he was unaware of the potential issues with the district
    court’s jurisdiction at the time he pleaded guilty. The Government argues that we should
    enforce Defendant’s appellate waiver and dismiss this case. Because we hold that the
    district court had jurisdiction to revoke release and that Defendant’s guilty plea was
    valid, we do not address the enforceability of the waiver.
    We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions regarding jurisdiction.
    United States v. Slone, 
    411 F.3d 643
    , 646 (6th Cir. 2005). Title 
    18 U.S.C. § 3605
    governs jurisdiction over releasees under supervision and states:
    A court, after imposing a sentence, may transfer jurisdiction over a
    probationer or person on supervised release to the district court for any
    other district to which the person is required to proceed as a condition of
    his probation or release, or is permitted to proceed, with the concurrence
    of such court. A later transfer of jurisdiction may be made in the same
    manner. A court to which jurisdiction is transferred under this section is
    authorized to exercise all powers over the probationer or releasee that are
    permitted by this subchapter or subchapter B or D of chapter 227.
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3605
     (emphasis added). Subchapter D of chapter 227 confers on courts the
    power to “revoke a term of supervised release . . . if the court . . . finds by a
    preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised
    release . . .” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(3). Under § 3605, “the transferee court steps into the
    shoes of the transferor court.” United States v. King, 
    608 F.3d 1122
    , 1127 (9th Cir.
    2010). “[S]ection 3605 expand[s] the power of the transferee court over the supervised
    offender” as it “was intended to permit the transferee court ‘to exercise all the powers
    over the . . . releasee that are permitted’ by the statutes dealing with supervised
    releasees.” United States v. Fernandez, 
    379 F.3d 270
    , 275 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting S.
    REP. NO. 98-225, at 132 (1984)).
    We adopt the approach used by the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
    in holding that 
    18 U.S.C. § 3605
     authorizes a transferee court to revoke a term of a
    defendant’s supervised release for violations committed prior to the transfer of
    jurisdiction. See Fernandez, 
    379 F.3d at 275
    ; United States v. Clark, 405 F. App’x 89,
    No. 12-6400        United States v. Adams                                           Page 4
    92 (8th Cir. 2010); King, 
    608 F.3d at 1128
    ; United States v. Bailey, 257 F. App’x 210,
    212 (11th Cir. 2007). Analogously, the precedent we announce today gives transferee
    courts equal power to terminate or reduce the conditions of supervised release. See
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)(2). This approach avoids creating the “twilight zone” described by
    the Ninth Circuit whereby supervisees would obtain immunity for violations
    committed—but not discovered—before transfer. King, 
    608 F.3d at 1127
    .
    Here, Defendant pleaded guilty to leaving the judicial district on four occasions
    without permission in violation of the conditions of his supervised release. Defendant
    does not dispute that he left the judicial district without permission on the four dates
    indicated in his plea. The district court properly exercised its jurisdiction when it found
    by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant had violated a condition of his
    supervised release and revoked release.
    Defendant alternatively argues that his guilty plea is invalid because he did not
    knowingly waive his jurisdictional objection. Technical errors in Rule 11 pleas are
    harmless unless they affect substantial rights. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(h). Because we have
    affirmed a transferee court’s jurisdiction to revoke release based on pre-transfer
    violations, Defendant’s jurisdictional concern is revealed to be meritless and does not
    undermine the validity of his plea.
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-6400

Judges: Keith, McKEAGUE, Watson

Filed Date: 7/23/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/7/2023