Minnie Spangler v. E. Ky. Power Coop ( 2019 )

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 19a0546n.06
No. 19-5034
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
FILED
MINNIE SPANGLER, Oct 28, 2019
) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
EAST KENTUCKY POWER ) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
COOPERATIVE, INC., ) KENTUCKY
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
_________________________________/
Before: GUY, BUSH, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge. Minnie Spangler appeals the dismissal of her claim
that she was discharged in violation of § 510 of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140. Because Spangler
failed to plausibly allege that her employer East Kentucky Power Cooperative (EKPC) terminated
her employment for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of her rights as a beneficiary to
her deceased husband’s benefits, we affirm.
I.
Spangler filed suit in state court, and EKPC removed the action based on Spangler’s
representation that her wrongful discharge claims rested on a violation of § 510 of ERISA. The
First Amended Complaint followed, which reasserted Spangler’s state-law claim of wrongful
discharge (Count 1) and alleged that EKPC’s conduct violated § 510 of ERISA (Count 2). EKPC
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moved to dismiss both counts for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Spangler’s response explained that her employment “was terminated not for
exercising her own right, but for attempting to attain important information regarding [her
deceased husband] Danny’s benefits, which are governed by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act.” The district court granted EKPC’s motion in full, but only the ERISA claim is at
issue on appeal.1
II.
A district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim is reviewed de novo. Jackson v. Ford
Motor Co., 842 F.3d 902, 906 (6th Cir. 2016). In doing so, we take the well-pleaded facts as true
but “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain “enough facts to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556).
In relevant part, § 510 of ERISA makes it unlawful to “discharge, fine, suspend, expel,
discipline or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary . . . for the purpose of interfering with
the attainment of any right to which [she] may become entitled under [an employee benefit] plan.”
29 U.S.C. § 1140. That is, a plaintiff must prove that an adverse action—here the discharge—was
taken “with the specific intent of violating ERISA.” Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 845 (6th
1
Spangler expressly abandoned any challenge to the dismissal of her wrongful discharge claim, which the district
court found was precluded because ERISA provided the public policy underlying the claim and also specified the civil
remedies for such a violation. See Hill v. Ky. Lottery Corp., 327 S.W.3d 412, 420 (Ky. 2010); Harvey v. I.T.W. Inc.,
672 F. Supp. 973, 976 (W.D. Ky. 1987).
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Cir. 1996); see also Crawford v. TRW Auto. U.S. LLC, 560 F.3d 607, 612-13 (6th Cir. 2009). “The
plaintiff is not required to show that the employer’s sole purpose in discharging him was to
interfere with his [ERISA] benefits, but rather that it was a ‘motivating factor’ in the decision.”
Humphreys v. Bellaire Corp., 966 F.2d 1037, 1043 (6th Cir. 1992). That is, at the pleading stage,
Spangler “must allege sufficient ‘factual content’ from which a court, informed by its ‘judicial
experience and common sense,’ could ‘draw the reasonable inference’” that EKPC discharged
Spangler with intent to interfere with the attainment of her rights as a beneficiary to her husband’s
benefits. Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678).2
Because this appeal turns on the sufficiency of the factual allegations in the First Amended
Complaint, we begin there. Spangler alleged that she and her husband were both full-time
employees of EKPC until her husband’s death on October 11, 2014. After a brief period of
bereavement, Spangler returned to work at EKPC. Spangler alleged generally that she sought
information about spousal death benefits and that she was subjected to unspecified verbal
harassment in two meetings, the second of which culminated in her alleged discharge.
Specifically, Spangler alleged:
• “While attempting to navigate EKPC’s complicated spousal death benefit options,
Minnie sought the advice of an EKPC Human Resources employee and EKPC’s
General Counsel (the ‘General Counsel’).”
2
Spangler emphasizes that in the absence of direct evidence, she may prove her claim through circumstantial evidence
using the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas. See Crawford, 560 F.3d at 613-14 (discussing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); Humphreys, 966 F.2d at 1043. Under that burden-shifting
framework, the plaintiff must first make a prima facie showing of “(1) prohibited employer conduct (2) taken for the
purpose of interfering (3) with the attainment of any right to which the employee may become entitled.” Crawford,
560 F.3d at 613 (quoting Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 865 (6th Cir. 1997)). But the prima facie case is an
evidentiary standard—not a pleading standard. Keys, 684 F.3d at 609 (recognizing that Twombly and Iqbal did not
alter the holding in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002)).
