Jascha Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio ( 2023 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 23a0024n.06
Case No. 21-3996
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
JASCHA CHIAVERINI; CHIAVERINI, ) Jan 11, 2023
INC., ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
v.
) THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
) OHIO
CITY OF NAPOLEON, OHIO, et al.,
)
Defendants-Appellees. ) OPINION
Before: MOORE, CLAY, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. After Jascha Chiaverini bought stolen jewelry, he faced
several demands to return the property. The rightful owners, a police letter, and several officers
requested its return. But Chiaverini refused. He instead confronted the chief of police and alluded
that he operated his business without a license. Following a police investigation, a municipal judge
issued arrest and search warrants against Chiaverini for retaining stolen property, a licensing
violation, and money laundering. And a preliminary hearing confirmed the probable cause
underlying those charges. After those charges were dropped, Chiaverini filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983action, alleging malicious prosecution and false arrest. Because probable cause existed, the district
court granted summary judgment on his claims. And we affirm for the same reason.
No. 21-3996, Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, et al.
I.
Jascha Chiaverini managed a jewelry store in Napoleon, Ohio called the Diamond and Gold
Outlet.1 One day, he bought a men’s ring and a diamond earring from Brent Burns, the purported
owner of the jewelry, for $45. Before Burns left, Chiaverini completed a “buy card,”2 copied
Burns’ driver’s license, and photographed the ring and earring.
That same day, David and Christina Hill called the Outlet, asking if anyone had come in to
sell their stolen ring. Chiaverini told them to make a police report, yet David allegedly refused.
And Chiaverini denied having bought the ring they described. On the last call, David told
Chiaverini, “I know you bought it. . . . “[Y]ou bought it from Brent Burns.” At that point,
Chiaverini told David that “this conversation is ending.”
Both the Hills and Chiaverini called the police. An audio recording captured Chiaverini’s
conversation. He told a 911 dispatcher that the Hills would call “making a police report on some
jewelry.” He wanted to avoid “get[ting] into a pissing battle with” the Hills. And he asserted that
he was “just trying to be cooperative.”
Chiaverini said that he “believe[d] [he] may have [had the Hills’] property.” He clarified
that he did not know if he had the stolen jewelry, but he wanted “an officer” to come and talk to
him, not the Hills.3 But Chiaverini didn’t get what he wanted. David came to the Outlet, and the
police followed close behind.
1
Chiaverini, Inc., another plaintiff-appellant, owns that Outlet.
2
This card lists the biographical information of the seller and a description of the items sold.
3
Chief Weitzel later stated that this kind of call was common and, in his experience, not necessarily
indicative of innocence. He stated that, “I’ve seen many, many cases where somebody rushes to
the phone to make excuses.” (R. 93, Weitzel Deposition, PageID 2024.)
2
No. 21-3996, Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, et al.
Officers David Steward and Nicholas Evanoff arrived on the scene as David “started
screaming.” David provided Officer Steward with a description of the items and stated that Burns
stole them from him earlier that week. At the same time, Officer Evanoff spoke with Chiaverini.
Chiaverini provided the officers with photos of the jewelry and gave information on Burns. Before
leaving, Officer Evanoff confirmed that the items were stolen and instructed Chiaverini not to sell
them.
Officer Steward authored the narrative report on this incident. And later, Steward added
“additional details concerning the discussion[.]” One of the updates was a statement that
Chiaverini allegedly made to Officer Evanoff. According to Steward, Chiaverini stated that “the
reason he bought the ring and kept records regarding the purchase, was because he suspected that
it was in fact stolen.” In support of this, Officer Evanoff later said that Chiaverini “stated he
believed . . . the ring to be stolen” and “[t]hat’s why he filled out the buy card, because Brent Burns
normally sold him fake jewelry.” But Chiaverini denies saying this. So the veracity of Officer
Steward’s update is in dispute.
Officer Steward justified omitting the statement from the original narrative because at the
time “Burns was the suspect, not” Chiaverini. But when Chiaverini himself became a criminal
suspect, Officer Steward updated the narrative with what he now believed to be “important
information.” And Chief Robert Weitzel explained that updating reports in this fashion occurs on
a “fairly regular basis.” He also noted that the report system automatically provides an audit trail
when someone updates a document.
Hoping to return the property to its rightful owners, the police sent a “hold letter” to
Chiaverini. Chiaverini thought the letter was internally inconsistent. First, the letter directed him
to “hold this item . . . as evidence of the crime of Theft” and to “retain[] the items.” Second, it
3
No. 21-3996, Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, et al.
said that Chiaverini should “release these items to David or Christina Hill.” Later that day,
Christina came to the Outlet and asked for her items. Chiaverini allegedly refused to hand over
the jewelry based on the hold letter’s different directives.
