United States v. Jewel Sims ( 2020 )


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  •                          NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
    File Name: 20a0165n.06
    Case No. 19-5462
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    FILED
    Mar 19, 2020
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                           )                      DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
    )
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    )
    )       ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
    v.
    )       STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
    )       THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF
    JEWEL DEONTA SIMS,
    )       TENNESSEE
    Defendant-Appellant.                         )
    )
    BEFORE: NORRIS, DONALD, and NALBANDIAN Circuit Judges.
    BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. Defendant-Appellant Jewel Deonta Sims
    seeks an order from this Court vacating the judgment of the district court and remanding the matter
    for a new sentencing hearing. In sentencing Sims, the district court did not adopt all of the
    perspectives and arguments Sims presented regarding his family circumstances. Because the
    district court did not exercise a blanket refusal to consider Sims’ family circumstances in
    sentencing him, however, we AFFIRM the judgment below.
    I.
    On April 26, 2017, Sims was indicted on one count of being a felon in possession of a
    firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924. Sims pleaded guilty to the single count
    indictment on January 29, 2019. Thereafter, the court set the matter for sentencing.
    Case No. 19-5462, United States v. Sims
    The Presentence Report (“PSR”) calculated Sims’ recommended imprisonment range as
    seventy to eighty-seven months under the Guidelines, based on a total offense level of twenty-
    three and a criminal history of category IV. It did not note any factors warranting a departure. In
    his objections to the PSR, Sims lodged a number of factual objections and requested a variance,
    departure, and/or adjustment below the advisory Guidelines range based on his inability to obtain
    a concurrent sentence with his state case and a second federal case as well as his mental health and
    medical conditions. After taking up and resolving Sims’ factual objections, none of which changed
    the Guidelines range provided in his PSR, the district court accepted the recommendations of
    probation as articulated in the PSR. More specifically, the court found that Sims’ base offense
    level was twenty-six, given that the offense involved a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting
    a large capacity magazine or a firearm that is described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) and that Sims
    committed a part of the instant offense subsequent to two felony convictions of a crime of violence
    or a controlled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(1). At the government’s request, a three-
    level reduction was applied for Sims’ acceptance of responsibility, giving him a total offense level
    of twenty-three. With a criminal history computation of nine points, establishing a criminal history
    category of IV, Sims’ was subject to a Guidelines range of seventy to eighty-seven months,
    followed by one to three years of supervised release. Ultimately, the district court imposed a
    within-Guidelines sentence of eighty months of imprisonment, to run concurrent with his judgment
    in another federal case, followed by three years of supervised release.
    At the start of Sims’ sentencing hearing, the district court acknowledged that it reviewed
    letters submitted prior to the hearing from Sims’ family, including letters from two daughters and
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    Case No. 19-5462, United States v. Sims
    one son.1 The court also recognized that statements within those letters could be reviewed during
    sentencing.
    During sentencing, the district court considered Sims’ history and characteristics, stating
    as follows:
    [T]he Court feels compelled to comment on [] the notion of the Defendant having
    a family and that he should go back to his family. And this is all very
    understandable. I think Mr. Sims has family members that, from the letters, care
    about their father and husband. They want him to come home. . . .
    I think I am compelled to say, [] that for me, although I always like to hear
    background about the client and I feel for the family members that are affected, it’s
    difficult for me to grant leniency based on the wishes of the family or the desire to
    return to the family for several reasons. One is that they do not appear to me to be
    appropriately encompassed within the 3553(a) factors.
    Another thing is that the Court is loath to sort of discriminate against folks
    based on family status. And what I mean by that is, if I had very similar situations
    where one person can, you know, appeal to the fact that they have a family that
    needs them and the other person doesn’t, the Court is concerned about being unfair
    to the person that does not have those family members. And that is a real issue for
    the Court especially when, let’s face it, the one who doesn’t have a family, he may
    be less culpable in the sense that he didn’t put his family at risk of losing their
    valued family member by their behavior.
