Michelle Bruce v. Meharry Medical College , 692 F. App'x 275 ( 2017 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 17a0312n.06
Case No. 16-6678
FILED
Jun 07, 2017
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MICHELLE T. BRUCE, M.D., )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE
v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
) COURT FOR THE MIDDLE
MEHARRY MEDICAL COLLEGE, ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
)
) OPINION
BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; GIBBONS and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.
COLE, Chief Judge. Michelle Bruce ended her tenure at Meharry Medical College
(“Meharry”) in 2014. She subsequently sued Meharry for gender discrimination, creating a
hostile work environment, and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment to
Meharry on each claim. We affirm the district court’s judgment because Bruce has failed to
provide evidence to support a prima facie case for any of her claims.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2005, Bruce, who specializes in occupational medicine, began working at Meharry in
the Division of Occupational Medicine within the Department of Family and Community
Medicine. Bruce worked in that department until 2008 during which she had teaching, clinical,
and administrative responsibilities. In 2008 she moved to the Department of Internal Medicine,
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Bruce v. Meharry Medical College
where she remained until her resignation from Meharry in 2014. While in the Department of
Internal Medicine Bruce was responsible for student and employee health services, continued to
have teaching responsibilities, and had additional administrative responsibilities. Those
administrative responsibilities required Bruce to participate in college-wide committees, such as
the safety committee, which included Dr. Bernard Ray, who was in charge of facilities.
Bruce recounts that Ray was dismissive of her views at these meetings. Specifically
Bruce claims that Ray “would make belittling comments after [she] made a statement in a
meeting.” (Deposition of Michelle Bruce, R. 25-1, PageID 132.) He would also make noises of
exasperation when Bruce spoke. At one point, another person at the meeting directed Ray to
refrain from making such comments to Bruce.
Bruce also interacted with Ray after a flood in the building which housed her clinic. She
found the building unsuitable even after removal of the water, because the facility remained wet
and moldy and she felt that the carpet needed to be replaced. Ray coordinated the clean-up,
questioned Bruce’s opinions on the subject, and forced her and her clinic to move back into the
building before she believed it was habitable.
At a benefits fair on August 22, 2013, Ray told Marian Morgan, a nurse practitioner, and
others that he wanted a one-on-one physical examination with Bruce. Morgan felt that the
comment “meant something sexual” and told Bruce about it. (Dep. of Marian Morgan, R. 25-2,
PageID 210.) On August 28, 2013, Bruce sent an email to Meharry’s compliance hotline to
report the comment. She never received a response and did not follow up. Bruce also
specifically testified at her deposition that she did not tell Dr. Duane Smoot, her supervisor,
about Ray’s comments. Smoot confirms that he did not know about Ray’s comment or Bruce’s
complaint to the compliance hotline.
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On November 12, 2013, Smoot asked Bruce to become a primary-care provider at
Antioch, an off-site, primary clinic. She declined but said that on November 18, 2013, Smoot
informed her that the Antioch assignment was mandatory. Bruce declined again and never
reported for work at Antioch. Smoot asked three other physicians to work at Antioch, two male
and one female. Both male physicians also expressed hesitation, but one of them, Dr. Darryl
Jordan, ultimately became the primary-care physician at Antioch. Smoot said the other male
physician preferred not to work Antioch, but Smoot considers him available to work there if
necessary.
Bruce sent a letter of resignation to Smoot on March 3, 2014. Bruce then filed a charge
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and received a right-to-sue
letter. This suit followed. Bruce raised claims for gender discrimination, hostile work
environment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e,
et seq. (“Title VII”).
Meharry moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted on each claim.
II. ANALYSIS
We review a summary judgment determination de novo. Carl v. Muskegon Cty.,
763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). Courts consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and
draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986). “[T]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of plaintiff’s
position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
the plaintiff.” Id. at 252.
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A. Gender Discrimination
Bruce argues that Ray’s disrespectful and dismissive comments during meetings, his
disagreement with her opinion about clean-up after the flood, and Smoot’s ordering her to work
at Antioch establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination. Title VII’s anti-discrimination
provision makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–
2(a)(1). “[D]iscrimination claims under Title VII can be proven by direct or circumstantial
evidence.” Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, 689 F.3d 642, 648–49 (6th Cir. 2012)
(citations omitted). Circumstantial evidence allows the factfinder to draw a reasonable inference
that discrimination occurred. Id. at 649.
We apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis where a plaintiff attempts to
use circumstantial evidence to prove a discrimination claim where, as here, there is no direct
evidence. Id. at 653. To establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must
present evidence that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the job
and satisfactorily performed it; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) others,
similarly situated and outside the protected class, were treated differently. See id.; see also
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Bruce fails to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination because there is no
evidence that she suffered an adverse employment action or that others, outside the protected
class, were treated differently.
Bruce argues that she suffered an adverse employment action when Smoot told her she
had to work at Antioch. An adverse employment action “is an action by the employer that
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constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote,
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits.” Regan v. Faurecia Auto. Seating, Inc., 679 F.3d 475, 481 (6th Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted). Bruce argues that because her work at Antioch would not use her skills as an
occupational medicine specialist and make it impossible for her to complete all of her
administrative work, forcing her to work there constitutes an adverse employment action.
However, Bruce concedes that she never worked at Antioch. And she presented no evidence of
retaliation or any repercussions for refusing to work there. Therefore, she fails McDonnell
Douglas’s third prong because she suffered no adverse employment action.
Bruce also fails to make a prima facie case of gender discrimination because she provided
no evidence that others, outside the protected class, were treated differently. Bruce argues that
Meharry treated male doctors differently by allowing them to decline working at Antioch while
she was forced to work there. However, Bruce never worked at Antioch, while a male doctor,
who had previously expressed hesitation about working at Antioch, performed primary-care
responsibilities there in 2016. In addition, the other male doctor who expressed hesitation at
working at Antioch has not worked at Antioch, but Smoot considers him available to do so. The
evidence simply does not support Bruce’s assertion that male doctors were treated differently.
Accordingly, McDonnell Douglas’s fourth prong is not met.
B. Hostile Work Environment Claim
To establish a prima facie case for a hostile work environment, Bruce must establish that
(1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) “she was subjected to harassment, either through
words or actions, based on sex, (3) the harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with
her work performance and creating an objectively intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
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environment[,] and (4) there exists some basis for liability on the part of the employer.” Grace v.
USCAR, 521 F.3d 655, 678 (6th Cir. 2008).
Bruce fails to establish a prima facie case for a hostile work environment because she
failed to provide sufficient evidence that any alleged harassment directed at her created an
objectively intimidating or hostile work environment. She argues that Ray’s comments and
behavior toward her from 2008 to 2014, along with his allegedly sexually suggestive innuendo
about a physical examination, constitute an objectively intimidating, hostile or offensive work
environment. “The Supreme Court has provided a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider
when deciding whether a hostile work environment exists including: ‘the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance.’” Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)).
Here, the comments and expressions of exasperation occurred largely at committee
meetings. Further, the comments were not physically threatening and there is no evidence that
the comments affected Bruce’s work performance. While offensive in nature, these sporadic
comments are simply not severe or pervasive enough to establish a prima facie case for a hostile
work environment claim. See id. at 679 (holding that referring to a female colleague as “dancing
girl” or “call girl,” ignoring her except to comment on her appearance, and another female
employee’s quitting because of the same person was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case
of hostile work environment because the “offensive utterances, do not rise to the level required
by the Supreme Court’s definition of a hostile work environment”).
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C. Retaliation Claim
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation Bruce must show that (1) “she engaged in a
protected activity under Title VII,” (2) the exercise of protected rights was known by her
employer, (3) the employer took adverse employment action against her, and (4) “there was a
causal connection between the adverse employment action and the protected activity.” Taylor v.
Geithner, 703 F.3d 328, 336 (6th Cir. 2013).
Bruce failed to provide evidence that she met the second prong of a prima facie
retaliation case, because there is no evidence that Smoot knew she had filed a complaint against
Ray. Bruce argues that her email to the compliance hotline constituted protected activity and
that Smoot directed her to work at the clinic in retaliation for that email. Smoot, in his affidavit,
stated that he had no knowledge of Bruce’s email. Bruce acknowledges that she did not tell
Smoot about the incident.
However, Bruce argues that because some employees at Meharry were aware of Ray’s
conduct, Smoot did not need to have actual knowledge to establish the existence of a prima facie
case of retaliation. However, Bruce must show, either through direct or circumstantial evidence
that Smoot, her supervisor, knew of her protected activity. See Mulhall v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d
543, 552–54 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the plaintiff had to provide direct or circumstantial
evidence that the supervisors who took the adverse action against the plaintiff knew about the
protected activity prior to taking that action). Bruce has not produced either direct or
circumstantial evidence of Smoot’s knowledge of Ray’s conduct or the email to the compliance
hotline; therefore she fails to establish a prima facie case of retaliation.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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