American Beverage Association v. Snyder , 700 F.3d 796 ( 2012 )


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    Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
    File Name: 12a0394p.06
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
    _________________
    X
    Plaintiff-Appellant, -
    AMERICAN BEVERAGE ASSOCIATION,
    -
    -
    -
    No. 11-2097
    v.
    ,
    >
    RICK SNYDER, BILL SCHUETTE, and ANDREW -
    -
    Defendants-Appellees, --
    DILLON,
    -
    -
    -
    MICHIGAN BEER & WINE WHOLESALERS
    Intervenor-Appellee. -
    ASSOCIATION,
    N
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
    No. 1:11-cv-195—Gordon J. Quist, District Judge.
    Argued: July 20, 2012
    Decided and Filed: November 29, 2012
    Before: CLAY and SUTTON, Circuit Judges; RICE, District Judge.*
    _________________
    COUNSEL
    ARGUED: Patricia A. Millett, AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP,
    Washington, D.C., for Appellant. John J. Bursch, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN
    ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, Anthony S. Kogut, WILLINGHAM &
    COTÉ, East Lansing, Michigan, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Patricia A. Millett, AKIN
    GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, Washington, D.C., Hyland Hunt, AKIN
    GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, Dallas, Texas, for Appellant. John J. Bursch,
    Margaret A. Nelson, Ann M. Sherman, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY
    GENERAL, Lansing, Michigan, Anthony S. Kogut, Curtis R. Hadley, WILLINGHAM
    & COTÉ, East Lansing, Michigan, for Appellees. Cory L. Andrews, WASHINGTON
    LEGAL FOUNDATION, Washington, D.C., Helgi C. Walker, WILEY REIN LLP,
    Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae.
    *
    The Honorable Walter H. Rice, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Ohio,
    sitting by designation.
    1
    No. 11-2097          Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                                Page 2
    CLAY, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which SUTTON, J., and RICE,
    D. J., joined. SUTTON, J. (pp. 19–26), delivered a separate concurring opinion. RICE,
    D. J. (pp. 27–28), also filed a separate concurring opinion.
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    CLAY, Circuit Judge.            Plaintiff, the American Beverage Association
    (“Association”), appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to
    Defendants, Governor Rick Snyder, Attorney General Bill Schuette, and Michigan
    Treasurer Andrew Dillon in their official capacities (collectively Defendants), and the
    Michigan Beer & Wine Wholesalers Association (“MBWWA”), which intervened in
    support of Defendants. Plaintiff argues that Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.572a(10), which
    requires certain returnable bottles and cans to possess a unique-to-Michigan mark
    designation, violates the dormant Commerce Clause, regulates extraterritorially, and
    discriminates against interstate commerce.           For the reasons set forth below, we
    AFFIRM in part, REVERSE in part, and REMAND for further proceedings.
    BACKGROUND
    A.      Michigan’s Beverage Container Deposit Law
    Michigan is one of ten states that requires consumers to pay a can, plastic bottle,
    or glass bottle deposit when purchasing specified beverage containers. Mich. Comp.
    Laws § 445.571 et seq.1 In 1976, Michigan enacted the Michigan Container Act,
    commonly referred to as the “Bottle Bill.” The purpose of the Bottle Bill was to promote
    and encourage the recycling of beverage containers by offering a cash refund of a ten-
    cent deposit to consumers and distributors in an effort to reduce the amount of bottle and
    can litter. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.571 et seq.; see also Michigan Bottle Bill, A
    Final       Report     to:     Michigan        Great       Lakes      Protection         Fund,
    http://www.michigan.gov/documents/ deq/deq-ogl-mglpf-stutz_249882_7.pdf, at 2 (last
    1
    The other states are: Massachusetts, New York, Maine, Vermont, Iowa, Hawaii, California,
    Oregon, and Connecticut.
    No. 11-2097           Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                                    Page 3
    visited August 20, 2012). The Bottle Bill requires any beverage—defined as “a soft
    drink, soda water, carbonated natural or mineral water, or other nonalcoholic carbonated
    drink; beer, ale, or other malt drink of whatever alcoholic content; or a mixed wine drink
    or a mixed spirit drink”—to be sold to consumers in “returnable” containers. See 
    id. §§ 445.571(a),
    445.571(d). A “returnable” container is a container “upon which a
    deposit of at least 10 cents has been paid, or is required to be paid upon the removal of
    the container from the sale or consumption area, and for which a refund of at least
    10 cents in cash is payable by every dealer or distributor . . . .” See id.§ 445.571(d). All
    businesses that sell beverages to consumers are required to accept for rebate an empty
    container “of any kind, size, and brand” of beverage that the retailer (dealer) sells. See
    
    id. § 445.572(2).
    In exchange, the business or a reverse vending machine2 provides the
    consumer a ten-cent deposit refund paid on that container. The retailers then return the
    empty containers to beverage distributors or manufactures and collect the ten-cent
    refund. See 
    id. § 445.572(6).
    The Bottle Bill requires beverage containers sold within
    the State to clearly indicate the state’s name and the containers’ refund value. See 
    id. § 445.571(d).
    That information appears as “MI 10ç” on each individual beverage
    container.
    B.       The Redemption Problem
    Although the Bottle Bill has been successful in improving the environment by
    promoting the recycling of beverage containers, the bill also created two unanticipated
    problems: (1) consumers deposited more money on nonalcoholic beverage containers
    than distributors or manufacturers paid out in refunds (underredemption); and (2) the
    value of the deposits collected by the distributor or manufacturer was less than the total
    value of refunds paid (overredeemption). To address the problem of underredemption,
    the Michigan Legislature amended the Bottle Bill in 1989, and mandated that the value
    of unclaimed deposits escheat to the State Treasury. Under the amendment, the State
    Treasury gave 25 percent of the unclaimed revenue to in-state beverage retailers and the
    2
    A “reverse vending machine” is defined as a “device designed to properly identify and process
    empty beverage containers and provide a means for a deposit refund on returnable containers.” Mich.
    Comp. Laws § 445.572a(12)(j).
    No. 11-2097         Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                            Page 4
    remaining 75 percent financed a Michigan cleanup and redevelopment trust fund. See
    
    id. § 445.573(c).
    Despite the 1989 Bottle Bill Amendment, the redemption problem continued.
    Specifically, the State recognized that individuals would purchase beverage containers
    outside of Michigan and then attempt to return the beverage containers in Michigan to
    redeem the ten-cent deposit. As a result, the unauthorized returns and redemptions
    reduced the revenue stream to the State because no deposit was paid to the State of
    Michigan. A 1998 study estimated that fraudulent redemption in Michigan of beverage
    containers originating from outside of Michigan resulted in a loss of $15.6 to $30 million
    every year in Michigan deposits. In an effort to reduce these fraudulent redemptions, the
    Michigan Legislature enacted a statute criminalizing the redemption of containers by any
    individual who knows or should have known that no deposit was paid on the container.
    See 
    id. §§ 445.574a
    and b.
    C.      Michigan’s Unique-Mark Amendment to the Bottle Bill
    In December 2008, the Michigan Legislature amended the State’s Bottle Bill in
    order to increase revenue to the State. The Amendment required that, in addition to the
    MI 10ç designation, containers for certain brands of beverages bear a “symbol, mark,
    or other distinguishing characteristic that is placed on a designated metal container,
    designated glass container, or designated plastic container by a manufacturer to allow
    a reverse vending machine to determine if that container is a returnable container . . . .
    ” See 
    id. § 445.572a(10).
    The mark “must be unique to the state,” and can be “used only
    in this state and 1 or more other states that have laws substantially similar to this act.”
    
