Wattle v. Barko Hydraulics L.L.C. , 107 F. App'x 396 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                                         United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    August 5, 2004
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    __________________________                           Clerk
    No. 03-60979
    Summary Calendar
    __________________________
    C. W. WATTLE; TRAVELER’S INSURANCE COMPANY
    Plaintiffs - Appellees,
    versus
    BARKO HYDRAULICS L.L.C.,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ___________________________________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Mississippi
    (No. 1:01-CV-195-M)
    ___________________________________________________
    Before JONES, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
    *
    PER CURIAM:
    Barko Hydraulics L.L.C. (“Barko”) manufactures large and expensive machines
    called “feller-bunchers.” Used in the logging industry, feller-bunchers utilize saws to
    shear off trees near their base and metal arms to stack the logs on the ground. C.W. Wattle
    (“Wattle”), a veteran logger with 30 years of experience, purchased a feller-buncher from
    *
    Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should
    not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth
    in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
    Barko in 1998. Soon after the purchase, Wattle was operating the feller-buncher when it
    caught on fire, destroying much of the machine. Wattle sued Barko for breach of various
    warranties. After a three-day trial, during which experts testified on the cause of the fire
    and the value of the feller-buncher, the jury returned a verdict for Wattle. Barko moved
    the district court for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. Both motions were
    denied, Barko appeals.
    We must affirm the district court’s denial of Barko’s motion for a new trial unless
    there is a “clear showing of an abuse of discretion” by the district court. Hidden Oaks Ltd.
    v. City of Austin, 
    138 F.3d 1036
    , 1049 (5th Cir. 1998). Barko argues that the district court
    2
    abused its discretion by allowing the submission of expert opinions, after the close of
    discovery, from Jim Swain (“Swain”) and Dan Olsen (“Olsen”)—both of whom testified
    as to the cause and origin of the fire. In particular, Barko claims that it was prejudiced by
    the late-designated experts. See Campbell v. Keystone Aerial Surveys, 
    138 F.3d 996
     (5th
    Cir. 1998); Bradley v. U.S., 
    866 F.2d 120
     (5th Cir. 1989). In the cases Barko relies on, the
    parties were prejudiced because they lacked adequate time to prepare for the expert
    witnesses; here, however, Barko had ample opportunity to prepare—Swain and Olsen
    2
    Barko has two other complaints regarding witnesses. First, Barko argues that
    Wattle inappropriately testified to the after-value of the feller-buncher, an argument
    without merit considering Wattle did not testify at all about the after-value of the feller-
    buncher. Second, Barko asserts that the testimony of another witness on the issue of
    damages, Dexter Meredith, was prejudicial because Barko “had no idea” about the
    contents of Meredith’s opinions. The evidence does not support Barko’s claim:
    Meredith was listed as a witness on the pretrial order and his background as a claims
    adjuster was also disclosed.
    2
    were designated by Wattle over a year before trial.
    Barko also asserts that Olsen’s testimony was neither relevant nor reliable, two
    requirements for admission of expert testimony.              See Daubert v. Merrell Dow
    Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
    509 U.S. 579
    , 592 (1993). The district court concluded, based on
    Olsen’s professional background, the scope of his investigation, and the methodology of
    his report, that Olsen’s report was reliable. Barko fails to rebut these findings, instead
    offering arguments that conflate the reliability of the report with its correctness. But as this
    Court has noted, under Daubert one “need not prove to the judge that the expert’s
    testimony is correct.” Moore v. Ashland Chemical Inc., 
    151 F.3d 269
    , 276 (5th Cir. 1998).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion, and accordingly we will not overturn its
    denial of Barko’s motion for a new trial.
    Barko also claims that he deserves judgment as a matter of law. We review the
    district court’s ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo. See, e.g.,
    Mississippi Chemical Corp. v. Dresser-Rand Co., 
    287 F.3d 359
    , 365 (5th Cir. 2002). A
    judgment as a matter of law is granted by the district court if “there is no legally sufficient
    evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find” for Wattle. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a); Whitehead
    v. Food Max of Mississippi, Inc., 
    3 F.3d 265
    , 269 (5th Cir. 1998). Barko relies exclusively
    on Coursey v. Broadhurst, 
    888 F.2d 338
     (5th Cir. 1989). In Coursey, the plaintiff failed to
    submit any proof of the after-value for the tractor of his damaged tractor-trailer, and the
    plaintiff lost his appeal because of that omission. Barko asserts that Coursey requires this
    Court to separate a product into its component parts and the parties to offer proof of
    3
    damage for each component. Specifically, Barko argues that the sawhead and the rest of
    the feller-buncher were in fact two separate entities, and that Wattle’s failure to offer proof
    of damage to the sawhead alone entitles Barko to judgment as a matter of law. There is
    no language in Coursey, however, to support Barko’s contention. The court there was
    faced with the limited question of sufficiency of proof vis-à-vis the tractor—the question
    of trailer damages was not appealed—and did not face the questions of first, whether the
    trailer was part of the tractor or vice versa, or second, whether proof of damage to the
    3
    tractor-trailer was sufficient for the tractor alone. Barko’s reliance on Coursey is thus
    misguided and the district court was correct to find that the proof of damages for the
    whole feller-buncher was proper.
    Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
    3
    We also reject Barko’s objection to the jury instructions because the objection
    was premised on this faulty separation claim.
    4