United States v. Jason Emmons , 617 F. App'x 414 ( 2015 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 15a0449n.06
No. 14-5824
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Jun 15, 2015
) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JASON EMMONS, ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
)
Before: GIBBONS and COOK, Circuit Judges; MURPHY, District Judge.*
MURPHY, District Judge. Jason Emmons pled guilty to two counts of distributing crack
cocaine. He appeals from the district court’s imposition of a 145-month sentence. He claims that
the sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable, and that it violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (2012). Because we find no reversible error, we affirm.
I.
A.
“We review sentences under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v.
Howard, 570 F. App’x 478, 480 (6th Cir. 2014). “To determine whether a district court abused
its discretion, we look to whether the sentence is reasonable.” United States v. Walters, 775 F.3d
*
The Honorable Stephen J. Murphy, III, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Michigan, sitting by designation.
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United States v. Emmons
778, 781 (6th Cir. 2015). “The reasonableness review is split into two parts: procedural
reasonableness and substantive reasonableness.” Howard, 570 F. App’x at 480. “[We] must first
ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error.” Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “If the district court’s sentencing decision is procedurally sound, we then
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion
standard.” Howard, 570 F. App’x at 480. A substantive reasonableness inquiry will “take into
account the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
B.
Emmons argues that the district court erred by rejecting his challenges to the career
offender enhancement and the 18:1 crack-to-powder-cocaine ratio. Specifically, Emmons asserts
that the district court failed to conduct an independent analysis, failed to give sufficient weight to
a “growing national consensus” of judges disinclined to apply the enhancements in analogous
cases, and failed to provide an adequately detailed explanation of the sentence. Br. 18-27. The
cited errors implicate both procedural and substantive reasonableness.1
“A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court fails to calculate (or
improperly calculates) the Guidelines range, treats the Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider
the § 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails to adequately
explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Baker, 559 F.3d 443, 448 (6th Cir. 2009). But a
district court need not, “on its own initiative, examine the underlying bases for a Guideline
before imposing a sentence.” United States v. Brooks, 628 F.3d 791, 800 (6th Cir. 2011).
It is not disputed that Emmons’ two prior felony drug offenses—for distributing 0.1
grams of crack in 1999 and 0.9 grams of crack in 2004—qualified him for the career offender
1
“[T]he border between factors properly considered ‘substantive’ and those properly considered
‘procedural’ is blurry if not porous.” United States v. Liou, 491 F.3d 334, 337 (6th Cir. 2007).
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United States v. Emmons
enhancement. Tr. 6. And while Emmons claims the 18:1 ratio was inappropriately applied in this
case, he does not assert that it is de facto unreasonable. The district court’s consideration of
Emmons’ motion for a non-guideline sentence demonstrates that the district court correctly
treated the Guidelines as discretionary. Tr. 4-5, 14. And it is clear from the record that the Court
thoroughly considered the § 3553(a) factors. See Tr. 24. Emmons does not contend that the
sentence was based on erroneous facts. Finally, the district court provided a sufficient
explanation for the sentence. While acknowledging “a lot of criticism about the career offender
guidelines,” it noted that Emmons “fits the definition” of a career offender, the predicate offenses
“were in the Court’s view serious,” and Emmons “is the sort of recidivist” the enhancement was
designed to target. Tr. 6, 9, 13. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007) (“The
sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the
parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking
authority.”). For these reasons, the sentence is procedurally reasonable.
The 145-month sentence imposed by the district court is also substantively reasonable.
“Recidivism has long been recognized as a legitimate basis for increased punishment.” Ewing v.
California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003). The district court emphasized Emmons’ criminal history and
his status as a recidivist. In addition to having been convicted of the two qualifying felony drug
offenses, Emmons was previously convicted of “a number of . . . non-qualifying offenses” that
the district court considered “serious.” Tr. 13. The predicate offenses also involved a larger
quantity of drugs than Emmons’ prior offenses, and were committed while Emmons was on
supervised release from an earlier conviction. Tr. 12.
We apply a presumption of reasonableness to sentences within the Guidelines range.
United States v. Christman, 607 F.3d 1110, 1118 (6th Cir. 2010). The district court granted
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United States v. Emmons
Emmons’ request for a two-level reduction, resulting in an advisory guideline range of 130 to
162 months. The district court ultimately imposed a mid-range sentence of 145 months. Based on
the totality of the circumstances, we conclude the sentence is substantively reasonable and the
district court did not abuse its discretion.
II.
Emmons argues that the district court’s sentence is unconstitutional because it “is
excessively disproportionate and lacks a rational basis.” Br. 27. The Eighth Amendment
prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “The concept of
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment,” Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010),
though “strict proportionality between crime and sentence” is not required, Ewing v. California,
538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003).
The 145-month sentence imposed by the district court was based largely on Emmons’
status as a career offender, and courts have consistently held that career-offender provisions do
not violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 20 F.3d 670, 674 (6th Cir.
1994). Not only is the sentence presumptively reasonable as within the Guidelines range, but the
Supreme Court has previously upheld as constitutional more severe punishments. See, e.g.,
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 265 (1980) (affirming a mandatory life sentence for a recidivist
convicted of third non-violent felony). We decline to hold that the sentence imposed by the
district court is so disproportionate as to be unconstitutional.
The district court’s sentence is affirmed.
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