United States v. Christopher Vines ( 2020 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 20a0083n.06
No. 19-5133
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
FILED
Feb 04, 2020
)
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
)
COURT FOR THE EASTERN
CHRISTOPHER VINES, )
DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
BEFORE: SUTTON, BUSH, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. With Christopher Vines’s release from federal
custody, the United States made every effort to help him beat his gripping drug addiction. Vines
was placed on supervised release and enrolled in a drug-counseling program. Vines would soon
test positive for marijuana and cocaine, but the government stuck with him. Vines was enrolled
in various counseling programs; none worked. The district court imposed gradual terms of
imprisonment for Vines’s violations of his terms of supervised release, first six weekends, then
eight months. But no matter the judicially crafted approach, Vines went astray. After yet another
round of drug-related violations, the district court revoked Vines’s supervised release and imposed
a 24-month prison sentence. We AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2012, Vines pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. See
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Vines to 60 months in prison followed by three
Case No. 19-5133, United States v. Vines
years of supervised release. In view of Vines’s history of drug abuse and drug crimes, the district
court recommended that Vines receive 500 hours of substance-abuse counseling from a drug-
treatment program for inmates. Yet Vines’s addiction proved intractable. Within weeks of his
release from prison, Vines was back to his old ways. Those misdeeds are reflected by three post-
release episodes.
1. The terms of Vines’s supervised release prohibited him from possessing, using, or
distributing any controlled substance and required him to participate in a substance-abuse testing
and treatment program. Vines’s probation officer enrolled Vines in a qualifying program. But
Vines missed his first appointment. At his probation officer’s direction, Vines rescheduled. And
he made that appointment—only to then test positive for marijuana and cocaine.
This cycle repeated itself for the next six months. Vines would miss his counseling
appointments, his probation officer would admonish him, and Vines would reschedule his
appointments, where he, on multiple occasions, tested positive for drug use. So Vines’s probation
officer, with no objection from Vines, sought to modify the conditions of Vines’s supervised
release. The district court agreed and modified those terms to require Vines to serve six weekends
in intermittent custody, with added drug-testing obligations.
2. Three months later, Vines was arrested for assaulting his girlfriend. That offense
violated Vines’s terms of supervised release, which prohibited him from committing another
offense. Those terms also required Vines, if arrested, to notify his probation officer within 72
hours—another commitment Vines failed to honor. When Vines’s probation officer ultimately
contacted Vines about the offense, the officer discovered that Vines had moved to a new address.
That too was a supervised-release violation—Vines was required to notify his probation officer if
he moved to a new address. And a few days later, when Vines reported for his next drug-screening
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appointment, he again tested positive for both cocaine and marijuana. Altogether, Vines
committed four new supervised-release violations within about a week.
The district court held a hearing to revoke Vines’s supervised release. Vines admitted to
most of the violations, but not to committing domestic assault (and the government ultimately
chose not to pursue the matter). Vines’s admitted conduct yielded a Guidelines policy statement
range of 6 to 12 months in prison. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4. The parties jointly recommended, and
the district court agreed, that Vines receive an eight-month sentence of imprisonment followed by
a two-year term of supervised release.
3. Following Vines’s release from prison, his probation officer re-enrolled him in a drug
counseling program. Yet within just a matter of weeks, Vines again violated the terms of his
supervised release, missing three drug-counseling or therapy sessions. Those violations brought a
more intensive treatment program for Vines and many more missed appointments. Over five
months, Vines tested positive for drug use on seven different occasions. Eventually, an arrest
warrant was issued for Vines. A marshal arrested Vines—only after Vines slammed a door in the
marshal’s face—and discovered cocaine in Vines’s pocket.
At his revocation hearing, Vines admitted to each of the violations. His conduct constituted
a grade C supervised-release violation, which, when combined with his criminal history (category
IV), again corresponded with a Guidelines range of 6 to 12 months in prison. See U.S.S.G.
