Larry Groover v. Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc. , 420 F. App'x 358 ( 2011 )


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  •      Case: 10-30651 Document: 00511425544 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/28/2011
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    March 28, 2011
    No. 10-30651                         Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    LARRY GROOVER; AMBER LEE WELLS, natural guardian and mother of
    Brianna Sadie Nicole; LAURA CRISTINA MARCADO, natural guardian and
    mother of Matthew Gabriel Nickolas,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants
    v.
    CAMP DRESSER & MCKEE INC., also known as CDM; WILLIAM E.
    ROUEGE; ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY; ACE
    AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendants - Appellees
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 2:07-cv-00252-CJB-SS
    Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Camp Dresser & McKee (CDM) contracted with St. Tammany Parish,
    Louisiana (hereinafter the Parish) to serve as an independent contractor and
    supervise and manage the removal and clean up of debris resulting from
    Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. After competitive bidding, the Parish hired OMNI
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .
    R. 47.5.4.
    Case: 10-30651 Document: 00511425544 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/28/2011
    No. 10-30651
    Pinnacle, LLC (OMNI) to provide all labor and materials necessary to remove
    the debris. In accordance with this contract, one of OMNI’s subcontractors hired
    Groover Tree Services (GTS) to cut and trim trees at certain locations. As a crew
    from GTS was working at one of these sites, Chad Groover (Groover) was
    electrocuted and later died from complications related to the incident.
    Subsequently, Groover’s family members brought a negligence action against
    multiple defendants. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.
    The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. We
    AFFIRM.
    I.
    On March 20, 2006, the Parish entered into a contract with CDM, a
    consulting engineering firm.     Attached to the contract was a “Property
    Demolition Debris Removal Plan” (hereinafter PDDR) that defined the scope of
    CDM’s services. The PDDR explained that CDM was to act as the Parish’s
    designated representative to “monitor, supervise and manage all aspects of the
    demolition and debris removal contract and insure that only eligible work is
    performed.” Following the signing of CDM’s contract, the Parish awarded OMNI
    a contract whereby OMNI agreed to provide “all labor and materials and perform
    all of the work” necessary to remove designated hurricane debris. To assist
    OMNI in the performance of the contract, OMNI entered into a subcontract with
    Cahaba Disaster Recovery (Cahaba). In furtherance of its obligation under the
    subcontract with OMNI, Cahaba then entered into a subcontract with Sure
    Form, Inc. (Sure Form), which in turn, entered into an oral agreement with GTS.
    On the morning of December 7, 2006, William Rouege (Rouege), a CDM
    work-site monitor, received a “Work-Site Plan” (WSP) that identified specific
    trees or limbs that the Federal Emergency Management Agency predetermined
    eligible and authorized for removal from the designated location. Rouege arrived
    at the work site, met with and discussed the work with the property owner, and
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    No. 10-30651
    awaited the arrival of a work crew. Shortly thereafter, the GTS work crew
    arrived at the job site. Rouege performed a walkthrough with the work crew and
    identified the specific trees or limbs to be removed according to the WSP. The
    work crew began to cut and trim trees identified on the WSP. Groover was
    operating an aerial lift machine, which had been delivered on site to reach limbs
    and branches that were in the trees high above the work area. As Groover
    maneuvered around the job site and raised the basket of the lift machine into
    place, the basket made contact with an energized power line, and he was
    electrocuted. Seven months later, Groover died from complications resulting
    from the incident.
    Subsequently, Larry Groover, Chad Groover’s brother; Amber Lee Wells,
    the mother and guardian of Groover’s daughter; and Laura Cristina Marcado,
    the mother and guardian of Groover’s son (collectively Plaintiffs), filed suit
    against multiple defendants, including CDM, Rouege, and CDM’s insurers,
    Zurich American Insurance Company (Zurich), and ACE American Insurance
    Company (ACE) (collectively Defendants).1 The Plaintiffs alleged that CDM was
    negligent and that the company’s negligence caused Larry Groover to suffer
    mental anguish when he witnessed his brother’s death.
    The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Relevant here,
    they alleged that they did not have a legal duty to protect Groover from injury.
