Wendy Hancock v. Deandrea Miller ( 2021 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 21a0165n.06
Case No. 20-5422
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
Mar 26, 2021
WENDY HANCOCK, individually and )
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
as next friend for B.B., )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
v. ) COURT FOR THE MIDDLE
) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
DEANDRA MILLER, et al., )
)
Defendants-Appellees. ) OPINION
)
BEFORE: BATCHELDER, STRANCH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. Wendy Hancock’s thirty-month dispute with
the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) culminates in this appeal.
Hancock sued seventeen defendants for violating her and her daughter’s rights while
revoking Hancock’s custody of her children. The district court dismissed her
complaint. Hancock appeals select claims, but finding no error, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Wendy Hancock lived in Tennessee with her teenage son and twelve-year-old
“B.B.,” her daughter. August 2018 was an eventful month for the Hancock household.
Hancock filed an unruly petition against her son in juvenile court. Meanwhile, he
called the police to their home, and the officers found drug paraphernalia in his room.
No. 20-5422, Hancock v. Miller
The next day, the son left home after arguing with Hancock, and Hancock reported
him missing to the police. Unbeknownst to Hancock, the son’s father delivered the
son to DCS custody. While there, the son complained of verbal and physical
mistreatment, stated he feared going home, showed evidence of abuse, and reported
his mother’s drug and alcohol use.
The same day that her son lodged his complaints with DCS, police called
Hancock and told her to come to the police station to find out about her son. When
Hancock did not show up, the police obtained criminal warrants against Hancock for
assault and contributing to a minor’s delinquency.
In the wake of these events, DCS worker Deandra Miller petitioned the
Juvenile Court for an ex parte order against Hancock, alleging that Hancock dealt
and abused drugs and physically abused her children. The initial Juvenile Court
judge assigned to the petition, Judge Bratton Hale Cook, refused to address it because
of his familiarity with Hancock. Under the Tennessee Supreme Court’s “Standing
Order for the Designation of Substitute Judge,” the petition was referred to Judge
Michael Collins. Judge Collins issued an ex parte order granting DCS immediate
temporary custody of the children (“ex parte order” or “EPO”).
But Hancock and B.B. were missing. After two days, Detective James
Cornelius retrieved images from Facebook and broadcast them on the national child
alert system. He also “pinged” Hancock’s cell phone to determine her location. Police
arrested Hancock the next day and took B.B. into DCS custody. Detective James
Cornelius and Lieutenant Matthew Holmes and interrogated Hancock without
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reading Miranda warnings. Hancock alleges that the government used her
statements from this interrogation against her in juvenile and criminal proceedings.
The government charged Hancock with assault and contributing to the
delinquency of a minor. DCS placed Hancock’s son and B.B. in foster care and
arranged for them to receive the HPV vaccine. Hancock entered a “best interest”
guilty plea to the contributing to delinquency charge, and the state dismissed the
assault charge. And in March 2019, after a three-day hearing, a judge found
Hancock’s children dependent and neglected. Hancock elected for probation and a
supervised parenting plan to regain custody of her children. DCS returned her
children home in June.
Hancock sued seventeen defendants based on her belief that the state’s
employees and the state court had violated her rights in taking custody of her
children. She alleged state-law violations as well as federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. She sought damages and a declaratory judgment. The
defendants moved to dismiss all of Hancock’s claims, which the district court did. It
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Hancock’s federal claims arising from the
ex parte order under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. And it dismissed the rest of the
federal claims on substantive or immunity grounds. Having dismissed her federal
claims, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
Hancock now appeals the dismissal of some of her claims as to four of the defendants.
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II. DISCUSSION
Hancock argues that the district court made several errors. First, she claims
that the district court erred when it denied three motions to exclude and took judicial
notice of two state court orders and a DCS document. Second, she argues that her
constitutional claims challenging actions taken under the EPO are not barred by the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Third, she asserts several claims against DCS worker
Deandra Miller. And finally, she asserts Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against
Detective Cornelius and Lieutenant Holmes for their interrogation without Miranda
warnings and for pinging her cell phone without a warrant. We address and reject
each of her arguments below.
