Granderson v. Univ of MI , 211 F. App'x 398 ( 2006 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 06a0888n.06
Filed: December 12, 2006
No. 05-2453
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
CURTIS J. GRANDERSON, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
v. ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
)
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, ) OPINION
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
BEFORE: DAUGHTREY and COLE, Circuit Judges; RESTANI, Judge.*
R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge. This case involves the appeal of the district court’s
dismissal of a racial-discrimination claim brought by Curtis J. Granderson, Plaintiff-Appellant,
against his employer, the University of Michigan (“University”), Defendant-Appellee, under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. For the reasons that
follow, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND On January 2, 2001, the University fired
Granderson, a long-time food-service worker. More than a year after his termination, on March 21,
2002, Granderson filed a charge with the Michigan Employment Relations Commission
*
The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Chief Judge, United States Court of International Trade,
sitting by designation.
No. 05-2453
Granderson v. University of Michigan
(“MERC”)—a state agency that resolves labor disputes through the appointment of mediators,
arbitrators, and factfinders. In his charge, Granderson asserted federal claims against the University
under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”), in addition to numerous grievances against his union under Michigan’s Public
Employment Relations Act (“PERA”). Absent from his charge was any claim of racial
discrimination. Because the MERC lacks authority to enforce either the FMLA or the ADA and also
lacks authority to remedy PERA violations that occur more than six months prior to the filing of a
charge, the MERC dismissed all of Granderson’s claims.
On January 5, 2004, three years after his termination, Granderson filed suit pro se in federal
district court against the University and Tom Rhodes, his supervisor, alleging he was unlawfully
fired because he is African-American and because of psychological disabilities. Granderson further
alleged he experienced harassment, unfair criticism, false accusations, and retaliation during his time
with the University because of his race and disabilities. The complaint contained three counts
alleging numerous federal- and state-law violations.
On January 21, 2004, the district court dismissed Granderson’s supplemental state-law claims
without prejudice, leaving Granderson with claims under Title VII; the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After
committing a series of procedural errors—one resulting in the dismissal of Rhodes as a defendant
following a total failure to serve him with process—Granderson retained an attorney and, on March
17, 2005, filed a First Amended Complaint, which omitted all his previous claims except one count
of racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. Rather than answering Granderson’s complaint,
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Granderson v. University of Michigan
the University filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction arguing that
Granderson failed to exhaust administrative remedies by neglecting to file a charge of discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The district court granted the
University’s motion to dismiss, explaining that a plaintiff in a Title VII case must first file a timely
charge of discrimination with the EEOC and receive a right-to-sue letter before filing suit in federal
court. Because Granderson failed to file such a charge and could provide no valid excuse for this
failure, the court dismissed with prejudice Granderson’s Title VII claim—his only remaining claim.
On July 19, 2005, some four-and-a-half years after the University terminated him and a year-
and-a-half after filing his Title VII action in federal court, Granderson filed a charge with the EEOC
and received a right-to-sue letter. Granderson now appeals the dismissal of his Title VII action.
II. DISCUSSION
“In Title VII, Congress set up an elaborate administrative procedure, implemented through
the EEOC, that is designed to assist in the investigation of claims of racial discrimination in the
workplace and to work towards the resolution of these claims through conciliation rather than
litigation.” Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180-81 (1989) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(b)); see also Morgan v. Washington Mfg. Co., 660 F.2d 710, 711 (6th Cir. 1981) (explaining
the purpose of Title VII’s administrative scheme is “to encourage reconciliation and arbitration of
employee grievances prior to litigation”). It is well settled that a plaintiff must satisfy two
prerequisites before filing a Title VII action in federal court: (1) timely file a charge of employment
discrimination with the EEOC; and (2) receive and act upon the EEOC’s statutory notice of the right
to sue (“right-to-sue letter”). Puckett v. Tennessee Eastman Co., 889 F.2d 1481, 1486 (6th Cir.