§ 7B1.4. Vines asked the court to impose a three-and-a-half-month sentence, with a term of
supervised release. The government asked for a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range.
The district court, however, had a more serious penalty in mind: a 24-month sentence, one
that equaled the statutory maximum and doubled the top of the recommended sentencing range.
Among the justifications cited by the district court were Vines’s numerous supervised-release
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violations, his two prior appearances for modification to and revocation of supervised release, his
lack of cooperation with the probation office and the marshal, and the need to protect the public.
The district court also recommended that the Bureau of Prisons enroll Vines in its 500-hour drug
treatment program.
II. ANALYSIS
Just as if reviewing a sentence imposed following a conviction, we review a sentence
imposed after the revocation of supervised release for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Polihonki, 543 F.3d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). When (as here) that sentence
exceeds the prescribed Guidelines range, we “give due deference to the district court’s decision
that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
A. Vines’s Sentence Is Procedurally Reasonable.
Our review for procedural reasonableness is deferential. A district court abuses its
discretion in revoking supervised release only if it commits a “significant procedural error.” Id.
Such errors include improperly calculating the Guidelines range, failing to treat that range as
advisory, omitting from its reasoning the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (a subset of the
familiar § 3553(a) factors applicable in the supervised release setting), considering impermissible
factors, selecting the sentence based upon clearly erroneous facts, or failing to explain why it chose
the sentence. United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2018); see also United States
v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 203 (6th Cir. 2011) (explaining that “[t]he statute governing supervised
release, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), requires the district court to consider a subset of the § 3553(a)
factors”).
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1. As purported evidence of procedural error, Vines first contends that the district court
failed to acknowledge or discuss the Guidelines range applicable to his violations. This, says
Vines, resulted in the district court failing to provide sufficient justification for its upward variance.
But Vines’s claim runs headlong into heavy legal and factual realities. As a legal matter, the
district court was not required to refer explicitly to the Guidelines range during revocation
proceedings. See Polihonki, 543 F.3d at 324; see also United States v. Johnson, 403 F.3d 813, 816
(6th Cir. 2005) (stating that we do not require a “ritual incantation” of the Guidelines or the §
3583(e) factors to affirm a sentence). As with sentencing, we merely require that the district court
explain its reasons for imposing a particular sentence with enough detail to afford reasonable
appellate review. Polihonki, 543 F.3d at 323–24.
And as a factual matter, the recommended Guidelines range was a prominent consideration
throughout Vines’s revocation proceedings. Start with Vines’s Dispositional Report, which
described his misconduct, his supervised-release violations, and probation’s sentencing
recommendation. The Report also included a calculation of his Guidelines range, with the final
tally resulting in a recommended range of 6 to 12 months in prison. At the start of the revocation
hearing, the district court asked whether both parties had reviewed the report (they had), and
whether either party had any objections (they did not). Both parties and the district court then
referred to that range throughout the hearing. Vines sought a sentence below the Guidelines range,
and the government recommended a sentence at its low end. And in issuing its sentence, the
district court acknowledged these Guidelines-related proposals, stating that it was “going to
disregard the recommendation of [Vines’s] counsel and the recommendation of the government to
impose a sentence within the [G]uidelines.” At each turn of the sentencing process, then, the
Guidelines range was top of mind for the court and parties.
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2. But, says Vines, even if the district court considered the Guidelines range, it nevertheless
failed to explain sufficiently the rationale for imposing its above-Guidelines sentence. To Vines’s
mind, the district court’s errors were plentiful. It failed to consider the § 3583(e) factors, misstated
particular facts, and failed to explain why it rejected Vines’s request for a lower sentence.
True, the district court did not recite the § 3583(e) factors. But we do not require a
“ritual incantation” of those factors. Johnson, 403 F.3d at 816. We simply require that the district
court address the relevant factors in reaching its conclusion. Id.; see United States v. Trejo-
Martinez, 481 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2007), which the district court safely achieved in deciding
to vary upward. The court began by acknowledging Vines’s long history of drug exposure and
abuse. His father was a drug dealer, his mother and sister both struggled with drug addiction, and
drugs, Vines added, “played a major part in [his] life and arrest record.” The district court credited
Vines for “[identifying] the problem.”