We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo, allowing Plaintiff’s claims to
proceed only if they “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(internal quotation marks removed) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). Claims have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint need not contain “detailed
factual allegations,” but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action” or
“a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” will not suffice. Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); Courser v. Allard, 969 F.3d 604, 615 (6th Cir. 2020).
A. Motions to Exclude
Hancock’s first argument is that the district court erred in denying three
motions that she made to exclude various court records. She argues that judicial
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notice of these documents was inappropriate under Federal Rule of Evidence 201,
which permits courts to take notice of certain facts even on a motion to dismiss. We
reject her arguments because each of the documents qualified under FRE 201.
Rule 201 outlines the requirements for judicial notice of adjudicative facts. It
permits courts to take notice of “a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute”
because it either “is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction”
or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Under this rule and relevant case
law, courts take notice of “developments in related proceedings in other courts of
record.” Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. City of Cleveland, 695 F.3d 548, 553 n.2 (6th Cir.
2012) (cleaned up).1 “Specifically, on a motion to dismiss, we may take judicial notice
of another court’s opinion not for the truth of the facts recited therein, but for the
existence of the opinion, which is not subject to reasonable dispute over its
authenticity.” Winget v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 537 F.3d 565, 576 (6th Cir.
2008) (citation omitted).
Hancock argues that the district court erred in denying her motion to exclude
a juvenile court order, a “permanency plan” by the Department of Children’s Services
that was filed with the juvenile court, and the Standing Order for the Designation of
Substitute Judges by the Tennessee Supreme Court.
1
A juvenile court in Tennessee is a court of record. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-159(a);
In re S.L.M., 207 S.W.3d 288, 296 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
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The juvenile court order plainly meets the requirements of Rule 201. “Judicial
records are a source of ‘reasonably indisputable accuracy’ when they record some
judicial action such as dismissing an action, granting a motion, or finding a fact.”
United States v. Ferguson, 681 F.3d 826, 834 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting 21B Charles
Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5106.4 (2d ed. 2005)).
Hancock posits that the juvenile court order is not appropriate for judicial
notice because it is not a “final order” and that the order “is of no force or effect” under
Tennessee law because it was “negated by the de novo appeal.” (Appellant’s Br. at
16.) Her argument fails on its own terms. Tennessee law permits appeal only of a
“final order or judgment.” § 37-1-159(a). And she did appeal, so the order must have
been final.2 And in any event, she does not explain how the order not being “final”
would affect how we would apply Rule 201.
Hancock also argues that the order is not a “public record” because it is
confidential, and she says that it is not central to her claims. These arguments do not
address whether judicial notice was appropriate or whether the existence of the order
“can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Instead, Hancock’s arguments go to
2
Hancock seems to believe that “final” means that the order is the final word in the matter.
This colloquial sense of the term “final” differs from the legal term “final judgment” for appeal.
See Hantz Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 664 F. App’x 452, 459 (6th Cir.
2016) (“Accordingly, as a legal term of art, ‘final judgment’ virtually always designates the
judgment by a court that determines all the rights and obligations of the parties in a case so that it
can be appealed—not a judgment that has been resolved after appeal.”)
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whether admitting the order converted the 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a summary
judgment motion. This requires different analysis.
Considering the order was proper and did not convert the motion to dismiss
into a motion for summary judgment. When deciding a motion to dismiss, a court
ordinarily cannot consider evidence outside the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). If a
party presents such evidence and the court does not exclude it, then the court must
treat the motion to dismiss as a summary judgment motion and allow appropriate
discovery. Id. But a court deciding a motion to dismiss may consider “other materials
that are integral to the complaint, are public records, or are otherwise appropriate
for the taking of judicial notice.” Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d
553, 560 (6th Cir. 2005); see also McLaughlin v. CNX Gas Co., LLC, 639 F. App’x 296,
298 (6th Cir. 2016) (“We may also consider documents that a defendant attaches to a
motion if the documents ‘are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to
her claims’ without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.”) (quoting
Weiner v. Klais & Co., 108 F.3d 86, 89 (6th Cir. 1997)). Because a juvenile court order
is appropriate for judicial notice, the district court could consider it to demonstrate
the adjudicative fact that the order was issued and what it said—though not for the
truth of the facts asserted— without converting the 12(b)(6) into a summary
judgment motion. See In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d 455, 467 (6th Cir.
