Luke Waid v. Richard Snyder ( 2020 )


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  •                               RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
    Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
    File Name: 20a0161p.06
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    IN RE: FLINT WATER CASES.                                  ┐
    ___________________________________________               │
    │
    LUKE WAID, Parent and Next-Friend of SR, a minor,          │
    et al.,                                                    │
    >        Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533
    Plaintiffs,                            │
    │
    │
    ELNORA CARTHAN et al.,                                     │
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,      │
    │
    v.                                                  │
    │
    │
    DARNELL EARLEY, GERALD AMBROSE, HOWARD                     │
    CROFT, MICHAEL GLASGOW, DAUGHERTY JOHNSON,                 │
    and CITY OF FLINT, MICHIGAN (19-1425); RICHARD             │
    DALE SNYDER, former Governor of Michigan, ANDY             │
    DILLON, former Treasurer of Michigan, and                  │
    GRETCHEN WHITMER, present Governor of Michigan             │
    (19-1472); LIANE SHEKTER-SMITH, STEPHEN BUSCH,             │
    PATRICK COOK, MICHAEL PRYSBY, AND BRADLEY                  │
    WURFEL (19-1477); and ADAM ROSENTHAL (19-1533),            │
    Defendants-Appellants.          │
    ┘
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Michigan at Ann Arbor.
    No. 5:16-cv-10444—Judith E. Levy, District Judge.
    Argued: April 27, 2020
    Decided and Filed: May 22, 2020
    Before: MERRITT, MOORE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533       Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                         Page 2
    _________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: William Y. Kim, CITY OF FLINT LAW DEPARTMENT, Flint, Michigan, for
    Appellant City of Flint, and Christopher J. Marker, O’NEIL, WALLACE & DOYLE, P.C.,
    Saginaw, Michigan, for Appellant Glasgow in 19-1425. Margaret A. Bettenhausen, OFFICE OF
    THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan for Appellants in 19-1472.
    Charles E. Barbieri, FOSTER, SWIFT, COLLINS & SMITH, P.C., Lansing, Michigan, for
    Appellants in 19-1477. James A. Fajen, FAJEN AND MILLER, PLLC, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
    for Appellant in 19-1533. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellees.
    ON BRIEF: William Y. Kim, CITY OF FLINT LAW DEPARTMENT, Flint, Michigan,
    Frederick A. Berg, Jr., BUTZEL LONG, P.C., Detroit, Michigan, Sheldon H. Klein, Joseph E.
    Richotte, BUTZEL LONG, P.C., Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, Christopher J. Marker, O’NEIL,
    WALLACE & DOYLE, P.C., Saginaw, Michigan, Todd R. Perkins, THE PERKINS LAW
    GROUP PLLC, Detroit, Michigan, Alexander S. Rusek, WHITE LAW, PLLC, Okemos,
    Michigan, Barry A. Wolf, Flint, Michigan, Edwar A. Zeineh, LAW OFFICE OF EDWAR A.
    ZEINEH, Lansing, Michigan, for Appellants in 19-1425. Margaret A. Bettenhausen, Richard S.
    Kuhl, Nathan A. Gambill, Zachary C. Larsen, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY
    GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan for Appellants in 19-1472. Charles E. Barbieri, FOSTER,
    SWIFT, COLLINS & SMITH, P.C., Lansing, Michigan, Michael J. Pattwell, Jay M. Berger,
    CLARK HILL PLC, Lansing, Michigan, Thaddeus E. Morgan, FRASER, TREBILCOCK,
    DAVIS & DUNLAP, Lansing, Michigan, Philip A. Grashoff, Jr., SMITH HAUGHEY RICE &
    ROEGGE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for Appellants in 19-1477. James A. Fajen, FAJEN AND
    MILLER, PLLC, Ann Arbor, Michigan, James W. Burdick, BURDICK LAW, P.C., Bloomfield
    Hills, Michigan, for Appellant in 19-1533. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for
    Appellees.
    MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which MERRITT, J., joined.
    MURPHY, J. (pp. 39–45), delivered a separate opinion concurring in the judgment in part and
    dissenting in part.
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. This is a case about the Flint Water Crisis.
    From 2014 to 2015, City of Flint and Michigan State officials caused, sustained, and covered up
    the poisoning of an entire community with lead- and legionella-contaminated water. The crisis
    started in April 2014 when the City began delivering Flint River water to its predominantly poor
    and African-American residents, knowing that it was not treated for corrosion. In a matter of
    weeks, Flint residents reported that there was something wrong with the way the water looked,
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533                Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                                        Page 3
    tasted, and smelled, and that it was causing rashes. In response, the City treated the water with
    additional chlorine—exacerbating the corrosion in the old water lines.                                 The corrosion
    contaminated the water with hazardous levels of lead and caused an outbreak of Legionnaires’
    disease. State and City officials failed to stop the delivery of Flint River water and obstinately
    assured the public that the water was safe, when they knew it was not. Now, Flint residents can
    expect to see their children permanently developmentally stunted. It has been six years since the
    start of the crisis and corroded pipes still infect the water and poison the people of Flint. The
    question before us is whether these Defendants-Appellants allegedly responsible for the crisis are
    immune from suit.
    This appeal arises out of a consolidated class action in the In re Flint Water Cases
    litigation. It follows from the denial of motions to dismiss certain defendants based on qualified
    and absolute immunity. The Plaintiffs-Appellees are individuals affected by the Flint Water
    Crisis.1 The Defendants-Appellants are City and State officials and the City of Flint.2 Plaintiffs-
    Appellees claim that City and State officials’ deliberate indifference to their being poisoned
    violated their substantive due process right to bodily integrity, a constitutional claim we have
    already recognized in Guertin v. Michigan, 
    912 F.3d 907
    , 921 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. denied,
    
    140 S. Ct. 933
    (2020). Acknowledging that Guertin controls, Defendants-Appellants contend
    that their alleged individual conduct does not plausibly amount to a constitutional violation. Or,
    in the case of the City of Flint and Governor Whitmer,3 that the Eleventh Amendment requires
    their dismissal from this action—an argument we rejected in prior appeals.                               See 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 936
    ; Boler v. Earley, 
    865 F.3d 391
    , 412–13 (6th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 
    138 S. Ct. 1281
    (2018).
    1
    We use the term “Plaintiffs” when referring to all plaintiffs belonging to the putative class, and we use the
    term “Plaintiffs-Appellees” when referring solely to the plaintiffs that are party to this appeal.
    2
    We use the term “Defendants” when referring to all named defendants, and we use the term “Defendants-
    Appellants” when referring solely to the defendants that are party to this appeal.
    3
    Governor Whitmer was elected into office in January 2019 and continues to serve as Michigan’s Governor
    at the time of this writing. For the sake of consistency with its earlier Flint Water decisions, the district court solely
    referred to Governor Snyder in its opinion, even where claims are made against the present Governor in her official
    capacity. R. 798 (Op. & Order at 8 n.4) (Page ID #21110).
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533               Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                                     Page 4
    We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the motions to dismiss with respect to every
    Defendant-Appellant except Treasurer Dillon. We REMAND for the district court to decide
    whether Dillon should be dismissed in light of its decision in Brown v. Snyder (In re Flint Water
    Cases), No. 18-cv-10726, 
    2020 WL 1503256
    , at *9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2020).
    I. BACKGROUND4
    Plaintiffs allege that, from June 2013 through April 25, 2014, City and State officials
    created a public health crisis. R. 620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 47–48, ¶ 133) (Page ID #17850–
    51). Officials “ordered and set in motion the use of highly corrosive and toxic Flint River water
    knowing that the [treatment plant] was not ready.”
    Id. “By January
    29, 2015, State officials
    understood that the public health crisis was caused by the corrosion of the entire infrastructure of
    the Flint water system. Yet no action was taken to warn the public of the health crisis or to
    correct the harm.”
    Id. at 81,
    ¶ 238 (Page ID #17884).5 Accordingly, “the complaint alleges
    constitutional violations that occurred during two relevant periods: (1) the period leading up to
    the April 2014 switch to the Flint River, during which Defendants were callously indifferent to
    the facts showing that the water would be dangerous; and (2) the 18-month period from April
    2014 to October 2015, during which Defendants were callously indifferent to the
    mounting evidence that the water was actually causing serious harm, including death.”
    Appellees Br. at 4–5.
    A. The Switch to the Flint River
    The City of Flint did not always receive its water from the Flint River. For decades, the
    City received clean water from Lake Huron through the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department
    (“DWSD”). R. 620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 34–35, ¶¶ 86–91) (Page ID #17837–38). At some
    4
    The facts are taken from Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amended Complaint, as we take all factual allegations to be
    true at this stage. See 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 916
    .
    5
    Some Defendants-Appellants contend that they were not aware that the water was contaminated. They
    point out that Plaintiffs themselves allege that private engineering firms provided inaccurate information about water
    quality to government officials. See R. 620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 51–80, ¶¶ 148–232) (Page ID #17854–83).
    But those allegations do not negate the separate allegations that City and State officials nevertheless had knowledge
    from other sources that the water was contaminated. Therefore, the role of private engineering firms is irrelevant at
    the motion to dismiss stage.
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                           Page 5
    point, however, the City became concerned with the DWSD’s cost and decided to look into
    alternative water sources.
    Id. at 35–37,
    ¶ 92 (Page ID #17838–40). In 2011, City officials had a
    study conducted to see if the Flint River could be used as a safe water source if it was processed
    through the old Flint Water Treatment Plant (“FWTP”).
    Id. at 33–34,
    ¶¶ 82–86 (Page ID
    #17836–37);
    id. at 36–37,
    ¶ 92 (Page ID #17839–40).           The reports issued from the study
    concluded that Flint River water could meet regulatory requirements if properly treated—but that
    would require over $69 million in improvements to the FWTP, including improvements that
    would protect the water from corrosion.
    Id. at 36–37,
    ¶ 92 (Page ID #17839–40). For the
    moment, the City decided against switching to the Flint River as its primary drinking source.
    Id. at 37,
    ¶ 94 (Page ID #17840).
    But by August 2012, the City was embroiled in a financial emergency, leading Governor
    Snyder to appoint Edward Kurtz as Emergency Manager for the City.
    Id. at 38–39,
    ¶ 101 (Page
    ID #17841–42). In Michigan, the State can appoint emergency managers to take over financially
    distressed cities, control their operations, and rein in spending. See 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 939
    ; R.
    620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 39, ¶ 102) (Page ID #17842).             To carry out their mission,
    emergency managers are granted “broad powers” to “act for and in the place and stead of the
    governing body and the office of chief administrative officer of the local government.” MICH.
    COMP. LAWS § 141.1549(2).
    As Emergency Manager, Kurtz made a pitch to Governor Snyder and State Treasurer
    Andy Dillon that the City of Flint should switch to receiving water from an altogether new
    source, the Karegnondi Water Authority (“KWA”). R. 620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 38–39,
    ¶ 101–02) (Page ID #17841–42). The DWSD, on the other hand, made its case to Snyder,
    Dillon, and Kurtz that its water was cheaper and more reliable.
    Id. at 39,
    ¶ 103 (Page ID
    #17842). Caught between competing offers, Dillon requested an independent assessment of cost
    effectiveness for each plan by the engineering firm of Tucker, Young, Jackson and Tull
    (“TYJT”).
    Id. at 39–40,
    ¶ 104 (Page ID #17842–43). In February 2013, TYJT informed Dillon
    that “it would be more cost-effective for Flint on both a short term and long term basis to
    continue to be supplied with water from DWSD.”
    Id. Accordingly, on
    March 17, 2013,
    Treasurer Dillon wrote to Governor Snyder that “the KWA representatives were misrepresenting
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                           Page 6
    the benefits of the deal and that the ‘(r)eport that I got is that Flint should stay w DWSD.’”
    Id. Then, on
    March 28, 2013, Dillon reversed course and emailed Snyder recommending that he
    authorize the City of Flint’s switch to the KWA, noting that Kurtz, the Mayor, and City Council
    all supported that decision.
    Id. at 41,
    ¶ 107 (Page ID #17844). Even though the KWA was more
    costly than the DWSD, the City would be able to borrow funds to pay its share of the project if it
    obtained an Administrative Consent Order (“ACO”) from a State Agency attesting to need due to
    “fire, flood, or other calamity.”
    Id. at 127
    , 
    ¶¶ 375–76 (Page ID #17930).
    The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (“MDEQ”) ultimately backed the
    interim plan, even though it knew “that the decision to switch the water source for Flint was not
    based on a scientific assessment of the suitability of the Flint River water.”
    Id. at 40–41,
    ¶ 106
    (Page ID #17843–44).      The MDEQ Deputy Director wrote, “[W]e are in a situation with
    Emergency Financial Managers so it’s entirely possible that they will be making decisions
    relative to cost.”
    Id. In March
    2013, MDEQ officials, including Stephen Busch and Liane
    Shekter-Smith, knew that “the use of Flint River water would pose increased health risks to the
    public . . . , the triggering of additional regulatory requirements, and significant upgrades to the
    Flint Water Treatment Plant.”