The district court then turned from Vines’s personal history to his supervised-release
history, weighing the number and nature of his violations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). As the
district court noted, there was “some type of noncompliance almost every single month, and for
many months two or three times, either failure to report, missing appointments, positive drug tests,
or something else.” At the time of Vines’s arrest for these violations, the district court added,
Vines resisted, ran into his apartment, and forced the marshal to break into the apartment to retrieve
him. The district court then emphasized the need to “protect the public” from Vines’s actions.
Vines counters that he never failed to report to his probation officer. That may be. But the district
court did not specify to whom Vines failed to report. And it is uncontested that Vines failed to
report to several required drug tests and counseling sessions.
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Nor does the record support Vines’s belief that the district court failed to consider his
request for a three-and-a-half-month sentence and imposition of supervised release with continued
addiction counseling. Keeping in mind that Vines had already been afforded numerous chances
to comply with various drug-counseling programs and that the district court had “already revoked
[Vines] in the past,” the district court denied Vines’s request. Vines had run out of chances; he
was “unable, at this point in [his] life, to comply with the conditions of supervised release.” All
told, the district court adequately considered the suggested Guidelines range and sufficiently
explained its rationale for instead choosing to impose a longer term of imprisonment.
B. Vines’s Sentence Is Substantively Reasonable.
Vines also claims that his 24-month sentence is substantively unreasonable. That sentence,
which doubled the top end of his Guidelines range, might fairly be described as “long.” But it was
not “too long” when measured by “the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; Rayyan,
885 F.3d at 442. Those circumstances, most conspicuously, included Vines’s serial violations of
his supervised-release terms. See, e.g., United States v. Kokoski, 435 F. App’x 472, 477 (6th Cir.
2011) (relying, in part, on the defendant’s repeat violations as a basis for imposing the statutory-
maximum sentence); United States v. Visage, 530 F. App’x 411, 412 (6th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(upholding an above-Guidelines sentence based on the defendant’s repeat violations and need to
protect the public). For an offender who commits multiple supervised-release violations, it is not
an abuse of discretion to vary up to the applicable statutory maximum. See, e.g., United States v.
Glass, 749 F. App’x 434, 441–42 (6th Cir. 2018) (upholding a 24-month sentence, where the
Guidelines range was 3 to 9 months); United States v. Jackson, 541 F. App’x 668, 670–71 (6th
Cir. 2013) (24-month sentence, 15 to 21 months Guidelines range); United States v. Wells, 443 F.
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App’x 997, 998–99 (6th Cir. 2011) (24-month sentence, 12 to 18 months Guidelines range);
Kokoski, 435 F. App’x at 477 (34-month sentence, 8 to 14 months Guidelines range).
As part of its 24-month sentence, the district court also included a recommendation to the
Bureau of Prisons that Vines participate in the system’s 500-hour drug-abuse program. Vines
suggests the district court likely imposed a lengthy sentence to allow Vines to complete that
program while in prison. True, a district court may not lengthen a defendant’s prison term for the
sole purpose of promoting substance-abuse rehabilitation. Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319,
334–35 (2011). But that is not what occurred here. When issuing Vines’s sentence, the district
court discussed Vines’s repeated violations, his previous modification and revocation proceedings,
and the need to protect the public. It also emphasized that Vines needed to comply with his
conditions and get his life in order. “[F]or those reasons,” the district court imposed the statutory-
maximum sentence. It was not until after the court issued the sentence that it began to discuss
drug-treatment programs with Vines, at which point the district court opined that the program
“may be [Vines’s] only shot at beating this addiction.” But that sequencing is entirely consistent
with Tapia. 564 U.S. at 334 (permitting a district court to discuss “opportunities for rehabilitation
within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs”). No abuse of discretion
occurred.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM.
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