2014).
We look next to the permanency plan. Hancock repeats her argument that the
document is not appropriate for judicial notice because it is not a public record or
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central to her claims. Again, these arguments do not address judicial notice, but
whether the document is evidence that converts a motion to dismiss into a motion for
summary judgment. And at any rate, Hancock identifies no support for the notion
that confidential court filings are not public records. Indeed, she admits that “court
filings in other cases” are appropriate for judicial notice. (Appellant’s Br. at 10.)
Finally, we turn to the Standing Order. Hancock argues that the Standing
Order is not appropriate for judicial notice because the fact that it provided Judge
Collins with authority is subject to reasonable dispute. But this assertion does not
contradict the fact that the Standing Order is a public record, as it is an order from
the Supreme Court of Tennessee. See Ferguson, 681 F.3d at 834. So judicial notice
was appropriate.3
B. Rooker–Feldman
Hancock challenged the EPO’s validity, and she alleged that those who acted
under the EPO violated her rights. Because a lower federal court lacks jurisdiction to
review a state court order, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of claims based on
the EPO or its execution. “We review de novo a district court’s ruling that the Rooker–
Feldman doctrine deprives the district court of jurisdiction.” Kovacic v. Cuyahoga
Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 606 F.3d 301, 308 (6th Cir. 2010).
Rooker stated a simple negative implication of 28 U.S.C. § 1257: lower federal
courts lack jurisdiction to hear appeals from state court decisions. Only the Supreme
3
Hancock challenges the district court’s alleged assumption that the standing order was
valid under state law. We need not address this issue since Rooker–Feldman applies to Judge
Collins’ actions, and this allegation would only go to dispute his jurisdiction to issue the order. See
infra, Section II.B.
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Court holds the power to declare a state court decision “null and void.” Rooker v. Fid.
Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414–16 (1923). Later, the Court clarified that § 1257 does not
prevent a party from challenging a state law in federal court. It merely prevents a
party from challenging a state court ruling applying that law. See D.C. Ct. of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). It is “a doctrine with only limited application.”
Kovacic, 606 F.3d at 309 (quoting Coles v. Granville, 448 F.3d 853, 857 (6th Cir.
2006)).
Rooker–Feldman invokes the same idea of respect for state courts as
preclusion, collateral estoppel, and abstention. But the doctrines are not the same. In
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), the Court held
that Rooker–Feldman only applies to “state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Id.
at 284. It does not “override or supplant preclusion doctrine” or otherwise impact
existing doctrines on how federal courts defer to state courts. Id.So we work with two important boundaries. First, Rooker–Feldman applies
only to court orders. Berry v. Schmitt, 688 F.3d 290, 299 (6th Cir. 2012). A plaintiff
may challenge a summons or a writ of garnishment that a clerk issues without
violating Rooker–Feldman. See Van Hoven v. Buckles & Buckles, P.L.C., 947 F.3d 889,
892–93 (6th Cir. 2020). Second, the doctrine applies when plaintiffs challenge the
state court decision, not state law generally. So “alleging error in a state court
decision” rouses Rooker–Feldman. Hall v. Callahan, 727 F.3d 450, 453 (6th Cir. 2013)
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(citation omitted). But challenging a state law or policy prospectively does not. See
Brent v. Wayne Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 901 F.3d 656, 674 (6th Cir. 2018). The
type of relief requested—whether retrospective or prospective—often reveals which
type of claim it is. Berry, 688 F.3d at 299–300.
In winnowing would-be Rooker–Feldman cases, our Circuit uses the “source of
the injury” standard. McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006). If
the state court judgment is the source of the injury, then Rooker–Feldman applies.