    Id. at 40,
    ¶ 105 (Page ID #17843).
    In 2013, both the City of Flint and the City of Detroit were under State emergency
    management.
    Id. at 42,
    ¶ 114 (Page ID #17845). As Governor, “Snyder was briefed on reports
    from both Flint’s and Detroit’s emergency managers and issued directions to both managers as it
    related to the transition” away from the DWSD.
    Id. Thus, “Governor
    Snyder was personally
    involved in the decisional process which led to the transition from DWSD to the KWA.”
    Id. On April
    4, 2013, Snyder’s Chief of Staff emailed him, stating “(a)s you know, the Flint people have
    requested Dillon’s ok to break away from the DWSD.”
    Id. at 43,
    ¶ 115 (Page ID #17846).
    Snyder then instructed Dillon, Kurtz, Detroit’s Emergency Manager, and other key players to
    have the DWSD submit one last offer to the City of Flint.
    Id. The DWSD
    did so, Kurtz rejected
    the offer, and Snyder “authorized Kurtz, through Department of Treasury officials, to enter into a
    contractual relationship with KWA for the purpose of supplying water to Flint beginning in mid-
    year 2016 or 2017.”
    Id. at 43,
    ¶¶ 115–18 (Page ID #17846) (emphasis added). The City would
    need to rely on a water source other than the KWA until then. “At the time the Governor
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                          Page 7
    authorized Kurtz to contractually bind Flint to the KWA project, the Governor and State officials
    knew that the Flint River,” rather than the DWSD, “would be used as an interim source and that
    the use of the interim source had the backing of Snyder, Andy Dillon, and MDEQ Director
    Wyant.”
    Id. at 44,
    ¶ 119 (Page ID #17847).
    In June 2013, Dillon, Kurtz, and other key players developed the interim Flint River plan
    that would supply the City with water from April 25, 2014 until approximately December 2016.
    Id. at 44,
    ¶ 120 (Page ID #17847). A “critical part” of the interim plan was to upgrade the FWTP
    so that it could treat the Flint River water and then later treat water delivered through the KWA.
    Id. at 44,
    ¶ 122 (Page ID #17847). In September 2013, Governor Snyder appointed Darnell
    Earley as the City of Flint’s new Emergency Manager.
    Id. at 45,
    ¶ 125 (Page ID #17848).
    Earley worked to ensure that the interim Flint River plan would not be displaced by a return to
    the DWSD, even as the FWTP “was deemed unready for service by several people involved with
    its management.”
    Id. at 51,
    ¶ 147 (Page ID #17854).
    In March 2014, MDEQ officials, led by Chief of the Office of Drinking Water and
    Municipal Assistance Liane Shekter-Smith, put the interim Flint River plan into motion by
    ensuring, at the Treasury’s direction, that the City quickly obtain the necessary ACO so that the
    KWA would not need to stop construction. See
    id. at 45–46,
    ¶ 128 (Page ID #17848–49);
    id. at 130,
    ¶¶ 382–83 (Page ID #17933). The ACO “(i) required Flint to make use of the Flint Water
    Treatment Plant, (ii) attempted to prevent Flint from ever returning to the DWSD and (iii)
    mandated Flint to ‘undertake the KWA public improvement project or undertake other public
    improvement projects to continue to use the Flint River . . . .’”
    Id. at 45–46,
    ¶ 128 (Page ID
    #17848–49). “After obtaining the ACO, Flint entered a Bond Purchase Agreement allowing it to
    borrow funds despite being in receivership so that the KWA could move on to the next phase of
    construction. Unfortunately, the Flint Water Treatment Plant was nowhere near ready to begin
    distributing water.”
    Id. at 131,
    ¶ 384 (Page ID #17934).
    On March 14, 2014, the associate director of the Governor’s Office of Urban and
    Metropolitan Initiatives stated in an email to other members of Snyder’s staff that the “expedited
    timeframe” for switching to Flint River water “is less than ideal and could lead to some big
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                           Page 8
    potential disasters down the road.”
    Id. at 45,
    ¶ 127 (Page ID #17848). His warning went
    unheeded, as plans stayed in motion.
    On April 16, 2014—a week before the date set for the switch to the Flint River—Michael
    Glasgow, the City’s water treatment plant laboratory and water quality supervisor, emailed
    MDEQ Water Quality Analyst Adam Rosenthal, “. . . it looks as if we will be starting the plant
    up tomorrow and are being pushed to start distributing water as soon as possible . . . . I would
    like to make sure we are monitoring, reporting and meeting requirements before I give the OK to
    start distributing water.”
    Id. at 46,
    ¶ 129 (Page ID #17849). The next day, Glasgow informed
    the MDEQ that “the FWTP was not fit to begin operations and that ‘management’ was not
    listening to him.”
    Id. On April
    17, 2014, Glasgow wrote to MDEQ District Supervisor Stephen
    Busch and MDEQ District 11 (Flint) Engineer Michael Prysby,
    I have people above me making plans to distribute water ASAP. I was
    reluctant before, but after looking at the monitoring schedule and our current
    staffing, I do not anticipate giving the OK to begin sending water out anytime
    soon. If water is distributed from this plant in the next couple of weeks, it will be
    against my direction. I need time to adequately train additional staff and to
    update our monitoring plans before I will feel we are ready. I will reiterate this to
    management above me, but they seem to have their own agenda.
    Id. “Glasgow later
    told State investigators that he received pressure from superiors—particularly
    Defendants Johnson and Croft—to begin the switch to the Flint River.”
    Id.
    at 47,
    ¶ 130 (Page ID
    #17850).
    MDEQ Water Treatment Specialist Patrick Cook signed the permit that was the last
    necessary approval for use of the FWTP.
    Id.
    at 47,
    ¶ 132 (Page ID #17850).
    B. Lead Poisoning and Legionnaires’ Disease
    “On April 25, 2014, Flint officially began using the Flint River as its primary water
    source, despite the fact that the proper preparations had not been made and Glasgow had warned
    that the FWTP was not ready.”
    Id. at 57,
    ¶ 164 (Page ID #17860). Flint River water had high
    chloride levels that, left untreated, would corrode the water pipes and cause lead to “leach into
    drinking water.”
    Id. at 55,
    ¶ 161 (Page ID #17858). The MDEQ purportedly believed that it
    needed to collect data on the water for an entire year, in two consecutive six-month tests, before
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533         Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                            Page 9
    it could treat the water for corrosion.
    Id. at 95–96,
    ¶ 290 (Page ID #17898–99). Prior to the
    switch, City and MDEQ officials “discussed optimization for lead,” but “decided that having
    more data was advisable before implementing an optimization method.”
    Id. at 55,
    ¶ 159 (Page
    ID #17858). Rather than delay the switch to the Flint River, the City began delivering untreated
    water to its residents.
    Within weeks of the switch, residents reported to Shekter-Smith that there was something
    wrong with the smell, taste, and color of the water, and that it was causing rashes.
    Id. at 57,
    ¶¶ 165–66 (Page ID #17860). By June 2014, residents were reporting that “the water was
    making them ill.”
    Id. at 57,
    ¶ 167 (Page ID #17860). The City and State did nothing.
    Id. “On August
    14, 2014, Flint’s water tested above legal limits for total coliform and E. coli bacteria.”
    Id. at 57,
    ¶ 168 (Page ID #17860). In response, the City issued boil water advisories and treated
    the water with additional chlorine.
    Id. at 57–58,
    ¶¶ 168–69 (Page ID #17860–61). Chlorine,
    however, “as has been well known for decades,” “preferentially reacts with the bare metal [in
    corroded pipes] instead of attacking solely bacteria.”
    Id. at 57–58,
    ¶ 169 (Page ID #17860–61).
    Unsurprisingly, then, the bacterial problem did not abate—so the City added still more chlorine.
    Id. The water
    then tested high in total trihalomethanes (“TTHM”), a byproduct of chlorine
    interacting with metal, and a “red flag that the steel in the pipes had been laid bare,” and that lead
    was leaching into the water.
    Id. at 58,
    ¶¶ 170–71 (Page ID #17861). Back in May 2014, MDEQ
    officials—including Busch, Prysby, and Rosenthal—knew that TTHM levels were above the
    EPA’s maximum contaminant level but did nothing, even as residents raised concerns about the
    water.
    Id. at 58,
    ¶ 172 (Page ID #17861). From May 2014 to August 2015, the City sampled the
    water six times to test for corrosivity, and “[t]he sampling results all showed that the drinking
    water was very corrosive.”
    Id. at 62,
    ¶ 187 (Page ID #17865).
    In the summer of 2014, just “[a]s officials were beginning to assess the extent of Flint’s
    TTHM problems, . . . the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS)
    reported an outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease—another red flag.”
    Id. at 58–59,
    ¶ 173 (Page ID
    #17861–62). Legionnaires’ disease “is a severe form of pneumonia.”
    Id. at 59,
    ¶ 174 (Page ID
    #17862). It infects people who inhale or consume water contaminated with legionella bacteria.
    Id. “Extensive studies
    of legionella have established that the pathogen enters the water supply
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533         Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                        Page 10
    when the ‘bio-film’ protecting pipes is stripped away—which is exactly what happened when the
    River’s corrosive water entered the City’s pipes.”
    Id. When a
    City officer informed Earley and
    his then-advisor Gerald Ambrose of the outbreak, Earley responded by “disclaiming any
    connection between the outbreak and Flint’s water.”
    Id. at 59,
    ¶ 175 (Page ID #17862). Earley
    stated that “the City’s ‘message’ should be that the outbreak was ‘an internal issue at McLaren
    [Hospital] that they are working on with our assistance, not a Flint water problem that we are
    trying to resolve.’”
    Id. In September
    2014, MDHHS reported that “lead poisoning rates ‘were higher than usual
    for children under age 16 living in the City of Flint during the months of July, August and
    September, 2014.’”
    Id. at 59–60,
    ¶ 176 (Page ID #17862–63). And in early October 2014,
    officials realized that the bacterial contamination partly stemmed from the use of over-75-year-
    old cast iron pipes that comprised most of the City’s water distribution system.
    Id. at 60,
    ¶ 177
    (Page ID #17863). Still no action.
    On October 13, 2014, General Motors stopped using Flint River water at its engine plant
    out of fear that the high levels of chloride would corrode its machinery.
    Id. at 60,
    ¶ 179 (Page ID
    #17863). The next day, a member of Governor Snyder’s executive staff wrote to the team:
    Now we are getting comments about being lab rats in the media, which are going
    to be exacerbated when it comes out that after the boil water order, there were
    chemicals in the water that exceeded health-based water quality standards. I think
    we should ask the [Emergency Manager] to consider coming back to the Detroit
    system in full or in part as an interim solution to both the quality, and now the
    financial, problems that the current solution is causing.
    Id. at 60–61,
    ¶ 180 (Page ID #17863–64). Snyder’s legal counsel similarly stated that the Flint
    River water issues are “downright scary” and “advised that, ‘[t]hey should try to get back on the
    Detroit system as a stopgap ASAP before this thing gets too far out of control.’”
    Id. at 61,
    ¶ 182
    (Page ID #17864). The executive staff directed MDEQ officials to brief Earley on the water
    quality issues,
    id. at 60–61,
    ¶ 180 (Page ID #17863–64), but Earley refused to reconnect to the
    DWSD,
    id. at 61,
    ¶ 181 (Page ID #17864).
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                         Page 11
    With their awareness of the dangers of Flint River water only increasing, officials
    nonetheless failed to disclose the risks to Flint Residents.
    Id. at 80,
    ¶ 235 (Page ID #17883).
    “On December 31, 2014, the first round of lead monitoring showed results exceeding the Lead
    and Copper Rule’s action levels for lead, 15 parts per billion.”
    Id. at 61–62,
    ¶ 183 (Page ID
    #17864–65). And the samples had not even been drawn from the highest risk homes.
    Id. In January
    2015, State officials met to discuss the legionella problem.
    Id. at 80,
    ¶ 233 (Page ID
    #17883). Around that time, MDEQ Director of Communications Bradley Wurfel wrote in an
    email, “I don’t want my director to say publicly that the water in Flint is safe until we get back
    the results of some county health department of epidemiological trace-back work on [the] 41
    cases of Legionnaires’ disease” diagnosed since the switch to the Flint River.
    Id. at 62,
    ¶ 184
    (Page ID #17865).
    On January 9, 2015, the University of Michigan turned off certain water fountains on its
    Flint campus because tests it conducted revealed high levels of lead.
    Id. at 62,
    ¶ 185 (Page ID
    #17865). “That same day, Earley,” again, “refused to return to DWSD water.”
    Id. at 62,
    ¶ 186
    (Page ID #17865). A few days later, Earley resigned as Emergency Manager, and Governor
    Snyder appointed Gerald Ambrose in his stead.
    Id. at 80,
    ¶ 234 (Page ID #17883).