    The Plaintiffs filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment, asking the
    1
    The Plaintiffs filed suit against numerous defendants, and the defendants filed
    several third-party claims. Relevant to the present appeal, the Plaintiffs filed suit against
    CDM, Rouege, Zurich, ACE, Scottsdale Insurance Company (hereinafter Scottsdale), Omni,
    and Cahaba. In Groover v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 
    586 F.3d 1012
    (5th Cir. 2009), a panel of this
    court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants
    Scottsdale, Omni, and Cahaba. At issue in this case is the Plaintiffs’ appeal of the district
    court’s grant of CDM, Zurich, and Rouege’s joint motion for summary judgment. At the
    district court, ACE adopted this motion for summary judgment. Thus, the district court’s
    judgment also applied to ACE. In a letter to this court, on November 1, 2010, ACE adopted
    CDM’s filing with this court, claiming that its interests are aligned with CDM’s.
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    district court to conclude that the Defendants had a statutory duty, under the
    Louisiana Overhead Power Line Safety Act (OPLSA), L A. R EV. S TAT.
    §§ 45:141–46, to contact the local electric company and have the power lines de-
    energized prior to the incident. The district court held a hearing on the parties’
    motions. After hearing arguments from the parties, the district court orally
    granted the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Plaintiffs timely
    appealed.
    II.
    A.
    This court reviews a district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment
    and application of state law de novo. Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 
    476 F.3d 337
    , 343 (5th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant
    shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
    is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(a).   If the movant
    demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts
    to the non-movant to provide specific facts showing the existence of a genuine
    issue for trial. 
    Id. 56(c), (e).
                                            B.
    This is a diversity case, and Louisiana state law governs the issue of
    liability. Under Louisiana law, the threshold issue in a negligence action is
    whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty. Audler v. CBC Innovis Inc.,
    
    519 F.3d 239
    , 249 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Meany v. Meany, 
    639 So. 2d 229
    , 233
    (La. 1994)). Whether a duty is owed is a question of law. 
    Audler, 519 F.3d at 249
    . “In deciding whether to impose a duty in a particular case, Louisiana
    courts examine whether the plaintiff has any law to support the claim that the
    defendant owed him a duty.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Here, the
    Plaintiffs have not pointed to sufficient evidence to establish nor provided case
    law to support their contention that CDM owed GTS a duty.
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    The Plaintiffs claim that CDM was the principal and GTS was an
    independent contractor. Thus, they contend, CDM had a duty to GTS because
    CDM allegedly controlled and expressly authorized the unsafe work practices
    that led to Groover’s death. See Roberts v. Cardinal Servs. Inc., 
    266 F.3d 368
    ,
    380 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that, under Louisiana law, a principal is not
    liable for the injuries resulting from the negligent acts of an independent
    contractor, unless the principal retained “operational control” over the
    contractor’s work, expressly or impliedly approved the unsafe work practices, or
    the activity is ultrahazardous). However, the Plaintiffs have not shown, as a
    threshold matter, that a principal-independent contractor relationship existed
    between CDM and GTS.
    It is well-established under Louisiana law that “the relationship between
    the principal and the independent contractor is in large measure determined by
    the terms of the contract itself.” Duplantis v. Shell, 
    948 F.2d 187
    , 193 (5th Cir.
    1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). By examining the contract, the court
    can determine to what extent the alleged principal reserved the right to control
    the alleged independent contractor’s work. 
    Id. Here, the
    record shows—and the
    parties acknowledge—that CDM and GTS did not have a contract. CDM’s
    contract was with the Parish. GTS’s contract was an oral agreement with Sure
    Form. It appears that the Plaintiffs ask us to presume that the relationship
    between CDM and GTS was that of principal-independent contractor based on
    CDM’s contract with the Parish, the PDDR, and CDM’s General Health and
    Safety Plan for its employees. Having closely examined the record, we decline
    to hold that, as a matter of law, a principal-independent contractor relationship
    existed between the parties.
    Finally, the Plaintiffs’ argue that the district court erred in dismissing
    their partial motion for summary judgment because CDM’s alleged duty arises
    under the OPLSA. However, this argument is contrary to the OPLSA’s purpose.
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    The OPLSA provides a means by which powerline operators and owners can hold
    individuals and companies liable “for all damages, costs, or expenses incurred
    by the owner or operator as a result” of contact with powerlines during the
    course of unauthorized work. L A. R EV. S TAT. § 45:144(A). See generally Moreno
    v. Entergy Corp., 
    49 So. 3d 418
    , 420–21 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2010) (energy company
    sought indemnification pursuant to the OPLSA). Thus, the Plaintiffs’ arguments
    are unavailing and the district court did not err in dismissing their motion.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.
    6