Id. But “[i]f there is some other source of injury, such as a third party’s actions, then
the plaintiff asserts an independent claim.” Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 368–
69 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting McCormick, 451 F.3d at 393). And just as the relief
requested helps to classify the type of claim, the request for relief is also indispensable
in determining the source of the injury. VanderKodde v. Mary Jane M. Elliott, P.C.,
951 F.3d 397, 402 (6th Cir. 2020). On this basis, we have repeatedly declined to apply
Rooker–Feldman to cases alleging third-party misconduct, even when closely related
to a state court proceeding.
But we also follow an important exception—that “if a third party’s actions are
the product of a state court judgment,” then challenging the acts would be to
challenge the judgment itself. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 394. For example, if election
officials refuse to tally ballots because a court order commanded them to exclude the
ballots, Rooker–Feldman would not allow a suit against the officials. Id. (citing
Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 88 (2d Cir. 2005)).
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The district court dismissed all claims arising from the EPO as barred by the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine. This included:
(a) Fourth Amendment claims concerning the seizure of the children pursuant
to the [EPO]; (b) Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims
concerning removing the children pursuant to the [EPO] and participating in
hearings pursuant to the [EPO]; (c) Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process claims concerning removing and retaining the children pursuant to the
[EPO], including a claim based upon the provision of the HPV vaccine to B.B.
under the medical treatment provision of the [EPO].
(R. 122, PageID 1021–22.). Hancock challenges each of these holdings.
Hancock argues that Rooker–Feldman should not apply to her claims because
the EPO no longer has any effect, so she is not asking for relief from the EPO. But
her Amended Complaint says otherwise. It states that she is “seeking declaratory
judgment on the ex parte order and the actions of Judge Michael Collins as follows:
That the ex parte order . . . violates the Fourteenth Amendment . . . [and] the Fourth
Amendment . . .” (R. 34, PageID 253.) She also argues, “Declaratory relief is
appropriate because the validity and enforceability of said order” is still at issue in
her separate criminal proceedings. (Id. at 254. (emphasis added)). And she asks for a
declaration that the EPO is “void.” (Id. at 253.) All her claims against Collins reside
under the Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief, which requests the district court
void the EPO. This is “inviting district court review and rejection of” a state-court
order—something we may not do under Rooker–Feldman. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at
284. And her appellate briefing rests on the same claims barred by Rooker–Feldman.
Because many of Hancock’s claims depend on declaring the EPO void, Rooker–
Feldman analysis is sufficient for resolving several issues. Rooker–Feldman
effectively blocks all claims against Judge Collins, and we need not address the issue
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of judicial immunity or any of the remaining allegations against Judge Collins.
Hancock’s complaint also reveals that any claim against Miller, James, and Holmes
based on the seizure of B.B., removal and retention of her children, and arrest for
custodial interference also turn on the validity of the EPO. Hancock does not allege
any constitutional injury independent of the EPO, instead alleging that the EPO was
the “direct and proximate cause” of these alleged harms. (R. 34, PageID 253.) So these
alleged harms were “the product of a state court judgment,” not independent third-
party actions, and Rooker–Feldman bars review. McCormick, 451 F.3d at 394.
Hancock also claims that Rooker–Feldman does not apply because the EPO
was not a final order. But we have held that Rooker–Feldman applies to interlocutory
orders. See Pieper v. Am. Arb. Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458 (6th Cir. 2003). After Exxon
Mobile, there has been some debate among circuit courts about whether Rooker–
Feldman reaches federal complaints filed before the state proceeding is fully
complete.4 But even assuming completion of state court proceedings is the standard,
4
For example, the Eleventh Circuit held in Nicholson v. Shafe that Rooker–Feldman did
not apply if a state court appeal was still pending when the plaintiff filed the federal case. 558 F.3d
1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). That court reasoned that Exxon Mobil’s emphasis on limiting Rooker–
Feldman requires federal courts to apply it in only factually identical situations, down to the detail
that the state proceedings and opportunity to appeal in Rooker and Feldman had ended. Id. at 1274–
75. See also Federacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto
Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 24–27 (1st Cir. 2005).