    On January 21, 2015, State officials had water coolers discreetly installed in State
    buildings located in Flint, careful not to make their actions known to the public.
    Id. at 80,
    ¶ 235
    (Page ID #17883). On January 27, 2015, the Genesee County Health Department (“GCHD”)
    reported a likely “association between the spike in Legionnaires’ disease reports and the onset of
    the use of Flint River water.”
    Id. at 81,
    ¶ 237 (Page ID #17884). The City and State did nothing.
    Id. On January
    29, 2015, the DWSD offered Emergency Manager Ambrose “an opportunity to
    purchase DWSD water at attractive rates . . . includ[ing] waiving the re-connection fee.”
    Id. at 81,
    ¶ 239 (Page ID #17884). Ambrose refused.
    Id. “On February
    17, 2015, Flint water users
    staged public demonstrations demanding that Flint reconnect with DWSD.”
    Id. at 82,
    ¶ 243
    (Page ID #17885). Ambrose again refused.
    Id. Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533
           Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                        Page 12
    C. The Coverup
    With the crisis growing undeniable, City and State officials attempted to cover it up.
    They lied to the public and to regulators, and they took no action to protect the people of Flint.
    Id. On February
    26, 2015, Jennifer Crooks of the EPA followed up on a request from a Flint
    resident to test her water after she and her family became physically ill, developed rashes, and
    even experienced hair loss after drinking from the tap.
    Id. at 81,
    ¶ 240 (Page ID #17884);
    id. at 82–83,
    ¶ 244 (Page ID #17885–86). Crooks wrote to MDEQ and EPA officials that “the iron
    contamination was so high that the testing instrumentation could not measure it” and that the
    water tested for 104 parts per billion (“ppb”) of lead, well over the 15 ppb regulatory maximum.
    See
    id. at 82–83,
    ¶ 244 (Page ID #17885–86). Crooks further noted that, with two children under
    the age of three residing at the house, there were “[b]ig worries here.”
    Id. This prompted
    another EPA employee, Miguel Del Toral, to wonder whether the City of Flint was
    implementing optimized corrosion control, and whether the high lead levels were isolated to that
    one family’s neighborhood or were more widespread. See
    id. at 83,
    ¶ 245 (Page ID #17886).
    The EPA shared its concerns with the MDEQ. In response, MDEQ District Supervisor Stephen
    Busch lied and told Del Toral that the City was using corrosion control.
    Id. at 83
    , 
    ¶ 246 (Page ID
    #17886).
    “Likewise, [City Utilities Administrator Daugherty] Johnson inhibited efforts by [GCHD]
    to obtain information about Flint’s water through the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”).”
    Id. at 83
    84, 
    ¶ 248 (Page ID #17886–87). On January 27, 2015, GCHD requested water-testing
    information that would help it understand perceived water quality issues and the outbreak of
    Legionnaires’ disease. See
    id. A week
    later, Johnson responded that he had not received the
    FOIA request but would fulfill it as soon as possible.
    Id. Yet, “by
    March 2015, GCHD still had
    not received the information they requested by FOIA.”
    Id. The GCHD
    soon gathered that it was
    “being stonewalled.”
    Id. at 84,
    ¶ 250 (Page ID #17887).
    By March 2015, Governor Snyder and other State officials knew “that they had a massive
    public health emergency which probably included widespread lead poisoning on their hands and
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533         Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                           Page 13
    began discussing distributing water filters to Flint water users.”
    Id. at 84,
    ¶ 249 (Page ID
    #17887). Nevertheless, “these public officials took no action to warn or otherwise protect
    Plaintiffs and the Class, and continued to conceal from them and the public the true nature,
    extent, and severity of the public health crisis.”
    Id. The Governor’s
    office’s talking points
    included false statements that the City was practicing corrosion control consistent with federal
    protocols and that Flint’s water was in compliance with federal lead and copper rules.
    Id. at 149–50,
    ¶ 419 (Page ID #17952–53).
    On March 10, 2015, the GCHD wrote to Croft, Prysby, Ambrose, the mayor, and other
    City officials that the threat of legionella was serious and tied to Flint River water.
    Id. at 138,
    ¶ 401 (Page ID #17941). The GCHD official noted that he had requested to meet with the water
    plant staff and MDEQ to discuss his concerns, but that the water plant staff did not respond and
    that the MDEQ declined.
    Id. On March
    12, 2015, Shekter-Smith emailed MDEQ employees
    that, “[w]hile the change in source may have created water quality conditions that could provide
    additional organic nutrient source to support legionella growth, there is no evidence or
    confirmation of legionella coming directly from the Water Treatment Plant or in the community
    water supply distribution system at this time.”
    Id. at 85,
    ¶ 252 (Page ID #17888). The next day,
    Shekter-Smith approved a response from Busch to the GCHD that stated the following:
    • “conclusions that legionella is coming from the public water system without
    the presentations of any substantiating evidence from your epidemiologic
    investigations appears premature and prejudice toward that end;
    • “[i]t is highly unlikely that legionella would be present in treated water coming
    from the City of Flint water treatment plan[t] given the treatment plant’s use of
    ozone along with complete treatment and chlorine disinfect contact time to
    comply with federal surface water treatment rules for potable water;” and
    • “there is no direct correlation that can be made to the presence of legionella.”
    Id. at 85–86,
    ¶ 253 (Page ID #17888–89). “That same day, Wurfel wrote in an email to Snyder
    administration officials, ‘Political flank cover out of the City of Flint today regarding the spike in
    Legionnaire cases. . . . Also, area ministers put a shot over the bow last night . . . with a call for
    Snyder to declare a state of emergency there and somehow “fix” the water situation . . . .’”
    Id. at 86,
    ¶ 254 (Page ID #17889).
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                          Page 14
    On March 25, 2015, the Flint City Council voted to re-connect to the DWSD.
    Id. at 86,
    ¶ 255 (Page ID #17889). Ambrose rejected their vote.
    Id. On April
    24, 2015, MDEQ Water Treatment Specialist Patrick Cook admitted in an email
    to Miguel Del Toral of the EPA that “Flint is currently not practicing corrosion control at the
    [F]WTP.”
    Id. at 86–87,
    ¶ 257 (Page ID #17889–90). In the same email, however, Cook “misled
    the EPA regarding the necessity of using corrosion control in Flint after the switch,”
    id. at 83,
    ¶ 247 (Page ID #17886), touting distorted water quality test results that showed that the water
    was within the regulatory limit of 15 ppb for lead, R. 735-3 (Cook Email at 2) (Page ID #20343).
    On April 28, 2015, Governor Snyder’s chief of staff told Snyder and other staff members
    that “[t]he water issue continues to be a danger flag.” R. 620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 87, ¶ 258)
    (Page ID #17890).
    On June 24, 2015, Del Toral released an EPA report (the “Del Toral Report”) warning of
    high lead levels in Flint water.
    Id. at 87,
    ¶ 259 (Page ID #17890). “On the following day, Del
    Toral wrote an internal email with respect to the elevated lead in Flint water at EPA stating:
    I understand that this is not a comfortable situation, but the State is complicit in
    this and the public has a right to know what they are doing because it is their
    children that are being harmed.
    Id. He “further
    warned that the failure to inform Flint water users of the elevated lead levels was
    ‘bordering on criminal neglect.’”
    Id. at 87,
    ¶ 260 (Page ID #17890). The Del Toral Report was
    shared with MDEQ officials Shekter-Smith, Cook, Busch, and Prysby.
    Id. at 87,
    ¶ 261 (Page ID
    #17890). State and City officials did nothing.
    Id. at 88,
    ¶ 262 (Page ID #17891).
    On July 9, 2015, City Utilities Administrator Michael Glasgow emailed MDEQ Water
    Quality Analyst Adam Rosenthal the following “Key Points” in all caps:
    1)   Flint has lots of lead pipe, no corrosion control treatment, and has had no
    legitimate LCR testing for at least a year.
    2)   Amongst low income infants, breast feeding rates are lower, and formula use
    is higher. Many Flint[] residents cannot afford to flush due to higher water
    rates. They cannot afford bottled water. This is an unprecedented situation
    and EPA needs to take this seriously. Now.
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533         Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                         Page 15
    3)   We have one child with an elevated blood lead already . . . In fact, that is the
    only reason we know about any of the above.
    4)   MDEQ is still publicly insisting Flint water has tested safe, is safe, and that
    [F]lint has no violations of any sort.
    Id. at 89,
    ¶ 267 (Page ID #17892).
    “On July 10, 2015, MDEQ [Director of Communications] Brad Wurfel, in an effort to
    conceal the public health crisis, appeared on public radio and advised listeners that Flint water
    was safe and that it was not causing ‘any broad problem’ with lead leaching into residential
    water.”
    Id. at 88,
    ¶ 265 (Page ID #17891). Wurfel knowingly lied and assured parents in
    particular that “anyone who is concerned about lead in the drinking water can relax.”
    Id. On July
    22, 2015, Governor Snyder’s Chief of Staff wrote to the Director of MDHHS
    that residents’ concerns were being “blown off” by the Defendants.
    Id. at 89,
    ¶ 268 (Page ID
    #17892). Around the same time, Snyder’s Director of Urban Initiatives spoke to Snyder directly
    and “advised him of the growing concerns among Flint residents that they were being exposed to
    toxic levels of lead.”
    Id. at 89,
    ¶ 269 (Page ID #17892).
    On July 24, 2015, Wurfel publicly stated that “residents of Flint do not need to worry
    about lead in their water supply, and DEQ’s recent sampling does not indicate an imminent
    health threat from lead or copper.”
    Id. at 89–90,
    ¶ 270 (Page ID #17892–93). But the sampling
    Wurfel referenced was “purposefully skewed . . . to minimize the crisis.”
    Id. at 90,
    ¶ 271 (Page
    ID #17893). Glasgow would later confess that the MDEQ altered water quality reports by
    removing the highest lead levels—“we threw out bottles everywhere just to collect as many as
    we can, just to hit our number.” Id.; see also
    id. at 91,
    ¶ 273 (Page ID #17894). Glasgow also
    “distort[ed] the City’s water test results by instructing residents to run their water—or ‘flush’
    it—before testing, and fail[ed] to obtain water from certain houses.”
    Id. at 90–91,
    ¶ 272 (Page
    ID #17893–94). He claims that he skewed the samples at Busch’s and Prysby’s direction.
    Id. at 91,
    ¶ 273 (Page ID #17894).
    When a July 2015 water quality report was altered to exclude some high lead levels,
    Rosenthal forwarded it on.
    Id. Rosenthal was
    investigated for “willful participation in the
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                          Page 16
    manipulation of lead testing results and falsely report[ing] that the 90th percentile of the results
    for lead water testing was below the federal action level.”
    Id. In August
    2015, Professor Marc Edwards from Virginia Tech publicly announced that the
    City of Flint was experiencing a major public health emergency.
    Id. at 91,
    ¶ 274 (Page ID
    #17894). Wurfel countered his announcement by stating that Professor Edwards and his team
    “only just arrived in town and (have) quickly proven the theory they set out to prove, and while
    the state appreciates academic participation in this discussion, offering broad, dire public health
    advice based on some quick testing could be seen as fanning political flames irresponsibly.”
    Id. at 92,
    ¶ 275 (Page ID #17895).
    In the summer of 2015, Dr. Mona Hanna-Attisha published her own study to alert Flint
    residents to the dangers of drinking Flint River water.
    Id. at 93,
    ¶ 279 (Page ID #17896). Dr.
    Hanna-Attisha’s study showed a “spike in the percentage of Flint children with elevated blood
    lead levels from blood drawn in the second and third quarter of 2014.”
    Id. Although MDHHS
    had data of its own indicating a similar spike,
    id. at 92,
    ¶ 276 (Page ID #17895), Wurfel lied and
    stated on September 25, 2015, that “MDHHS officials have re-examined its blood lead level data
    and the MDHHS statistics do not show the same upward trend documented by Dr. Hanna-
    Attisha,”
    id. at 94,
    ¶ 283 (Page ID #17897). “On September 28, 2015, Wurfel stated publicly
    that the Flint water crisis was becoming ‘near-hysteria’ because of Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s report.
    He said that he wouldn’t call her reports ‘irresponsible. I would call them unfortunate.’ Wurfel
    finished his remarks that day by falsely stating that ‘Flint’s drinking water is safe in that it’s
    meeting state and federal standards.’”
    Id. at 94,
    ¶ 284 (Page ID #17897).
    Over a year into the crisis, on October 8, 2015, Governor Snyder finally ordered the City
    of Flint to reconnect with the DWSD.
    Id. at 95,
    ¶ 287 (Page ID #17898). The City made the
    switch on October 16, 2015.
    Id. at 95,
    ¶ 288 (Page ID #17898). On October 18, 2015, the
    Director of the MDEQ emailed Governor Snyder and admitted that failing to implement
    optimized corrosion control for an entire year while Flint residents were being poisoned was a
    mistake.
