State of Iowa v. Tommy Tyler, Jr. , 830 N.W.2d 288 ( 2013 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA
No. 11–1065
Filed April 26, 2013
STATE OF IOWA,
Appellee,
vs.
TOMMY TYLER, JR.,
Appellant.
On review from the Iowa Court of Appeals.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William A.
Price (suppression motion) and Scott D. Rosenberg (trial), Judges.
Defendant appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress, which was affirmed by the court of appeals. DECISION OF
COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT
REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
Gary D. Dickey of Dickey & Campbell Law Firm, P.L.C., Des
Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bridget A. Chambers,
Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and
David M. Porter, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
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ZAGER, Justice.
In this case, we are asked to determine whether law enforcement
had probable cause to believe that an equipment violation was occurring
under Iowa Code section 321.37(3), which prohibits an owner of a motor
vehicle from placing a frame around a license plate that obstructs the
view of the plate. If probable cause is not present to justify the stop, the
State asks us to decide whether reasonable suspicion of the equipment
violation is sufficient to support a traffic stop.
The district court denied the motion to suppress, and Tyler was
convicted of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), second
offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2009). Tyler appeals,
arguing the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We
transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed. We granted
further review. For the reasons expressed below, we vacate the decision
of the court of appeals, reverse the judgment of the district court, and
remand for further proceedings.
I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.
On October 13, 2010, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Johnston Police
Officer Brad Lowe was sitting stationary in his marked patrol car in the
parking lot of the Dragon Car Wash on Merle Hay Road. Officer Lowe
observed Tommy Tyler’s white Cadillac Escalade turn northbound onto
Merle Hay Road from Johnson Drive, past Officer Lowe’s position. Officer
Lowe testified that as Tyler’s vehicle approached his position, “it
appeared the vehicle had a tinted license plate cover on the front of the
license plate.” As the vehicle pulled past, Officer Lowe testified, “I then
pulled out behind the vehicle and also noticed that it had a license plate
cover obstructing the view of the plate on the rear as well.” Officer Lowe
recognized the vehicle as the same one he had attempted to stop two
3
days earlier, also because of his concern regarding “tinted” license plate
covers.
Officer Lowe testified that because he found it difficult to run the
license plate on the vehicle, he initiated the traffic stop, which was
captured on videotape from his squad car. Prior to making contact with
the driver, however, Officer Lowe was able to view all of the numbers and
letters printed on the rear license plate, saw the “Iowa” printed at the top
of the license plate, observed the county displayed on the bottom of the
plate, and had a full view of the registration sticker. Based upon these
observations, Officer Lowe was able to quickly and accurately call the
plate information into dispatch.
After making initial contact with Tyler and advising him of the
reason for the stop, Officer Lowe detected an odor of an alcoholic
beverage coming from within the vehicle and noted that Tyler’s speech
was slow. Based on these observations, Officer Lowe initiated an OWI
investigation. This investigation culminated in a breathalyzer test
indicating Tyler had a blood alcohol content of .147.
Tyler filed a motion to suppress the evidence discovered as a result
of the stop. He argued the stop violated the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, and article I, section 8 of the Iowa
Constitution, both of which prohibit unreasonable search and seizure.
Tyler argued that Officer Lowe lacked either reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to justify the stop.
Evidence admitted at the suppression hearing, including the in-car
videotape, photographs, and witness testimony, demonstrated that both
the rear and front license plate covers were clear rather than tinted. The
videotape of the stop shows Officer Lowe was able to read the license
plate in order to provide the information to his dispatcher as both
4
vehicles were coming to a stop. Officer Lowe indicated that he had not
attempted to read and call in the license plate prior to that point. He did,
however, testify that the license plate was “blurred” and that he could
not read the plate when he had initially turned on his lights.
The district court denied Tyler’s motion to suppress. After a bench
trial, Tyler was convicted of OWI, second offense. Tyler appealed,
arguing the district court erred in failing to suppress the evidence. The
court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling. We granted further
review.
II. Standard of Review.
Tyler asserts his state and federal constitutional rights to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure were violated. Because of the
constitutional dimensions of these claims, our review is de novo. State v.
Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Iowa 2011). A de novo review constitutes “an
independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by
the entire record.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
We give “deference to the factual findings of the district court due to its
opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, but [we are] not
bound by such findings.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
III. Discussion and Analysis.
A. Unreasonable Search and Seizure. Both the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of
the Iowa Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by
the government. State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 1997) (“The
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protect individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials.”). As we
5
have consistently stated, “[W]e jealously protect this court’s authority to
follow an independent approach [to evaluate claims made] under our
state constitution.” Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 771. Where a party raises both
state and federal constitutional claims but does not argue that a
standard independent of the federal approach should be employed under
the state constitution, we ordinarily apply the substantive federal
standards but reserve the right to apply the standard in a fashion
different from federal precedent. State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 883
(Iowa 2009). Because Tyler has not proposed a standard for interpreting
our search and seizure provisions under the Iowa Constitution differently
from its federal constitutional counterpart, we will apply the general
standards as outlined by the United States Supreme Court for
addressing a search and seizure challenge under the Iowa Constitution.
See id.
The United States Supreme Court has considered the
constitutionality of traffic stops under the Fourth Amendment in a
number of cases. A traffic stop is unquestionably a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436–37, 104 S.
Ct. 3138, 3148, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 332–33 (1984); State v. Heminover,
619 N.W.2d 353, 357 (2000) (“When the police stop a car and temporarily
detain an individual, the temporary detention is a ‘seizure’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”), abrogated on other grounds by
State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 n.2 (Iowa 2001).
Under the Fourth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court
has recognized that allowing law enforcement unbridled discretion in
stopping vehicles “ ‘would invite intrusions upon constitutionally
guaranteed rights.’ ” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661, 99 S. Ct.
1391, 1400, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 672 (1979) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
6
U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968)). When
there is no probable cause or reasonable suspicion for a stop, an officer
has the “kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion [that] is the
evil the Court has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that
the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some
extent.” Id. Moreover, the Court recognized that individuals frequently
spend significant time traveling in automobiles and must be entitled to
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures when traveling.
Id. at 662–63, 99 S. Ct at 1401, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 673. “Were the
individual subject to unfettered governmental intrusion every time [she
or] he entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment would be seriously circumscribed.” Id.
B. Bases for Traffic Stops. We have considered the scope of
article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution in a traffic stop context. In
State v. Tague, we held that briefly crossing the edge line on a divided
roadway did not provide reasonable suspicion of intoxication to support a
traffic stop or probable cause that a violation of Iowa Code section
321.297 occurred under article I, section 8. 676 N.W.2d 197, 205–06
(Iowa 2004).
The State argues that the stop in this case may be supported
under both probable cause and reasonable suspicion theories. If a traffic
violation actually occurred and the officer witnessed it, the State has
established probable cause. Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 201. A reasonable
mistake of fact does not negate justification for a stop based on probable
cause. State v. Lloyd, 701 N.W.2d 678, 680–81 (Iowa 2005).
Reasonable suspicion is a much more nebulous concept, and a
standard that may or may not be appropriate to apply to smaller offenses
such as traffic violations. Professor LaFave speculates that,
7
[i]f the [U.S.] Supreme Court were to address the issue [of
whether the nature of the offense being investigated is
relevant to whether reasonable suspicion can justify a traffic
stop], it might well be that the Court would conclude that
Terry stops upon less than probable cause cannot be made
with respect to all offenses, so that a goodly number of traffic
offenses would not be encompassed with the Terry
reasonable-suspicion standard.
Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop” from Start to Finish: Too
Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1843,
1851 (2004).
