Rosel Hurley, III v. Nat'l Basketball Players Ass'n ( 2022 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 22a0544n.06
Case No. 22-3038
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Dec 30, 2022
ROSEL C. HURLEY, III, )
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
)
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v.
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE
NATIONAL BASKETBALL PLAYERS
) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
ASSOCIATION & NATIONAL BASKETBALL
) OHIO
ASSOCIATION,
) OPINION
Defendants-Appellees. )
Before: SILER, BUSH, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Lawyer Rosel C. Hurley III had designs on
becoming an agent for players in the National Basketball Association. So he applied to take an
exam the National Basketball Players Association requires for certification as an agent. The NBPA
told Hurley that he was approved to take the exam, only to reverse course and reject his application
days before the exam date. Hurley responded by filing an antitrust suit against the NBPA and the
NBA. The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. We now affirm.
I.
The NBPA is a non-profit corporation and labor organization within the meaning of the
National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5). Its player agents are the exclusive
Case No. 22-3038, Hurley v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, et al.
representatives for NBA players. But becoming an agent is far from a slam dunk. To represent
an NBA player, a prospective agent must both pass an exam and be certified by the NBPA.
Hurley applied to take the exam. In his application, he disclosed that, at the time, his law
license had been suspended by the Ohio Supreme Court. He also answered follow-up requests
from the NBPA. The NBPA informed Hurley that he had been approved to take the online exam.
But just two days before the exam date, the NBPA told Hurley that he would not be allowed to do
so.
Hurley cried foul. According to him, the reason given for his application’s denial—his
disciplinary history—was pretextual. In Hurley’s view, the NBPA and NBA, for reasons unstated,
did not want him to be an agent. So he filed suit against the two associations. The gist of Hurley’s
complaint was that defendants violated the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2. Defendants’ actions,
Hurley alleged, “would cause a reasonable person to believe that the [NBPA was] acting in concert
with and at the behest of a non-labor member or group, [the NBA,] in order to ensure [Hurley’s]
exclusion from the marketplace the [d]efendants completely control.” Complaint, R. 1, PageID# 6
¶ 14.
The district court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). It viewed the NBPA’s alleged actions as statutorily exempted from the Sherman Act,
and the NBA’s purported actions as nonstatutorily exempted from the same. Hurley timely
appealed.
II.
Hurley’s appeal boils down to one issue: whether he proffered viable Sherman Act claims.
In essence, Hurley believes that the NBPA acted in concert with the NBA to deny him the ability
to take the player agent exam in violation of sections 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act. We review the
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district court’s dismissal of those claims de novo, meaning we “accept as true all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint and ask whether those allegations plausibly suggest an entitlement to
relief.” Grow Mich., LLC v. LT Lender, LLC, 50 F.4th 587, 593 (6th Cir. 2022).
Basic principles of antitrust law foreclose Hurley’s claims. Start with his claim against the
NBPA. Generally speaking, the Sherman Act prohibits monopolizing or unreasonably restraining
trade and commerce. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2. But Congress did not dispatch the Act to cover all
actors. One example is labor unions: Congress broadly exempted them from the Act’s
prohibitions. Clayton Act § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (“Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations . . . , or to forbid or
restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.”); see also H.A. Artists
& Assocs. v. Actors’ Equity Ass’n, 451 U.S. 704, 713–16 (1981). In view of this broad exception,
we see no basis for imposing antitrust liability against the NBPA alone. See also Indep. Sports &
Ent. v. Fegan, No. CV 17-02397-AB, 2017 WL 2598550, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2017)
(recognizing “that the NBPA is exempt from the Sherman Act and thus can monopolize the
representation of basketball players”); Collins v. Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n, 850 F. Supp.
1468, 1475 (D. Colo. 1991) (“The NBPA Regulations . . . are exempt from antitrust law.”), aff’d,
976 F.2d 740, 1992 WL 236919, at *2 (10th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table decision) (“[T]he
statutory labor exemption from the Sherman Act permits the NBPA to establish a certification
procedure for player agents.”).
Hurley fares no better by alleging conspiratorial conduct between the NBPA and the NBA.