    Id. at 95–96,
    ¶ 290 (Page ID #17898–99). The Governor’s own task force on the crisis
    reported in March 2016 that the Governor’s office failed to act, or even to conduct a
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                        Page 17
    comprehensive review of the water situation in Flint, in part because of cost.
    Id. at 150–51,
    ¶¶ 420–21 (Page ID #17953–54).
    D. Aftershock
    “Flint is currently in a state of crisis:     Mayor Karen Weaver declared a State of
    Emergency on December 14, 2015 and on January 4, 2016, the Genesee County Commissioners
    declared a State of Emergency.”
    Id. at 96–97,
    ¶ 294 (Page ID #17899–17900). Governor Snyder
    did the same on January 5, 2016, but chose not to disclose the threat of legionella.
    Id. at 97,
    ¶ 295 (Page ID #17900). He disclosed that threat for the first time on January 13, 2016, on the
    same day that he activated the Michigan National Guard to assist the City of Flint.
    Id. at 97,
    ¶ 296 (Page ID #17900).
    The water crisis has created persistent harms.         The effects of lead poisoning are
    “catastrophic,” particularly for young children.
    Id. at 104–05,
    ¶ 314 (Page ID #17907–08). “In
    children, low levels of exposure have been linked to damage to the central and peripheral
    nervous system, learning disabilities, shorter stature, impaired hearing, and impaired formation
    and function of blood cells.”
    Id. (quoting EPA).
    “[L]ead affects children’s brain development
    resulting in reduced intelligence quotient (IQ), behavioral changes such as shortening of
    attention span and increased antisocial behavior, and reduced educational attainment. . . . The
    neurological and behavioral effects of lead are believed to be irreversible.”
    Id. at 105,
    ¶ 315
    (Page ID #17908) (quoting World Health Organization). In some cases, “ingestion of lead can
    cause seizures, coma and even death.”
    Id. at 105,
    ¶ 316 (Page ID #17908) (quoting EPA). In
    pregnant women, the fetus can be exposed to lead in the mother’s body, causing reduced growth
    and premature birth.
    Id. at 105,
    ¶ 317 (Page ID #17908). “Flint’s children have suffered
    specific, measurable damages in the form of lost earning potential. They have also incurred
    damages in the form of required special educational, medical, sociological, occupational and
    disability services, and related education assistance programs.”
    Id. at 106–07,
    ¶ 322 (Page ID
    #17909–10).
    In adults, lead exposure can damage cardiovascular, kidney, and reproductive functions.
    Id. at 107,
    ¶ 323 (Page ID #17910). A recent study shows a drastic drop in fertility following the
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                            Page 18
    water crisis.
    Id. at 107,
    ¶ 324 (Page ID #17910). “Given the long-lasting risks of lead exposure
    and the potential for lead sediment to be disturbed and re-mobilized into the water system,
    Plaintiffs will require regular medical and tap water testing and evaluation, at bare minimum, in
    accordance with government standards.”
    Id. at 107,
    ¶ 325 (Page ID #17910).
    “Although the City has begun adding polyphosphate to its system to reduce the leaching
    of lead from its service lines, this is unlikely to render Flint’s water safe because many of the
    pipes have become so corroded that not even phosphate will be able to fully encapsulate the
    surface of the pipes and prevent lead from leaching into the water supply.”
    Id. at 109
    , 
    ¶ 331
    (Page ID #17912). The same problem applies to home pipes and appliances—meaning that
    solely replacing municipal pipes will not fix the health crisis.
    Id. at 109
    –12, 
    ¶¶ 332–40 (Page ID
    #17912–15);
    id. at 119,
    ¶ 359 (Page ID #17922). And because “the health effects of lead
    poisoning often go undetected for some time,” there is a need for “ongoing medical monitoring[,]
    educational programs[, and] other remedial programs.”
    Id. at 119–20,
    ¶ 360 (Page ID #17922–
    23). In many ways, the crisis has never ended.
    E. Procedural History
    This case is a consolidated class action in the In re Flint Water Cases litigation. See R.
    173 (Order Consolidating Cases) (Page ID #8072). The only claim before us on appeal is
    Plaintiffs-Appellants’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 substantive due process claim for deprivation of bodily
    integrity. The Putative Class includes Flint residents and businesses, but only Flint residents are
    parties to this appeal. The Defendants include City and State officials, the City of Flint, and
    private engineering firms, but only the government defendants are parties to this appeal.
    Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint on September
    29, 2017. R. 214 (1st Am. Compl.) (Page ID #8494). They filed a Second Amended Complaint
    on October 27, 2017. R. 238 (2d Am. Compl.) (Page ID #8737). Defendants then filed motions
    to dismiss under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See R. 273 (Mot. to Dismiss)
    (Page ID #9797); R. 274 (Mot. to Dismiss) (Page ID #9909); R. 276 (Mot. to Dismiss) (Page ID
    #9986); R. 277 (Mot. to Dismiss) (Page ID #10111); R. 278 (Mot. to Dismiss) (Page ID #10167);
    R. 279 (Mot. to Dismiss) (Page ID #10237); R. 281 (Mot. to Dismiss) (Page ID #10644); R. 282
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533               Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                                   Page 19
    (Mot. to Dismiss) (Page ID #10789); R. 283 (Mot. to Dismiss) (Page ID #10931); R. 294 (Mot.
    to Dismiss) (Page ID #11358). Before those motions were resolved, Plaintiffs filed a Third
    Amended Complaint on January 25, 2018. R. 349 (Third Am. Compl.) (Page ID #11759).
    On August 1, 2018, the district court issued an opinion and order granting in part and
    denying in part the motions to dismiss. Carthan v. Snyder (In re Flint Water Cases), 329 F.
    Supp. 3d 369 (E.D. Mich. 2018). Some Defendants appealed, while others filed motions for
    reconsideration. R. 560 (Mot. for Recons.) (Page ID #17043); R. 561 (Mot. for Recons.) (Page
    ID #17072); R. 570 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #17246); R. 573 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID
    #17253); R. 575 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #17256); R. 579 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID
    #17281); R. 589 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #17316). We declined to adjudicate the appeals
    until the district court resolved the motions for reconsideration. Notice of Abeyance, Waid v.
    Snyder, No. 18-1967, slip op. (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2019). But before the district court could resolve
    those motions, Plaintiffs moved for leave to amend the Complaint, attaching a proposed Fourth
    Amended Complaint. R. 620 (Mot. for Leave to File Fourth Am. Compl.) (Page ID #17764).
    To dispose of the essentially competing motions, the district court “adopted an
    unorthodox but necessary plan.” R. 798 (Op. & Order at 5) (Page ID #21107).6 The district
    court “interpreted plaintiffs’ motion [for leave to amend the complaint] as a joint motion for
    relief from judgment and a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. Finding just cause,
    the Court vacated its August 1 decision on November 9, 2018, so that it could consider plaintiffs’
    motion for leave to amend.”
    Id. Because there
    was significant overlap between the Third
    Amended Complaint and the proposed Fourth Amended Complaint, and because the standards
    for leave to amend and Rule 12 dismissal are substantively the same, the district court
    adjudicated all pending motions in a single opinion and order.
    Id. at 5–6
    (Page ID #21107–08).
    Accordingly, the district court “issue[d] an omnibus opinion and order, adjudicating plaintiffs’
    motion for leave to file a fourth amended complaint, and, if successful, defendants’ motions to
    dismiss it in a single decision.”
    Id. (entered April
    1, 2019).           The district court granted
    Defendants-Appellants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims alleging § 1983 equal-protection
    6
    We approved this approach in Waid v. Snyder, No. 18-1967, slip op. (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2019) (order).
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533              Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                                   Page 20
    violations, § 1985(3) conspiracy, Michigan’s Elliott Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”), § 1983
    state-created danger, and gross negligence.
    Id. at 128
    (Page ID #21230). But the district court
    denied Defendants-Appellants’ motions to dismiss Plaintiffs-Appellees’ § 1983 bodily-integrity
    claim on the bases of qualified and absolute immunity.7
    Id. at 127
    (Page ID #21229).
    Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 1 order on April 15, 2019,
    regarding certain claims not at issue on this appeal. R. 809 (Pls. Mot. for Recons.) (Page ID
    #21864). The district court disposed of that motion on June 11, 2019. R. 880 (Order Den. Pls.
    Mot. for Recons.) (Page ID #23632).
    II. JURISDICTION
    Under the collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction over the City and State officials’
    interlocutory appeals of the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the extent they raise
    legal questions. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 
    472 U.S. 511
    , 526–27 (1985); Bunkley v. City of Detroit,
    
    902 F.3d 552
    , 559 (6th Cir. 2018).               The collateral order doctrine also provides us with
    jurisdiction over the City of Flint’s and Governor Whitmer’s interlocutory appeals from the
    district court’s denial of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct
    & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 
    506 U.S. 139
    , 147 (1993). We accordingly have
    jurisdiction over each party’s appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
    III. DISCUSSION
    Defendants-Appellants argue that they are immune from suit and that the district court
    should have granted their Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss Plaintiffs-Appellees’ § 1983 bodily-
    integrity claim. “Given this procedural posture, we construe the complaint in the light most
    favorable to plaintiffs, accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draw all reasonable
    inferences in plaintiffs’ favor.” 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 916
    . At the same time, Plaintiffs’ factual
    allegations must state a plausible claim.
    Id. (citing Bell
    Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    ,
    556–58 (2007)).
    7
    The district court granted motions to dismiss in favor of some Defendants, who accordingly are not a part
    of this appeal. R. 798 (Op. & Order at 128) (Page ID #21230). Additionally, Plaintiffs’ Monell claim was not
    certified for interlocutory appeal.
    Id. at 109
    (Page ID #21211).
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533         Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                          Page 21
    Defendants-Appellants are City and State officials, sued in their individual capacities; the
    City of Flint; and Governor Whitmer, sued in her official capacity. We have already decided key
    issues of law in this case that came up in separate appeals:
    (1)   the creation and cover-up of the Flint Water Crisis violated Flint residents’
    substantive due process right to bodily integrity, 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 921
    ;
    (2)   that right was clearly established at the time,
    id. at 934;
           (3)   the City of Flint is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, even
    though it was under State Emergency Manager control during the crisis,
    id. at 936;
    and
    (4)   a request for prospective injunctive relief in the form of compensatory
    education, medical monitoring, and evaluation services can be pursued
    against the current Governor in her official capacity under Ex parte Young,
    
    Boler, 865 F.3d at 412
    –13.
    Some (but not all) Defendants-Appellants were parties to the Guertin appeal and were denied
    qualified immunity in that case.
    A. Qualified Immunity
    The Defendant-Appellant City and State officials argue that qualified immunity shields
    them from suit. We review de novo a district court’s decision to deny qualified immunity. See
    Sutton v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cty., 
    700 F.3d 865
    , 871 (6th Cir. 2012).
    “Qualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff
    pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that
    the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 
    563 U.S. 731
    , 735 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 917
    .
    Plaintiffs allege that Defendants-Appellants violated their substantive due process right to bodily
    integrity. R. 620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 167–69, ¶¶ 463–70) (Page ID #17970–72). Because
    Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants-Appellants intended to harm them, Plaintiffs-Appellees
    must demonstrate that they acted with deliberate indifference. 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 926
    . The
    district court found Plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient to state a claim against Defendants-
    Appellants. R. 798 (Op. & Order at 100) (Page ID #21202).
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533         Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                           Page 22
    In Guertin, we held that City and State officials’ role in creating, sustaining, and covering
    up the Flint Water Crisis violated Flint residents’ right to bodily integrity, 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 921
    , and that this right was clearly established at the time,
    id. at 934.
    The substantive due
    process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against conscience-shocking deprivations
    of liberty.
    Id. at 918.
    Violating a person’s bodily integrity is a grave deprivation of their liberty.
    See
    id. at 918–19.
         The Guertin plaintiffs were deprived of their bodily integrity when
    government officials forcibly invaded their bodies by misleading them into consuming a life-
    threatening substance.
    Id. at 920–22.
    Once that hurdle is met, whether the alleged conduct
    amounts to deliberate indifference depends on the circumstances, including whether the
    defendants had time to deliberate, whether there was an involuntary relationship, and whether
    there was a legitimate government purpose. See
    id. at 922–26.
    Each of these factors weighed
    against the defendants in Guertin.
    Id. at 925–26.
    And what was true there is true here: “the
    generally alleged conduct [i]s . . . egregious.”
    Id. at 925.
    The parties agree that lead and legionella are life-threatening substances and that these
    contaminants spread to residents through the water supply. R. 798 (Op. & Order at 43) (Page ID
    #21145). Flint residents had no choice but to receive their water through the City’s water plan.
    See 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 925
    (citing Flint City Charter § 4-203(A); Flint Code of Ord. §§ 46-7,
    46-50(b), 46-51, 46-52). On top of that, “various defendants’ assurances of the water’s potability
    hid the risks, turning residents’ voluntary consumption of a substance vital to subsistence into an
    involuntary and unknowing act of self-contamination.”
    Id. at 925–26.