Indeed, our own jurisprudence notes the unsettled nature of the
law regarding when reasonable suspicion justifies traffic stops. See Pals,
805 N.W.2d at 774 (“Federal courts are divided on the issue of whether
the Fourth Amendment per se prohibits police from stopping a vehicle
based only on reasonable suspicion of a completed misdemeanor or civil
infraction.”) Additionally, there is a school of thought that Terry compels
a balancing test to justify the stop. 1
Perhaps the greatest distinction between a probable cause analysis
and a reasonable suspicion analysis is the purpose of the stop. Our
decisions have universally held that the purpose of a Terry stop is to
1Professor LaFave has stated:
[T]he [U.S. Supreme] Court characterized the Terry rationale as warrant[ing]
temporary detention for questioning on less than probable cause where the
public interest involved is the suppression of . . . serious crime, and has said
that under Terry, seizures made on less than probable cause draw their
justification from both the limited intrusions on the personal security of those
detained and the substantial law enforcement interests being served. As several
of the Court’s other Fourth Amendment decisions illustrate, the seriousness of
the offense thought to be involved bears directly upon the substantiality of the
law-enforcement interest; as one member of the Court put it, the Supreme Court
has never suggested that all law enforcement objectives . . . outweigh the
individual interests infringed upon so as to support a stop on reasonable
suspicion.
LaFave, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1843 at 1851–52 (footnotes and internal quotation marks
omitted).
8
investigate crime. See, e.g., Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 204 (noting that the
police need only have reasonable suspicion to detain “for investigatory
purposes”). Conversely, the purpose of a probable cause stop is to seize
someone who has already committed a crime. See, e.g., id. at 201
(“Probable cause exists if the totality of the circumstances as viewed by a
reasonable and prudent person would lead that person to believe that a
crime has been or is being committed and that the arrestee committed or
is committing it.” (Citation and internal quotation marks omitted.)).
C. Probable Cause. We have held that “[w]hen a peace officer
observes a violation of our traffic laws, however minor, the officer has
probable cause to stop a motorist.” Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 201; see also
United States v. Mendoza, 677 F.3d 822, 827 (8th Cir. 2012). However,
the State bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the officer had probable cause to stop the motorist. State v.
Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Iowa 2010). If the State is unable to
meet its burden, all evidence obtained at the stop must be suppressed.
Id. at 651–52. In determining whether Officer Lowe observed a violation
of our traffic laws, we will “give considerable deference to the trial court’s
findings regarding the credibility of the witnesses,” but we will not be
“bound by them.” See Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 201.
Probable cause is not the same standard as beyond a reasonable
doubt. Probable cause may exist even if the officer’s perception of the
traffic violation was inaccurate. The existence of probable cause for a
traffic stop is evaluated “from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable
police officer.” Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696, 116 S. Ct.
1657, 1661–62, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 919 (1996). Indeed, “[t]he touchstone
of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness . . . .” United States v.
9
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118, 122 S. Ct. 587, 591, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497, 505
(2001).
Officer Lowe testified that he observed a violation of Iowa Code
section 321.37(3), which states: “It is unlawful for the owner of a vehicle
to place any frame around or over the registration plate which does not
permit full view of all numerals and letters printed on the registration
plate.” Iowa Code § 321.37(3). He did not claim that he had probable
cause to stop Tyler for any traffic violation such as speeding or
disobeying a traffic signal. The only basis asserted by Officer Lowe for
the stop was that he observed a violation of Iowa Code section 321.37(3).
Our precedent is clear that a mistake of fact may justify a traffic
stop. Lloyd, 701 N.W.2d at 680–81; Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d at 101 (“We
have . . . held that a mistaken basis for a stop does not necessarily
render the stop invalid.”); State v. Melohn, 516 N.W.2d 24, 25 (Iowa 1994)
(holding it was reasonable for police to stop a vehicle speeding away from
the vicinity of gunshots, even though the facts later showed the
individual was not involved in the gunfire); State v. Jackson, 315 N.W.2d
766, 767 (Iowa 1982) (holding as valid an officer’s stop of a vehicle for
failure to display license plates, even though the officer later learned the
vehicle was displaying proper temporary plates). “The . . . question is
whether [the officer’s] mistake was an objectively reasonable one.” Lloyd,
701 N.W.2d at 681.
However, we have elected not to extend this permissiveness to
mistakes of law, holding a mistake of law is not sufficient to justify a
stop. “[E]vidence derived from a stop based on a law enforcement
officer’s mistake of law must be suppressed.” Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d at
650.
10
We must first decide if Officer Lowe was mistaken. If he was
correct as to both the facts and the law, then probable cause existed to
detain Tyler, and the evidence obtained as a result of that stop is
admissible. However, if we determine Officer Lowe was mistaken, we
must determine whether he was mistaken as to the law or as to the facts.