The police then returned to the Outlet. And they instructed Chiaverini to release the items
to the Hills. But Chiaverini refused. He reasoned that it “would have been a criminal act[.]” And
his counsel advised him to hold onto the property.
Chiaverini confronted Chief Weitzel outside the police station two days later. Chiaverini
asked about the letter’s contradictory directives. And Weitzel said he would get back to Chiaverini
after meeting with the City’s law director. Weitzel recalled that Chiaverini said that he did not
need to comply with the hold letter and would not release the items to the Hills. This stance left
Weitzel confused, as Chiaverini had always complied in the past.
Chiaverini may have said too much. Chief Weitzel testified that Chiaverini “alluded to the
fact that he didn’t have a [precious-metal-dealers] license.” And Chief Weitzel responded, “I think
you have more problems than just this particular ring if you’re operating without a license.”4
Before this conversation, Weitzel believed that Chiaverini was licensed under Ohio law as a
precious-metals dealer. And when Weitzel found out that Chiaverini wasn’t, Weitzel knew that
Chiaverini “had no protection under the license.” On that basis, Weitzel thought Chiaverini
received stolen property without the right to retain it. So the police began another aspect to the
investigation. And after reviewing the Ohio Department of Commerce’s website, the police found
Chiaverini’s precious-metals-dealers license inactive.
4
Chiaverini purports that he told Weitzel that state law exempted him from the licensing
requirements. As we discuss below, Chiaverini has failed to produce evidence that he was exempt
from state-licensing requirements.
4
No. 21-3996, Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, et al.
Officer Steward sent all relevant police reports to the City of Napoleon Law Director, Billy
Harmon. Chiaverini alleges that the police didn’t disclose the alterations to Steward’s report to
Harmon at the time. At any rate, from the files Harmon reviewed, he made warrant templates for
the officers to complete. For the templates, Harmon identified Chiaverini’s potential criminal
offenses as receiving stolen property, operating without a valid license as both a pawnbroker and
a precious-metals dealer, money laundering, and engaging in a pattern of corrupt activity.
Officer Evanoff applied for a search warrant. As part of the application, Evanoff signed a
Probable Cause Affidavit, stating that Chiaverini “bought a ring while suspecting that it was stolen,
and was later informed by the Napoleon Police Department that this item was confirmed stolen.”
He then stated that Chiaverini “furthered the commission of corrupt activity by refusing the return
of this stolen property.” And he added that Chiaverini “operat[ed] this business without the proper
licens[es].” Evanoff also signed criminal complaints charging Chiaverini with: (1) receiving
stolen property (Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.51(A)); (2) Ohio Precious Metals Dealers Act
(“OPMDA”) licensure violations (Ohio Rev. Code § 4782.02); and (3) money laundering (Ohio
Rev. Code § 1315.55(A)(1)).
A municipal judge signed the search and arrest warrants, which prompted the police to
search the Outlet and arrest Chiaverini.5 The officers also seized the Hills’ stolen jewelry. And
they seized items related to licenses, sales, and purchases of precious metals. After the police
arrested Chiaverini, he remained in custody for three days.
5
The judge stated, “I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that the above property
so described is being concealed on the premises above described and that the foregoing grounds
for application for issuance of the search warrant pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Ohio Rules of
Criminal Procedure exist.” (R. 102-11, Search Warrant, at 1.)
5
No. 21-3996, Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, et al.
Ten days later, the same judge who issued Chiaverini’s warrants held a preliminary
hearing. Officer Evanoff said that he confirmed with Chiaverini that the jewelry was stolen, that
the Outlet received a hold letter, and that Chiaverini had bought the jewelry knowing it may be
stolen. Chiaverini then explained why he kept the stolen property after the police requested him
to release the items. Chiaverini also challenged Evanoff’s testimony, stating he never told Evanoff
that he believed the items were stolen at the time of purchase. And although Chiaverini confirmed
he didn’t have a precious-metals-dealers license, he claimed to operate under an exemption. The
judge found that probable cause existed and bound over all charges for trial.
Later, however, a court dismissed the criminal case against Chiaverini without prejudice
for failure to be timely presented to a grand jury. And the police returned the seized items no later
than August 2017.