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• “[O]n or about December 8, 2014, during a meeting in the General Counsel’s office,
Minnie was verbally assailed, harassed and physically threatened by an EKPC
employee (‘the incident’).”
• “Shortly after the incident, Minnie began to experience severe chest pains and was
later transported to the hospital . . . [and was] advised to take a leave of absence
from EKPC.”
• “Upon her return to EKPC [on or about January 29, 2015], Minnie was unable to
acquire information from EKPC representatives regarding the supplemental death
benefits arising from Danny’s passing, and therefore directly contacted a National
Rural Electric Cooperative Association (‘NRECA’) representative, the
organization responsible for administering EKPC’s employee retirement plans, for
assistance in answering her questions.”
• “On or about May 15, 2015, following her attempted contact with the NRECA
representative, Minnie met with an EKPC Human Resources employee whom was
presumably disturbed by Minnie’s decision to seek guidance directly from NRECA
(the ‘meeting’).”
• “Upon information and belief, during the meeting the EKPC employee verbally
assailed and harassed Minnie and specifically directed her to grab her purse and go
home (the ‘termination’).”
• “Following her termination, Minnie immediately left the EKPC premises and sent
an email to her immediate supervisor advising him she would not return to EKPC.”
Offering no other factual allegations, Spangler asserted that “the conduct of EKPC, set forth above,
violated the express terms of ERISA, specifically, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (commonly referred to as §
510 of ERISA).” In dismissing this claim, the district court found Spangler had failed to plead
facts that plausibly alleged that EKPC engaged in prohibited conduct “with the specific intent to
violate ERISA.”
Reviewing the complaint de novo, the question is whether the facts, if taken as true, permit
an inference that EKPC discharged Spangler for the purpose of interfering with her rights to her
husband’s benefits. See 16630 Southfield Ltd. P’ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 505-
06 (6th Cir. 2013); Bailey v. Enrichment Corp., 530 F. App’x 471, 477-78 (6th Cir. 2013).
Spangler argues on appeal that an inference of improper motivation may be drawn solely based on
“temporal proximity”—namely, that she was discharged (actually or constructively) during a
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meeting about spousal benefits shortly after having contacted the NRECA about those benefits.
Spangler relies heavily on Humphreys and Ameritech, but neither decision supports an inference
in this case.
To be sure, in Ameritech we said that temporal proximity between an employer’s actions
and the date when the employee would have become eligible for benefits can, in some cases,
“support an inference that the adverse actions were taken with the intent of interfering with future
[ERISA] benefits.” Ameritech, 129 F.3d at 865. The proximity in that case was between the
employer’s decisions to retroactively deny the employee six weeks of short-term disability benefits
and then discharge the employee one week before he would have qualified for long-term disability
benefits if he had continued to receive those short-term disability benefits. Id. at 864. Summary
judgment was nonetheless proper because the employee failed to show that he continued to qualify
for short-term disability benefits, which meant that he could not establish that he might have
received long-term disability benefits if he had not been discharged. Id. at 866. In Humphreys,
the employee claimed that he was discharged two months before his pension would have vested at
substantial cost to his employer. 966 F.2d at 1043-44. This court found that “the proximity to
vesting provides at least some inference of intentional, prohibited activity.” Id. at 1044.
There were no facts from which to infer why Spangler was sent home. There was no claim
that her discharge prevented her from receiving spousal death benefits to which she otherwise
would have become entitled. Nor did she allege that her rights to spousal death benefits depended
on her own employment. The allegation that she was discharged during a meeting about her
husband’s benefits shortly after having attempted to contact the NRECA about those benefits does
not give rise to an inference that Spangler’s employment was terminated with the intent to interfere
with her rights as a beneficiary to her deceased husband’s benefits. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
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(“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”). The district court did not err in
dismissing this claim.
AFFIRMED.