If he was mistaken as to the law, then probable cause based on that
mistake of law cannot be asserted to justify the stop, and without further
justification, the evidence obtained as a result of that stop must be
suppressed. See id. If we determine Officer Lowe was mistaken as to the
facts, we must then decide if the mistake was objectively reasonable. If
the mistake was objectively reasonable, probable cause existed, and the
evidence is admissible. Alternatively, if Officer Lowe’s mistake of fact was
not objectively reasonable, the evidence must be excluded.
1. Mistake of Law. Officer Lowe wrote in his police report,
I noticed the vehicle had a tinted license plate cover on the
front license plate which is in violation of Iowa Code
321.37(3) display of plates. As the vehicle passed my patrol
car I observed it also had a tinted license plate cover on the
rear license plate as well.
In fact, the cited Code section does not proscribe tinted license
plate covers. Rather, it proscribes placement of any frame or cover
“which does not permit full view of all numerals and letters printed on
the registration plate.” Iowa Code § 321.37(3). Officer Lowe’s police
report, standing alone, would be a mistake of law, and as such, would
not allow the State to meet its burden of proof in establishing probable
cause to stop Tyler’s vehicle.
However, during the course of the suppression hearing, the State
offered various alternative reasons for why the stop was justified. We
have held that the State is not limited to the reasons stated by the
11
investigating officer in determining whether either probable cause or
reasonable suspicion existed for the stop. Heminover, 619 N.W.2d at
357.
Here, none of the reasons advanced by the State support a finding
that Tyler’s plates violated Iowa law, and no testimony or evidence was
introduced as an alternative reason for Tyler’s seizure. Officer Lowe told
Tyler during the stop that he had pulled him over because of tinted
license plates. Tinted license plates are not a violation of Iowa law, and
the State does not contend otherwise. See Iowa Code § 321.37(3).
Officer Lowe also seems to conflate the requirements of Iowa Code
section 321.37(3) with the requirements of Iowa Code section 321.388.2
During his testimony at the suppression hearing, Officer Lowe testified
that “a license plate must be clearly legible from a distance of 50 feet.”
None of our cases have interpreted section 321.388, but the court of
appeals has held that “if the deputy had testified that he observed the
plate from something that would approximate fifty feet, and it did not
appear to be illuminated so as to be legible, we would likely find the stop
reasonable.” State v. Reisetter, 747 N.W.2d 792, 794 (Iowa Ct. App.
2008). This Code section requires illumination sufficient to render the
license plate clearly legible. Officer Lowe does not contend the
illumination of the plate was insufficient. In fact, the evidence in the
record is clearly to the contrary. The fifty-foot distance is only relevant
when applied to the question of adequate illumination, indicating
another mistake of law.
2Iowa Code section 321.388, entitled “Illuminating Plates,” provides “[e]ither the
rear lamp or a separate lamp shall be so constructed and placed as to illuminate with a
white light the rear registration plate and render it clearly legible from a distance of fifty
feet to the rear.”
12
Finally, the State advances a theory in its brief suggesting that “the
plate cover could have had a light coat of dust, mud or snow so as to
render Tyler’s plate unreadable from an angle or from a distance,” in
violation of Iowa Code section 321.38. 3 This argument was not raised
below and, thus, was not considered by the district court. Generally, we
will only review an issue raised on appeal if it was first presented to and
ruled on by the district court. State v. Derby, 800 N.W.2d 52, 60 (Iowa
2011). Nonetheless, no evidence was presented suggesting that any of
these theories regarding possible obstruction of the plate may have been
true. Again, the evidence is to the contrary as the videotape shows no
foreign materials on the plate. It is not Tyler’s responsibility to prove a
negative—that there was no conceivable reason for a stop.
Recognizing that Officer Lowe’s understanding of the law regarding
license plate covers was flawed, the State attempted to justify the stop
with other laws, specifically Iowa Code sections 321.388 and 321.38.
Under the facts of this case, neither of these other laws has been shown
by the State to provide Officer Lowe with probable cause to justify his
seizure of Tyler. Consequently, we conclude that a mistake of law
occurred. Unless the State can demonstrate alternate justification for
the stop, any evidence derived from the stop must be suppressed. See
Louwrens, 792 N.W.2d at 650.