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Granderson v. University of Michigan
1989) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798
(1973)). The proper exhaustion of administrative remedies gives the Title VII plaintiff a green light
to bring an employment-discrimination claim in court. See, e.g., Patterson, 491 U.S. at 181 (“Only
after . . . the plaintiff has obtained a ‘right to sue’ letter from the EEOC, may he or she bring a Title
VII action in court.”). Granderson acknowledges he never filed a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC and never received a right-to-sue letter before filing the underlying Title VII action.
On appeal, Granderson first argues that he attempted to proceed with available EEOC
administrative remedies but, because he was not alleging any form of workplace discrimination, the
EEOC intake supervisor directed him to “visit” the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”).
Once at the NLRB, Granderson claims he was then referred to a MERC agency in Lansing,
Michigan, where he ultimately filed his charge. As such, Granderson argues that he constructively
exhausted the administrative-filing requirement by filing a charge with the MERC.
This argument fails for several reasons. First, even if we were to assume that filing a charge
with the MERC is tantamount to filing a charge with the EEOC, which it is not, Granderson was late
in invoking the administrative process. A Title VII plaintiff must file a charge with the EEOC within
180 days after the occurrence of the alleged discriminatory employment practice or within 300 days,
if the claimant has “initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to
grant or seek relief from such practice.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Here, Granderson waited over
400 days after the University terminated him before filing a charge with the MERC, well outside
both the 180-day and 300-day filing requirements. Second, Granderson did not allege a Title VII
discrimination claim in his charge before the MERC such as to put the University on notice of a
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No. 05-2453
Granderson v. University of Michigan
potential claim of racial discrimination. The only claims Granderson alleged against the University
related to (1) improper notification of his rights under the FMLA and the ADA, and (2) improper
termination at the close of his FMLA leave and the start of his ADA leave. These factual allegations
were insufficient to put the University on notice that Granderson perceived himself to be the victim
of discrimination. Cf. Dixon v. Ashcroft, 392 F.3d 212, 218 (6th Cir. 2004) (applying the “scope of
investigation test” to determine whether factual allegations were sufficient to put the EEOC on
notice that the claimant perceived himself to be a victim of racial discrimination). In sum, even if
we were to consider Granderson’s MERC charge equivalent to an EEOC charge, it would still not
provide a green light to bring a Title VII action in court: Granderson did not file his charge on time,
nor did the charge contain a claim of racial discrimination.
Next, Granderson argues, in essence, that Title VII’s exhaustion requirement should be
equitably tolled as he has now filed a charge with the EEOC. See, e.g., Truitt v. County of Wayne,
148 F.3d 644, 646 (6th Cir. 1998) (explaining that the exhaustion requirement is a precondition
“that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling”) (citation
omitted). Granderson attributes his four-year delay in filing charges with the EEOC to being “bed
ridden and house bound” with a pain level that was “10+.” These reasons do not, however, exempt
him from Title VII’s timely filing and exhaustion requirements. See Lomax v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., No. 99-6589, 2000 WL 1888715, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 19, 2000) (per curiam) (“[A]ll [Title VII]
claimants, including pro se claimants, have a responsibility to meet the requirements of the law . .
. .”); see also Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456 (1st Cir. 1996) (“[P]ro se status does not
relieve [a plaintiff] of the obligation to meet procedural requirements established by law.”).
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No. 05-2453
Granderson v. University of Michigan
Granderson has simply presented nothing persuasive to excuse his lengthy delay in filing a charge
with the EEOC.
Finally, Granderson argues that his attorney was incompetent, missed hearings, did not
answer motions, did not submit briefs, met with Granderson only to tell him that his case had been
dismissed, and refused to explain the district court’s judgment dismissing the case. Even if these
claims are correct, they do not excuse Granderson’s delay in seeking relief before the EEOC.
Granderson failed to file a charge with the EEOC for over four years and waited over 400 days
before filing a charge with the MERC. Granderson’s attorney cannot be blamed for this delay, as
Granderson had not yet retained an attorney during most of this time.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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