United States v. Joel Coronado-Turua ( 2020 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 20a0110n.06
Case No. 19-1507
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Feb 20, 2020
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
v. ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
JOEL CORONADO-TURUA, ) MICHIGAN
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
BEFORE: SUTTON, McKEAGUE, and DONALD, Circuit Judges.
BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Joel Coronado-Turua pled guilty to
conspiracy to distribute seven kilograms of cocaine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846. In the
plea agreement, Coronado-Turua and the government agreed to a guideline range of 70 to 87
months, but they also agreed that, if the district court found that Coronado-Turua had a higher
guideline range based on his criminal history, then the higher guideline range would become the
agreed range. Although Coronado-Turua was facing a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years,
Id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)(II), the parties believed that he would qualify for a sentence “without regard
to any statutory minimum sentence” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), often referred to as the safety
valve, see, e.g., United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 582, 586 (6th Cir. 2008). Unfortunately for
Coronado-Turua, the district court found that he had a prior conviction that the parties were not
Case Nos. 19-1507, United States v. Coronado-Turua
aware of prior to making the plea agreement. The district court found that, with that conviction,
the safety valve would not apply to Coronado-Turua, and his attorney agreed. The district court
sentenced Coronado-Turua to the mandatory minimum of 120 months without objection from the
government.
In this direct appeal, Coronado-Turua alleges ineffective assistance of counsel,1 arguing
that his counsel (1) should have discovered the prior conviction before negotiating the plea and
(2) should have argued that the safety valve still applied to Coronado-Turua based on the plain
language of the statute.
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) deficient
performance by the attorney and (2) prejudice resulting from that deficient performance.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Supreme Court has noted that, “[w]hen
an ineffective-assistance claim is brought on direct appeal, appellate counsel and the court must
proceed on a trial record not developed precisely for the object of litigating or preserving the claim
and thus often incomplete or inadequate for this purpose.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S.
500, 504-05 (2003). Following that reasoning, our Court “ordinarily [] will not review a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because the record is usually insufficient to
permit an adequate review of such a claim.” United States v. Gardner, 417 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir.
2005).
We do, however, allow for an exception to this rule “for cases in which the record is
adequately developed to allow the court to properly assess the merits of the issue.” United States
v. Fortson, 194 F.3d 730, 736 (6th Cir. 1999). Typically, these cases involve pure questions of
law, see, e.g., United States v. Burgess, 142 F. App’x 232, 240 (6th Cir. 2005) (determining an
1
Although the plea agreement contains an appellate waiver, it does not bar an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
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Case Nos. 19-1507, United States v. Coronado-Turua
ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal “as a matter of law”); a fully developed record, see,
e.g., United States v. Wynn, 663 F.3d 847, 850-51 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that the district court had
previously held a hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel); or a simple decision where proof
of deficient performance of prejudice was absent from the record, see, e.g., United States v. Geedi,
490 F. App’x 755, 760-61 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding no merit to defendant’s claims of prejudice on
direct appeal).
Coronado-Turua’s case does not meet this exception. At this point, we are missing
information about the communications between Coronado-Turua and his counsel regarding the
plea agreement and his criminal history. See United States v. Bradley, 400 F.3d 459, 462 (6th Cir.
2005) (refusing to hear an ineffective assistance of counsel claim without more information about
the communications between defendant and his counsel regarding a plea agreement). There is also
the question of prejudice and whether Coronado-Turua would have refused the plea agreement
even if he knew he was going to get a 120-month sentence. Finally, on appeal, Coronado-Turua
makes a novel argument regarding the safety valve’s applicability to him; further briefing on that
issue will only serve to help this Court make a decision in the post-conviction proceedings. As
such, we find it appropriate to follow the general rule and decline to address the merits of
Coronado-Turua’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Coronado-Turua’s conviction and sentence.
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