    Id. The provision
    does not define “substantially similar,” but the State interprets the
    phrase to include all states with Bottle Bill deposit schemes, including those where the
    deposit is less than Michigan’s. Failure to comply with the new provision could result
    in a penalty of up to six months’ imprisonment and/or a $2,000 fine.               See 
    id. § 445.572a(11).
    The provision applieds only to companies that meet the State’s specified
    threshold sales requirements.
    No. 11-2097           Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                                      Page 5
    On March 1, 2010, the Bottle Bill provision went into effect for nonalcoholic
    beverages in 12-ounce metal containers.3 See 
    id. § 445.752a(2).
    On February 24, 2011,
    the provision went into effect for nonalcoholic beverages in 12-ounce glass or plastic
    containers.4 See 
    id. § 445.572a(3)–(5).
    Plaintiff is a “non-profit association of the manufacturers, marketers, distributors,
    and bottlers of virtually every nonalcoholic beverage sold in the United States,”
    including bottled water, juices, juice drinks, soft drinks, teas, dairy beverages, sports
    drinks, and energy drinks. (Pl.’s Br. 12.) Plaintiff seeks to protect “its members’ legal
    rights and the interests of the industry and beverage consumers” and represents members
    that produce beverages regulated by the Michigan 2008 Amendment to the Bottle Bill.
    (Id.)
    On February 25, 2011, Plaintiff filed this action in the United States District
    Court for the Western District of Michigan against Defendants, seeking declaratory,
    injunctive, and other relief. Plaintiff claimed that Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.572a(10),
    a provision of the 2008 Bottle Bill, violated the Commerce Clause of the United States
    Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Plaintiff alleged that the 2008 provision requires interstate
    beverage manufacturers, on pain of criminal penalty, to produce, distribute, and sell
    designated beverages in unique-to-Michigan containers, and prohibits the sale of those
    same packaged beverages in all (or almost all) other States in the Country. Plaintiff
    further claimed that compliance with Michigan’s unique-mark requirement is
    extraterritorial because the Association’s members must “change the way they source
    and deliver product both in Michigan and in the other states in which they operate . . .
    [by isolating] the Michigan-specific product in separate Michigan- specific
    manufacturing and distribution locations or in segregated areas of multi-state
    3
    This currently includes seven Coca-Cola Enterprise products (Coca-Cola, Diet Coke, Caffeine
    Free Diet Coke, Sprite, Coca-Cola Zero, Cherry Coke, and Dr. Pepper), five Pepsi Bottling Group products
    (Pepsi, Diet Pepsi, Mountain Dew, Diet Mountain Dew, and Diet Caffeine Free Pepsi), and three Dr.
    Pepper/Snapple products (A&W, Dr. Pepper, and Vernors). (Def.’s Br. 13.)
    4
    The beverages include two Coca-Cola Refreshment products (Coca-Cola, Diet Coke) and four
    Pepsi Beverage Company products (Pepsi, Diet Pepsi, Mountain Dew, Diet Mountain Dew). (Def.’s Br.
    14.)
    No. 11-2097        Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                            Page 6
    manufacturing and distribution facilities.” (R.1, Compl. ¶ 60.) According to Plaintiff,
    compliance with the statute increases the need for more warehouse space to separate
    inventory and eliminates flexibility in the supply chain.
    Plaintiff moved for summary judgment arguing that, as a matter of law, the
    challenged statute is both extraterritorial and discriminatory in violation of the dormant
    Commerce Clause. Alternatively, Plaintiff argued that it should prevail under the
    balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 
    397 U.S. 137
    , 142 (1970), which
    upholds a state regulation unless the burden on interstate commerce outweighs the local
    benefits. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 
    476 U.S. 573
    , 579
    (1986) (citing 
    Pike, 397 U.S. at 142
    ). Defendants filed their response in opposition to
    summary judgment and, alternatively moved for summary judgment in their favor. On
    April 26, 2011, the district court issued an order, which permitted the MBWWA to
    intervene in support of Defendants.
    The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, finding that Mich.
    Comp. Laws § 445.572a(10) is neither discriminatory nor extraterritorial. As to the
    application of the Pike balancing test, the district court concluded that summary
    judgment was not appropriate because a question of material fact existed on the extent
    of the burden that Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.572a(10) places on interstate commerce.
    Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration or for certification of interlocutory appeal.
    The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration but granted certification
    for interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.572a(10) is
    extraterritorial or discriminatory in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause under 28
    U.S.C. § 1292(b). This Court issued an order concluding that an interlocutory appeal
    was appropriate in this matter.
    DISCUSSION
    I.      Standard of Review
    We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Olde v.
    Decatur Cnty., Tenn., 
    421 F.3d 386
    , 389 (6th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is
    No. 11-2097         Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                             Page 7
    appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
    fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
    We “must view all the facts and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
    favorable to the nonmoving party.” Cummings v. City of Akron, 
    418 F.3d 676
    , 682 (6th
    Cir. 2005) (internal quotations and citation omitted). After the moving party has
    satisfied its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth “specific facts
    showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
    Radio Corp., 
    475 U.S. 574
    , 587 (1986) (citation and alternation omitted).
    II.    Dormant Commerce Clause
    Under the Commerce Clause, Congress has the power “[t]o regulate Commerce
    with foreign Nations, and among the several States . . . .” U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
    “We have interpreted the Commerce Clause to invalidate local laws that impose
    commercial barriers or discriminate against an article of commerce by reason of its
    origin or destination out of State.” C & A Carbone, Inc., v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y.,
    