But the Fifth Circuit noted that the emphasis on “ended” proceedings “is found not
in Exxon’s holding but in its description of the Rooker and Feldman cases.” Houston v. Venneta
Queen, 606 F. App’x 725, 732 (5th Cir. 2015). Exxon’s actual holding requires only that the
judgment challenged be “rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.” Exxon
Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284. And later Supreme Court precedent emphasized not the ending of all state
court proceedings, but effectual “appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal
court.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006). Our circuit has not decided this question post-
Exxon. In Quality Associates, a panel touched on the question in a footnote, noting that it believed
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Rooker–Feldman still applies here. The state court dismissed Hancock’s case almost
two months before she filed her suit in federal court. Because Hancock challenged a
state court order and actions that flowed directly from its mandate, the district court
had no jurisdiction over these claims.
C. Claims Against Deandra Miller
Hancock argues that Miller violated her substantive due process rights
through her “bad faith investigation which resulted in false statements in order to
obtain a removal order.” (Appellant’s Br. at 56.) She also claims that Miller made
false statements in her petition for the EPO, that she started the removal proceedings
as retaliation for protected speech and use of an activist attorney, and that she
withheld exculpatory evidence when advancing the petition for the EPO.5 We reject
most of these arguments on absolute immunity grounds and one argument for
insufficient pleading.
Pieper had been displaced by Exxon, and citing Nicholson approvingly. Quality Assocs., Inc. v.
The Procter & Gamble Distrib. LLC, 949 F.3d 283, 290 n.5 (6th Cir. 2020). But it ultimately found
Rooker–Feldman inapplicable on different grounds—the state court order at issue was not
rendered until after the district court case had commenced, running afoul of Exxon’s requirement
that the judgment challenged be “rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced.” Exxon-Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.
Our leading post-Exxon case, which pre-dated Quality Associates, considered applying
Rooker–Feldman appropriate when the proceedings on the relevant order had “ended,” though the
case as a whole had three years of proceedings yet to come. See McCormick, 451 F.3d at 391, 395;
McCormick v. McCormick, No. 84-422014-DO (Wayne County Circuit Court). Requiring finality
of only the order being effectively appealed may better align with the Supreme Courts guidance
and the Rooker–Feldman rationale. But we leave that decision for another day.
5
Hancock also alleged that Miller failed to communicate with Hancock’s lawyer when
launching the petition and setting a hearing. But Hancock has not alleged that Miller personally
had a legal duty to contact Hancock’s lawyer. Indeed, in her brief, she diffuses responsibility
among different defendants and DCS.
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Like prosecutors, social workers have absolute immunity for conduct
“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Kovacic v.
Cuyahoga Cty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 724 F.3d 687, 694 (6th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 724
(6th Cir. 2011)). This includes work as a legal advocate, such as filing legal papers
with the courts, appointing guardians ad litem, and testifying. Id.; Rippy ex rel. Rippy
v. Hattaway, 270 F.3d 416, 422 (6th Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs cannot skirt this bar by
alleging malice, corruption, or error. Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 694. The immunity is
complete.
But administrative duties, investigations, and agency decisions do not fall
under the immunity. Id. That is, the immunity follows the actions, not the person.
Rippy, 270 F.3d at 422. In determining whether the action is immune at the dismissal
stage, the pleadings are important. Regardless of other possibly viable allegations,
the district court must look only at the facts alleged. See id. at 423 n.2.
Absolute immunity blocks the claims of bad-faith investigation, false
statements, and retaliation because Hancock did not allege that the investigation
caused her harm independent of the EPO. In other words, the true harm she alleged
was the eventual entry of the EPO, not any particular investigative acts. A plaintiff
complaining about a social worker’s legal advocacy cannot skirt immunity by
presenting her claims as based on the investigation. See Rippy, 270 F.3d at 421(rejecting a claim for improper investigation when the claim really centered on false
statements in the petition). And because social workers have absolute immunity for
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filing petitions with the court—even ones with false statements or ones filed for
improper reasons—the other two claims fail.6 To the extent Hancock asserts a claim
based on Miller’s execution of the judicial order—which would be protected by
qualified immunity rather than absolute immunity—such a claim is, as discussed
earlier, barred by Rooker–Feldman. Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 695.