    The Flint Water Crisis
    was a “predictable harm” set into motion by alleged decisions that “took place over a series of
    days, weeks, months, and years.” See
    id. at 925.
    Given officials’ ample time to deliberate, “this
    known risk cannot be excused on the basis of split-second decision making.” See
    id. Worse, the
    officials stood their ground. The crisis was undeniable, but they refused to switch the City back
    to clean water, or even to take the meager step of introducing corrosion control, or even to admit
    that the water was poisoned. “When such extended opportunities to do better are teamed with
    protracted failure even to care, indifference is truly shocking.” County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
    
    523 U.S. 833
    , 853 (1998).
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533          Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                       Page 23
    No legitimate government purpose justifies the City and State officials’ actions. See
    
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 926
    .         “[J]ealously guarding the public’s purse cannot, under any
    circumstances, justify the yearlong contamination of an entire community.”
    Id. The question
    remains whether each Defendant-Appellant’s alleged actions individually amount to deliberate
    indifference. See
    id. To state
    a claim for bodily integrity, Plaintiffs-Appellees must demonstrate that the
    officials’ actions “shock the conscience”—here, through deliberate indifference. See 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 922
    , 926; see also Claybrook v. Birchwell, 
    199 F.3d 350
    , 359 (6th Cir. 2000). The
    standard for deliberate indifference is subjective recklessness.      
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 926
    .
    “[P]laintiffs must show the government officials ‘knew of facts from which they could infer a
    substantial risk of serious harm, that they did infer it, and that they acted with indifference
    toward the individual’s rights.’”
    Id. (quoting Range
    v. Douglas, 
    763 F.3d 573
    , 591 (6th Cir.
    2014)).
    Critically, this case comes to us at the motion to dismiss stage. The allegations in the
    Complaint must be taken as true.
    Id. at 916.
    Some judges of this court have even noted that,
    because the facts at this stage are yet undeveloped, “it is generally inappropriate for a district
    court to grant a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity. Although an
    officer’s entitlement to qualified immunity is a threshold question to be resolved at the earliest
    possible point, that point is usually summary judgment and not dismissal under Rule 12.”
    Wesley v. Campbell, 
    779 F.3d 421
    , 433–34 (6th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation omitted). With
    these principles in mind, Plaintiffs-Appellees have plausibly alleged that Defendants-Appellants
    violated their right to bodily integrity.
    1. City Officials
    Defendant-Appellant City Officials include Emergency Managers Earley and Ambrose,
    Public Works Director Croft, and Utilities Administrators Glasgow and Johnson. The Guertin
    court described Earley, Ambrose, and Croft as “instrumental in creating the 
    crisis.” 912 F.3d at 926
    . We have not had the opportunity previously to address the conduct of Glasgow and
    Johnson.
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533         Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                           Page 24
    All of the Defendant-Appellant City Officials argue that they are entitled to qualified
    immunity because they acted based on professional opinions from MDEQ officials and private
    engineering firms. See Butz v. Economou, 
    438 U.S. 478
    , 507 (1978) (“Federal officials will not
    be liable for mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law.”);
    Appellant Br. (19-1425) at 25, 27–29, 31–34. We have already held, however, that, “[t]o the
    extent these defendants claim ‘mistakes in judgment’ because they reasonably relied upon the
    opinions of Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) employees and
    professional engineering firms, those are facts to be fleshed out during discovery and are not
    appropriate to resolve at the motion-to-dismiss posture.” 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 927
    (citation
    omitted). The same reasoning applies here. At this stage, we must credit Plaintiffs’ allegation
    that the Defendant-Appellant City Officials had independent knowledge that the Flint River
    water was causing a public health crisis—regardless of what the MDEQ or the engineering firms
    reported.
    a. Earley
    Darnell Earley was Emergency Manager for the City from September 2013 (prior to the
    crisis) to January 2015 (in the midst of the crisis). Earley forced the switch to Flint River water
    when he knew that the FWTP was not ready and that it was important that the water be treated.
    R. 620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 51, ¶ 147) (Page ID #17854); see also 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 927
    .
    Plaintiffs-Appellees also allege that Earley directed City officials to lie to the public and tell
    them that the Legionnaires’ disease outbreak in the summer of 2014 “was ‘an internal issue at
    McLaren [Hospital] that they are working on with our assistance, not a Flint water problem that
    we are trying to resolve.’” R. 620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 59, ¶ 175) (Page ID #17862). Even
    after he was briefed on water quality issues by the MDEQ in the fall of 2014, Earley refused to
    reconnect to the DWSD.
    Id. at 60–61,
    ¶¶ 180–81 (Page ID #17863–64). He again refused to
    reconnect to the DWSD in January 2015, when officials were aware of the lead and legionella
    problems and after the University of Michigan ceased use of Flint River drinking water because
    of lead contamination.
    Id. at 62,
    ¶¶ 185–86 (Page ID #17865).             These actions plausibly
    demonstrate deliberate indifference to the crisis that would likely result.
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533         Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                          Page 25
    b. Ambrose
    Gerald Ambrose took over as Emergency Manager for the City of Flint in January 2015
    (in the midst of the crisis). Prior to that, he had served as Earley’s advisor, and had been notified
    about the Legionnaires’ disease outbreak in the summer of 2014.
    Id. at 59,
    ¶ 175 (Page ID
    #17862).    Like Earley, he repeatedly refused to reconnect to the DWSD—showcasing an
    indifference that was “especially egregious” in light of the undeniable and worsening crisis. See
    
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 927
    . After State officials installed water coolers in Flint offices and the
    GCHD reported that the outbreak of Legionnaires’ likely was connected to the use of Flint River
    water, the DWSD offered Ambrose a deal for reconnecting in January 2015. R. 620-3 (Fourth
    Am. Compl. at 81, ¶ 239) (Page ID #17884). He refused.
    Id. In February
    2015, Flint residents
    publicly demanded reconnecting to the DWSD, and he again refused.
    Id. at 82,
    ¶ 243 (Page ID
    #17885). In March 2015, the Flint City Council voted to re-connect to DWSD.
    Id. at 86,
    ¶ 255
    (Page ID #17889). Ambrose rejected their vote.
    Id. City and
    State officials were well aware of
    the crisis by January 2015 and were under the scrutiny of the GCHD and the EPA by March
    2015. Ambrose’s staunch refusal to stop use of Flint River water in spite of what he knew
    plausibly demonstrates deliberate indifference to the crisis.
    c. Glasgow
    Michael Glasgow was a City Utilities Administrator, and the City’s water treatment plant
    laboratory and water quality supervisor. Prior to making the switch to the Flint River, he knew
    that the FWTP was not ready and that the City would be distributing contaminated water.
    Id. at 46,
    ¶ 129 (Page ID #17849). He tried to stop the switch from happening but nevertheless
    participated in the transition.
    Id. He later
    told State investigators that Croft and Johnson, who
    were his superiors, pressured him to make the switch.
    Id. at 47,
    ¶ 130 (Page ID #17850).
    Plaintiffs-Appellees concede that Glasgow’s conduct in implementing the switch did not
    demonstrate deliberate indifference. See Oral Argument at 1:12:52–1:13:10.
    What Plaintiffs-Appellees take issue with is Glasgow’s later role in covering up the
    extent of lead contamination. In July 2015, Glasgow wrote to Rosenthal that “Flint has lots of
    lead pipe, no corrosion control treatment” and that “[t]his is an unprecedented situation and EPA
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                          Page 26
    needs to take this seriously. Now.”
    Id. at 89,
    ¶ 267 (Page ID #17892). Despite what he knew,
    he distorted water quality tests to downplay the extent of the lead contamination.
    Id. at 89–91,
    ¶¶ 270–72 (Page ID #17893–94). Glasgow claims that he did so at the direction of MDEQ
    officials Busch and Prysby.
    Id. at 91,
    ¶ 273 (Page ID #17894). But as Plaintiffs-Appellees point
    out, Busch and Prysby were MDEQ (not City) officials who, unlike Croft and Johnson, had no
    authority over him. The facts, when fully developed, ultimately might show that Glasgow truly
    was coerced into distorting the water quality tests, so that he cannot be said to have acted with
    deliberate indifference. But at this stage, the allegations plausibly support a reasonable inference
    that he did act with deliberate indifference when he helped to cover up the crisis.
    d. Croft
    Howard Croft was Public Works Director for the City of Flint. Croft permitted the
    switch to the Flint River even though he knew that the FWTP was not prepared to deliver safe
    drinking water.
    Id. at 47,
    ¶ 130 (Page ID #17850); see also 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 927
    . In fact,
    Glasgow stated that Croft pressured him to make the switch despite Glasgow’s warnings. R.
    620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 47, ¶ 130) (Page ID #17850). Croft also knew from the GCHD
    that the Legionnaires’ disease outbreak was connected to Flint River water, and he did nothing.
    Id. at 138,
    ¶ 401 (Page ID #17941). His alleged role in creating and failing to mitigate the crisis
    plausibly demonstrates deliberate indifference.
    e. Johnson
    Daugherty Johnson was another City Utilities Administrator.          Along with Croft, he
    purportedly pressured Glasgow to make the switch to the Flint River despite Glasgow’s
    warnings.
    Id. at 47,
    ¶ 130 (Page ID #17850). He also stonewalled the GCHD’s attempt to
    investigate Flint River water quality issues and the outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease.
    Id. at 83
    84, ¶¶ 248–50 (Page ID #17886–87). His alleged role in creating and covering up the crisis
    plausibly demonstrates deliberate indifference.
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533         Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                            Page 27
    2. MDEQ Officials
    Defendant-Appellant MDEQ Officials include State agency employees who permitted the
    switch to the Flint River, distorted water quality tests, and resisted concerns from other agencies
    like the EPA and the GCHD regarding the quality of Flint River water. In Guertin, we stated
    that the MDEQ Officials—there, Busch, Shekter-Smith, Prysby, and Wurfel—“played a pivotal
    role in authorizing Flint to use its ill-prepared water treatment plant to distribute drinking
    water[,] . . . falsely assured the public that the water was safe[,] and attempted to refute assertions
    to the 
    contrary.” 912 F.3d at 927
    . We have not had the opportunity previously to address the
    conduct of Rosenthal and Cook.
    The MDEQ Officials argue that they decided not to use corrosion control based on a
    mistaken, but reasonable, interpretation of the EPA Lead and Copper Rule. Appellant Br. (19-
    1477) at 3–4, 38, 45. But as we stated in Guertin, “[t]o the extent these defendants made ‘honest
    mistakes in judgment’—in law or fact—in interpreting and applying the Lead and Copper Rule,
    that defense is again best reserved for after 
    discovery.” 912 F.3d at 928
    (citation omitted). At
    this stage, we must accept the reasonable inference from Plaintiffs’ allegations that, whatever the
    MDEQ’s purported justifications for its actions, it rushed the switch to the Flint River knowing it
    would deliver contaminated water and that the decision-makers cared only about cost, not water
    quality. Their purported defense also does not explain why they failed to treat the water after
    they came under the EPA’s scrutiny, or why they lied to the EPA.
    Plaintiffs-Appellees plausibly allege a constitutional violation for each Defendant-
    Appellant MDEQ Official for the reasons stated below.
    a. Shekter-Smith
    Liane Shekter-Smith was the MDEQ Chief of the Office of Drinking Water and
    Municipal Assistance. Despite knowing that Flint River water presented health risks, see R. 620-
    3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 40, ¶ 105) (Page ID #17843), she secured the necessary administrative
    consent order (or ACO) and rushed the switch to the Flint River before the FWTP was ready, see
    id. at 45–46,
    ¶ 128 (Page ID #17848–49). When reports poured in from residents that something
    was wrong with the water and that it was making them ill, she did nothing. See
    id. at 57,
    ¶¶ 165–
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                        Page 28
    67 (Page ID #17860). After privately suggesting that the water might be contaminated,
    id. at 85,
    ¶ 252 (Page ID #17888), she publicly combatted the GCHD’s legionella analysis,
    id. at 85–86,
    ¶¶ 252–53 (Page ID #17888–89). And she did nothing to mitigate the crisis even after the Del
    Toral Report blew the whistle on high lead levels in Flint’s water.
    Id. at 87–88,
    ¶¶ 259–62 (Page
    ID #17890–91). Her alleged role in creating, failing to mitigate, and covering up the crisis
    plausibly demonstrates deliberate indifference.
    b. Rosenthal
    Adam Rosenthal was the MDEQ Water Quality Analyst. He did not stop the switch to
    the Flint River in spite of Glasgow’s warning that the FWTP was not ready.
    Id. at 46,
    ¶ 129
    (Page ID #17849). He knew as early as May 2014 that the water contained high TTHM levels
    that were above regulation (and indicated lead contamination), and did nothing.
    Id. at 58,
    ¶ 172
    (Page ID #17861). In July 2015, Glasgow wrote to him that “Flint has lots of lead pipe, no
    corrosion control treatment” and that “[t]his is an unprecedented situation and EPA needs to take
    this seriously. Now.”