    . . . And the Court is always happy to hear from family members and
    understands their stories[. Still,] the Court, in its view, would not be carrying out
    its responsibilities by affording that weight, even though it wants to be
    compassionate to family members.
    But the Court realizes that incarceration is always hard on family members;
    that’s just part of the process. And I don’t think this Court is speaking out of school
    when it says that these are the kinds of things that folks need to think about before
    they intentionally undertake the conduct that they know full well is going to risk
    getting them in trouble and taking them away from their family.
    Having said that, however, the Court does take note of the fact that the
    Defendant, although from what I can tell from the presentence report and the
    criminal history, has not always been prioritizing his family, the Court notes from
    the letters that he does have incentive to do so now. From the documents filed
    today from [Sims’ counsel], it appears that he is taking a new stance and trying to
    do something affirmative to turn his life around. And that’s very appropriate.
    Sent. Hr’g Tr., R. 41, at PageID #148-50.
    1
    An additional letter written by one of Sims’ sons was submitted and presented at the hearing,
    which the district took time to review.
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    Case No. 19-5462, United States v. Sims
    Sims’ counsel then addressed the court, stating that they viewed the appropriateness of
    considering Sims’ family circumstances slightly different than the court—that, although each
    defendant’s family circumstances may be different, it is properly considered given the
    individualized assessment required in imposing a sentence under the Guidelines. The court
    responded as follows:
    Yeah. Well, I understand, [your point], and I think you might get some
    courts to agree with you. I think, you know, for the reasons I said, I see it
    differently. I think I’m authorized to.
    But I will say this about this, and I am concerned about a Defendant who
    maybe—and there are some people—I know some—pretty much all alone in the
    world and they can’t point to that. And I just don’t want them to be disadvantaged.
    But having said that, I will tell you where I have thought about Mr. Sims’
    family and am taking into account, and it’s on the issue of the need for
    incapacitation, meaning how likely is he motivated despite, I think, a history of
    unfortunate sort of inability to comply with the law? How motivated is he to turn
    his life around? And I reviewed your documents, and I like the statements that
    were made in what I was reading.
    I think—I have accounted for the fact that I think that it is likely that having
    those family members that are pulling for him, that want him there, will be a
    substantial motivating force. I just hope it’s enough. But was I thinking about that
    when I’m thinking, you know what? After—you know, after—in addition to what
    time he’s serving in Eastern Tennessee, how much time does he really need to serve
    extra? I did take that into account. So I appreciate that.
    
    Id. at PageID
    #157-58.
    After this discussion and others concerning the appropriate considerations in sentencing
    Sims under the Guidelines, the court pronounced a sentence of eighty months and adjourned the
    proceedings. Thereafter, the court resumed its proceedings to afford Sims an opportunity to
    address the court prior to judgment being entered and inform the parties of the Federal Bureau of
    Prisons’ decision regarding Sims’ sentencing credit, about which the parties previously expressed
    concern. When Sims addressed the court, he spoke, in part, of his family circumstances—namely,
    the effect of his behavior on his wife and kids as well as how he wanted to lead a better life and be
    a better example to his family.
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    Case No. 19-5462, United States v. Sims
    The district court acknowledged Sims’ statements and further explained how it considered
    Sims’ family circumstances in sentencing him:
    And, Mr. Sims, I want to say a few things that go into my thinking about
    the sentence. You know, one thing I want you to know is that before going back
    over the sentence with you, I do want you to know that I heard what you said. And
    I’m also glad that you had an opportunity to do what I think you were doing, which
    was to address your family. I would say that your remarks were consistent with
    what I was picking up on this morning prior to sentencing from reading what you
    had written about your interest in helping prevent recidivism and something I would
    have guessed you were feeling about your children, because I read your children’s
    letters and your wife’s letters.