3Section 321.38, in pertinent part, provides:
321.38. Plates, method of attaching—imitations prohibited.
Every registration plate shall at all times be securely fastened in a
horizontal position to the vehicle for which it is issued so as to prevent the plate
from swinging and at a height of not less than twelve inches from the ground,
measuring from the bottom of the plate, in a place and position to be clearly
visible and shall be maintained free from foreign materials and in a condition to
be clearly legible.
13
2. Mistake of fact. Tyler presented significant evidence at the
suppression hearing, and then again at his trial, to indicate his license
plate covers were clear and would “permit full view of all numerals and
letters printed on the registration plate.” Tyler presented testimony from
a private investigator, who attempted to recreate the situation the officer
described, and concluded that Tyler’s license plate cover did not obscure
the view of the license plate. The district court found this testimony was
“not persuasive,” as it occurred “under different conditions and lighting.”
The district court did not, however, enumerate these differences. The
test occurred at the same place as the initial incident. Tyler testified the
lighting was the same, and Officer Lowe declined to offer an opinion on
whether the lighting was the same. The re-creation took place earlier in
the night than the 2:00 a.m. stop, but it was dark at both of these times.
Officer Lowe did not suggest that weather conditions or dirt on the plate
cover inhibited his ability to read the plate. The test took place
approximately three weeks after the incident, so the season was the
same. Neither the State nor the district court articulated specific
reasons why the test should be given no credibility. Upon our de novo
review, we find the re-creation probative as to what Officer Lowe likely
saw.
Additionally, Tyler introduced photographs of his license plate
covers and a videotape of the stop on that evening. When Officer Lowe is
following Tyler, the video is so grainy that it is difficult to see anything at
all. Thus, it is not probative of what Officer Lowe saw. However, when
Tyler pulled over in a parking lot, Officer Lowe was able to read the
license plate accurately and completely to the dispatcher without
hesitation.
14
No evidence supports an objectively reasonable basis for believing
that Tyler’s plates were not in conformity with all of Iowa’s traffic laws.
Despite acknowledging that he was a skilled police report writer, and
further acknowledging that he understood the importance of the police
report to the criminal justice process, Officer Lowe did not indicate in his
report that his view of the license plate was obscured.
Officer Lowe admitted he had no difficulty reading the license plate
to dispatch prior to actually stopping Tyler’s vehicle as Tyler was slowing
down. The videotape of the stop confirms he was able to read the plate
without difficulty. In his testimony, Officer Lowe stated that the license
plate was “blurred” and that the “cover creates a glare at times,” but did
not indicate why he thought the cover itself created any blurring or glare,
as opposed to the normal glare that would come from an uncovered white
license plate or any of the other numerous colored license plates now
offered by the Iowa Department of Transportation. The condition of
Tyler’s car, as seen in the videotape, is very clean. Based on the
photographs, the uncontroverted testimony of the defense witnesses, and
the observable cleanliness of the vehicle’s exterior and license plate as
shown in the videotape, we find no objectively reasonable fact that would
support a finding that the license plates were in any way obstructed from
Officer Lowe’s view. In making credibility determinations, we examine
extrinsic evidence for contradictions to that witness’s testimony.
Mendoza, 677 F.3d at 827. We also examine a witness’s testimony for
internal inconsistencies in making credibility determinations. Id.
The officer’s testimony that there was a “glare” and that the plates
were occasionally “blurry” does not indicate any difference between
Tyler’s covered plate and an uncovered license plate. If we were to hold
that an officer’s mistaken conclusion that any plate that gave off a glare
15
or was blurry in the intermittent brightness of street lights at 2:00 in the
morning had an illegal cover, we would be giving law enforcement officers
carte blanche to pull over any motorist at any time, as sunlight could
also cause glaring and blurriness on an uncovered plate. We decline to
extend the authority of law enforcement officers to execute traffic stops
based on the facts as described in this case.