    511 U.S. 383
    , 390 (1994). However, “[t]he [Commerce] Clause has long been
    understood to have a ‘negative’ aspect that denies the States the power unjustifiably to
    discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce.” Or. Waste
    Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t’ of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 
    511 U.S. 93
    , 98 (1994). “The
    Clause, by negative implication, restricts the States' ability to regulate interstate
    commerce.” Huish Detergents, Inc. v. Warren Cnty., Ky., 
    214 F.3d 707
    , 712 (6th Cir.
    2000).    “The dormant Commerce Clause is driven by concern about ‘economic
    protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic
    interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.’” Dept. of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 
    553 U.S. 328
    , 337–38 (2008) (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 
    486 U.S. 269
    ,
    273–74 (1988)).
    This Circuit has adopted a two-step analysis to evaluate challenges to the
    dormant Commerce Clause. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 
    622 F.3d 628
    , 644 (6th
    Cir. 2010). Under the first step, we must determine whether “a state statute directly
    regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or [whether] its effect is to favor
    No. 11-2097           Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                            Page 8
    in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests.” 
    Id. (quoting Brown-Forman,
    476 U.S. at 579). “A [state regulation] can discriminate against out-of-state interests in
    three different ways: (a) facially, (b) purposefully, or (c) in practical effect.” 
    Id. at 648
    (quoting E. Ky. Res. v. Fiscal Court of Magoffin Cnty. Ky., 
    127 F.3d 532
    , 540 (6th Cir.
    1997)). “[T]he critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both local and
    interstate activity.” 
    Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579
    . The plaintiff bears the initial
    burden of proof to show that the state regulation is discriminatory. 
    Davis, 553 U.S. at 338
    .
    If the plaintiff satisfies its burden, then “a discriminatory law is virtually per se
    invalid and will survive only if it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be
    adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.” 
    Id. at 328
    (quoting Or.
    Waste Sys., 
    Inc., 511 U.S. at 101
    (internal citation omitted)). However, if the state
    regulation is neither discriminatory nor extraterritorial, then the court must apply the
    balancing test established in Pike. Under the Pike balancing test, a state regulation is
    upheld “unless the burden it imposes upon interstate commerce is ‘clearly excessive in
    relation to the putative local benefits.’” Int’l 
    Dairy, 622 F.3d at 644
    (quoting 
    Pike, 397 U.S. at 142
    ).
    A.       Mich. Comp. Laws § 445. 572a(10), Michigan’s unique-mark
    provision, does not discriminate against interstate commerce
    Plaintiff argues that the Michigan unique-mark mandate, which requires certain
    beverage containers to possess a particular “symbol, mark, or other distinguishing
    characteristic,” Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.572a(10), discriminates against interstate
    commerce, facially, purposefully, and in effect, because the provision penalizes
    manufacturers if they choose to sell the beverage containers both in Michigan and in
    another state.
    1.      Facial Discrimination
    Plaintiff claims that the unique-packing requirement facially violates the dormant
    Commerce Clause because the provision only applies to interstate manufacturers or
    No. 11-2097         Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                              Page 9
    shippers of beverages. According to Plaintiff, “Michigan enacted operative thresholds
    that are sufficiently high [and] are only met by companies who have a very high volume
    of business—that is, national brands.” (Pl.’s. Br. at 40.) The district court found that
    Michigan’s unique-mark provision is not facially discriminatory because “by its plain
    terms, the unique-mark requirement applies to all beverage manufacturers who meet the
    specified threshold regardless of their in-state or out-of-state origins.”
    “To determine whether a law violates [the] ‘dormant’ aspect of the Commerce
    Clause, we first ask whether it discriminates on its face against interstate commerce.”
    United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 
    550 U.S. 330
    ,
    338 (2007) (citations omitted). “[D]iscrimination against interstate commerce in favor
    of local business or investment is per se invalid. . . .” 
    Carbone, 511 U.S. at 392
    (citation
    omitted). Thus, a state law is per se invalid if it provides “differential treatment of in-
    state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”
    United 
    Haulers, 550 U.S. at 338
    (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Michigan’s unique-mark provision is not facially discriminatory against interstate
    commerce. The provision does not distinguish between in-state and out-of-state
    beverage manufacturers and requires all beverage containers to follow the unique-mark
    requirement. The provision states in relevant part:
    A symbol, mark, or other distinguishing characteristic that is placed on
    a designated metal container, designated glass container, or designated
    plastic container by a manufacturer to allow a reverse vending machine
    to determine if that container is a returnable container must be unique to
    this state, or used only in this state and 1 or more other states that have
    laws substantially similar to this act.
    Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.572a(10). On its face, the provision is neutral in application.
    There is not an “obvious effort to saddle those outside the State” with the burden of
    complying with the regulation. Chem. Waste Mgmt. Inc., v. Hunt, 
    504 U.S. 334
    , 346
    (1992). Rather, the same unique marking requirement applies equally to in-state and out-
    of-state manufacturers. Therefore, whether a beverage manufacturer is located in
    No. 11-2097            Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                                  Page 10
    Michigan or outside of the state, it must still comply with the statute’s requirements.5
    See United 
    Haulers, 550 U.S. at 345
    (upholding a flow control ordinance which treated
    “in-state private business interests exactly the same as out-of-state ones, [and therefore
    did] not discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant Commerce
    Clause”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    2.      Purposeful Discrimination
    Plaintiff also alleges that Michigan’s unique-mark provision has a discriminatory
    purpose on the basis that the provision prohibits the sale of the same beverage containers
    manufactured in Michigan and other states, and prevents vendors in Michigan from
    purchasing the same beverage containers manufactured by out-of-state distributors.
    To determine whether a state regulation purposefully discriminates within
    interstate commerce, we turn to the actual language in the statute. This is because the
    most “persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute [are] the words by which the
    legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient
    in and of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such cases we have
    followed their plain meaning.” E. Ky. 
    Res., 127 F.3d at 542
    (quoting Perry v. Commerce
    Loan Co., 
    383 U.S. 392
    , 400(1966)). Our review not only includes the statute itself, but
    also the legislative history and legislative intent to determine whether the statute
    achieved its legislative purpose.
    Our analysis is somewhat limited given the scant legislative history of the State’s
    provision. The Michigan Legislature stated that the intended purpose of the statute was
    to prevent the illegal, fraudulent redemption of beverage containers in the State.
    See,     e.g.,    House       Fiscal      Agency,        Legislative        Analysis        of    the
    Bottle           Bill      Revisions             and        RVM          Antifraud               Act,
    5
    Plaintiff claims that Michigan’s unique-mark provision only applies to companies that engage
    in commerce in Michigan plus one other State as opposed to companies that operate solely within
    Michigan. But that is a misstatement. Any Michigan-based company that meets the State’s threshold sales
    requirement and chooses to engage in business within Michigan is subject to the same unique-mark
    provision as companies that compete in the national market and conduct business in Michigan. See Mich.
    Comp. Laws § 445.572a(1), (3), (5).
    No. 11-2097         Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                          Page 11
    http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2007-2008/billanalysis/House/pdf/
    2007-HLA-5147-3.pdf, 2–6 (last visited August 20, 2012). The Michigan Soft Drink
    Association (“MSDA”) provided further support for the concern that fraudulent
    redemption was widespread. The MSDA stated that “[i]n recent years, the fraudulent
    redemption of out-of-state beverage containers in Michigan has increased. Unclaimed
    deposits paid to the state declined from the peak of $23.5 million in 2000, to $8.9 million
    in 2007—a drop of more than $10 million.” See MSDA Fraudulent Redemption,
    http://misoftdrink.org/Fraudulent_Redemption.asp (last visited August 20, 2012).
    Plaintiff asserts that Michigan’s goal is to “maximize the flow of revenue” into the State
    by discriminating against interstate actors. But as the district court recognized, “there
    is nothing that indicates that Michigan is attempting to benefit local economic actors at
    the expense of out-of-state actors.” The text of the statute confirms that the Michigan
    Legislature intended to address a significant problem—the fraudulent redemption of
    beverage containers purchased outside the State—by regulating the conduct of both in-
    state and out-of-state actors. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.572a(10). Absent concrete
    evidence from the statutory language that the unique-mark requirement is purposefully
    discriminatory, Plaintiff cannot prevail on this claim.
    3.      Discriminatory Effect
    A statute may be discriminatory in effect if “the claimant [can] show both how
    local economic actors are favored by the legislation, and how out-of-state actors are
    burdened by the legislation.” Int’l 
    Dairy, 622 F.3d at 648
    (quoting E. Ky. 
    Res., 127 F.3d at 543
    ).
    Plaintiff identifies three reasons why Michigan’s unique-mark provision is
    discriminatory in effect: “(1) the law requires the creation and maintenance of special
    state-exclusive production and distribution operations in order to do business in
    Michigan; (2) it eliminates the competitive advantages otherwise enjoyed by interstate
    companies; and (3) it impedes the free movement of commerce by imposing an
    economic and practical toll on interstate companies only.” (Pl.’s Br. 42–43); see also
    No. 11-2097         Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                           Page 12
    Granholm v. Heald, 
    544 U.S. 460
    (2005); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver.
    Comm’n, 
    432 U.S. 333
    , 351 (1977).
    Plaintiff relies on the Supreme Court case of Granholm v. Heald to show that the
    provision has a discriminatory purpose. In Heald, Michigan residents and an out-of-state
    winery alleged that Michigan laws that governed the distribution of alcohol violated the
    Commerce Clause because the laws allowed in-state wineries to ship directly to
    consumers in Michigan, subject only to a licensing requirement, while out-of-state
    wineries, whether licensed or not, were prohibited from direct shipment. 
    Heald, 544 U.S. at 469
    . The Supreme Court held that the Michigan regulatory scheme
    discriminated against interstate commerce because out-of-state wineries faced “two extra
    layers of overhead [which] increase[d] the cost of out-of-state wines to Michigan
    consumers.” 
    Id. at 474.
    The Court explained that “[t]he differential treatment require[d]
    all out-of-state wine, but not all in-state wine, to pass through an in-state wholesaler and
    retailer before reaching consumers.” 
    Id. Plaintiff in
    this case alleges in a similar fashion
    that the “Michigan-exclusive packaging mandate similarly requires interstate beverage
    companies to establish a Michigan-only production, warehousing, transportation, and
    distribution operation” in order to sell to Michigan consumers.
    Heald is distinguishable, however, on the basis that the Michigan laws in Heald
    purposefully imposed a burden on out-of-state wineries by implementing a complete ban
    on direct shipment while allowing in-state wineries to enjoy the benefits of direct
    shipment. This type of regulatory scheme clearly attempted to affect the market playing
    field by allowing Michigan wineries to gain market share against their out-of-state
    competitors.
    In this case, the Michigan provision does not favor in-state beverage
    manufacturers and distributors over out-of-state. The unique-mark provision requires
    all those who sell certain amounts of beverages in Michigan to use the same unique-to-
    Michigan mark, without any reference to in-state or out-state origins. Contrary to
    Plaintiff’s assertion, the Michigan provision does not create an “extra layer of overhead”
    because all manufacturers and distributors are subject to the same provision. In essence,
    No. 11-2097         Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                            Page 13
    any manufacturer who wants to sell and distribute beverage containers regardless of
    whether they are in-state or out-of-state, is subject to the unique-mark provision. Thus,
    we agree with the district court’s assessment that “the unique-mark requirement burdens
    in-state beverage manufacturers who meet the designated thresholds to the same extent
    it burdens out-of-state manufacturers who meet the designated thresholds.”               We
    therefore conclude that the State’s statute does not discriminate against interstate
    commerce on this basis.
    B.      Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.572a(10) is extraterritorial in violation of
    the dormant Commerce Clause
    Despite our conclusion that Michigan’s unique-mark provision does not
    discriminate against interstate commerce, the Supreme Court recognizes “a second
    category of regulation that is also virtually per se invalid under the dormant Commerce
    Clause”—whether the law regulates extraterritorial commerce. Int’l 
    Dairy, 622 F.3d at 645
    . A statute is extraterritorial if it “directly controls commerce occurring wholly
    outside the boundaries of a State [and] exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State’s
    authority.” Healy v. Beer Inst. Inc., 
    491 U.S. 324
    , 336 (1989). The relevant inquiry is
    whether the “practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond the
    boundaries of the State.” 
    Id. at 336
    (citing 
    Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 579
    ). To
    determine a statute’s “practical effect,” the court not only considers the consequences
    of the statute itself, but also “how the challenged statute may interact with the legitimate
    regulatory regimes of other States and what effect would arise if not one, but many or
    every, State adopted similar legislation.” 
    Id. The Supreme
    Court has applied the extraterritoriality doctrine only in the limited
    context of price-affirmation statutes. These statutes force regulated entities to certify
    that the in-state price they charge for a good is no higher than the price they charge out-
    of-state. See 
    Healy, 491 U.S. at 337
    –40; 
    Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 582
    –84. In
    Brown-Forman, New York instituted a law that required distillers who posted wholesale
    prices in the state to not charge a lower price for the product in any other state during the
    month of posting. The New York law prevented the distillers from offering promotional
    No. 11-2097        Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                           Page 14
    allowances to wholesalers in other states, because the allowances lowered the effective
    price below the New York posted price. 
    Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 577
    –78. The
    Supreme Court found that by “[f]orcing a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one
    State before undertaking a transaction in another directly regulates interstate commerce.”
    