    My sense was that, you know, facing—even with your—even having a
    criminal history as you did, you hadn’t been facing this kind of jail sentence that
    you are looking at now. And the Court’s view was that this whole experience,
    including the desire to be back with your family, would motivate you to make those
    positive changes in your life and that, in the Court’s view, those were things that
    would help the Court conclude that we didn’t need two full sentences, one of
    78 months and one of 80 months right on top of each other. We didn’t need that,
    and the Court did take that into account.
    And so the Court certainly has heard what you’re saying. It doesn’t change
    the Court’s analysis. I think it does highlight some things that the Court was
    thinking. And, you know, I—when I look at these cases, I’m always hopeful that
    folks that have been in trouble are committed to making positive change and that
    they are motivated to make a positive change. And I was picking up this morning
    that you were motivated to make a positive change. The sort of remarks you made
    here would tend to confirm that, the next positive step.
    
    Id. at PageID
    #174-76. The court then restated Sims’ eighty-month sentence.
    Sims now asks this Court to vacate the judgment of the district court and remand his case
    for a new sentencing hearing. According to Sims, the district court erred in imposing his sentence
    by making a blanket refusal to consider information regarding Sims’ family situation under 18
    U.S.C. § 3553(a), rendering his sentence procedurally unreasonable.
    II.
    “When evaluating a sentence for procedural reasonableness, we focus on how the district
    court calculated the sentence.” United States v. Potts, 
    947 F.3d 357
    , 364 (6th Cir. 2020). “We ask
    whether the district court properly calculated the Guidelines range, remembered to treat that range
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    as advisory, considered the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) while refraining from
    considering impermissible factors, selected the sentence based upon facts not clearly erroneous,
    and adequately explained why it chose the sentence.” 
    Id. Our standard
    of review influences how we assess these considerations. 
    Id. Where the
    defendant preserves a sentencing argument below, we review the district court’s decision to reject
    that argument for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Parrish, 
    915 F.3d 1043
    , 1046-47 (6th
    Cir. 2019). Where no objection lies, or where “defense counsel does not object with a reasonable
    degree of specificity to a purported procedural error, a plain error standard of review applies.”
    United States v. Gibbs, 
    626 F.3d 344
    , 349 (6th Cir. 2010).
    Here, the district court, after announcing the sentence it intended to impose and its
    explanation for the sentence, including its hesitancy to consider arguments regarding Sims’ family
    circumstances, gave Sims’ counsel an opportunity to respond. Sims’ counsel then stated that
    although they understood the court’s concerns, they viewed the state of the law on whether “family
    [is an] appropriate history and characteristic factor” differently. Sent. Hr’g, R.41, at PageID #156-
    57. Indeed, Sims’ counsel stated that although every defendant before the court may have a
    different family circumstance, the inquiry is still proper, as the sentencing factors consider the
    circumstances particular to each defendant. Counsel stated that he “just wanted to make that
    point.” 
    Id. at PageID
    #157. Although it does not appear that an adequate objection was made after
    imposition of the sentence, the disagreement with the district court discussed above was made
    when the court’s sentencing ruling was made or sought.2 Moreover, it was made with a reasonable
    2
    United States v. Bostic, 
    371 F.3d 865
    , 871 n.3 (6th Cir. 2004) (“A party may preserve a
    claim of error by informing the court—when the court ruling or order is made or sought—
    of the action the party wishes the court to take, or the party’s objection to the court’s action
    and the grounds for that objection.” (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b))); United States v.
    Vonner, 
    516 F.3d 382
    , 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (stating that answering “no” to the
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    degree of specificity, as evidenced by the district court’s response directly to the argument. Thus,
    we view the objection as having been raised with particularity at sentencing and review it for an
    abuse of discretion.
    III.
    We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion with regard to considering Sims’
    family circumstances in fashioning his sentence. “[S]entencing judges ‘exercise a wide discretion’
    in the types of evidence they may consider when imposing sentence and . . . ‘[h]ighly relevant—
    if not essential—to [their] selection of an appropriate sentence is the possession of the fullest
    information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.’” Pepper v. United
    States, 
    562 U.S. 476
    , 480 (2011) (quoting Williams v. New York, 
    337 U.S. 241
    , 246-47 (1949)).