    Id. at 89,
    ¶ 267 (Page ID #17892). Yet, Glasgow wrote, “MDEQ is still
    publicly insisting Flint water has tested safe, is safe, and that [F]lint has no violations of any
    sort.”
    Id. Rosenthal, apparently
    unmoved, soon afterward distributed a distorted water quality
    report that was altered to exclude high lead levels.
    Id. at 91,
    ¶ 273 (Page ID #17894). He has
    also been accused of manipulating and falsely reporting the test results.
    Id. His alleged
    role in
    creating, failing to mitigate, and covering up the crisis plausibly demonstrates deliberate
    indifference.
    c. Busch
    Stephen Busch was the MDEQ District Supervisor. Busch knew as early as March 2013
    that Flint River water presented health risks and would require significant treatment,
    id. at 40,
    ¶ 105 (Page ID #17843), but he did not stop the switch to the Flint River even after Glasgow
    warned him that the FWTP was not ready,
    id. at 46,
    ¶ 129 (Page ID #17849); see also 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 927
    . When the MDEQ came under the EPA’s scrutiny for lead contamination,
    Busch lied and told Del Toral that the City was using corrosion control. R. 620-3 (Fourth Am.
    Compl. at 83, ¶ 246) (Page ID #17886); see also 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 928
    . Busch claims that he
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533          Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                       Page 29
    did not lie and that, instead, he simply informed the EPA that the City had a corrosion control
    program in place, meaning that the City was monitoring the water without treating it. See
    Appellant Br. (19-1477) at 54. That is quibbling with the facts and asks us to do what we cannot
    at this stage—to view the allegations in the light most favorable to him. See 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 916
    . Plaintiffs’ allegation stands.
    Busch also lied to the GCHD.          He told them that the evidence did not support a
    connection between the outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease and the switch to the Flint River.
    R. 620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 85–86, ¶ 253) (Page ID #17888–89).               And according to
    Glasgow, Busch directed him to distort water quality tests to exclude high results for lead
    contamination.
    Id. at 91,
    ¶ 273 (Page ID #17894). Busch’s alleged role in creating, failing to
    mitigate, and covering up the crisis plausibly demonstrates deliberate indifference.
    d. Prysby
    Michael Prysby worked under Busch as an MDEQ Engineer for District 11, which
    serviced the City of Flint. Along with Busch, he did not stop the switch to the Flint River in the
    face of Glasgow’s warnings,
    id. at 46,
    ¶ 129 (Page ID #17849); see also 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 927
    ; he did nothing in response to the Del Toral Report, R. 620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at 87–88,
    ¶¶ 259–62) (Page ID #17890–91); and he purportedly directed Glasgow to distort water quality
    tests to exclude high results for lead contamination,
    id. at 91,
    ¶ 273 (Page ID #17894). His
    alleged role in creating, failing to mitigate, and covering up the crisis plausibly demonstrates
    deliberate indifference.
    e. Cook
    Patrick Cook was the MDEQ Water Treatment Specialist. He signed the permit that was
    the last necessary approval for the (rushed) use of Flint River water and the FWTP.
    Id. at 47,
    ¶ 132 (Page ID #17850). Like other officials, he at first did nothing in response to the Del Toral
    Report.
    Id. at 87–88,
    ¶¶ 259–62 (Page ID #17890–91). Then, in April 2015, he admitted in an
    email to Del Toral that “Flint is currently not practicing corrosion control at the [F]WTP,”
    id. at 86–87,
    ¶ 257 (Page ID #17889–90), after Busch had lied and told the EPA that the City was
    using corrosion control,
    id. at 83,
    ¶ 246 (Page ID #17886). In the same email, however, Cook
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533              Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                                    Page 30
    “misled the EPA regarding the necessity of using corrosion control in Flint after the switch.”
    Id. at 83
    , 
    ¶ 247 (Page ID #17886). Cook contends that the email itself renders Plaintiffs’ reading of
    it implausible. Reply Br. (19-1477) at 6–7.
    When a document attached to the complaint contradicts the allegations, the document
    trumps the allegations. Williams v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 498 F. App’x 532, 536 (6th Cir. 2012).
    For a document to contradict the complaint, it must “utterly discredit” the allegations. Cagayat
    v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., 
    952 F.3d 749
    , 755 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bailey v. City of
    Ann Arbor, 
    860 F.3d 382
    , 386–87 (6th Cir. 2017)). The email at issue here does not utterly
    discredit Plaintiffs’ allegations. Though Cook admits at the start of the email that the City is not
    using corrosion control, he then states that there was and is no need to do so because the Flint
    River water’s testing results were within the regulatory limit of 15 ppb for lead. R. 735-3 (Cook
    Email at 2) (Page ID #20343) (“The first round of samples after switch-over from DWSD . . .
    had 90th percentiles of 6 ppb for Lead . . . . The highest lead result out of the 20 [samples]
    received [from the second round of testing] thus far is 13 ppb.”). Touting allegedly distorted
    water quality test results and false compliance plausibly was misleading. Therefore, the district
    court was right to credit Plaintiffs’ allegations. Cook’s alleged role in creating and covering up
    the crisis plausibly demonstrates deliberate indifference.8
    f. Wurfel
    Bradley Wurfel was the MDEQ Director of Communications and was instrumental in the
    coverup. In the summer of 2015, as concerns and criticism reached their peak, he repeatedly lied
    to the public and assured them that Flint River water was safe. R. 620-3 (Fourth Am. Compl. at
    88–90, ¶¶ 265–70) (Page ID #17891–93); see also 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 928
    . He told parents that
    “anyone who is concerned about lead in the drinking water can relax.” R. 620-3 (Fourth Am.
    Compl. at 88, ¶ 265) (Page ID #17891). He cited distorted water quality tests as evidence that
    8
    Defendant Cook notified us that the district court dismissed him from a separate Flint Water Crisis case,
    Brown v. Snyder (In re Flint Water Cases), No. 18-cv-10726, 
    2020 WL 1503256
    , at *12 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27,
    2020). He contends that his dismissal from Brown similarly warrants his dismissal here. We disagree. The district
    court in Brown dismissed Cook because his wrongful conduct occurred after the plaintiff’s injury in that case.
    Id. at *10,
    12. The plaintiff in Brown had died of Legionnaires’ disease before Cook allegedly misled the EPA.
    Id. There is
    no similar timing issue in this case.
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                         Page 31
    “residents of Flint do not need to worry about lead in their water supply.”
    Id. at 89–90,
    ¶ 270
    (Page ID #17892–93).        He even attacked independent whistleblower reports by Professor
    Edwards and Dr. Hanna-Attisha that stated that the City of Flint was in the midst of a major
    public health emergency. He accused Professor Edwards of “quickly prov[ing] the theory [he]
    set out to prove” and decried the “near-hysteria” resulting from Dr. Hanna-Attisha’s report.
    Id. at 92,
    ¶ 275 (Page ID #17895);
    id. at 94,
    ¶¶ 283–84 (Page ID #17897); see also 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 928
    .
    Wurfel asks us to consider the context and totality of the statements he made, but points
    to nothing that directly negates Plaintiffs’ allegations. See Appellant Br. (19-1477) at 50–52.
    We will not view the allegations in the light most favorable to the defendant—and that is
    essentially what Wurfel asks us to do. See 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 916
    . We also reject his attempt
    to reargue his position in Guertin that “mere” public statements cannot violate a person’s right to
    bodily integrity. See Reply Br. (19-1477) at 11–13. The Guertin court concluded that public
    statements like those alleged here did amount to a constitutional 
    violation. 912 F.3d at 929
    .
    That decision controls. Wurfel’s alleged role in covering up the crisis plausibly demonstrates
    deliberate indifference.
    3. State Officials
    The Defendant-Appellant State Officials sued in their individual capacities are Governor
    Snyder and Treasurer Dillon. We have not had the opportunity previously to address their
    conduct. We hold that Plaintiffs-Appellees plausibly allege a constitutional violation as to
    Snyder, but we refrain from deciding this question for Dillon until the district court has an
    opportunity to reconsider in light of Brown v. Snyder (In re Flint Water Cases), No. 18-cv-
    10726, 
    2020 WL 1503256
    , at *9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2020).
    a. Governor Snyder
    Governor Snyder was in office for the entire relevant time period. He “was personally
    involved in the decisional process which led to the transition from DWSD to the KWA,”
    id. at 42,
    ¶ 114 (Page ID #17845), having himself coordinated the switch,
    id. at 43,
    ¶ 115–18 (Page ID
    #17846). And he knew that the Flint River would serve as the City’s interim water source until
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533         Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                           Page 32
    the KWA went online.
    Id. at 44,
    ¶ 119 (Page ID #17847). Prior to the switch, a member of his
    staff warned him that it “could lead to some big potential disasters down the road.” See
    id. at 45,
    ¶ 127 (Page ID #17848). In spite of that warning, Snyder did not stop the switch from going
    forward.
    Soon after the switch, there was evidence of corrosion and accompanying lead and
    legionella contamination. See
    id. at 58–60,
    62, ¶¶ 173, 177, 187 (Page ID #17861–63, 17865).
    On October 13, 2014, General Motors stopped using Flint River water at its engine plant out of
    fear that the water would corrode its machinery.
    Id. at 60,
    ¶ 179 (Page ID #17863). The next
    day, a member of Snyder’s executive staff expressed concern with the reports coming out about
    the water’s contamination and recommended that they ask the Emergency Manager to switch
    back to the DWSD “as an interim solution to both the quality, and now the financial, problems
    that the current solution is causing.”
    Id. at 60–61,
    ¶ 180 (Page ID #17863–64). Snyder’s legal
    counsel similarly stated that the dangers posed by Flint River water were “downright scary” and
    “advised that, ‘[t]hey should try to get back on the Detroit system as a stopgap ASAP before this
    thing gets too far out of control.’”
    Id. at 61,
    ¶ 182 (Page ID #17864). Snyder evidently was
    unmoved.
    In January 2015, the University of Michigan turned off certain water fountains on its
    Flint campus after tests revealed high levels of lead contamination.
    Id. at 62,
    ¶ 185 (Page ID
    #17865). Around the same time, the GCHD reported a likely “association between the spike in
    Legionnaires’ disease reports and the onset of the use of Flint River water.”
    Id. at 81,
    ¶ 237
    (Page ID #17884). Meanwhile, State officials had water coolers discreetly installed in State
    buildings located in Flint, without announcing their concerns to the public.
    Id. at 80,
    ¶ 235 (Page
    ID #17883). At some point in 2015, Snyder met with other government officials to discuss the
    serious threats posed by lead and legionella contamination, and his office even considered
    distributing water filters to protect Flint water users.
    Id. at 80,
    ¶ 233 (Page ID #17883);
    id. at 84,
    ¶ 249 (Page ID #17887). But ultimately Snyder did nothing.
    In addition to public reports from whistleblowers, Snyder’s own staff kept him personally
    apprised of the worsening crisis. In April 2015, Snyder’s chief of staff emailed Snyder and other
    staff members that “[t]he water issue continues to be a danger flag.”
    Id. at 87,
    ¶ 258 (Page ID
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                        Page 33
    #17890). Soon afterward, Snyder’s Director of Urban Initiatives spoke to Snyder directly and
    “advised him of the growing concerns among Flint residents that they were being exposed to
    toxic levels of lead.”
    Id. at 89,
    ¶ 269 (Page ID #17892). Nothing came of it. All the while,
    Snyder kept the crisis under wraps and stood by as the public continued to be poisoned. The
    Governor’s own task force eventually would disclose that Snyder failed to act in part because of
    cost.
    Id. at 150–51,
    ¶¶ 420–21 (Page ID #17953–54).
    Finally, after more than a year into the crisis, Snyder relented and ordered the City of
    Flint to reconnect with the DWSD on October 8, 2015.
    Id. at 95,
    ¶ 287 (Page ID #17898). He
    declared a State of Emergency three months later on January 5, 2016, and disclosed the
    legionella problem on January 13, 2016.
    Id. at 97,
    ¶¶ 295–96 (Page ID #17900). “Without a
    state of emergency, plaintiffs were denied valuable resources that could have helped abate the
    harm that they were still suffering.” R. 798 (Op. & Order at 46–47) (Page ID #21148–49).
    Snyder argues in the first instance that he is entitled to qualified immunity because he
    acted (or failed to act) in reliance on the MDEQ and engineering firms’ assessments. See
    Appellant Br. (19-1472) at 37–40. Again, “those are facts to be fleshed out during discovery and
    are not appropriate to resolve at the motion-to-dismiss posture.” 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 927
    (citations omitted). For the same reason, his defense that any alleged disinformation or inaction
    arose from legitimate disagreements over “the nature and extent of the problems and the
    appropriate solution” is misplaced at this stage. See Reply Br. (19-1472) at 8–11.