    Id. at 582.
    Although New York is within its power to regulate the sale of liquor within
    its state, the Court held that “it may not project its legislation into [other States] by
    regulating the price to be paid for liquor in those States.” 
    Id. at 582–83
    (internal
    quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Similarly in Healy, the Supreme Court struck down Connecticut’s price
    affirmation statute, which required out-of-state beer distributors to post their prices on
    each brand of beer sold in the State and to also affirm that their posted prices were no
    higher than prices in the border states of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York.
    
    Healy, 491 U.S. at 326
    –29. The Court found that Connecticut’s statute created “the kind
    of competing and interlocking local economic regulation that the Commerce Clause was
    meant to preclude.” 
    Id. at 337.
    In addition, the Court concluded that the “effect of the
    Connecticut statute is essentially indistinguishable from the extraterritorial effect found
    unconstitutional in Brown-Forman” by requiring “out-of-state shippers to forgo the
    implementation of competitive-pricing schemes in out-of-state markets because those
    pricing decisions are imported by statute into the Connecticut market regardless of local
    competitive conditions.” 
    Id. at 339.
    Therefore, the Court concluded that any statute that
    has “the undeniable effect of controlling commercial activity occurring wholly outside
    the boundary of the State” is extraterritorial and violates the dormant Commerce Clause.
    