The NBPA, says Hurley, “was acting in concert with a non-union member to boycott [Hurley]
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from taking the NBPA Agent Exam.” Blue Br. at *10. Here again, Hurley confronts the statutory
exemption for unions, albeit in an extended fashion. Drawing upon the spirit of the union
exemption, the Supreme Court, through “nonstatutory” means, Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers
& Steamfitters Loc. Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975), has similarly “excluded from
antitrust scrutiny” “[a]ny anticompetitive effect of a properly bargained collective bargaining
agreement.” Nat’l Hockey League Players Ass’n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d
462, 474 (6th Cir. 2005). It did so in view of “the congressional policy favoring collective
bargaining under the NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free competition in business
markets.” Connell Constr., 421 U.S. at 622; see also Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d
at 474.
Applied in this setting, that exception encompasses the NBPA’s agreement with the NBA.
By all accounts, the parties’ collective bargaining was standard fare, done for the purpose of
protecting players from unscrupulous agent behavior. Collins, 850 F. Supp. At 1478–79. In the
absence of plausible allegations that the bargaining was not conducted in self-interested ways,
there is little basis to find liability under the Sherman Act. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.
219, 232 (1941); Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 689–90 (1965) (exempting
restrictions obtained “through bona fide, arm’s-length bargaining in pursuit of their own labor
union policies, and not at the behest of or in combination with nonlabor groups”); Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 250 (1996) (exempting conduct that “grew out of, and was directly
related to, the lawful operation of the bargaining process[,] involved a matter that the parties were
required to negotiate collectively[, and] concerned only the parties to the collective-bargaining
relationship”).
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True, as Hurley notes, the exemption has not been extended to situations where unions are
“aid[ing] non-labor groups to create business monopolies and to control the marketing of goods
and services.” Allen Bradley Co. v. Loc. Union No. 3, Int’l Bhd. Of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797,
808 (1945); cf. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 232 (“So long as a union acts in its self-interest and does
not combine with non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under [§ 17] are not to be distinguished
by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness
or unselfishness of the end of which the particular union activities are the means.” (footnote
omitted)). See also Conn. Ironworkers Emps. Ass’n v. New England Reg’l Council of Carpenters,
869 F.3d 92, 102–03 (2d Cir. 2017). Yet Hurley points to nothing that would suggest that is what
happened here. All he can muster is the assertion that “a reasonable person would assume that,”
in view of the NBPA’s eleventh-hour reversal and ensuing denial of his application, the NBPA
and NBA must have impermissibly conspired to restrain trade. We need not credit this conclusory
statement as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); 16630 Southfield Ltd. P’ship
v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 2013). Nor would it make sense to do so, in
view of the statutory and case law backdrop we write against. After all, saying that the mere fact
that parties entered into a standard collective bargaining agreement constitutes improperly
“aid[ing] non-labor groups to . . . control the marketing of goods and services,” Allen Bradley Co.,
325 U.S. at 808, disregards the longstanding balance struck between competing congressional
policies. See Connell Constr., 421 U.S. at 622. It would likewise elevate the exception to the
point where it swallows the rule.
All told, the bargained agreement between the NBPA and NBA is protected from Hurley’s
antitrust suit, even if he could identify anticompetitive consequences arising out of it. See
Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 419 F.3d at 474.
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* * * * *
Some final housekeeping matters are in order. One, because the labor exemptions to
antitrust laws preclude Hurley’s Sherman Act claims, we need not reach the other challenges to
those claims. Two, to the extent Hurley argues that the NBPA violated the Railway Labor Act, 45
U.S.C. §§ 151–188, those arguments are forfeited, as he did not make them before the district
court. Sheet Metal Workers’ Health & Welfare Fund of N.C. v. Law Off. of Michael A. DeMayo,
LLP, 21 F.4th 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2021).
Lastly, there remains the issue of arbitration between Hurley and the NBPA. Before the
district court, the two agreed that Hurley was required to bring any challenges to the propriety of
the NBPA’s denial of his application before an arbitrator. To the extent that issue is still live, we
leave Hurley with whatever arbitration rights he previously possessed.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
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