Thomas v. City of Wichita , 29 F. App'x 564 ( 2002 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    JAN 30 2002
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    CHESTER A. THOMAS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                   No. 01-3167
    (D.C. No. 98-CV-1491-MLB)
    CITY OF WICHITA, a municipal                           (D. Kan.)
    corporation,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT           *
    Before LUCERO , PORFILIO , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
    Appellant Chester Thomas, appearing pro se, challenges the district court’s
    decision granting summary judgment in favor of appellee City of Wichita (“the
    City”) on his claims of discrimination based on disability under the Americans
    with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213, and based on race under
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
    collateral estoppel. The Court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
    judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
    conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). We have
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
    I
    On August 12, 1992, Thomas, then a firefighter for the City, injured his
    right arm and shoulder while attempting to lift a large heart-attack patient. On
    January 11, 1993, Thomas signed a resignation stating that he was physically
    unable to perform his duties as a firefighter. He had been told by his superiors
    that because there was no position that could accommodate his new limitations, he
    would either have to resign or be fired.
    Thomas subsequently applied for permanent partial work disability benefits.
    Michael Payne, risk manager for the City of Wichita, denied his request, stating
    that because Thomas had resigned voluntarily, he was excluded from benefits
    under Kansas’s worker’s compensation law.
    An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) heard Thomas’s benefits claim, and
    concluded that Thomas was entitled to benefits based on a 55% disability. This
    determination was appealed by the City, and the Worker’s Compensation Appeals
    Board reduced the award to benefits based on a 47.6% disability. A settlement
    was then reached by the parties for a lump-sum payment representing the total of
    Thomas’s benefit payments less 10%.
    -2-
    On September 1, 1998, Thomas filed complaints with the Equal
    Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Kansas Human Rights
    Commission alleging that the City had discriminated against him based on his
    disability when it forced him to resign and based on his race in its handling of his
    claim for worker’s compensation benefits. These agencies declined to pursue his
    claims. On December 22, 1998, Thomas filed this suit.
    The City moved for summary judgment on both the ADA and the Title VII
    claims, arguing that because Thomas resigned in 1992 but did not file his
    administrative complaints until 1998 he was well outside the 300-day time limit
    and his claims were barred.   1
    In response, Thomas stated that the continuing
    violation and equitable tolling doctrines applied to excuse this defect.
    The district court granted the City’s motion with respect to Thomas’s claim
    of disability discrimination, concluding that no continuing violation had been
    alleged because the only action purportedly based on Thomas’s disability was his
    forced resignation in 1993 and concluding that the doctrine of equitable tolling
    did not apply because there was no evidence that the City attempted to conceal
    facts from Thomas. Finally, the court determined that the race discrimination
    1
    Under Title VII’s time limitation requirements, which also apply to ADA
    actions, a lawsuit must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the
    discriminatory action in states, such as Kansas, that statutorily prohibit
    discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
    -3-
    claim was not time-barred because the City’s appeal of Thomas’s benefits award,
    alleged to be motivated by Thomas’s race, was within the 300-day time limit.
    A second motion for summary judgment on the remaining Title VII claim
    was then filed by the City, arguing that (1) Thomas had not established a prima
    facie case of discrimination; (2) even if Thomas had established his prima facie
    case, the City had proffered legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its
    treatment of his benefits claim; and (3) Thomas offered no evidence that those
    reasons were merely pretextual. The district court agreed, resolving the motion in
    favor of the City on the basis that Thomas had failed to show that the City’s
    purported reasons for its actions were unworthy of credence or motivated by
    Thomas’s race.
    II
    Our review of the district court’s decision granting summary judgment is
    de novo, and we apply the same standard as the district court.   Adler v. Wal-Mart
    Stores, Inc. , 
    144 F.3d 664
    , 670 (10th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is warranted
    when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
    On appeal, Thomas argues that either the continuing violation or equitable
    tolling doctrine should apply to excuse his delay in pursuing his ADA claim.
    Upon review of the briefs and the record, we conclude that the district court
    -4-
    correctly determined that neither of these concepts applies. We affirm on this
    issue, therefore, for the reasons stated by the district court.
    On his Title VII claim, Thomas argues that the City failed to provide
    a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for appealing Thomas’s benefits award.
    In reviewing Thomas’s argument, we note that “[t]he relevant inquiry is not
    whether [the employer’s] proffered reasons were wise, fair, or correct, but
    whether [the employer] honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith
    upon those beliefs.”   Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc.   , 
    186 F.3d 1301
    , 1318
    (10th Cir. 1999).
    There are two linchpins to Thomas’s argument: an internal memorandum
    setting forth the City’s strategy for responding to his claim, and the distinction
    between the 1993 and 1990 versions of the Kansas worker’s compensation law.
    According to Thomas, the City’s reason for denying his claim was not supported
    by the 1990 version of the law and the City knew the 1990 rather than the 1993
    version applied to his claim.
    First, the interoffice memorandum reveals no racial animus. As the district
    court concluded, it merely presents the City’s strategy for resolving Thomas’s
    claims on terms favorable to the City. Second, the City’s basis for rejecting
    Thomas’s claim appears to be equally tenable under either version of the Kansas
    statute. Payne reasoned that an employee who voluntarily resigned could
    -5-
    theoretically continue to earn a salary comparable to his pre-injury salary. While
    this logic was ultimately rejected by the ALJ and the Appeals Board, the
    conclusions of these two bodies were not based on any distinction between the
    two versions of the law.   Compare Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-510e(a) (1990)
    (disallowing benefits where employee is able to earn “comparable” wages)       with
    Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-510e(a) (1993) (disallowing benefits where employee is able
    to earn 90% of previous salary). Rather, the critical issue was the ALJ’s finding
    that Thomas had not resigned voluntarily, but had been forced to resign.
    Ultimately, the proceedings before the ALJ and Appeals Board involved
    legitimate disagreements among the various physicians and other witnesses
    regarding the nature and extent of Thomas’s injuries and the events surrounding
    his resignation/termination. While Thomas ultimately prevailed on these points,
    nothing suggests that the City’s position in these proceedings was frivolous.
    Legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons were offered by the City for appealing
    Thomas’s award.
    In light of this showing, the burden fell on Thomas to counter with specific
    facts showing that the City’s reasons for its appeal were unworthy of credence or
    racially motivated in some way.   See Bullington , 186 F.3d at 1317. This showing
    must be made by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific
    exhibits. See Adler , 144 F.3d at 670–71. Repeated, unsupported assertions by
    -6-
    Thomas that the City’s actions were based on his race are insufficient to defeat
    summary judgment.
    Finally, Thomas also appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for
    sanctions based on his allegation that the City had committed fraud, as evidenced
    by the above-referenced interoffice memorandum. We review the district court’s
    ruling on a motion for sanctions for abuse of discretion.    See Burkhart ex rel.
    Meeks v. Kinsley Bank , 
    852 F.2d 512
    , 515 (10th Cir. 1988). There is nothing
    suggesting that the City’s conduct before the court was fraudulent. Accordingly,
    we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.
    III
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue
    forthwith.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Carlos F. Lucero
    Circuit Judge
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-3167

Citation Numbers: 29 F. App'x 564

Judges: Anderson, Lucero, Porfilio

Filed Date: 1/30/2002

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023