    Id. at 337.
    The district court noted that the Sixth Circuit has applied the extraterritorial
    doctrine to product labeling restrictions. Specifically, we held in International Dairy
    that Ohio’s labeling rule, which restricted the “types of claims that dairy processors
    could make about milk and milk products” did not violate the dormant Commerce
    Clause. Int’l 
    Dairy, 622 F.3d at 633
    –34. The plaintiffs argued that Ohio’s labeling rule
    “force[d] them to create a nationwide label in accordance with Ohio's requirements” in
    No. 11-2097        Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                           Page 15
    order to satisfy the complex national distribution channels for milk products. 
    Id. at 647.
    The Sixth Circuit disagreed and stated that:
    [U]nlike the price-affirmation statutes, which directly tied their pricing
    requirements to the prices charged by the distillers in other states, the
    Ohio Rule's labeling requirements have no direct effect on the Processors'
    out-of-state labeling conduct. That is to say, how the Processors label
    their products in Ohio has no bearing on how they are required to label
    their products in other states (or vice versa). Nor does compliance with
    the Ohio Rule raise the possibility that the Processors would be in
    violation of the regulations of another state—the key problem with the
    New York statute in Brown-Forman. The Rule accordingly does not
    purport to regulate conduct occurring wholly outside the state.
    
    Id. (quotation marks
    and citation omitted). Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Ohio’s
    product labels could be used anywhere in the country and did not create an
    extraterritorial problem.
    But Plaintiff asserts that this case does not fit squarely either within the price-
    affirmation extraterritorial cases addressed by the Supreme Court or the product labeling
    case from this Circuit. Rather, Plaintiff claims that Michigan’s unique-mark requirement
    is “quite different” because the label or container used in Michigan can be used only in
    Michigan. It cannot be used anywhere else. According to Plaintiff, Michigan “has made
    itself an economic island withdrawn from the national commerce stream in beverages.”
    Plaintiff cautions that if Michigan can “both prescribe what [beverage] products can be
    sold in-state and outlaw the sale of that same [beverage] product in other States of the
    Union . . . [then] it can do it for every other product [and] [s]o can every other State.”
    Plaintiff asserts that the State even criminalizes sales occurring in other states in
    violation of its statute by imposing a penalty of either a $2,000 fine and/or up to six
    months imprisonment.
    Defendants dismiss Plaintiff’s argument by stating that Michigan’s unique-mark
    requirement does not govern extraterritorially because no conflict exists between the
    states since Michigan is the only state with a unique-mark requirement, and the statute’s
    requirements does not directly control conduct occurring wholly outside the State’s
    border. We find Defendants’ logic flawed for several reasons.
    No. 11-2097            Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                                        Page 16
    First, Defendants fail to explore other alternative measures that could combat the
    State’s redemption problem. Defendants argue that the State’s provision is the only
    means to prevent fraudulent redemption and allow the State to retrieve unclaimed
    deposits to increase the state’s revenue. But it is difficult to reconcile how this provision
    is the only means for the State to address its redemption problem, when no other efforts
    were made by Defendants that could potentially satisfy the state’s purported legitimate
    purpose in a non-extraterritorial fashion. For example, it was suggested during oral
    argument that the State of Michigan could use the money from the unclaimed deposits
    and impose less burdensome measures, which may include limiting the number of
    beverage containers that may be redeemed by an individual or company. The State
    could also require consumers who wish to recycle beverage containers in Michigan to
    provide a proof of purchase receipt, which would indicate that the container was sold
    and purchased in the state. Plaintiff also recommends additional viable alternatives and
    suggests that a good starting point for Defendants would be the “vigorous enforcement
    of the only recently enacted law against retailer fraud.”
    Furthermore, the nine other states that have instituted bottle deposit laws seemed
    to have adopted regulations without imposing any criminal or civil penalties on in-state
    or out-of-state manufacturers and distributors.6 Although these alternative approaches
    may or may not be less desirable or may potentially raise other concerns, Defendants
    failed to consider reasonable alternatives before first committing themselves to a
    problematical course by implementing an invalid provision on extraterritorial grounds.
    As we previously indicated, our analysis of the extraterritorial effect of the
    State’s unique-mark provision requires a consideration of “how the challenged statute
    may interact with the legitimate regulatory regimes of other States and what effect would
    6
    See Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 14500 (2012) et seq.; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-243 (2012) et seq.; Haw.
    Rev. Stat. § 342G-101 (2012) et. seq.; Iowa Code § 455C.1 (2012) et seq.; ME. Rev. Stat. 32 § 1861
    (2011) et seq; MA. Gen. Laws 94 § 321 (2012) et seq., N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. Law § 27-1001 (2012) et seq.;
    OR. Rev. Stat. § 459A.700 (2012) et seq.; VT. Stat. Ann. 10 § 1521 (2012) et seq. To be clear, Michigan’s
    ten-cent deposit per beverage container contributes to the State’s high redemption rate inasmuch as
    Michigan provides a higher refund value than all of the other participating states, with the exception of
    California, which administers ten-cent refunds for bottles 24 ounces or greater. Even so, no other state with
    a beverage container deposit law attempts to burden the beverage industry by forcing them to apply a
    unique-mark to their beverage containers in order to enter the Michigan market.
    No. 11-2097         Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                            Page 17
    arise if not one, but many or every, State adopted similar legislation.” 
    Healy, 491 U.S. at 336
    . Plaintiff argues that additional extraterritorial problems triggered by the unique-
    mark requirement include the State projecting its regulatory regime into the jurisdiction
    of another state and the potential destruction of the national common market through the
    adoption of state-exclusive product laws.
    As an initial matter, we recognize that this case presents a novel issue of an
    “unusual extraterritoriality question” that has not been addressed either by the Supreme
    Court or any other court. To date, no other state has implemented a requirement similar
    to Michigan’s.      However, Defendants’ reference to Plaintiff’s argument as a
    “hypothetical inquiry” also deflects attention away from the real issue in that Michigan’s
    unique-mark requirement not only requires beverage companies to package a product
    unique to Michigan but also allows Michigan to dictate where the product can be sold.
    The reach of this statute and the criminal penalty for violations cannot be as easily
    dismissed as suggested by Defendants. Plaintiff must comply with the statute now or
    face criminal sanctions. In addition, other states must react today to Michigan’s unique-
    mark requirement or also face legal consequences. Thus, Michigan is forcing states to
    comply with its legislation in order to conduct business within its state, which creates
    an impermissible extraterritorial effect and is in violation of the Supreme Court’s
    precedent stated in Brown-Forman and Healy. See 
    Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 583
    –84;
    