    This principle is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3661, which states that “[n]o limitation shall be placed on
    the information [a sentencing judge may consider] concerning the [defendant’s] background,
    character, and conduct. . . .” The principle is also codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which provides
    certain factors that sentencing courts must consider, including the “the history and characteristics
    of the defendant[.]” Family circumstances are an appropriate consideration by a district court as
    part of “‘the history and characteristics of the defendant.’” United States v. Lapsins, 
    570 F.3d 758
    ,
    774 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)); see also United States v. Petrus, 
    588 F.3d 347
    , 355 (6th Cir. 2009).
    To avoid procedural error, the district court “must ‘set forth enough to satisfy the appellate
    court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its]
    court’s Bostic request for remaining objections does not alter a defendant’s right to appeal
    issues “previously raised”); United States v. Moore, 512 F. App’x 590, 592-93 (6th Cir.
    2013) (considering an objection raised, despite counsel saying there were no objections
    after the sentence was imposed, where counsel made his request prior to sentencing).
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    own legal decisionmaking authority.’” United States. v. Klups, 
    514 F.3d 532
    , 537 (6th Cir. 2008)
    (quoting Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 356 (2007)). When a district court applies the
    Guidelines and appears to adopt “the Commission’s own reasoning that the Guidelines sentence is
    a proper sentence (in terms of § 3553(a)[)],” a long explanation is typically unnecessary. 
    Rita, 551 U.S. at 356-57
    . However, the district court must address a defendant’s “nonfrivolous reasons for
    imposing a different sentence” than the one contemplated by the district court. 
    Id. at 357.
    How
    much explanation is warranted depends on the unique circumstances in each sentencing. 
    Klups, 514 F.3d at 537
    (citing United States v. Liou, 
    491 F.3d 334
    , 338 (6th Cir. 2007)).
    Contrary to Sims’ assertion, the district court did not exercise a blanket refusal to consider
    his family circumstances in fashioning his sentence. Sims is correct in stating that § 3661 does
    not provide sentencing courts any basis to invent a blanket prohibition against a defendant’s
    introduction of certain types of evidence at sentencing, including a defendant’s family
    circumstances. United States v. Taylor, 
    648 F.3d 417
    , 426 (6th Cir. 2011). Here, however, the
    district court explained how it considered Sims’ family circumstances in fashioning his sentence.
    The court found it “difficult for [it] to grant leniency based on the wishes of the family or the desire
    to return to the family[,]” because, from its perspective, such circumstances “do not appear . . . to
    be appropriately encompassed with in the 3553(a) factors.” Sent. Hr’g Tr., R. 41, at PageID #149.
    Still, such a view does not constitute a blanket refusal to consider Sims’ family circumstances.
    Indeed, the court explicitly stated that it read the materials submitted by Sims’ family and
    considered his family circumstances. Moreover, the district court analyzed how Sims’ family
    circumstances bore on the § 3553(a) factors, in part, by noting that one who commits a crime but
    does not have a family may be less culpable than one who does, as the former did not put their
    family at risk of losing their valued family member as a result of their behavior. Importantly, the
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    Case No. 19-5462, United States v. Sims
    court also stated that the letters and statements made regarding Sims’ family circumstances
    demonstrated that Sims’ had incentive to turn his life around, and the record reveals the court took
    this into account in sentencing Sims. The district court stated that it did not find consecutive
    sentences appropriate due, in part, to Sims’ family circumstances, and it articulated how Sims will
    still have children of school age after serving the sentence imposed, such that he could be a positive
    force to them starting immediately upon his release. Thus, the district court’s discussion of Sims’
    family circumstances at sentencing shows a reasoned basis for the exercise of its legal decision-
    making authority on the issue.
    Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion and AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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