Officer Lowe admits he specifically targeted Tyler’s vehicle, as he
had attempted to stop it a day or two earlier, ostensibly for the same
tinted license plate cover issue. Tyler’s friend, whose vehicle had
identical license plate covers, testified that she had passed by Officer
Lowe’s position immediately before Tyler passed by it. Yet, Officer Lowe
did not stop her. This gives rise to the reasonable conclusion, upon our
de novo review, that Officer Lowe may have targeted Tyler’s car for a
reason other than an obscured license plate cover. 4 Based on the above
analysis, we conclude that probable cause is lacking under both the
Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.
D. Reasonable Suspicion. Having found no probable cause, the
State urges us to consider whether reasonable suspicion of the
equipment violation provides a sufficient basis to justify the stop. In its
review of the district court’s ruling on the motion to suppress, the court
of appeals suggested that reasonable suspicion may not be enough to
justify a stop such as this, based on dicta in Pals. In Pals, we stated,
“Federal courts are divided on the issue of whether the Fourth
Amendment per se prohibits police from stopping a vehicle based only on
4Tyler, who is black, argues he was the victim of racial profiling. We need not
reach this argument on appeal. However, we do agree with Tyler that the possibility for
racial profiling requires us to carefully review the objective basis for asserted
justifications behind traffic stops.
16
reasonable suspicion of a completed misdemeanor or civil infraction.”
805 N.W.2d at 774. 5 However, neither Pals nor the case at bar involved
a completed misdemeanor. Rather, Pals dealt with an ongoing civil
infraction. Id. Here, Tyler was ostensibly stopped in order to investigate
an ongoing traffic offense. Officer Lowe claims to have observed an
ongoing violation of Iowa law—operation of a motor vehicle with an
obscured license plate.
In Terry, the United States Supreme Court found that law
enforcement could stop citizens if swift action was required, “predicated
upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat.” 392 U.S. at
20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905. In deciding whether a stop is
appropriate based on reasonable suspicion, a court must engage in a
balancing test—balancing the governmental interest advanced by the
seizure against the “intrusion upon the constitutionally protected
interests of the private citizen” to be free from unnecessary seizure. Id.
at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905. “Under Terry, police may
stop a moving automobile in the absence of probable cause to investigate
a reasonable suspicion that its occupants are involved in criminal
activity.” Pals, 805 N.W.2d at 774.
We have described a stop based on reasonable suspicion under
Terry as an “investigatory stop.” E.g., State v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775,
781 (Iowa 2010); Tague, 676 N.W.2d at 204. Professor LaFave has noted
that the purpose of a Terry stop is “to allow immediate investigation
through temporarily maintaining the status quo. If reasonable suspicion
exists, but a stop cannot further the purpose behind allowing the stop,
5This contested issue, in fact, is the subject of much legal scholarship. See
generally Sameer Bajaj, Policing the Fourth Amendment: The Constitutionality of
Warrantless Investigatory Stops for Past Misdemeanors, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 309 (2009).
17
the investigative goal as it were, it cannot be a valid stop.” 4 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.3, at
482 (5th ed. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The
purpose of a Terry stop, then, is to investigate a crime.
[I]f the officer has a legitimate expectation of investigatory
results, the existence of reasonable suspicion will allow the
stop—if the officer has no such expectations of learning
additional relevant information concerning the suspected
criminal activity, the stop cannot be constitutionally
permitted on the basis of mere suspicion.
Id. at 4.
We have said that “ ‘[t]he principal function of an investigatory stop
is to resolve the ambiguity as to whether criminal activity is afoot.’ ”
Vance, 790 N.W.2d at 780 (quoting State v. Richardson, 501 N.W.2d 495,
497 (Iowa 1993)). Though Officer Lowe testified he initially believed the
plate to be obstructed due to it being tinted, he also testified that he was
able to clearly read and relay the plate information to dispatch as soon
as he attempted to do so. Once this ambiguity was resolved, there was
no longer a need for further investigation. The stop, then, was not for the
purpose of investigating an ongoing crime. If the State wants to rely on
reasonable suspicion as justification for this stop, it must show that
Officer Lowe was attempting to actively investigate whether a crime was
occurring and that seizure was required in order to accomplish that
purpose. The State did not make that showing. As a result, the State
has not shown reasonable suspicion to justify the stop either under the
Fourth Amendment or article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.