    Healy, 491 U.S. at 334
    ; see also 
    Heald, 544 U.S. at 473
    (finding that Michigan and New
    York’s regulatory schemes contribute to “[t]he current patchwork of laws–with some
    States banning direct shipments altogether, others doing so only for out-of-state wines,
    and still others requiring reciprocity . . . invite[s] a multiplication of preferential trade
    areas destructive of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause.”) (quoting Dean Milk Co.
    v. Madison, 
    340 U.S. 349
    , 356 (1951) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, we
    conclude that the Michigan statute is extraterritorial in violation of the dormant
    No. 11-2097             Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                                        Page 18
    Commerce Clause because it impermissibly regulates interstate commerce by controlling
    conduct beyond the State of Michigan.7
    CONCLUSION
    In sum, we conclude that Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.572a(10), the State’s unique
    mark requirement, is not discriminatory. However, because the unique-mark requirement
    forces manufacturers and distributors of beverage containers to adopt the State’s unique
    labeling system, without the consideration of other less burdensome alternatives,
    Michigan’s unique-mark requirement has an impermissible extraterritorial effect. For
    these reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND to the district court with instructions to
    proceed consistently with this opinion. We also AFFIRM the district court’s order
    granting summary judgment to Defendant on the basis that the State statute is not
    discriminatory.
    7
    Because we concluded that Michigan’s unique-mark provision does not discriminate against
    interstate commerce but is extraterritorial, the Pike balancing test does not apply. See Int’l 
    Dairy, 622 F.3d at 646
    (stating that the Pike balancing test controls when a state regulation is neither extraterritorial nor
    discriminatory in effect).
    No. 11-2097        Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                           Page 19
    ____________________
    CONCURRENCE
    ____________________
    SUTTON, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join Judge Clay’s opinion in full. I write
    separately to express skepticism about the extraterritoriality doctrine, the fulcrum of
    today’s decision and a branch of the dormant Commerce Clause that the Supreme Court
    last referred to nine years ago as the doctrine “applied in Baldwin and Healy,” decisions
    from 1935 and 1989. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 
    538 U.S. 644
    , 669
    (2003); see Healy v. Beer Inst., 
    491 U.S. 324
    (1989); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,
    
    294 U.S. 511
    (1935).
    A little history helps to explain how the extraterritoriality doctrine became the
    “dormant branch of the dormant Commerce Clause.” IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 
    616 F.3d 7
    , 29 n.27 (1st Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Sorell v. IMS Health Inc.,
    
    131 S. Ct. 2653
    (2011). To the founding generation, it was an article of common faith
    that “no state or nation can, by its laws, directly affect, or bind property out of its own
    territory, or bind persons not resident therein.” Joseph Story, Commentary on the
    Conflict of Laws § 20 (1834). A State’s power to “protect the lives, health, and
    property” of its residents was “essentially exclusive,” United States v. E.C. Knight Co.,
    
    156 U.S. 1
    , 11 (1895), given the then-modest regulatory authority of the National
    Government under the Commerce Clause. And no State could regulate “except with
    reference to its own jurisdiction” because each State’s powers ended at its borders.
    Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 
    104 U.S. 592
    , 594 (1881). On the other side of the dual-
    sovereignty coin, the Federal Government’s power “to regulate commerce among the
    several states” was “also exclusive.” E.C. 
    Knight, 156 U.S. at 11
    . A structural challenge
    to a state or federal regulation thus required courts to determine “whether the right
    government was acting within the right sphere.” Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet
    of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 Sup. Ct.
    Rev. 253, 257.
    No. 11-2097         Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                           Page 20
    Over time, the lines between the separate spheres blurred, in part because the
    nature of commerce changed, in part because the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
    Commerce Clause changed. The Federal Government gained power over traditionally
    “local” activities, ending the States’ exclusive regulatory power. See, e.g., United States
    v. Darby, 
    312 U.S. 100
    (1941). And the States began to regulate commerce that
    eventually would cross state lines, ending the Federal Government’s exclusive authority.
    If States did not discriminate against out-of-state interests or disproportionately burden
    interstate commerce, they could share regulatory authority with the Federal Government,
    at least so long as Congress did not exercise its option of regulating the area exclusively.
    See, e.g., S.C. Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 
    303 U.S. 177
    (1938) (upholding
    a state statute regulating the size of trucks using the State’s highways despite the law’s
    burden on interstate commerce); Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg, 
    306 U.S. 346
    (1939)
    (upholding a state statute setting minimum prices for milk shipped for sale out of state);
    Duckworth v. Arkansas, 
    314 U.S. 390
    (1941) (upholding a state statute requiring a
    license to transport liquor through the state); see also Wiley Rutledge, A Declaration of
    Legal Faith 68 (1947) (“[J]ust as in recent years the permissive scope for congressional
    commerce action has broadened . . . the prohibitive effect of the clause has been
    progressively narrowed. The trend has been toward sustaining state regulation formerly
    regarded as inconsistent with Congress’ unexercised power over commerce.”).
    One measure of this transformation, from using the Commerce Clause to monitor
    largely exclusive spheres of authority to overseeing largely overlapping spheres of
    authority, is this: Today, a State may fix the price of natural gas drilled within its
    borders and purchased at the wellhead, even when 90 percent of the gas will be shipped
    out of state. Cities Serv. Gas Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 
    340 U.S. 179
    (1950). And
    today the Federal Government may regulate local loan sharking that never crosses state
    lines. Perez v. United States, 
    402 U.S. 146
    (1971).
    Which brings me back to extraterritoriality.            Is it possible that the
    extraterritoriality doctrine, at least as a freestanding branch of the dormant Commerce
    No. 11-2097         Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                            Page 21
    Clause, is a relic of the old world with no useful role to play in the new? I am inclined
    to think so.
    When the central function of the dormant Commerce Clause was to keep the
    States and the Federal Government in their separate spheres of regulatory authority, it
    made sense to think of extraterritoriality as a relevant proxy for interstate-commerce
    violations. Extraterritorial lawmaking after all operates on one side of this line and
    territorial lawmaking operates on the other. But that line has come and gone. The key
    point of today’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is to prevent States from
    discriminating against out-of-state entities in favor of in-state ones.
    Yet the extraterritoriality doctrine, if taken seriously (or at least as seriously as
    Healy has taken it), has nothing to do with favoritism. Even state laws that neither
    discriminate against out-of-state interests nor disproportionately burden interstate
    commerce may run afoul of extraterritoriality, as this case well shows. All three of us
    agree that the Michigan redemption law does not favor in-state entities at the expense
    of out-of-state ones, and yet all three of us agree that the law violates the
    extraterritoriality doctrine applied in Healy. That is because, if a State regulates
    “commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders,” that regulation is
    automatically invalid, no matter how great the regulation’s local benefit, no matter how
    small its out-of-state burden. 
    Healy, 491 U.S. at 336
    ; see also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 
    457 U.S. 624
    , 642–43 (1982) (plurality opinion) (stating that an extraterritorial regulation of
    tender offers was invalid “whether or not the commerce has effects within the State”);
    Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 
    476 U.S. 573
    , 583 (1986)
    (striking down New York’s price-affirmation law based on its extraterritorial effect).
    Even a hypothetical state law that facilitated interstate commerce—say, an Ohio law that
    gave tax credits to automobile companies that keep open the production lines of their
    factories in Michigan and elsewhere—would be invalid if it had extraterritorial
    “practical effect[s].” 
    Healy, 491 U.S. at 336
    . Whatever role extraterritoriality once
    played in Commerce Clause law, it is difficult to perceive the interstate-commerce
    function it plays today.
    No. 11-2097          Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                           Page 22
    Not just the original function of the extraterritoriality doctrine has been lost to
    time; so too has its meaning. The modern reality is that the States frequently regulate
    activities that occur entirely within one State but that have effects in many. To take one
    example, California sets high emission standards for cars sold in its State, a set of
    regulations that affects automobile prices across the country. See Chamber of Commerce
    v. EPA, 
    642 F.3d 192
    , 197–98 (D.C. Cir. 2011). This state law undoubtedly has the
    “practical effect,” 
    Healy, 491 U.S. at 336
    , of impacting car companies located in any
    State with lower emission standards—which is to say all of them—and thus has
    extraterritorial effects. Faced with this discrepancy in state emission standards, national
    car manufacturers have three choices: (1) produce California models and rest-of-country
    models, spreading the costs of maintaining two separate production and distribution
    networks across consumers nationwide; (2) sell only California-compliant cars and pass
    the higher costs of production on to consumers nationwide; or (3) stop selling cars in
    California entirely, shutting the State off from the stream of commerce and depriving
    consumers of the economies of scale generated by a national automobile market. All
    three options practically impact businesses and commerce in other States.
    California is not unique, and emission standards are not the only area where this
    problem arises. Ohio requires state-specific milk labels. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v.
    Boggs, 
    622 F.3d 628
    (6th Cir. 2010). Vermont insists that light bulbs come with labels
    warning of the dangers of mercury. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 
    272 F.3d 104
    (2d
    Cir. 2001). And many States tax businesses that operate across state lines. See, e.g.,
    Meadwestvaco Corp. ex rel Mead Corp. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 
    553 U.S. 16
    , 24–25
    (2008).
    If, in the absence of preemptive federal legislation, these laws and others like
    them do not violate the extraterritoriality doctrine of Healy, why not? Their effect is no
    less direct than the Michigan unique-mark requirement we invalidate today. What
    divides impermissible “direct” extraterritorial laws from permissible “indirect” ones?
    I cannot tell, and I do not think Healy’s suggestion to look to the “practical effect” of the
    regulation offers any meaningful 
    guidance. 491 U.S. at 336
    .
    No. 11-2097          Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                         Page 23
    What’s more, we already have an ineffable test for invalidating some state
    regulations but not others that affect interstate commerce. State regulations that burden,
    but that do not facially discriminate against, interstate commerce must survive Pike
    balancing, which requires a State to show that the in-state regulatory benefits of a law
    outweigh the out-of-state burdens the law places on interstate commerce. See Pike v.
    Bruce Church, Inc., 
    397 U.S. 137
    (1970). The inquiry asks courts to balance interests
    they are ill-equipped to measure, let alone to compare. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna,
    Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 
    520 U.S. 564
    , 619 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that
    balancing “invites us, if not compels us, to function more as legislators than as judges”);
    Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 
    486 U.S. 888
    , 897 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
    concurring) (pointing out that Pike reduces courts to asking “whether a particular line
    is longer than a particular rock is heavy”).
    Why have two tests that suffer from these problems rather than just one? If Pike
    is problematic for this reason, so too is the extraterritoriality doctrine. The original
    function of the doctrine no longer exists, and it is exceedingly difficult to understand
    which extraterritorial effects exceed its bounds and which do not—except through a
    “practical effect” inquiry that shares many of the same traits and pitfalls as Pike
    balancing. For the judge who thinks little of Pike balancing and little of the judicial
    capacity to weigh apples-and-oranges interests neutrally, it is difficult to see the
    justification for preserving a “practical effect” extraterritoriality inquiry. And for the
    judge who wants to preserve Pike balancing, it is difficult to see what additional purpose
    is served by imposing the extraterritoriality inquiry as well. In the absence of a clear
    purpose or meaning, extraterritoriality provides a “roving license for federal courts to
    determine what activities are appropriate for state and local government to undertake.”
    United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Auth., 
    550 U.S. 330
    , 343
    (2007).
    Eliminating extraterritoriality as a freestanding Commerce Clause prohibition
    also would not eliminate the role of territory in constitutional law. Territorial limits on
    lawmaking underlie, indeed animate, many other constitutional imperatives. The most
    No. 11-2097        Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                          Page 24
    powerful of these, due process, limits a State’s power to extend its law outside its
    borders. A State must have at least some contact with a defendant to exercise personal
    jurisdiction, see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
    444 U.S. 286
    , 293–94
    (1980); its courts may not impose punitive damages that are “grossly excessive” to the
    State’s interest in the conduct underlying a lawsuit, BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 
    517 U.S. 559
    , 569 (1996); and it can criminalize only conduct that produces “detrimental effects”
    within its borders, Strassheim v. Daily, 
    221 U.S. 280
    , 285 (1911). Even if Ohio, for
    instance, made it illegal for its citizens to gamble, the State could not prosecute Nevada
    casinos for letting Buckeyes play blackjack. See Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills,
    