Chiaverini filed a complaint against Evanoff, Steward, and other individual defendants as
well as the City of Napoleon. He alleged, among other things, common law and constitutional
violations for unlawful search and seizure, malicious prosecution, and false arrest. The officers
moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity and state-law immunity. Granting
summary judgment, the district court made a series of holdings. Most important among them was
that probable cause supported the arrest and search warrants against Chiaverini. And because the
viability of Chiaverini’s claims against the individual defendants all hinged on a lack of probable
cause, the court dismissed them. This appeal followed.6
6
The district court also held that the City of Napoleon was entitled to summary judgment on
Chiaverini’s § 1983 claims. The court reasoned that the complaint didn’t identify any city policy
or custom of deliberate indifference. Because Chiaverini didn’t argue the Monell claims against
the City in his opening brief on appeal, he has forfeited that argument. See, e.g., Island Creek
Coal Co. v. Wilkerson, 910 F.3d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 2018).
6
No. 21-3996, Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, et al.
II.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Morrissey v. Laurel
Health Care Co., 946 F.3d 292, 297 (6th Cir. 2019). Although we must view evidence in the light
most favorable to Chiaverini, he “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial” to withstand summary judgment. Zakora v. Chrisman, 44 F.4th 452, 464 (6th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
III.
The district court found that no constitutional violation occurred, and so, qualified
immunity barred Chiaverini’s claim against the individual defendants. Qualified immunity is a
two-pronged test, and we can address either prong first. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236
(2009). To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must “show [that] the officer’s conduct
violated a constitutional right” and that the right was “clearly established.” Robertson v. Lucas,
753 F.3d 606, 615 (6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). This appeal concerns the first of those two
issues. And we hold that no constitutional violation occurred because probable cause supported
the arrest and search warrants.
Chiaverini makes several claims. But all fall short for a simple reason: Probable cause
justified the search, arrest, and prosecution. In reaching this decision, we ask whether the judge
arbitrarily exercised her authority and whether there was a “substantial basis” for her decision to
issue a warrant. Mills v. City of Barbourville, 389 F.3d 568, 576 (6th Cir. 2004); see United States
v. Tagg, 886 F.3d 579, 586 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Brown, 732 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir.
2013). If the judge wasn’t arbitrary and had a substantial basis for her decision, we pay “great
deference” to her probable-cause determination. Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 814 (6th
7
No. 21-3996, Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, et al.
Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted); see United States v. Christian, 925 F.3d 305, 311–12 (6th Cir.
2019) (en banc).7
Moreover, we can affirm the district court’s decision if probable cause supports one or
more of the three charges against Chiaverini. See Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 311–
12 (6th Cir. 2001); Marcilis v. Twp. of Redford, 693 F.3d 589, 604 (6th Cir. 2012). He brings
false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims based on an alleged unreasonable seizure. Because
all of those claims arise under the Fourth Amendment, their success depends on whether probable
cause supported his detention and prosecution. Howse v. Hodous, 953 F.3d 402, 409 (6th Cir.
2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1515 (2021). If probable cause did exist for at least one of the
charges, we can conclude that he was “no more seized when [he was] detained to await prosecution
for several charges than if he were seized for just one valid charge.” Id. For that reason, even
tacked-on “meritless charges . . . [do] not change the nature of the seizure.” Id. at 409 n.3.
So long as probable cause supports at least one charge against Chiaverini (like his receipt-
of-stolen-property violation), his false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims based on other
charges (like his money-laundering charge) also fail. Howse, 953 F.3d at 409–10. Chiaverini’s
warrants involved three charges: (i) receiving stolen property, (ii) license violations under the
7
Chiaverini says we can’t consider the state court’s issuance of a warrant and preliminary hearing.
He believes that our decision in Bradley v. Reno precludes us from considering the court’s
probable-cause finding because he couldn’t appeal it—given that his charges were dropped. 749
F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir. 2014). But Bradley stands for a different point. That case says that we do
not give those probable-cause findings formal preclusive effect under Ohio law. Id. at 558.
Still, a judge’s decision to issue a warrant deserves “great deference.” Mays, 134 F.3d at 814(quotation omitted). And Bradley doesn’t change that. 749 F.3d at 558 (“[A] state judge’s finding
of probable cause suggests, even if it does not prove, that the officer behaved reasonably in
thinking he had probable cause.”). So while a prior state court holding on probable cause is not a
slam-dunk defense for a state entity, courts can still consider it. In any event, the district court
didn’t blindly defer to the state court decision. It also analyzed the facts on its own after
considering the totality of the circumstances.
8
No. 21-3996, Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, et al.
