Keybank Nat'l Ass'n v. Leff , 276 F. App'x 486 ( 2008 )


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  •             NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    File Name: 08a0246n.06
    Filed: May 8, 2008
    07-1866
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    KEYBANK NATIONAL                                          )
    ASSOCIATION,                                              )
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                                 )
    )
    v.                                                        )     ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
    )     STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
    RONNIE LEFF, individually and as                          )     THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
    trustee of the Ronnie H. Leff 2005                        )     MICHIGAN
    Family Trust, LESLIE LEFF,                                )
    individually and as trustee of the Leslie                 )
    Jan Leff Family Trust,                                    )
    )
    Defendants-Appellants.
    Before: DAUGHTREY, COOK, and FARRIS,* Circuit Judges.
    FARRIS, Circuit Judge.
    Ronnie and Leslie Leff, individually and as trustees of family trusts in their
    names, appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Keybank
    *
    The Hon. Jerome Farris, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    National Association. The Leffs contend that the district court misconstrued several
    payment guaranties and expanded the scope of their liability as guarantors. The Leffs
    also contend that the admission of an email into evidence violated Federal Rule of
    Evidence 408. We affirm.
    I
    We review de novo “[q]uestions of contract interpretation, including those that
    form the basis for the grant of summary judgment.” Royal Ins. Co. v. Orient Overseas
    Container Line Ltd., 
    514 F.3d 621
    , 634 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
    The Leffs contend that the court must read the construction loan agreements,
    promissory notes, and payment guaranties together. “Contracts of guaranty are to be
    construed like other contracts. . . .” Morris & Co. v. Lucker, 
    158 Mich. 518
    , 519
    (Mich. 1909).1 “Where one writing references another instrument for additional
    contract terms, the two writings should be read together.” Forge v. Smith, 
    458 Mich. 198
    , 207 (1998). They contend that the payment guaranties must be read with the
    contemporaneously formed construction loan agreements and promissory notes that
    also refer to each other.
    The Leffs further urge the court to limit the scope of the guaranties based on
    section 4.1(a) of the construction loan agreements. “[U]nambiguous contracts are not
    1
    Michigan law applies to this diversity action.
    2
    open to judicial construction and must be enforced as written.” 
    Id. at 467
    (emphasis
    in original). Nothing in the relevant contracts requires us to consider the language
    of section 4.1(a) to ascertain the scope of guaranties. The plain language is
    unambiguous. See 
    id. The Leffs
    agreed to guarantee their share of the full amount
    of the promissory notes and loans.
    Moreover, nothing in section 4.1(a) demonstrates its relevance to the payment
    guaranties. Section 4.1(a) refers only to KeyBank’s maximum loan obligation and
    is not a limitation on the guaranty. A “contract should not be given a forced,
    unnatural or unreasonable construction which would extend or restrict the [contract]
    beyond what is fairly within its terms, or which would lead to an absurd conclusion
    or render the [contract] nonsensical and ineffective.” Mich. Twp. Participating Plan
    v. Pavolich, 
    591 N.W.2d 325
    , 329 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). The Leffs’ construction
    of the relevant contracts would lead to an “absurd conclusion.” 
    Id. II The
    Leffs contend that the district court erroneously admitted an email that
    included settlement-related information.
    We review the district court’s denial of a motion to strike evidence for abuse
    of discretion. See Seay v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 
    339 F.3d 454
    , 480 (6th Cir. 2003).
    Rule 408 bars admission of evidence that is “offered to prove liability for . . .
    3
    furnishing or offering or promising” to compromise a claim. Fed. R. Evid. 408(a)(1).
    It also excludes “conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations regarding
    the claim.” 
    Id. at 408(a)(2).
    Nothing suggests that this email falls within Rule 408.
    It was not part of a settlement negotiation, and it was not an offer to compromise.
    Further, the contents of the email do not bear on the interpretation of the relevant
    contracts.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-1866

Citation Numbers: 276 F. App'x 486

Filed Date: 5/8/2008

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023