    593 F.3d 660
    , 666 (7th Cir. 2010).
    The Full Faith and Credit Clause underscores a related geographical limitation
    on the States’ police power. States must respect “public acts which are within the
    legislative jurisdiction of the enacting State,” but they face no similar imperative for
    extraterritorial laws. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 
    286 U.S. 145
    , 156 (1932).
    The Extradition Clause likewise presupposes territorial lawmaking limits when it speaks
    of the “State having Jurisdiction of the Crime,” U.S. Const., art. IV § 2, and the Sixth
    Amendment requires that defendants receive a trial “by an impartial jury of the State and
    district wherein the crime shall have been committed,” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Indeed,
    one of the American colonists’ indictments of King George III was that he “combined
    with others to subject us to a Jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution, and
    unacknowledged by our Laws.” The Declaration of Independence para. 15 (U.S. 1776).
    Although extraterritoriality underlies these constitutional imperatives, it carries
    no freestanding weight outside of them. A law that does not discriminate against
    interstate commerce, that complies with the traditional requirements of due process and
    that complies with these other limitations, it seems to me, should not be invalidated
    solely because of an extraterritorial effect. See, e.g., Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus.
    Accident Comm’n, 
    294 U.S. 532
    , 541–42 (1935).
    Eliminating extraterritoriality as a freestanding Commerce Clause prohibition
    also would not change case outcomes. In Healy, extraterritoriality was an alternative
    No. 11-2097         Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                            Page 25
    holding. The Court independently held that Connecticut’s law discriminated against
    brewers who engaged in interstate commerce because “a manufacturer or shipper of beer
    is free to charge wholesalers within Connecticut whatever price it might choose so long
    as that manufacturer or shipper does not sell its beer in a border 
    State.” 491 U.S. at 341
    .
    Justice Scalia, indeed, joined the anti-discrimination holding but not the
    extraterritoriality one, concluding that the Court should have resolved the case solely on
    the former ground. See 
    id. at 345
    (Scalia, J., concurring). Nor was the extraterritoriality
    doctrine indispensable to the other cases. The New York price-affirmation law at issue
    in Brown-Forman affected only distillers who sold in other 
    States, 476 U.S. at 576
    , and
    the Illinois law in Edgar was a “direct restraint on interstate commerce” that would have
    “thoroughly stifled” the ability of out-of-state corporations to make tender 
    offers, 457 U.S. at 642
    . Even Baldwin, the case sometimes called the father of the modern
    extraterritoriality doctrine (though it never used the term), dealt with a state law that was
    the “equivalent to a rampart of customs duties designed to neutralize advantages
    belonging to the place of 
    origin.” 294 U.S. at 527
    . All told, I am not aware of a single
    Supreme Court dormant Commerce Clause holding that relied exclusively on the
    extraterritoriality doctrine to invalidate a state law.
    Nor is there anything special about the Michigan redemption law that ought to
    make it unconstitutional under the extraterritoriality doctrine but not the traditional
    dormant Commerce Clause doctrine or some other constitutional guarantee. The law
    does not discriminate against interstate commerce by favoring in-state bottlers at the
    expense of out-of-state ones. Even though the unique-mark requirement serves a vital
    state interest and imposes only a minuscule burden on interstate commerce, its
    extraterritorial effect appears to doom it. No one, the plaintiffs included, doubts that
    Michigan may enact a bottle-deposit law under the American Constitution. But
    extraterritoriality and extraterritoriality alone bars Michigan from the option it believes
    will best make its bottle-deposit scheme effective.
    Michigan, perversely enough, could have chosen to reduce bottle-deposit fraud
    by enacting regulations far more hurtful to interstate commerce yet not extraterritorial.
    No. 11-2097        Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                        Page 26
    The State might have required beverage manufacturers to place a large “Made for Sale
    in Michigan” label on their products, demanded a burdensome warning label or
    mandated that manufacturers sell bottles in unusual sizes and shapes that fit only
    Michigan bottle-redemption machines. So long as those regulations survived Pike
    balancing, they would be constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., Int’l 
    Dairy, 622 F.3d at 648
    –49; 
    Sorrell, 272 F.3d at 108
    –09. Michigan instead chose a nondiscriminatory
    method premised on compliance in other States, a seeming requirement of any innocuous
    unique-mark requirement. It is only a non-innocuous unique-mark requirement—the
    more offensive to the bottler the better—that frees Michigan from having to worry about
    fraudulent redemptions arising from non-unique-mark sales in other States. How
    strange. The Michigan law penalizes manufacturers who bottle soda cans in Ohio and
    sell them in Ohio but happen to use a Michigan mark. Extraterritoriality—nominally an
    offshoot of the Commerce Clause—thus requires courts to strike down a
    nondiscriminatory state law that affects a purely intrastate transaction. Whatever
    problem such a law poses, I am hard-pressed to understand why the dormant-dormant
    Commerce Clause should regulate it.
    No. 11-2097         Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                          Page 27
    ____________________
    CONCURRENCE
    ____________________
    RICE, District Judge, concurring. I concur in Judge Clay’s opinion, but I write
    separately for two reasons. First, Judge Clay does not address the case of National
    Electrical Manufacturers Association v. Sorrell, 
    272 F.3d 104
    (2d Cir. 2001), heavily
    relied upon by the district court in holding that Michigan’s statute was not
    extraterritorial.
    Sorrell involved a Vermont statute that required manufacturers of products
    containing mercury to label the products as such and to direct consumers to recycle the
    products or dispose of them as hazardous waste. The court found that the statute did not
    have the practical effect of regulating interstate commerce.              It rejected the
    manufacturers’ claim that the statute essentially required them to so label all products
    regardless of where they were sold, noting that manufacturers could choose to modify
    their production and distribution systems to differentiate between those products bound
    for Vermont and those that were not. The court also rejected a claim that the
    manufacturers could be exposed to multiple, inconsistent labeling requirements imposed
    by other States, noting that a risk of conflicting statutes was insufficient. Rather, there
    had to be an actual conflict, and none was shown. 
    Id. at 112.
    Seizing on this language from Sorrell, the district court held that because no
    other State has enacted a “unique mark” requirement, the ABA could not show that
    Michigan’s statute actually conflicts with requirements imposed by any other State. The
    district court’s reliance on Sorrell is misplaced. Under the circumstances presented here,
    whether or not manufacturers are, in fact, subject to inconsistent labeling requirements,
    the potential for havoc certainly exists. Notably, in Healy v. Beer Institute, 
    491 U.S. 324
    (1989), there was no actual conflict at issue. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court noted that
    it had to consider “what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State adopted
    similar legislation.” 
    Id. at 336
    .
    No. 11-2097           Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, et al.                                     Page 28
    Michigan does not get a “free pass” to enact extraterritorial legislation just
    because it is the first State to do so. The statute at issue controls conduct beyond
    Michigan’s borders by impliedly requiring manufacturers to use a different label
    everywhere else. In contrast to Sorrell, where manufacturers had the option of using the
    State-compliant label nationwide, manufacturers have no such option under Michigan’s
    law.
    I also write separately to clarify that because we have found the statute to be
    extraterritorial, it must be struck down, and that is the end of the inquiry. It appears that
    the parties and the district court all assumed that if the statute were found to be either
    discriminatory or extraterritorial, the next step would be to determine whether it
    nevertheless “advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
    reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives.” Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 
    553 U.S. 328
    , 338 (2008).1 This additional inquiry, however, applies only to statutes that are
    deemed discriminatory. It has no application to a statute that has been deemed
    extraterritorial. To the extent that Part II(B) of the majority opinion implies otherwise,
    in stating that “no other efforts were made by Defendants that could potentially satisfy
    the state’s purported legitimate purpose in a non-extraterritorial fashion,” I believe that
    some clarification is helpful.
    1
    This inquiry is completely separate from the Pike balancing test, which applies only when the
    statute is neither discriminatory nor extraterritorial.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-2097