OPMDA, and (iii) money laundering. (See Appellee’s Br. at 2–3.) Here, there was probable cause
to arrest and prosecute him for both his receipt of stolen property and the licensure violation. So
all of his false-arrest and malicious-prosecution claims fail.8
A. Receiving Stolen Property
Ohio law makes it a crime to receive stolen property. It states, “No person shall receive,
retain, or dispose of property of another knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the
property has been obtained through commission of a theft offense.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.51(A).
Applying the language of the statute, the officers had probable cause to believe that Chiaverini
committed the crime. He “retain[ed] . . . property of another” knowing it to be stolen (or at a
minimum having “reasonable cause to believe” that it had been stolen). Id.
In fact, Chiaverini heard several demands to return the property. He received the hold letter
from the police telling him to return the Hills’ jewelry. Several times, the Hills told Chiaverini to
return their property. And the officers did the same. With that knowledge, he refused to return
the items. So the police had probable cause to believe that he knowingly retained stolen property.
Chiaverini’s counterarguments are not persuasive. He claims that no probable cause
existed because he didn’t know the jewelry was stolen when he bought it. But the statute also
criminalizes retaining stolen property, not just buying stolen property. Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2913.51(A). And Chiaverini retained the stolen items after he knew they were stolen. So his
argument fails.
8
Chiaverini argues that Ohio’s money-laundering statute required the stolen property’s value to
exceed $1,000. Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.31(I)(2)(c). He also claims that no evidence estimated
the property’s value above $1,000. But we need not decide whether the officers had probable
cause for the money-laundering charge because probable cause existed for the other valid charges.
See Howse, 953 F.3d at 408–09.
9
No. 21-3996, Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, et al.
Next, Chiaverini claims that the hold letter had contradictory commands. He argues that
if he released the jewelry, the State could have charged him with “conceal[ing]” or “remov[ing]”
the evidence under Ohio Revised Code § 2921.12. But the letter, the Hills, and several officers on
different occasions directed Chiaverini to return the stolen property. And the judge who issued
the warrants admitted the letter into evidence at the preliminary hearing and found the directive to
return the items unambiguous. So the letter supported probable cause rather than undercutting it.
Cf. Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 555 (2012) (“The fact that the officers secured these
[judicial] approvals is certainly pertinent in assessing whether they could have held a reasonable
belief that the warrant was supported by probable cause.”); Bradley, 749 F.3d at 558 (“A state
judge’s finding of probable cause suggests, even if it does not prove, that the officer behaved
reasonably in thinking he had probable cause.”).
Next, Chiaverini argues that he had a possessory right over the jewelry to all but the true
owner. And absent a trial on who truly owned the property, he asserts that his property interests
outweighed the Hills’. He adds that his ownership interests in the property implicate procedural
due process. But under Ohio common law, Burns didn’t acquire good title when he stole the Hills’
property. Danopulos v. Am. Trading II, L.L.C., 69 N.E.3d 157, 159 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016). And
“‘one who purchases or acquires property from a thief,’ even in good faith, doesn’t have a right to
the possession of the goods against ‘the rightful owner.’” Id. (quoting Wacksman v. Harrell, 189
N.E.2d 146, 148 (Ohio 1963)). The police made clear that the Hills were the rightful owners.
Even more important, the OPMDA required Chiaverini to return the Hills’ stolen property
after the police told him to. His possessory interest doesn’t negate the fact that Ohio law
criminalizes retaining stolen property. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.51(A). And OPMDA allows
officers to recover stolen property. See Ohio Rev. Code § 4728.04; see also Liberty Coins, LLC
10
No. 21-3996, Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, et al.
v. Goodman, 880 F.3d 274, 287 (6th Cir. 2018) (“If the ring bought by the dealer indeed appears
to be the stolen item, the dealer will then be required under the [O]PMDA to return it to its rightful
owner, [] and law enforcement will have a lead on the thief, thereby furthering the state’s
interests.”). So Chiaverini didn’t have a right to retain the items because they belonged to the Hills
and the police ordered him to return the property. And his actions gave rise to probable cause to
arrest and prosecute him for the crime of receiving stolen property.
B. The OPMDA License Violation
In addition, the facts giving rise to Chiaverini’s licensing violation support probable cause.
The OPMDA “allows for the possibility of criminal penalties.” Liberty Coins, LLC, 880 F.3d at
281–82. Ohio Revised Code § 4728.02(A) provides that, except for in some limited
circumstances, “no person shall act as a precious metals dealer without first having obtained a
license from the division of financial institutions in the department of commerce.” And whoever
violates that statute “is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree on a first offense[.]” Ohio Rev.