    We agree with the district court that the allegations against Governor Snyder are
    sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference. See R. 798 (Op. & Order at 39–47) (Page
    ID #21141–49). Unlike the executive defendants in Guertin, Snyder personally contributed to
    creating this crisis. The executives that we decided should have been dismissed in Guertin were
    Wyant, the Director of the MDEQ; Lyon, the Director of the MDHHS; and Wells, the Chief
    Medical Executive of the MDHHS. 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 929
    –31. Wyant may have been “aware
    of some of the issues arising with the water supply post-switch,” but there were no plausible
    allegations that “Wyant personally made decisions regarding the water-source switch” or that “he
    personally engaged” in other conscience-shocking conduct.
    Id. at 929.
    As for Lyon and Wells,
    we noted that “[t]he complaint set[] forth no facts connecting Lyon and Wells to the switch to the
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533             Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                                 Page 34
    Flint River or the decision not to treat the water, and there [wa]s no allegation that they took any
    action causing plaintiffs to consume the lead-contaminated water.”
    Id. at 929–30.
    All that the
    plaintiffs alleged was a general “fail[ure] to ‘protect and notify the public’ of the problems with
    Flint’s water,” rather than allege a particular action taken by Lyon or Wells that would
    demonstrate their deliberate indifference.
    Id. at 930.
    Plaintiffs’ allegations here demonstrate that Governor Snyder personally was aware that
    Flint River water was contaminated and that he personally made the decision to switch the City
    from the DWSD to Flint River water. The allegations demonstrate that Snyder personally
    understood not just from public reports, but from his own staff, that Flint residents were being
    poisoned. Plaintiffs’ allegations demonstrate that Snyder downplayed the problem and delayed
    taking action to protect the people of Flint, first by refusing to switch back to the DWSD, then by
    failing to supply Flint residents with protective supplies, and finally by waiting three months
    after the City connected back to the DWSD to declare a state of emergency. Snyder’s alleged
    role in creating, failing to mitigate, and covering up the crisis plausibly demonstrates deliberate
    indifference.9
    b. State Treasurer Dillon
    Andy Dillon was Treasurer for the State of Michigan when the City was in the process of
    switching to Flint River water. Dillon was asked to assess the cost effectiveness of staying with
    the DWSD or switching to the KWA. See
    id. at 39–40,
    ¶ 104 (Page ID #17842–43). Dillon
    ultimately recommended to Snyder that the Governor authorize the City to switch to the KWA,
    after Dillon learned that the City could fund the switch with an ACO that would require use of
    Flint River water in the interim.
    Id. at 41,
    ¶ 107 (Page ID #17844). Dillon was part of the core
    team that developed the interim Flint River plan, see
    id. at 44,
    ¶ 119 (Page ID #17847), and he
    knew that the FWTP would need to undergo significant upgrades before it could treat the water
    9
    We note, without passing judgment, that the district court dismissed Governor Snyder from the action in
    Guertin. See Guertin v. Michigan, No. 16-cv-12412, 
    2017 WL 2418007
    , at *24 (E.D. Mich. June 5, 2017). It did so
    because there were no plausible allegations in that case that Governor Snyder personally was involved in the
    decision-making process for using Flint River water.
    Id. The plaintiffs’
    theory in Guertin was that Snyder should
    be on the hook merely because he appointed the City Managers who helped to create and sustain the crisis.
    Id. The same
    cannot be said here, as Plaintiffs have alleged Snyder’s personal actions and knowledge in great detail.
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533         Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                          Page 35
    properly,
    id. at 44,
    ¶ 122 (Page ID #17847). In spite of what he knew, the Treasury pressed the
    MDEQ to secure the ACO quickly, so that the switch to the Flint River would take place before
    the FWTP was ready.
    Id. at 130,
    ¶ 383 (Page ID #17933).
    Plaintiffs-Appellees ask that we remand for the district court to decide whether to dismiss
    Dillon from this case. Defendants-Appellants do not protest that request. After we accepted this
    appeal, the district court dismissed Dillon as a defendant in a separate Flint Water Crisis case,
    Brown v. Snyder (In re Flint Water Cases), No. 18-cv-10726, 
    2020 WL 1503256
    , at *9 (E.D.
    Mich. Mar. 27, 2020). The district court recently discovered that Dillon was not Treasurer at the
    time of the actual switch to Flint River water in April 2014.
    Id. at *9
    n.13. In light of that, the
    district court found that Dillon did not have authority over the switch and, therefore, that he
    cannot be found liable.
    Id. Without passing
    judgment on that decision, we see no issue with
    Plaintiffs-Appellees’ request that we remand for the district court to decide in the first instance
    whether to dismiss Dillon in light of that fact. See Lopez v. Foerster, 791 F. App’x 582, 586 (6th
    Cir. 2019) (“Although we have jurisdiction to decide the qualified-immunity question, given the
    unique circumstances of this case, we remand to the district court to consider the issue in the first
    instance.”).
    B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
    The City of Flint and Governor Whitmer argue that they are entitled to Eleventh
    Amendment sovereign immunity. “Whether Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity exists in
    any particular case is a question of constitutional law that we review de novo.” Mingus v. Butler,
    
    591 F.3d 474
    , 481 (6th Cir. 2010).
    The Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits against the State, but generally does not
    bar suits against cities. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The judicial power of the United States shall
    not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
    the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”);
    see also S&M Brands, Inc. v. Cooper, 
    527 F.3d 500
    , 507 (6th Cir. 2008); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
    Servs., 
    436 U.S. 658
    , 690 n.54 (1978). Two quirks of immunity doctrine are at play in this
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                         Page 36
    appeal. The district court correctly concluded that precedent from prior Flint Water cases
    precludes the City’s and Governor Whitmer’s arguments in this case.
    1. City of Flint
    The City argues that it is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity because it
    was under State emergency management during the events leading up to and during the Flint
    Water Crisis. “Although municipalities typically do not enjoy sovereign immunity, ‘arms of the
    state’ do.” Appellant Br. (19-1425) at 36; 
    Metcalf, 506 U.S. at 144
    (“[A] State and its ‘arms’ are,
    in effect, immune from suit in federal court.”). We already foreclosed this argument in Guertin.
    The Guertin court held that the City was not acting as an arm of the State when it was under
    State emergency management and, accordingly, that it was not entitled to sovereign 
    immunity. 912 F.3d at 936
    . The City acknowledges that Guertin’s holding is binding on this panel.
    Appellant Br. (19-1425) at 36 n.15. It makes its present argument “for the purpose of preserving
    the issue for further appeal,” if any.
    Id. We accordingly
    note that the City has preserved its
    argument and that we abide by our decision in Guertin.
    2. Governor Whitmer
    Plaintiffs seek prospective injunctive relief against Governor Whitmer in her official
    capacity to combat the ongoing effects from the violation of their constitutional rights. They
    accordingly seek “[a]n injunctive order to remediate the harm caused by the Government
    Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct including, but not limited to: repairs of private property
    and establishment of medical monitoring to provide health care and other appropriate services to
    Class members for a period of time deemed appropriate by the Court.” R. 620-3 (Fourth Am.
    Compl. at 214) (Page ID #18017). They also seek “[a]ppointment of a monitor who will assist in
    the development of remedial plans including, but not limited to: early education, education
    intervention programs, criminal and juvenile justice evaluations.”
    Id. Under Rule
    25(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the successor to an officer
    sued in their official capacity is “automatically substituted as a party.” FED. R. CIV. P. 25(d).
    When Whitmer succeeded Snyder in January 2019, she automatically became a party to this
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533              Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                                    Page 37
    action in her official capacity as Governor. Whitmer argues that she is entitled to sovereign
    immunity because Plaintiffs fail to plead a proper Ex parte Young claim against her.
    The State generally is immune from suit, but Ex parte Young provides an exception for
    plaintiffs seeking prospective injunctive relief against State actors in their official 
    capacity. 209 U.S. at 156
    ; S&M 
    Brands, 527 F.3d at 507
    . Plaintiffs originally pleaded their Ex parte Young
    claims against Governor Snyder, but since Governor Whitmer has taken office, they have not
    amended their Complaint to include allegations against her personally. Appellant Br. (19-1472)
    at 52–53. Whitmer argues that, because the alleged unconstitutional conduct occurred solely in
    the past, the pleadings are deficient to state a claim for prospective injunctive relief. Plaintiffs-
    Appellees point out that we rejected a similar argument by Governor Snyder in Boler, a previous
    Flint Water 
    case. 865 F.3d at 412
    –14.
    Plaintiffs-Appellees seek prospective injunctive relief to remediate the ongoing harms
    stemming from the Flint Water Crisis. This type of relief is proper under Ex parte Young. See
    Milliken v. Bradley, 
    433 U.S. 267
    , 290 (1977). In Milliken, the Supreme Court held that, under
    Ex parte Young, courts could order newly integrated schools to implement remedial education
    programs in order to combat the lasting effects of de jure school segregation.
    Id. “[T]he victims
    of Detroit’s de jure segregated system will continue to experience the effects of segregation,” the
    Court reasoned, “until such future time as the remedial programs can help dissipate the
    continuing effects of past misconduct.”
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Like the remedial education
    programs at issue in Milliken, the remedial measures that Plaintiffs-Appellees request here “are
    plainly designed to wipe out continuing [harms] produced by” the unconstitutional acts of
    Defendants-Appellants. See id.10
    10
    Defendants-Appellants argue that we should look to Green v. Mansour, 
    474 U.S. 64
    (1985)—not
    Milliken—to decide this case. They rely upon the Supreme Court’s statement in Green that the Eleventh
    Amendment permits suits against the State only “designed to prevent ongoing violations of federal law.”
    Id. at 71.
    Green is not on point. There, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs could not seek notice relief ancillary to a
    declaratory judgment under Ex parte Young that would, in effect, serve only to provide them with retroactive
    monetary relief. See 
    Green, 474 U.S. at 73
    (“The issuance of a declaratory judgment in these circumstances would
    have much the same effect as a full-fledged award of damages or restitution by the federal court, the latter kinds of
    relief being of course prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment.”). Green did not confront the same issue that is
    involved in this case—whether remedial measures to combat the effects of past constitutional violations are
    available as a form of prospective injunctive relief under Ex parte Young.
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                          Page 38
    What was true in Boler remains true today: “Damage to the water pipes has been done,
    and has ongoing 
    effects.” 865 F.3d at 413
    . The year-long corrosion of public and private water
    pipes continues to contaminate the water, and the prolonged and extreme exposure to lead—
    particularly in children and mothers—will leave lasting developmental effects. See supra pp.
    17–18. Plaintiffs have alleged ongoing effects from constitutional violations, even if the conduct
    at issue occurred solely in the past. See 
    Boler, 865 F.3d at 413
    . Moreover, Plaintiffs’ requests
    for repairs, medical monitoring, educational programs, and criminal and juvenile justice
    evaluations are identical to those sought and upheld in Boler. See 
    Boler, 865 F.3d at 413
    .
    Nevertheless, Whitmer argues, this case is different because she personally did not
    commit the initial constitutional violations and she is not alleged to be deliberately indifferent
    now. That distinction makes no difference. As Plaintiffs-Appellees aptly state, “[a]n official-
    capacity suit for prospective relief is simply the vehicle by which the state can be compelled to
    fix a constitutional violation” committed in the past that has continuing effects. Appellees Br. at
    82 (citing Lewis v. Clarke, 
    137 S. Ct. 1285
    , 1290–91 (2017)). It does not matter what Whitmer
    personally did or did not do in the past, or even in the present. “Injunctive relief is appropriate
    here, not because the defendants will be deliberately indifferent again in the future, but because
    the past deliberate indifference has continuing effects.”
    Id. at 83
    (citing 
    Boler, 865 F.3d at 413
    ).
    We conclude that the district court rightly rejected Whitmer’s Eleventh Amendment argument.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the motions to dismiss with respect to every
    Defendant-Appellant except Treasurer Dillon. We REMAND for the district court to decide
    whether Dillon should be dismissed in light of its decision in Brown v. Snyder (In re Flint Water
    Cases), No. 18-cv-10726, 
    2020 WL 1503256
    , at *9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 27, 2020).
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533         Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                        Page 39
    _____________________________________________________________________
    CONCURRING IN THE JUDGMENT IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART
    _____________________________________________________________________
    MURPHY, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Like other cases
    that have reached our court, this case arises out of the tragedy known as the Flint water crisis.
    See Guertin v. Michigan, 
    912 F.3d 907
    (6th Cir. 2019); Boler v. Earley, 
    865 F.3d 391
    (6th Cir.
    2017). The district court held that the plaintiffs’ complaint stated actionable claims against many
    government actors in Michigan. Carthan v. Snyder, 
    384 F. Supp. 3d 802
    , 839–43, 857–61 (E.D.
    Mich. 2019). These government actors have taken this immediate appeal on qualified-immunity
    grounds. Yet our court recently allowed similar claims to proceed against many of the same
    actors. 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 926
    –32. I joined Judge Kethledge’s dissent from the denial of
    rehearing en banc in that case.      Guertin v. Michigan, 
    924 F.3d 309
    , 315 (6th Cir. 2019)
    (Kethledge, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). While “the sympathies of every
    decent person run entirely to the plaintiffs” in all of these cases, I did not believe that the
    complaint’s allegations met the Supreme Court’s high bar “for prying away an officer’s qualified
    immunity”—even at the early motion-to-dismiss stage.