Citation Numbers: 700 F.3d 796

Filed Date: 11/29/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023

Authorities (39)

national-electrical-manufacturers-association-v-william-h-sorrell , 272 F.3d 104 ( 2001 )

International Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Boggs , 622 F.3d 628 ( 2010 )

Huish Detergents, Inc. v. Warren County, Kentucky Monarch ... , 214 F.3d 707 ( 2000 )

Eastern Kentucky Resources v. The Fiscal Court of Magoffin ... , 127 F.3d 532 ( 1997 )

Clifford Cummings, Jr. v. City of Akron Rodney Sherman and ... , 418 F.3d 676 ( 2005 )

herbert-odle-dba-sports-club-inc-sherill-douglas-jenifer-cosimano-and , 421 F.3d 386 ( 2005 )

United States v. E. C. Knight Co. , 15 S. Ct. 249 ( 1895 )

Healy v. Beer Institute , 109 S. Ct. 2491 ( 1989 )

Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products , 59 S. Ct. 528 ( 1939 )

Duckworth v. Arkansas , 62 S. Ct. 311 ( 1941 )

Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills , 593 F.3d 660 ( 2010 )

Strassheim v. Daily , 31 S. Ct. 558 ( 1911 )

SC Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros. , 58 S. Ct. 510 ( 1938 )

Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis , 128 S. Ct. 1801 ( 2008 )

BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore , 116 S. Ct. 1589 ( 1996 )

Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison , 117 S. Ct. 1590 ( 1997 )

Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. ... , 123 S. Ct. 1855 ( 2003 )

Granholm v. Heald , 125 S. Ct. 1885 ( 2005 )

United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste ... , 127 S. Ct. 1786 ( 2007 )

Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. , 131 S. Ct. 2653 ( 2011 )

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