United States v. Toscana , 241 F. App'x 325 ( 2007 )


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  •                                       File Name: 07a0601n.06
    Filed: August 21, 2007
    NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
    No. 06-3676
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                           )
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                         )   ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
    )   STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
    v.                                          )   SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO,
    )   WESTERN DIVISION
    GEORGE TOSCANA,                                     )
    )
    Defendant-Appellant.                        )                  OPINION
    )
    Before: KENNEDY and COOK, Circuit Judges; and ALDRICH, District Judge.*
    ANN ALDRICH, District Judge.                Defendant-appellant George Osvaldo Toscana
    (“Toscana”) appeals the 40-month sentence handed down by the district court pursuant to his guilty
    plea on the grounds that the sentence is not “reasonable” under United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005), because the district court failed to properly take into account Toscana’s cooperation with
    authorities and his family situation, failed to properly take into account his criminal history, and
    failed to credit Toscana because of his alleged “minor role” in the offense. Because the sentence
    imposed by the district court is reasonable and the district court satisfied the requirements of 18
    *
    The Honorable Ann Aldrich, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio,
    sitting by designation.
    1
    U.S.C. § 3553, the sentence is affirmed.
    In October 2002, Toscana and three other individuals were arrested for transporting cocaine
    from California to Ohio. Two of the individuals were driving one vehicle, which contained the
    cocaine; Toscana and Obed Moreno (“Moreno”) were following in another vehicle. After Ohio
    police officers stopped the first vehicle for a traffic violation and found cocaine following a search,
    Toscana and Moreno were arrested when police called them to arrange for a controlled delivery. At
    his change of plea hearing on May 14, 2004, Toscana admitted to planning the crime with Moreno,
    approaching the driver of the first car with Moreno, and recruiting the passenger in the first car on
    his own. As part of his plea agreement, Toscana was to assist law enforcement in investigating the
    individual who had supplied the cocaine he and the others had been transporting. In exchange,
    plaintiff-appellee the United States of America (the “Government”), agreed to file a motion for a
    downward departure at sentencing if Toscana provided substantial assistance. Prior to sentencing,
    a presentence investigation report (“PSR”) was prepared, which listed five convictions on Toscana’s
    criminal record, mostly for driving while on a suspended license, along with a number of other
    arrests. The PSR also noted that Toscana had committed the instant offense while on probation for
    one of his previous convictions, and within two years of release from a term of imprisonment on one
    of his previous convictions. Based on the applicable sentencing guidelines, Toscana had a criminal
    history category of IV.
    Toscana was sentenced on March 10, 2006, to a term of 40 months imprisonment on the
    charge of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841,
    846. In accordance with the plea agreement, the Government did file a motion for a downward
    departure based on the assistance rendered by Toscana, which the district court granted. The district
    2
    court credited Toscana for his assistance, though it noted that Toscana was not completely
    cooperative. The district court also noted Toscana’s large family, including his five children, in
    discussing whether Toscana was likely to commit other crimes in the future. The district court also
    departed downward with respect to Toscana’s criminal history, finding that a criminal history
    category of IV overstated Toscana’s criminal record, but that the criminal history category of I
    sought by Toscana could not be supported by the facts, settling on a criminal history category of II.
    The district court also rejected Toscana’s request for a reduction based on his alleged “minor role”,
    because Toscana had admitted that he helped to plan the operation with Moreno and had recruited
    the passenger in the first car. The driver of the first car and Moreno received sentences of 18 and
    27 months, respectively. Toscana’s sentence of 40 months, though 6 months below his guideline
    range of 46 to 57 months based on a final offense level of 22 and a criminal history category of II,
    exceeded the sentences of his co-defendants. Toscana did not make any objections after the district
    court imposed the 40 month sentence. Toscana then filed the instant appeal on May 11, 2006,
    challenging his sentence as unreasonable.
    Toscana argues that his sentence is unreasonable because the district court failed to properly
    consider his assistance to the Government, his large family, and his criminal history, and failed to
    credit him for his “minor role” in the crime. The applicable standard of review is whether the
    sentence imposed by a district court was reasonable. United States v. Richardson, 
    437 F.3d 550
    , 553
    (6th Cir. 2006). Although Toscana did not raise any specific objections below, the Government
    concedes that the colloquy at sentencing was insufficient for Toscana to have waived any objections
    to his sentence by failing to raise them, so that the standard of review here is for reasonableness, not
    plain error. United States v. Clark, 
    469 F.3d 568
    , 569-71 (6th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
    3
    Reasonableness review has “both substantive and procedural components.” United States v.