As for the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence, Hancock does not detail any
legal duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in a removal proceeding. But if there were
such a duty, Miller would be immune just like any prosecutor violating Brady
disclosure requirements. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).7
Hancock’s brief also mentions B.B.’s claims. Her procedural due process claim
echoes the arguments we have already addressed. Her Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendment claims focusing on obtaining and executing the EPO fail for the same
reasons we have explained.
The only remaining claim against Miller that is not covered by absolute
immunity is the due process claim for conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But
Hancock did not bring a § 1983 conspiracy claim in her amended complaint. She only
6
Hancock also argues that Miller violated her procedural due process rights “by seeking
and obtaining a [sic] ex parte order where there were no exigent circumstances.” (Appellant’s Br.
at 50.) To be sure, a parent may prevail on a procedural due process claim for failure to provide a
pre-deprivation hearing before interfering with their family integrity. See, e.g., Schulkers v.
Kammer, 955 F.3d 520, 545–46 (6th Cir. 2020). But Hancock only alleges that Miller wrongfully
sought the EPO. This also falls under the absolute immunity for legal advocacy.
7
See Koubriti v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 470 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Just as we stated above,
Jones and Imbler make clear that absolute immunity protects a prosecutor from civil liability for
the non-disclosure of material exculpatory evidence at trial.”)
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brought a § 1985 conspiracy claim, which she did not raise on appeal. So we affirm
the district court’s dismissal of this claim.
D. Fourth and Fifth Amendment Claims Against Detective Cornelius and
Lieutenant Holmes
Hancock alleged that Holmes and Cornelius violated her Fifth Amendment
rights by interrogating her without reciting her Miranda rights to elicit statements
that the government later used in a criminal proceeding. She also alleged that
Detective Cornelius violated her Fourth Amendment right when he “pinged” her cell
phone location without a warrant. We reject the first argument for insufficient
pleading and the second because Cornelius is entitled to qualified immunity.
Officers can be liable in § 1983 lawsuits for Fifth Amendment violations. See
McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418, 437 (6th Cir. 2005). The government
violates the Fifth Amendment when it uses incriminating statements that it obtained
illegally. So when the government does not use the statements in a criminal
proceeding, “the plaintiff may not sue because he has not suffered the injury against
which the Fifth Amendment protects.” McKinley, 404 F.3d at 438.
Hancock’s Fifth Amendment claim fails for insufficient pleading. She never
explains what incriminating statements she made. And she does not allege any
particular criminal proceeding in which the government used the statements. She
simply claims that her statements “are now being used against his [sic] in criminal
court.” (Appellant’s Br. at 62.) But “[l]egal conclusions that are masquerading as
factual allegations” are not enough to carry Hancock’s claims. Heyne v. Metro.
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Nashville Pub. Schs., 655 F.3d 556, 564 (6th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
For the Fourth Amendment claim, the district court ruled that Cornelius was
entitled to qualified immunity for pinging Hancock’s cell phone. Because he
reasonably believed that the circumstances were exigent, he did not violate her
clearly established constitutional right. In reply, Hancock argues that excluding the
documents that she moved to exclude would remove any justification for pinging her
cell phone. Because we affirm the district court in denying the motions to exclude, we
reject this claim.
Hancock also asserts that the district court’s exigency finding relied on the
truth of the statements in the juvenile court order. But the district court only
addressed the exigent circumstances based on Cornelius’ view of the situation. Since
the actual truth of the statements in the court documents would not impact Cornelius’
justified reliance, the district court did not need to assume the accuracy of the
statements.
Finally, Hancock argues that exigency is a question of fact for a jury, which
would preclude a 12(b)(6) dismissal. But her only argument against exigency is that
the court should have excluded the document establishing the exigent circumstances.
Since that boils down to a legal question of evidence exclusion, there is no question
for the jury.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.
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