United States v. Torris Boyd , 835 F.3d 791 ( 2016 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 15-2097
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Torris Izell Boyd
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa - Dubuque
    ____________
    Submitted: April 11, 2016
    Filed: July 5, 2016
    ____________
    Before COLLOTON, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
    On July 31, 2006, Torris Izell Boyd pled guilty to distribution of cocaine base
    near a playground in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 860 as
    well as 18 U.S.C. § 2. At sentencing, the district court1 calculated a total offense
    1
    The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
    the Northern District of Iowa.
    level of 38 along with a category IV criminal history. The guideline range equated
    to 324-405 months, but the district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 308
    months’ imprisonment pursuant to United State Sentencing Guideline (“U.S.S.G.”)
    § 5K1.1. We affirmed Boyd’s conviction and sentence on November 28, 2007.
    United States v. Boyd, 256 F. App’x 890 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (unpublished).
    In 2008, the district court retroactively applied two amendments to the Guidelines,
    Amendment 706 and Amendment 7152 , and exercised its discretion to grant Boyd a
    reduction in his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10.
    Boyd’s sentence was ultimately reduced to 279 months. The district court again
    examined Boyd’s sentence in 2013 to determine whether a sentence reduction
    pursuant to Amendment 7503 was warranted. The district court denied Boyd’s motion
    to reduce his sentence but advised that if Boyd improved his disciplinary record and
    availed himself of educational courses within the prison system over the next three
    years, he could move the court for a sentence reduction at that time.
    Amendment 782 became effective November 1, 2014, and retroactively
    reduced most drug quantity base offense levels by two levels. United States v.
    Thomas, 
    775 F.3d 982
    , 982-83 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Based on his conviction
    and sentence, Boyd was eligible for an Amendment 782 reduction. The district court
    held a hearing on April 28, 2015 pursuant to its own motion under § 3582(c)(2) to
    determine whether a reduction in Boyd’s sentence in accordance with Amendment
    782 was justified. The district court noted Boyd’s extensive criminal history and
    2
    Amendment 706 reduced the base offense level for offenses involving cocaine
    base by two levels. United States v. Higgins, 
    584 F.3d 770
    , 771 (8th Cir. 2009). In
    2008, Amendment 715 replaced Amendment 706 and created a uniform two-level
    reduction for the same offenses. United States v. Ivory, 388 F. App’x 567, 568 (8th
    Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished).
    3
    Amendment 750 reduced the offense levels listed in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 for
    certain crack-cocaine offenses. United States v. Harris, 
    688 F.3d 950
    , 952 (8th Cir.
    2012).
    -2-
    record of misconduct while incarcerated, which included over thirty disciplinary
    violations. Emphasizing the nature and seriousness of the danger to a person or the
    community that may be posed by a reduction in Boyd’s term of imprisonment, the
    district court considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, as well as the provisions and
    commentary of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, and determined that in light of the defendant’s
    criminal history and extensive record of post-sentencing misconduct, a further
    reduction was not justified.
    Boyd timely appealed the district court’s denial of the § 3582(c)(2) motion.
    We review the district court’s decision on a retroactive sentence reduction under
    § 3582(c)(2) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Anderson, 
    707 F.3d 973
    , 974
    (8th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). Boyd argues the district court abused its discretion by
    failing to recognize that his prior criminal history and recidivism were fully
    accounted for in his original sentence and that his prison disciplinary violations were
    adequately addressed through the prison disciplinary system, including a substantial
    loss of credit for good time.
    “A district court may reduce a previously imposed prison term if the
    defendant’s sentence was ‘based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
    lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . if such a reduction is consistent with
    applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.’” 
    Thomas, 775 F.3d at 982
    (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)). The plain language of § 3582(c)(2)
    allows a district court wide latitude, stating that “the court may reduce the term of
    imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the
    extent that they are applicable.” (emphasis added). Even where a defendant is
    eligible for a sentence reduction, the “doubly discretionary” language of § 3582(c)(2)
    does not entitle a defendant to a reduced sentence. United States v. Long, 
    757 F.3d 762
    , 764 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 
    703 F.3d 464
    , 470 (8th
    Cir. 2013)). In fact, “[f]ar from creating a substantive right to a modification,
    -3-
    ‘§ 3582(c)(2) represents a congressional act of lenity.’” 
    Johnson, 703 F.3d at 469
    (emphasis added) (quoting Dillon v. United States, 
    560 U.S. 817
    , 828 (2010)).
    Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1), a district court “shall substitute” the amended
    Guidelines range for the initial range and “shall leave all other guideline application
    decisions unaffected.” The Application Notes for U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 advise the
    district court to consider the § 3553(a) factors, “the nature and seriousness of the
    danger to any person or the community that may be posed by a reduction in the
    defendant’s term of imprisonment,” and “post-sentencing conduct of the defendant
    that occurred after imposition of the term of imprisonment.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt.
    n. 1(B).
    We note that Boyd’s criminal history contained a second-degree murder
    conviction among multiple other offenses committed as both a juvenile and an adult.
    His record of misconduct while incarcerated for his current conviction includes thirty
    acts that required administrative sanctions, including fights, introduction of
    drugs/alcohol, possession of a dangerous weapon, assault, property destruction, and
    sexual activity. Given the district court’s explicit statement regarding its
    consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, the nature and seriousness of the danger to
    other persons or the community that a reduction in Boyd’s sentence may pose, and
    Boyd’s post-sentencing conduct, we are satisfied that the district court adequately
    weighed the appropriate factors in its decision to deny a sentence reduction. The
    length of Boyd’s post-sentencing misconduct report demonstrates both his failure to
    improve his behavior as well as the seriousness of the danger posed to the community
    by a further reduction in his sentence. Boyd’s loss of good time credit as a result of
    his behavior is of no consequence to the district court’s sentence reduction decision.
    Our review of Boyd’s sentence reveals no abuse of the district court’s wide
    discretion.
    -4-
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)
    motion to reduce Boyd’s sentence pursuant to Amendment 782.
    ______________________________
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-2097

Citation Numbers: 835 F.3d 791

Filed Date: 7/5/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023