    Jones, 
    445 F.3d 865
    , 869 (6th Cir.2006). A sentence may be procedurally unreasonable if “the
    district judge fails to ‘consider’ the applicable Guidelines range or neglects to ‘consider’ the other
    factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and instead simply selects what the judge deems an appropriate
    sentence without such required consideration.” United States v. Webb, 
    403 F.3d 373
    , 383 (6th Cir.
    2005); see also United States v. McBride, 
    434 F.3d 470
    , 476 n. 3 (6th Cir. 2006). A sentence may
    be substantively unreasonable where the district court “select[s] the sentence arbitrarily, bas[es] the
    sentence on impermissible factors, fail[s] to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors, or giv[es] an
    unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” 
    Webb, 403 F.3d at 385
    .
    Although sentences within the guidelines range are afforded a presumption of reasonableness,
    sentences falling outside the guidelines range are neither presumptively reasonable nor
    presumptively unreasonable. United States v. Williams, 
    436 F.3d 706
    , 708 (6th Cir. 2006); United
    States v. Foreman, 
    436 F.3d 638
    , 644 (6th Cir. 2006). Regardless of whether the sentence imposed
    is inside or outside the guidelines range, the district court “must articulate the reasons for the
    particular sentence imposed in order to enable this [c]ourt to engage in a meaningful reasonableness
    review of the sentence.” 
    Jones, 445 F.3d at 869
    . These reasons include an acknowledgment on the
    record of the defendant’s arguments for a lower sentence and an explanation of the court’s reasons
    for rejecting those arguments. See 
    Richardson, 437 F.3d at 554
    . The district court’s overall task
    remains that of imposing “‘a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
    purposes’ of section 3553(a)(2).” 
    Foreman, 436 F.3d at 644
    n.1 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
    Toscana argues that three issues in this case demonstrate that his sentence is unreasonable.
    First, he argues that the district court failed to properly take into account the totality of his
    4
    circumstances – specifically his cooperation with authorities and his family situation – as required
    by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) and (b)(1). However, Toscana’s sentence is procedurally reasonable
    because the district court did, in fact, take into account both of those facts in arriving at Toscana’s
    sentence. United States v. Cage, 
    458 F.3d 537
    , 543-44 (6th Cir. 2006); 
    McBride, 434 F.3d at 477-78
    (holding that if the sentencing court discusses an issue, then explains its sentencing rationale, the
    mandate of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 is satisfied, even if the issue’s specific impact on the sentence is not
    explained). Moreover, because Toscana appears to challenge only the extent of the court’s
    downward departure, his claim is not cognizable on appeal. United States v. Jones, 
    417 F.3d 547
    ,
    551 (6th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The district court gave Toscana full credit for his assistance.
    Toscana has provided no basis for credit beyond that given by the district court.
    Second, Toscana argues that the district court, in finding that criminal history category II
    should apply to him, still overstated his criminal background and thus failed to properly account for
    his criminal history as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) and (a)(4). Because Toscana’s initial
    criminal history category would have been IV, Toscana is effectively challenging the degree of the
    district court’s downward departure. Like Toscana’s challenge to the degree of the downward
    departure for his cooperation, this claim is not cognizable on appeal. United States v. Ridge, 
    329 F.3d 535
    , 544-45 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). More importantly, there is no error in the
    district court’s decision to depart downward to criminal history category II, as Toscana’s criminal
    record does not justify a departure to category I, as sought by Toscana.
    Finally, Toscana challenges the district court’s denial of credit because of Toscana’s alleged
    “minor role” in the offense as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) and (a)(4). We review the district
    court’s finding in this respect for clear error. United States v. Stone, 
    432 F.3d 651
    , 655 (6th Cir.
    5
    2005) (citation omitted). The district court considered this argument at sentencing, and rejected it.
    Based on the facts Toscana admitted at his change of plea hearing, there is no error – much less clear
    error – in the district court’s refusal to find that Toscana played a “minor role” in the crime. Toscana
    planned the enterprise with Moreno and recruited the first car’s passenger on his own; his role cannot
    be found to have been “minor”.
    Because the district court discussed and considered each of the issues raised by Toscana in
    this appeal, his sentence was procedurally reasonable. Because the district court clearly explained
    why it imposed the sentence it did, did not rely on any impermissible factors or give unreasonable
    weight to any permissible factors, and departed 6 months below the applicable guideline range,
    Toscana’s sentence is also substantively reasonable.
    For the foregoing reasons, the sentence imposed by the district court is affirmed.
    6