    Id. at 315–16;
    cf. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 
    137 S. Ct. 1843
    , 1865–69 (2017).
    Now, however, Guertin is circuit law that we must faithfully follow. And this case’s
    similarities to Guertin are striking. This case’s plaintiffs? Flint residents who allege serious
    harm from contaminated water, just as in Guertin. Its defendants? State and local actors, many
    of whom were defendants in Guertin.          The claim?      That these actors violated the same
    substantive-due-process right to bodily integrity at issue in Guertin. The procedural posture?
    An appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss the complaint, just as in Guertin. The
    allegations? Largely the same as in Guertin—that government actors played various roles in
    switching Flint’s water supply to a contaminated source and then in concealing the water’s
    contaminated nature. The defenses? The same qualified-immunity and sovereign-immunity
    defenses from Guertin (and Boler).
    What does this background mean for this case? As an initial matter, I would have written
    the majority opinion “in a different key.” 
    Guertin, 924 F.3d at 311
    (Sutton, J., concurring in the
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                          Page 40
    denial of rehearing en banc). This appeal arises at the pleading stage. We must assume that the
    complaint’s allegations are true even though many remain hotly contested by the defendants. If
    discovery ends up showing only negligence on their part, the defendants may raise their
    qualified-immunity defenses at the summary-judgment stage. See
    id. at 315;
    Guertin, 912 F.3d
    at 935
    . Still, I agree with most of my colleagues’ conclusions. Under Guertin, I agree that the
    substantive-due-process claims must proceed against the defendants from the City of Flint
    (Emergency Managers Gerald Ambrose and Darnell Earley, Director of Public Works Howard
    Croft, and Utility Administrators Michael Glasgow and Daugherty Johnson). And I agree that
    the claims must proceed against the defendants from the Michigan Department of Environmental
    Quality (Stephen Busch, Patrick Cook, Michael Prysby, Adam Rosenthal, Liane Shekter-Smith,
    and Bradley Wurfel). Yet I respectfully disagree with my colleagues over whether Guertin
    permits the claim against former Governor Rick Snyder, and I also would resolve the claim
    against former Treasurer Andy Dillon now. I read Guertin as requiring us to reject the claims
    against Snyder and Dillon.
    Keep in mind that the Guertin appeal involved twelve individual defendants, but our
    court allowed claims to proceed against only seven of 
    them. 912 F.3d at 932
    . Guertin noted that
    public actors infringe a due-process right to bodily integrity when they injure individuals through
    conduct that “shocks the conscience.”
    Id. at 918–24.
    And it chose a deliberate-indifference test
    to measure whether the defendants’ actions in that case shocked the conscience.
    Id. at 926.
    That
    test (which Guertin called a “particularly high hurdle”) required the plaintiffs to plausibly allege
    that the defendants “knew of facts from which they could infer a substantial risk of serious harm,
    that they did infer it, and that they acted with indifference toward the individual’s rights.”
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Importantly, Guertin then explained that it must apply this
    test to “each individual defendant’s conduct” because public actors cannot be held vicariously
    liable for the conduct of others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
    Id. at 926,
    929.
    Why did Guertin find this test met for some defendants but not for others? As I read our
    opinion, it distinguished the actors with the most day-to-day involvement in allegedly causing
    the crisis (or in allegedly covering it up) from higher-level officials with more supervisory roles
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533         Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                             Page 41
    or other employees with more tangential roles. See
    id. at 926–32;
    cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 680–84 (2009).
    On the one hand, Guertin allowed claims against the City of Flint employees who were
    allegedly the “chief architects” of the switch to the Flint River and who made that change while
    knowing that the Flint water-treatment plant was not 
    ready. 912 F.3d at 926
    . Guertin also
    allowed claims against the “front and center” employees in the Michigan Department of
    Environmental Quality who allegedly “authorized use of Flint River water with knowledge of its
    contaminants and then deceived others to hide the fact of contamination.”
    Id. at 927.
    On the other hand, Guertin rejected a claim against Daniel Wyant, the Director of the
    Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, who managed these employees and who was
    “aware of some of the issues” with the water after the transition.
    Id. at 929.
    The plaintiffs did
    not allege that he “personally made decisions regarding the water-source switch, nor [did] they
    allege he personally engaged in any other conduct that [we found] conscience-shocking.”
    Id. Similarly, the
    court rejected claims against Nick Lyon, the Director of the Michigan Department
    of Health and Human Services, and another executive in his department.
    Id. at 929–30.
    While
    these actors allegedly knew of problems with the water and failed to warn the public, those
    allegations fell “well-short of conscience-shocking conduct[.]”
    Id. at 930.
      Guertin lastly
    dismissed claims against two other lower-level employees in that department even though they
    allegedly sought to hide evidence of the crisis.
    Id. at 931–32.
    Guertin reasoned that the failure
    to “blow the whistle” did not suffice to meet its deliberate-indifference test.
    Id. at 932.
    Now apply these standards to the thirteen defendants sued in their personal capacities in
    this appeal. Guertin already denied qualified immunity to seven of them—three defendants with
    the city (Earley, Ambrose, and Croft) and four with the Michigan Department of Environmental
    Quality (Busch, Prysby, Shekter-Smith, and Wurfel). See
    id. at 926–29.
    The complaint in this
    case makes allegations against these defendants that are analogous to those in Guertin. So
    Guertin requires us to allow the claims to proceed against these defendants in this case too.
    Guertin did not consider two other defendants with the Michigan Department of
    Environmental Quality (Cook and Rosenthal) and two other defendants with the City of Flint
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                        Page 42
    (Glasgow and Johnson). But the complaint’s allegations against these actors fit the profile of
    those that Guertin found to shock the conscience. As I read Guertin, the key conscience-
    shocking allegations against the relevant actors were that they knowingly authorized use of
    contaminated water and engaged in “lies” by “deceiv[ing] others to hide the fact of
    contamination.”
    Id. at 929;
    see
    id. at 927.
    The complaint in this case asserts similar claims
    against Cook and Rosenthal. Cook is alleged to have intentionally misled the EPA about the
    need for corrosion control by knowingly providing the EPA with false information. Compl.,
    R.620-3, PageID#17886. And Rosenthal is alleged to have “willful[ly] participat[ed] in the
    manipulation of lead testing results[.]”
    Id., PageID#17894. Similarly,
    Glasgow allegedly
    participated in testing that “purposefully skewed the results to minimize the crisis,” wrongly
    telling residents “to run their water—or ‘flush’ it—before testing[.]”
    Id., PageID#17893–94. Finally,
    in the days before the switch to the Flint River water source, Johnson allegedly
    pressured Glasgow to complete the transition even though Glasgow told him that the Flint plant
    was not ready to safely operate.
    Id., PageID#17849–50. Under
    Guertin, these allegations
    against these defendants are enough.
    That leaves the claims against former Governor Snyder and Treasurer Dillon, neither of
    whom were addressed by Guertin. As I see it, both are entitled to qualified immunity under
    Guertin’s own logic. Start with the former governor. From a bird’s-eye view, Guertin already
    dismissed two of Snyder’s cabinet-level officials—Directors Wyant and Lyon—because it
    viewed them as too far removed from the conscience-shocking 
    conduct. 912 F.3d at 929
    –32. If
    Snyder’s subordinates were too far removed from the crisis to remain defendants, that fact
    should make us think twice before allowing claims to proceed against an official even further
    removed.
    To be sure, we are reviewing a different complaint. But the new allegations against
    Snyder do not overcome the “particularly high hurdle” that Guertin set.
    Id. at 926.
    Those
    allegations fall into two general time periods—those before the April 2014 transition to the Flint
    River water source and those after it. The allegations for both time periods fail to establish an
    actionable claim.
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533        Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                         Page 43
    Before the transition, the complaint at least alleges that Snyder took an action. Sometime
    in mid-2013, he allegedly approved the transition after subordinates and city officials
    recommended it to him.       Compl., R.620-3, PageID#17842–46.        But the complaint fails to
    plausibly allege facts suggesting that this approval was callously indifferent to a then-known risk
    of harm. See 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 926
    . Indeed, the complaint itself identifies an earlier study
    suggesting that Flint River water could satisfy regulations if the Flint plant received $69 million
    in upgrades.    Compl., R.620-3, PageID#17839–40.          And it also suggests that the switch
    contemplated upgrades.
    Id., PageID#17853–59. Nothing
    in these allegations takes this claim
    outside the usual rule that most “governmental policy choices come with risks attached to both of
    the competing options, and yet ‘it is not a tort for government to govern’ by picking one option
    over another.” 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 924
    –25 (quoting Schroder v. City of Fort Thomas, 
    412 F.3d 724
    , 729 (6th Cir. 2005)).
    In that respect, Snyder’s sign-off is nothing like the conscience-shocking actions
    allegedly taken by the “chief architects” of the transition.
    Id. at 926.
    Much later in April 2014,
    some of those defendants allegedly forced the transition through despite full knowledge that the
    Flint water-treatment plant was not ready to safely operate.
    Id. Indeed, the
    complaint alleges
    that Glasgow initially refused to approve the change but was pressured to proceed anyway.
    Compl., R.620-3, PageID#17849–50. The complaint makes no equivalent allegations against
    Snyder. At most, it identifies a March 2014 email from someone in the governor’s office sent
    “to several others in the governor’s office” suggesting that the expedited time frame was “less
    than ideal and could lead to some big potential disasters down the road.”
    Id., PageID#17848. The
    complaint does not even allege that the governor saw this email. Regardless, Guertin held
    that a claim could not proceed against Director Wyant even though the complaint alleged that
    he “was aware of some of the issues arising with the water supply post-switch[.]” 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 929
    . Even if Snyder did receive this email, it would establish no more than the
    general awareness of issues followed by inaction that Guertin found insufficient.
    After the transition, the complaint alleges that Snyder was “aware of the health crisis” by
    early 2015, but failed to take any “corrective action” until October 2015 (when he ordered a
    return to the prior water source) and January 2016 (when he declared a state of emergency).
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533         Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                           Page 44
    Compl., R.620-3, PageID#17885; see
    id., PageID#17887, 17891,
    17898–17900. The complaint
    adds that “public assurances provided by members of his Administration that Flint’s water was
    ‘safe’ were recklessly false, and caused or contributed to the poisoning of Flint’s citizenry.”
    Id., PageID#17904; see
    Carthan, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 841
    –43.
    In two ways, these allegations are similar to the allegations against Directors Wyant and
    Lyon that Guertin found insufficient. First, the complaint asserts no well-pleaded allegations
    that Snyder himself deceived the public; instead, it raises generic claims of deception against his
    “Administration.” Compl., R.620-3, PageID#17904. Yet, as with respect to Director Wyant in
    Guertin, even if “the conduct of individuals within his [chain of command] was constitutionally
    abhorrent, we may only hold [Snyder] accountable for his own conduct, not the misconduct of
    his subordinates.” 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 929
    (citing 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676
    –77). Second, the
    complaint alleges that Snyder knew of the problems and failed to disclose them to the public or
    to act sooner. Yet, as with respect to Director Lyon in Guertin, an alleged “fail[ure] to ‘protect
    and notify the public’” cannot state a claim because substantive due process “is a limitation only
    on government action.”
    Id. at 930.
    I thus would grant Snyder qualified immunity and dismiss
    him from this suit.
    Turn to former Treasurer Dillon. My colleagues remand the claim against him so that the
    district court may reconsider its earlier decision in light of a later decision granting him qualified
    immunity in a parallel case. Yet my analysis concerning Governor Snyder requires me to find
    Dillon entitled to qualified immunity too. The complaint’s only allegations against Dillon are
    that he was involved in the mid-2013 negotiations that led to Snyder’s approval to switch Flint’s
    water source. Compl., R.620-3, PageID#17842–44, 17847, 17851; 
    Carthan, 384 F. Supp. 3d at 858
    . As I explained for Snyder, that decision did not plausibly allege any deliberate indifference
    to a then-known risk of harm. See 
    Guertin, 912 F.3d at 924
    –25 (citing 
    Schroder, 412 F.3d at 729
    ).
    Nos. 19-1425/1472/1477/1533         Waid et al. v. Snyder et al.                           Page 45
    * * *
    One final loose end: the two sovereign-immunity defenses. For these defenses too,
    I agree with my colleagues. Guertin forecloses the City of Flint’s invocation of sovereign
    immunity. See
    id. at 936.
    And Boler forecloses Governor Gretchen Whitmer’s contention that
    the plaintiffs may not seek injunctive relief (identical to the injunctive relief requested in Boler)
    against the governor in her official capacity. 
    See 865 F.3d at 413
    .
    All told, then, I respectfully concur in the judgment in part and dissent in part.