Because of our conclusion that reasonable suspicion was not present, we
need not resolve the question of whether reasonable suspicion of a
completed misdemeanor may support a stop under the Fourth
Amendment or Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.
18
IV. Conclusion and Disposition.
Based on our de novo review, we find Officer Lowe did not have
either probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop Tyler’s vehicle.
This stop violated Tyler’s rights as guaranteed by both the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, and article I, section 8 of
the Iowa Constitution. Thus, all evidence obtained in the subsequent
stop is inadmissible. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals,
reverse the trial court’s ruling denying the motion to suppress, and
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT
COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
All justices concur. Appel, J., concurs specially. Mansfield, J.,
concurs specially, in which Waterman, J., joins.
19
#11–1065, State v. Tyler
APPEL, Justice (concurring specially).
I join in the majority opinion. We have repeatedly stated when a
party makes claims under parallel provisions of both the Iowa and
Federal Constitutions but does not suggest an independent state
constitutional standard, we apply the federal standards, but do not
necessarily apply them in the same way as the United States Supreme
Court. See, e.g., State v. Becker, 818 N.W.2d 135, 150 (Iowa 2012)
(“Even where a party has not provided a substantive standard
independent of federal law, we reserve the right to apply the standard
presented by the party in a fashion different than the federal cases.”);
NextEra Energy Res. LLC v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 815 N.W.2d 30, 45 (Iowa
2012) (“Even in cases where a party has not suggested that our approach
under the Iowa Constitution should be different from that under the
Federal Constitution, we reserve the right to apply the standard in a
fashion at variance with federal cases under the Iowa Constitution.”);
State v. Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 650 (Iowa 2012) (reiterating that we
apply a more rigorous cruel and unusual punishment analysis under the
Iowa Constitution than a federal court would under the United States
Constitution); State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 771–72 (Iowa 2011) (“Even
where a party has not advanced a different standard for interpreting a
state constitutional provision, we may apply the standard more
stringently than federal case law.”); State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862,
883 (Iowa 2009) (“[W]e do not necessarily apply the federal standards in
the same way as the United States Supreme Court.”); Varnum v. Brien,
763 N.W.2d 862, 878 n.6 (“[W]e have jealously guarded our right to
‘employ a different analytical framework’ under the state equal protection
clause as well as to independently apply the federally formulated
20
principles.” (citation omitted)); In re S.A.J.B., 679 N.W.2d 645, 648 (Iowa
2004) (“In analyzing claims under Iowa Equal Protection Clause, we
independently apply federal principles.”); Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v.
Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 6 (Iowa 2004) (“That brings us to the
alternative manner in which the court might exercise its obligation to
rule upon the state constitutional claim: by applying federal principles
independently.”). Reserving the right to applying federal standards in a
manner different than that of the United States Supreme Court as
requested by the parties is not “freelancing,” but performing our duty
under the Iowa Constitution. See State v. Baldon, ___ N.W.2d. ___, ___,
2013 WL 1694553, at *27 (Appel, J., concurring). In this case, however,
I agree with the majority in reaching the same result under both the Iowa
and United States Constitutions.
21
#11–1065, State v. Tyler
MANSFIELD, Justice (concurring specially).
I join the court’s well-reasoned opinion. This case can be, and as a
practical matter has been, decided under Fourth Amendment caselaw.
When a party does not advocate a separate interpretation of article I,
section 8, but simply argues federal constitutional precedent, we should
not be freelancing under the Iowa Constitution without the benefit of an
adversarial presentation. See State v. Baldon, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2013
WL 1694553 at *46 n.46 (Iowa 2013) (Mansfield, J., dissenting); see also
State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 566 (Iowa 2012) (“ ‘[W]e generally decline
to consider an independent state constitutional standard based upon a
mere citation to the applicable state constitutional provision.’ ” (quoting
State v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880, 895 (Iowa 2009) (Appel, J., specially
concurring))). Here the court has not departed from federal
constitutional precedent in the absence of separate Iowa constitutional
briefing. Instead, it has applied federal and state search and seizure
provisions consistently, and in my view correctly.
Waterman, J., joins this special concurrence.