Code § 4728.99.
Chiaverini alluded to Chief Weitzel that he did not have a precious-metals-dealers license.
And that admission gave Weitzel probable cause to believe that Chiaverini was committing a
crime. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971) (explaining that “[a]dmissions
of crime . . . carry their own indicia of credibility” and are “sufficient at least to support a finding
of probable cause to search”). And Weitzel did not stop there.
He did his homework. He and other officers looked on the Ohio Department of Commerce
website and saw that Chiaverini no longer had a precious-metals-dealers license. All in all,
Chiaverini admitted to a crime, and the police duly investigated Chiaverini’s admission. On these
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No. 21-3996, Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, et al.
facts, the judge who issued the warrant and the district court both found probable cause. And we
agree.
Again, Chiaverini’s arguments against probable cause are unavailing. He claims that the
licensure requirements do not apply to “incidental” purchase dealers. See Ohio Rev. Code
§ 4728.11(E)(4). He next reasons that the police did not request his business records to evaluate
the applicability of the exemption before the arrest. And he adds that the officers’ affidavits should
have included information that some stores might not need a license.
But his arguments ignore the default position under the OPMDA—that unlicensed
precious-metals dealers are breaking the law. And officers need not analyze every possible defense
to a crime before securing a warrant. See Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 874 (6th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that “[w]hile officers cannot ignore exculpatory facts in reaching a probable cause
determination . . . it is not the rule that they must investigate a defendant’s legal defenses prior to
making an arrest”).
Simply put, Chiaverini’s potential defenses to a crime don’t affect the initial probable-
cause determination. Ideally, perhaps, officers investigating allegations like these might inquire
into obvious explanations or defenses that a prosecutor can consider. But nothing required the
police to investigate Chiaverini’s affirmative defense. Fridley, 291 F.3d at 873 (“[I]t is not a
routine part of the prearrest investigation for police officers to inquire into affirmative defenses.”)
Although “innocent explanations . . . may exist,” they don’t “render the [] determination of
probable cause invalid.” United States v. Martin, 289 F.3d 392, 400 (6th Cir. 2002); see United
States v. Terry, 522 F.3d 645, 648–49 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that probable cause “does not
require ‘near certainty,’ only a ‘fair probability’” (citation omitted)). And we have explained that
“the Fourth Amendment does not require that a police officer know a crime has occurred at the
12
No. 21-3996, Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, et al.
time the officer arrests or searches a suspect.” United States v. Strickland, 144 F.3d 412, 415 (6th
Cir. 1998).
Still, Chiaverini asserts that a warrant application should include all material information
so that a magistrate can properly weigh the facts. But because the officers did not know about
Chiaverini’s exemption status, no material omission occurred. And even if the officers had listed
the exemption, a court could still find probable cause because no evidence showed that Chiaverini
qualified for the exemption.9 (See R. 135, Memorandum Opinion and Order, at 13 n.7.); see also
Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 305 (6th Cir. 2010) (“If the affidavit contains false statements or
material omissions, we set aside the statements and include the information omitted in order to
determine whether the affidavit is still sufficient to establish probable cause.”)
We analyze the affidavit “on the adequacy of what it does contain, not on what it lacks, or
on what a critic might say should have been added.” United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 975
(6th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Chiaverini alluded to the fact that he had committed a license violation.
And an investigation confirmed it. That’s why the officers and the judge had probable cause to
arrest and prosecute Chiaverini for violating the OPMDA. So qualified immunity applies because
the state actors did not violate the Constitution by acting on probable cause.
*****
Because probable cause existed to arrest and prosecute Chiaverini on at least one charge,
his malicious-prosecution and false-arrest claims fail. Howse, 953 F.3d at 409–10. “We need not
proceed any further than the probable cause analysis to decide [his] malicious prosecution claim.”
Darrah, 255 F.3d at 312. And the same goes for his false-arrest claims. See Marcilis, 693 F.3d at
9
The district court noted that even after discovery below, Chiaverini never provided evidence that
he qualified for an exemption. (R. 135, Memorandum Opinion and Order, at 13 n.7.)
13
No. 21-3996, Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, et al.
604. So the valid warrants here act as a complete defense to Chiaverini’s claims. See Robertson
v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 618 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Voyticky v. Vill. of Timberlake, 412 F.3d 669,
677 (6th Cir. 2005)) (explaining that “[a]n arrest pursuant to a facially valid warrant is normally a
complete defense to a federal constitutional claim for false arrest or false imprisonment made
pursuant to § 1983”).
IV.
We affirm the district court’s judgment.
14